The fact that the great Francisco Goya y Lucientes (1746-1828) was the official painter to the court of Carlos III, demonstrates the importance the King attributed to the promotion of both the sciences and the arts in his fight against the oligarchical Spanish Inquisition and the superstitious mental habits of a population oppressed by centuries of Hapsburg rule.

Goya is perhaps best known for his widely reproduced prints, the Disasters of War, which depicted the brutality of the 1808 Napoleonic invasion of Spain, and the Caprichos, which relentlessly lampooned the psychological backwardness of a Spanish population deprived of scientific education by the Aristotelian Society of Jesus (Jesuits), who controlled all education in Spain prior to their expulsion by Carlos in 1767.

Goya was recruited to the battle to free Spain from the grip of feudalism by Gaspar de Jovellanos, who introduced him to the Royal Economic Society, which Jovellanos directed before becoming Carlos’s Justice Minister. Jovellanos, whose portrait Goya painted in 1797-98, eulogized Carlos at his death in 1788 for his leadership in the fight to introduce economic development policies into Spain and its colonies, policies later realized in the U.S.A. as the American System of political economy.

Goya’s portrait ‘Carlos III in Hunting Costume’ uniquely captures the loving spirit of this king, who devoted his efforts to promoting the welfare not only of his own people, but of all human beings, as evidenced by his support of the American Revolution. In Goya’s painting, Carlos is shown without the trappings of royalty, reflecting his favorite saying: ‘First Carlos, then King.’

No progress could have been made in Spain without Carlos having reduced the power of the Inquisition and its Jesuit allies. The Inquisition was ultimately abolished in 1813, only to be reinstated by Fernando VII, and Goya attacked its re-establishment in his ‘Inquisition Scene.’

Our cover painting, ‘The Third of May, 1808, or The Executions of Príncipe Pío Hill’—Goya’s image of the resistance of the Spanish people to the invading army of Napoleon, whom the Synarchists had brought to power to prevent the spread of the American Revolution in Europe—is a republican homage to unarmed courage, martyrdom, and the Sublime.

[See ‘Spain’s Carlos III and the American System’]
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Defeating Synarchism, And the Sublime

In his essay “Of the Sublime,” a translation of which appears in this issue of *Fidelio*, Friedrich Schiller writes: “Great is he who overcomes the fearful. Sublime is he who does not fear it, even when he himself is overcome. . . . One can show oneself to be great in good fortune, sublime only in misfortune.”

On April 20, Mark Sonnenblick, a member of the Schiller Institute and long-time associate of Lyndon and Helga LaRouche, passed away after a year-long, heroic battle for life, following unsuccessful open-heart surgery. Mark, who was fluent in Spanish and Portuguese, had long been active in the work of Schiller Institute in Ibero-America in opposition to the Synarchists Quijanohacks.

We dedicate this issue of *Fidelio* to Mark’s fighting spirit, and to that of two other heroes in the fight against Synarchism, Carlos Cota Meza, of Mexico, who passed away in March 2002, and historian H. Graham Lowry, who passed away last year. All three were persecuted for their principled opposition to the Quijanohacks. All three showed their true mettle as sublime souls, not only in their resistance to political persecution, but also in their refusal to succumb to death even in the face of debilitating disease.

As Lyndon LaRouche demonstrates in his Promethean fight for justice against the renewed Synarchist threat to humanity from the bankers behind Dick Cheney’s Iraq war today, to be a leader in a period of crisis such as ours, requires such a sublime character.

In his essay, “Religion and National Security: The Threat from Terrorist Cults,” LaRouche writes: “The Synarchist threat from the presently continuing Martinist tradition of the French Revolution period’s Mesmer, Cagliostro, Joseph de Maistre, *et al.*, is, once again, a leading issue of the current time. This was, originally, the banker-backed terrorist cult used to direct that great internal, systemic threat of 1789-1815 to France, and to the world of that time. This same banker-cult symbiosis was behind Mussolini’s dictatorship, and behind Adolf Hitler’s role during 1923-45. This was the threat posed by prominent pro-Synarchists inside the British Establishment, who, during the World War II setting of Dunkirk, had attempted to bring Britain and France into that planned alliance with Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and Japan—which would, if achieved, have aimed to destroy the U.S.A. itself by aid of that consort of global naval power. That was the enemy which we joined with Winston Churchill to defeat, in World War II.”

Since the late 1700’s, the aim of Synarchism has been to prevent the spread of the Europe-engendered American Revolution, and ultimately, to destroy the United States through the simultaneous deployment of ostensibly left-wing terrorists (anarchy), such as the Jacobin terrorists of the French Revolution, and right-wing fascists, beginning with the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, for the purpose of imposing fascist order (Synarchy).

As LaRouche has emphasized, ever since the consolidation of the British Empire by the British East India Company at the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, the United States and its Leibnizian American System of political economy have been the primary pole of opposition to that Empire. All of world history since then, to the present day, has ultimately been a war between the British Empire and the American System.

In this issue of *Fidelio*, we present the extraordinary history of Spain’s King Carlos III, whose 1759-1788 reign was a reflection of the same Leibnizian influences which gave birth to the United States. Contrary to the Synarchists, who hate Carlos’s memory almost as much as they hate the U.S.A., the true cultural matrix which defines the positive identity of the nations of Ibero-America is not “*Hispanidad*” — a Synarchist concoction based upon an anti-Semitic, ultramontane, feudalist version of Catholicism best expressed by the Spanish Inquisition—but rather, the pro-American, Leibnizian policies of Carlos III and his advisers.
While he was King of Naples in 1739, the young Carlos III prevented the establishment of the Inquisition and invited the Jews, who had been expelled from Naples in 1540 by the Hapsburg Charles V, to return. As King of Spain beginning 1759, Carlos banished the Grand Inquisitor from Madrid, and later, in 1767, expelled the Inquisition-allied Jesuit Order from Spain and all its possessions. It is not surprising that the head of the National Synarchist Union in Mexico in the late 1930’s, Salvador Abascal, lamented that Carlos III’s expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, marked “the true origin of the Mexican Revolution, which is not more than a branch and a byproduct of the global revolution,” in reference to the impact of the American Revolution of 1776-1783.

Again reflecting the same influence of Leibniz that brought about the American Revolution, Carlos III implemented far-reaching economic and educational reforms which anticipated those later implemented under Alexander Hamilton in the United States. Moreover, Spain under Carlos joined France in recognizing the independence of the North American colonies. Even before the Declaration of Independence was published, Spain secretly aided the Americans, including by supplying the materiel which helped make the key American victory at Saratoga possible; later, after declaring war on Britain, Spain won significant military victories along the Mississippi and in Florida, as had been proposed by Benjamin Franklin.

Thus, the United States is indebted to Spain and Spanish America, including Mexico, for its very existence, just as the nations of Ibero-America are similarly indebted to us. Contrary to the argument of today’s Samuel Huntington and his Synarchist allies, there is no inherent “Clash of Civilizations” between predominantly Catholic Ibero-America and the predominantly Protestant United States. Instead, as U.S. President James Monroe and his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams argued, there is a “community of principle” among all sovereign nation-states, and especially among those in the Western Hemisphere, based upon the Leibnizian principle of the General Welfare. This is the principle which motivated Carlos III, the principle expressed in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution.

Today, the battle against Synarchism is primarily a battle against the attempted takeover of the U.S. government itself by the Synarchist bankers who began to make their move with the death of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Our issue’s remaining feature, on Classical drama and playwright Clifford Odets’ 1947 *The Big Knife*, traces the current neo-conservative policies of the Dick Cheney-controlled Bush Administration, to the elevation of Harry S Truman to the Presidency in 1945.

We stand today at a turning point. If we fail to follow Lyndon LaRouche’s leadership in defeating Synarchism and finally ending the post-1763 reign of the British Empire, then the outcome will be as tragic for us, as it was for Odets’ Charlie Castle or Schiller’s Don Carlos. There is no real alternative but to end the British Empire once and for all, by defeating its Synarchist apparatus. And the name of that alternative is Lyndon LaRouche.
The Synarchist threat from the presently continuing Martinist tradition of the French Revolution period’s Mesmer, Cagliostro, Joseph de Maistre, et al., is, once again, a leading issue of the current time. This was, originally, the banker-backed terrorist cult used to direct that great internal, systemic threat of 1789-1815 to France, and to the world of that time. This same banker-cult symbiosis was behind Mussolini’s dictatorship, behind Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, and behind Adolf Hitler’s role during 1923-45. This was the threat posed by prominent pro-Synarchists inside the British Establishment, who, during the World War II setting of Dunkirk, had attempted to bring Britain and France into that planned alliance with Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and Japan—which would, if achieved, have aimed to destroy the U.S.A. itself by aid of that consort of global naval power.
During the 1511-1648 interval, religious warfare in Europe had been orchestrated by the Venetian faction of opponents of that Italy-centered European Renaissance which brought forth the modern nation-state republic. This Venetian faction was represented then chiefly by the Habsburg dynasty of Vienna and Spain. Since the rise of the Anglo-Dutch and French “Enlightenment” of the Eighteenth century, the detonator of deadly internal threats to the security of European civilization has often been the provocative roles assigned to relatively small religious cults, such as millenarian, freemasonic, or other nominally Christian or Jewish denominations. These latter, dangerous sects have often included elements of the sexual freakishness which were typical of the quasi-Judeo-Christian varieties of their Manichean, Cathar, and Grail predecessors.

Since the Paris events of July 14, 1789, orchestrated by British agents Philippe Egalité and Jacques Necker, and until today, the greatest overt internal threat to the continued existence of modern European civilization, has

This Presidential policy study on the subject of “Synarchism as a terrorist cult” was issued by the LaRouche in 2004 campaign committee.
come from the recurring public eruptions of a hybrid, quasi-Phrygian-Dionysian freemasonic religious association, known as the Martinists, which originally emerged during the closing decades of the Eighteenth century. These Martinists have operated together with the network of family merchant-banks, which used them as instruments of political power. Britain’s Lord Shelburne, then the leading political representative of Barings Bank, was a key figure behind the unleashing of the Terror of 1789-1794, for example. This is the inner aspect of that recurring threat to civilization known to history books and newspaper headlines by such names as Jacobinism, Bonapartism, Synarchy, and as the fascist regimes which proliferated in post-Versailles Europe of the 1920’s through 1945. The extreme right-wing Synarchist networks left over from the fascist regimes of the pre-1945 period, figured in crucial roles in the European terrorist wave of the 1970’s, and are still active in Europe and the Americas today.

Although the terrorism motivated by today’s Synarchists is presently the leading subversive form of security threat to U.S. interests, I am, so far, virtually the only candidate for the 2004 Presidential nomination who has exhibited both the will and knowledge to address the explicitly religious character of this specific quality of present threat in a systematic way. There are admittedly potential political risks, from the deadly Synarchist cabals, for any leading candidate who points to these facts. Fear of those personal, as well as political risks, would tend to frighten most candidates away from bringing up this political threat from weird religious circles such as those of Texas’ Tom DeLay or typical Eighteenth-century-style Martinist ideologue Newt Gingrich; but, under present conditions, anyone who lacks the courage to do that, would not be competent to become the next U.S. President.

The Synarchist threat from the presently continuing Martinist tradition of the French Revolution period’s Mesmer, Cagliostro, Joseph de Maistre, et al., is, once again, a leading issue of the current time. This was, originally, the banker-backed terrorist cult used to direct that great internal, systemic threat of 1789-1815 to France, and to the world of that time. This same banker-cult symbiosis was behind Mussolini’s dictatorship, behind Francisco Franco’s dictatorship, and behind Adolf Hitler’s role during 1923-45. This was the threat posed by prominent pro-Synarchists inside the British Establishment, who, during the World War II setting of Dunkirk, had attempted to bring Britain and France into that planned alliance with Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, and Japan—which would, if achieved, have aimed to destroy the U.S.A. itself by aid of that consort of global naval power. That was the enemy which we joined with Winston Churchill to defeat, in World War II.

The continuation of that Synarchist effort from during the World War II period, is not only the continuing connection behind the fascist insurgencies of 1921-45, but is that thieving, international financier syndicate behind today’s role of Vice President Cheney and his Enron, Halliburton, and similar accomplices, which orchestrated the Enron-led swindle of California. That is the syndicate which has pushed the freak-show candidacy of an “Elmer Gantry”-like confidence man, the United States’ imported Austrian Arnold Schwarzenegger, as a proposed head of state.

Since long before the Eighteenth-century threat from the Martinist cult, the most notable forms of earlier intellectual combat against the influence of similar pro-terrorist cults, had come from theologians such as Philo (Judaeus) of Alexandria, Augustine, Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa, Cardinal Mazarin’s role in the crafting of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, and Moses Mendelssohn. Like Cusa and Moses Mendelssohn, the best insight into this problem’s continuing role within modern European civilization, has been expressed by certain devoutly religious figures who have argued, like Pope John Paul II today, for an ecumenical peace of religions; as opposed to those forces, such as today’s Synarchists, which are seeking to return to a medieval, ultramontane syncretism which had been derived, typically, from such ugly precedents as the Roman pantheon and Olympus cult.

However, after taking the importance of the theologians into account, the most efficient form of weapon of defense of the institution of the modern nation-state from corruption by such terrorist cults as the modern Martinists, has been that mode of separation of church from state which was instituted within the context of the U.S. Federal Constitution. At an appropriate point of this report, I shall show why that is the case.

The Martinists were always a religious form of conspiracy, which, like their one-time champion, the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, were determined to destroy actual Christianity, but were also determined in their efforts to take top-down control over the Catholic and other churches, from outside and from within. Their intent was, and is, to impose their rule, and their creepy religion, upon the churches and others, to create a pantheonic, ultramontane, imperial form of religious authority above the nation-state. This intent, to become the emergent pagan religion conquering, subverting, and superseding all other religions, is key to the mystical religious trappings of the Martinists and their present Synarchist successors.

At this point, some readers will ask: “What has this to
do with catching the individual terrorists who are out to hurt the U.S.A, right now?” The reader has yet to understand what terrorism is, how it works, and how to prevent, or at least control an actively ongoing terrorist operation.

Take the case of the kidnapping-assassination of Italy’s former Christian Democratic Prime Minister Aldo Moro. The known personal threat to Moro was delivered, according to an eyewitness report, by Henry A. Kissinger; that, during a Washington, D.C. meeting. The terrorist capability used for that murder included elements of the fascist circles which the Anglo-American powers had inserted, surreptitiously, into the Gladio organization established among, otherwise, Christian-Democratic, Socialist, and Communist veterans of the war-time resistance to Mussolini’s regime. This “right-wing” network with which the Italian fascist component of the 1970’s international “left-wing” terrorist operations was associated, still exists, as part of the Synarchist network which includes Italian, French, and Spanish fascist branches with connections to a Synarchist network presently operating in a more-or-less coordinated way in Central and South America.

Generally, what are meaningfully classed as “terrorist” operations, are usually conducted in the putative interests of governments, or groups of governments. They are customarily used as elements of what is known as “irregular warfare,” as this was defined in discussions in which I participated with military specialist Professor Friedrich A. von der Heydte, during the 1980’s. The killing of Moro was a political assassination by, and under control of a secret governmental capability within NATO, and motivated by Moro’s association with an openly debated policy, a policy which certain factions within NATO were determined to crush out of existence. The U.S. authority associated with the relevant fascist group in Italy, was not the U.S. CIA, but a different entity, which considered itself free to defy what should have been, under U.S. law, the higher authority of the Director of Intelligence of the CIA.

The usual cause for failure of anti-terrorist efforts, is that the fact of the true, higher-ranking political authorship of the decision to arrange the attacks is suppressed, at a high level, leaving law-enforcement agencies to chase the blend of false back-trails and expendable human tools used for the events. This is also complicated by the widespread use of police-agent-controlled, ostensibly deniable varieties of smelly right-left-wing groups and grouplets, smelly things regarded by the relative government agents as part of the “necessary assets” used for covert orchestration of the society’s political and related security affairs.

Terrorist action is usually either a deployment contro-
Therefore, the most efficient way to bring today’s citizen to the point of understanding the specific types of terrorist, fascist, and related threats, chiefly threatening Europe and the Americas today, is by exposing the fraudulent character of certain exemplary, paradigmatic types of pseudo-Christian teaching and practice. There must be deeper understanding of why the separation of church from state, and the present establishment of a global community of principle among perfectly sovereign nation-states, is a necessary strategic, as much as moral defense against the kind of menace which Martinism and its Synarchist expressions represent, still today. We must not let the state become the tool of a religious body, nor a religious body the tool, or victim of the state.

Presently, for example, there are two exemplary such right-wing cults of Synarchist pedigree prominently placed under my counterintelligence sights. The first is a fascist Israeli ring, a mixture of pro-Nazi pedigrees, from France, Italy, and Spain, but who, as under Hitler’s Nazi Party then, are deployed throughout the Americas, chiefly under the cover of the fascist doctrine of Hispanidad, and presently associated with the cover provided by keystone Spanish fascist Blas Piñar. The first, that fascist Israeli ring, is a mixture of quasi-religious and other professed Zionists. The second, is composed, partially, of typically Synarchist, extreme right-wing, often frankly gnostic Catholics (“integrists”).

Inside today’s U.S.A., for example, during recent decades, nominally Catholic associates of the cult are often co-deployed with Protestants cast in the mold of the wild-eyed tradition of Jonathan Edwards and our stereotypical “Elmer Gantry.” For the purpose of this report, keep those two types in view, but only as actual cases used here as models of classroom reference. Both of these types of gnostics, and also in their left-wing costuming, differ only in degree, as different brand-label packagings by their common mother, the Synarchist cult.

To simplify the initial phase of the presentation, focus upon the common features of the systemic opposition of these types of pro-terrorist cults to Christianity as such.

1. What Is Christianity?

Jesus Christ was born during the reign of the Roman Emperor Augustus, and was judicially murdered, on the order of Pontius Pilate, the son-in-law of that Emperor Tiberius who was then based on the Isle of Capri sacred to the pagan cult of Mithra. Despite the imperial reign of the Latin Caesars of that time, the prevalent culture of the eastern Mediterranean’s region was still the legacy of the Classical Greek language and tradition, as the Gospel of the Apostle John and the Epistles of the Apostle Paul reflect this choice of culture for their presentation of what the poet Shelley would term “profound and impassioned conceptions respecting man and nature.” Hebrew did not exist as a spoken language; in addition to civilized Greek, Aramaic or a vulgar, slum quality of Greek were relatively commonplace in Palestine of that time. At that time, the view of the Roman Empire was that it was, as the Apostle John reported his dream, the hateful “Whore of Babylon,” an echo of all that had been hated by Jews and Christians alike, as evil persecution incarnate, from among the imperial political-social systems of earlier Mesopotamia.

The culture through which Christianity spread from the Middle East was, principally, the medium of Greek culture, as that culture’s impact was also radiated, through slaves and other ways, within the reaches of the Roman Empire. The model expression of this Christian missionary’s work, is found in the Gospel of John and Epistles of Paul, in which the heritage of Plato serves as the cultural vehicle employed for the transmission of specifically Christian conceptions. The case of Philo of Alexandria’s argument against the theological implications of Aristotle, is a comparable reflection of the use of that existing language-culture; the heritage of Thales, Pythagoras, Solon, Plato, and the pre-Euclidean constructive geometry which they employed, was the medium best suited to transmission of conceptions of universal physical and related principle. It is by reading the writings of John and Paul, most notably, against the backdrop of the dialogues of Plato, that the intent of Christ’s and the Apostles’ communication, as to matters of principle, must be adduced. That is to say, by Socratic modes of cognitive replication of the clear intent behind the written Greek text. No symbolic sophistries, syncretic or otherwise, are permitted as so-called “explanations” or “interpretations.”

This Platonic view of what has come to be described as “the New Testament,” if replicated in the cognitive processes of the reader—rather than as a chimpanzee might be conditioned to respond obediently to mere text—affords the thinker, even a “doubting Thomas,” a living sense of the immediate, immortal presence of Christ and His Apostles, even across the distance of more than 2,000 years, a sense of a reality which no bare literal text could convey. The sense of such presence is experienced, as brought to life among those assembled for a participation in J.S. Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, or Wolfgang Mozart’s Ave Verum Corpus. It is through the methods of Classical irony, as typified by the best of all forms
The culture through which Christianity spread from the Middle East was, principally, the medium of Greek culture, as that culture’s impact was radiated within the reaches of the Roman Empire. The model expression of this Christian missionary’s work, is found in the Gospel of John and Epistles of Paul, in which the heritage of Plato serves as the cultural vehicle employed for the transmission of specifically Christian conceptions.

Raphael Sanzio, “The School of Athens” (detail), 1509.

of Classical artistic composition, that the human mind rises above the relative cognitive sterility of mere text, to insight into the efficient presence of meanings which lie beyond the bounds of the bestiality of bare sense-perception.

Contrary to the bestial doctrine, of text—that of U.S. Associate Justice Antonin Scalia—the New Testament, and the U.S. Federal Constitution after it, were composed for men and women, not for the literal edification of MIT Professor Noam Chomsky’s trained chimpanzee.

From those standpoints of reference, the sheer evil of what has become known as Synarchy, can be felt and smelled as it were the presence of something Satanically evil in the atmosphere. That these are the enemies of Jesus Christ, can be sensed by the witting as a presence in the room. The Jacobin Terror, Napoleon Bonaparte, G.W.F. Hegel, the terrorist bomber Richard Wagner, and the avowedly Satanic Friedrich Nietzsche or the Nazi Martin Heidegger, evoke such a sense of a hovering evil more disgusting than Judas, the prescience of something kindred to the unremorsefully Satanic degenerates Nietzsche and Adolf Hitler.

The point of recognizing that comparison, is not as if to prepare a legal case for a mortal court. The point is to adduce, to define more clearly for oneself, the location and nature of the passion which prompts the contemporary Synarchist, from inside himself, to create the kind of evil typified by the professedly Satanic Nietzsche, by his follower Martin Heidegger, by Mussolini, as by Hitler, the pro-Satanic Theodor Adorno, General Franco, Laval, and so on. The practical point is to understand why, how, and when this depraved association is likely to strike, how it spreads its influence, and sometimes turns your once-dear-and-trusted friends, or even professed Christian priests, into a semblance of panicked Gadarene swine, or the like.

The sum-total of such considerations can be pointed out by reference to a single principle; but the hearer’s comprehension is not so easily secured. The principle, expressed in the form of a corresponding question, is: What is the difference between man and beast? It is the principled question I have presented, as a centerpiece of higher education, to my international youth movement, a question I have situated in a study of Carl Gauss’s attack on the fraud by Euler and Lagrange, in Gauss’s 1799, original published report of the discovery of The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra. That same proof, expressed as a spiritual exercise, is the key to understanding the source of the evil which all Synarchy, of either left or right varieties, expresses.
The implications of that 1799 publication—as I have based an international youth movement’s higher educational program on a study of that work and its deeper implications—serves us again here and now, to point to the principles which must be known if the function of cults such as the Synarchism of today’s avowed U.S. neo-conservatives (the “Chicken-hawks”) is to be adequately understood. I refer to my recent publication, “Visualizing the Complex Domain”* for its treatment of the role of Gauss’s 1799 paper, and the continuation of that as later work of Bernhard Riemann, in defining the distinction of man from beast, that as from the standpoint of mathematical physics. The relevance of the Classical Greek to the work of the Apostles John and Paul is efficiently clarified for the modern thinker in that way.

Science and Religion

Speaking formally, modern science, like the modern nation-state, is a qualitative change in the human condition, the product of a giant leap upward in European culture, which was born in the Fifteenth-century Renaissance tradition of Brunelleschi, Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Johannes Kepler, and Gottfried Leibniz. This revolution in science and social practice, has some traceable deep roots in known features of ancient astronomical calendars and related matters of transoceanic navigation. Ancient Vedic calendars are an example of this, as are the implications of the adducible design of Egypt’s Great Pyramids. However, the internal history of science in the modern sense of that term, is traced from roots in Classical Greek culture’s acknowledged debt, principally to Egypt, from the time of Thales and Pythagoras. Here lies the unique historical significance of Gauss’s 1799 paper: not only in denouncing the willful hoaxes of the reductionists Euler and Lagrange, and, implicitly, also Immanuel Kant; but in exposing the systemic continuity expressed by Gauss’s examining, there, the connection of the modern comprehensive mathematical physics of Kepler and Leibniz, to the pre-Euclidean Greek, astronomy-oriented, constructive geometry of Pythagoras and Plato.

The crucial distinction of the successive expressions of the specific method common to both ancient and modern science, is that this is the only method by which the absolute distinction of man from beast can be strictly defined as a matter of experimentally proven universal physical principle.

The practical political significance of that proof, is not that it proves a particular choice of religious faith; but, that it informs the modern republic of the long-ranging physical-economic importance of certain ecumenical types of moral principles which have an authority of scientific certainty comparable to that of the universal principles of physical science. Such are the three principles of natural law (sovereignty, general welfare, and posterity) set forth in the Preamble of the U.S. Federal Constitution. The neglect of those principles will lead toward self-inflicted, punishing, systemic effects for a modern nation.

So, the U.S.A. was nearly destroyed by the self-affliction of tolerating a practice of slavery directly contrary to the principles of the Preamble and 1776 Declaration of Independence. The U.S.A., in particular, is suffering now from the consequences of especially those actions of the post-1963 period to date, such as radical “deregulation,” which were contrary, in effect, to precisely those scientifically grounded, Constitutional principles of natural law. In a similar way, the method associated with this proof enables us to forecast, with scientific precision, as I have done over recent decades, the awful calamities which will fall upon any society which submits to the pro-Satanic whims of cults such as the Synarchists and the networks of family merchant-banks behind them.

To understand the mind of the Synarchist (and his banker), we must recognize the root of the pathology in the way an inherently bestial, empiricist mind, such as that of Bernard Mandeville, the Physiocrats, and Adam Smith—each and all forerunners of the Synarchist cult—set out to construct what in fact the synthetic pagan religion, such as Smith’s pro-paganist, explicitly irrational, religious worship of “The Invisible Hand.” Smith had presented that same hedonistic image earlier, as the hedonistic principle of purely bestial irrationalism, copied from Mandeville’s notorious, explicitly pro-Satanic, 1714 The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vices, Public Benefits, as outlined by Smith in his 1759 The Theory of the Moral Sentiments. That fiction which they concocted, is appropriate only for the instruction and adoration of the credulous masses of a population which is being reduced to the status of either hunted, or herded (and also culled) human cattle.

The characteristic belief of the empiricist, such as Locke, Mandeville, Smith, or terrorist coordinator Bentham, is that which he adapts from the Sophism of ancient Greece: the doctrinal assumption that man is “a featherless biped,” a beast who knows nothing but that which either his senses, his purely bestial “instincts,” or a priest of the tradition of Delphi Apollo tells him. Pause here for a moment, to get the relevant image of the practice of that Apollo cult, and its continuing influence with-

* Executive Intelligence Review, July 11, 2003 (Vol. 31, No. 27).
in popular European culture down to the present day. According to the account generally purveyed among relevant agencies in Greece, the following portrait is supplied.

Look there! This is the site of the ancient Delphi cult of the Earth-mother goddess, Gaea, and her serpent-like consort, Python. In pops the Oriental rowdy, Apollo! In true macho style, Apollo, apparently sensing in Python a male rival for control of the neighborhood, chops the poor serpent into pieces, but, later, woos Gaea, pleading for her forgiveness.

The bi-polar Apollo tenderly lays the pieces of Python into a grave, building a temple around that grave-site.

Thereafter, a priestess who bears the title of Pythia, performs the following ritual. For a suitable payment, Pythia seats herself before the grave-site of Python, beside an urn containing balls. Depending whether the payment is small, or large, she answers each request for a prophecy, either by plucking a ball from the urn, or, for a higher price, delivering a piece of ambiguous virtual gibberish, like a fragment from a typical campaign speech by Arnie Schwarzenegger.

At this point, the confused supplicant looks to the row of seats directly across the grave-site, where the priests of Apollo, such as the famous Plutarch in his time, are seated, waiting. For a price, an explanation of the impenetrable mystery is delivered to the ears of the credulous. If the supplicant is both credulous and influential, the history of Greece and other places is shaped, in significant degree, by the credulity of that supplicant's faith in the story told by the Delphic fortune-teller.

Such is the Delphic method, the method of sophistry. Such is the religious belief of the empiricist or his dupe today. Such is the basis for the relative successes of the Martinist cult and of the bankers who deploy it for purposes of managing those herds of stock-market dupes and other human cattle which they cull, from time to time. It is, as Gauss’s 1799 paper proves, the Delphic method of Euler and Lagrange, as also of the Immanuel Kant who did so much to turn so many Germans, and others, into existentialist and other varieties of cullable cattle.

The essential distinction of man from both beasts and empiricists such as Euler, is precisely what is at issue in Gauss’s attacks on the Delphic hoaxes against science by two pagan religious fanatics of the cult of empiricism, Euler and Lagrange.

I explain the point about science.

The ancient Greek, pre-Euclidean notion of the physical universe was attributed, not to a Euclidean scheme for interpreting experience, but to what was known as “spherics.” “Spherics” was a synonym for astronomy, or, what were better described as astrophysics. The Pythagoreans, and their followers such as Plato, looked to the heavens for evidence of what might be called “the universe.” There, in that view, they sought out what might be regarded as universal physical principles, as Johannes Kepler did much later.

The typical form for universal motion was sought out, as if observable motion along the internal surface of a sphere of a great diameter; as if motion were typified by the transitions of the night-time sky and apparent motion of the Sun and Moon. The sphere, and the curvatures which might be derived from it as presumably elementary, were the starting-point for the effort to discover the lawful composition of that universe which generated the shadows of our sense-perception of observable astrophysical processes, and, from that point of reference, other observed processes as well.

In this way, a number of studies, based on the notion of a purely constructive geometry of primarily spherical action, showed us anomalies, cases in which observable recurring motion was not uniform in terms of the presumed Aristotelean clock-work of a spherical surface. Such an anomalous case is typified in the history of science by Kepler’s discovery of a principle of universal gravitation. Such anomalies told us that what our senses present to us, are not the realities of our universe, but, like gravitation, were the shadows which the real universe casts upon our organs of sense.

An experimental demonstration, based upon Florentine methods of bel canto training of the singing voice, enables us to prove that what is described as Pythagoras’ definition of the musical comma, is not a calculation derivable within a Euclidean manifold, but is an apparent anomaly generated by some efficient physical principle, acting from behind the shadows of sense-perception.

The cases of the doubling of the line, square, and cube, treated in Gauss’s 1799 paper, also expose the falseness inhering in a Euclidean or related form of geometry premised upon a priori definitions. The case of the construction of the Platonic solids, goes toward the heart of the issues posed by the methods of pre-Euclidean, constructive geometry employed by the Pythagoreans and Plato.

Against such background of the work of the Pythagoreans and kindred predecessors, Plato’s Socratic dialogues present a general solution for those and analogous paradoxes of naive faith in sense-certainty. The famous allegory of the Cave, from Plato’s The Republic, typifies this. Our sense-organs are part of our biological organization. What they present to us is not an image of the world outside us, but, rather, the effect of that outside world’s actions upon our sense-organs. As the point is
typified in Plato's *Timaeus* dialogue, and other locations, it is the anomalies associated with the spherical principle of a pre-Euclidean form of astronomy, which point out the existence of physically efficient, universal principles, existing beyond the reach of direct comprehension by our senses. These anomalies enable us to define what is acting upon the sensed image of the universe, to change that universe in ways not consistent with sphericity.

So, the culture of Classical Greece knew such forms of proof that the visible universe is controlled by principles which are not, of themselves, known to sense-perception, but are powers, according to Plato's scientifically precise meaning of that term, which control those recurring kinds of anomalous effects which sense-perception presents. In cases in which this knowledge of unseen principles enables mankind to increase our power in and over the universe to practical effect, we know that it is through the willful employment of such discovered, experimentally validated principles, principles from beyond sense-perception, that mankind is enabled to increase our species' control over the universe as perceived. As Plato emphasizes, this was already known in his ancient times. That already suffices to define the difference between man and beast. The emergence of modern European civilization carried the implications of that to a qualitatively higher level.

In the referenced 1799 paper, Gauss compares such ancient achievements, in defining universal physical principles, with the results of the progress in the revolutionary development of modern comprehensive mathematical physics, since Brunelleschi, Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Johannes Kepler, and Leibniz. On this basis, Gauss exposes the fraud of, most notably, Euler and Lagrange; and, implicitly, empiricist and positivist followers of Lagrange in the style of Laplace and Cauchy.

It should be noted here, that Gauss showed, in subsequent locations, beginning his famous *Disquisitiones Arithmeticae*, that the arithmetic associated with modern mathematical physics was underlain by the same deep principles of constructive geometry expressed by the pre-Euclidean discoveries of Archytas, Plato, *et al.* Gauss's defining the complex domain, and the work of his students Dirichlet and Riemann after him, have brought forth the deeper implications of the notion of a higher geometry which makes comprehensible the experimentally provable nature of the functional relationship between the visible and the higher, invisible reaches of the complex domain.

As simply and briefly as possible, what Gauss addressed, was the following.

Cardan's posing the problem of cubic algebraic roots, had led the empiricist ideologues Euler and Lagrange to concede the merely formal existence of certain algebraic magnitudes which they misnamed "imaginary numbers." As Gauss showed, then, and more amply latter, the inclusion of these numbers as expressions of functions of the complex domain, opened up mathematical physics to be able to deal, at once, with the relations among perceived and actual physical causes.

For political reasons created, successively, by Napoleon Bonaparte's tyranny in Europe, and the related conditions continued under the terms of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, Gauss was fearful of continuing to report his related original discoveries in (not non-Euclidean, but) anti-Euclidean geometry. It was only decades later, that Gauss made public reference to such youthful discoveries he had made while a student of Kästner and Zimmerman; it was only when modern science looked back at Gauss's work as a whole from the vantage-point of the work of Dirichlet, Riemann, and Wilhelm Weber's experimental proof of Ampère's principle of electrodynamics, that the full physical significance of Gauss's unpublished manuscripts from the 1790's could begin to be adequately understood.

Man's ability to reach, through powers unique to the human mind, beyond the range of sense-perception, to discover, and to master processes lying only in the real physical universe beyond reach of an animal's senses, is the first step toward actual knowledge of that realm we know by such terms as metaphysical, or spiritual. By knowledge, I mean something which must be discovered in the same sense any universal physical principle is not merely discovered to exist, but a discovery mastered in application to a changed, improved body of human practice. It can not be discovered by animal-like instinct, nor learned as a rule supplied by an established authority. It must be experienced, by each individual, as the mind's generation of an hypothesis which conquers a real paradox, an hypothesis proven by those appropriate forms of experimental methods which European civilization has derived from a pre-Euclidean tradition of constructive geometry.

I shall return to this matter at several, relevant points in the continued unfolding of my exposition.

**Man and His Nature**

To understand any aspect of modern European civilization and its religion today, we must take into account the profound change in the human condition which was wrought, in succession, by the Fifteenth-century Renaissance and such crucial sequels as the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the American Revolution. It was the combined hatred against all three of those successive, crucial
historical developments, which motivated the Martinists and every expression of their form of evil since the closing decades of the Eighteenth century.

First, prior to Europe's Fifteenth century, the standard condition of humanity, as far back, and as widely as we presently know, was the brutish reign of a relatively small oligarchy and its retinues, over a mass of humanity degraded to the status or either hunted or herded human cattle. Christianity represented, implicitly, a fundamental improvement in the human condition generally, by introducing the notion of a practice premised in principle on the universality of humanity. However, the existence of governing political institutions consistent with that Christian notion waited until that Italy-centered Renaissance which brought forth the first two modern nation-states, Louis XI's France and Henry VII's England.

Even then, the victory has never been completed, to the present day. The history of the struggle, since the Renaissance, to achieve that victory, is the source of needed insights into the challenges which must be met, and the pitfalls to be avoided, if progress toward that goal could be managed.

The feudal system, under the ruling partnership between Venice's rentier-oligarchical form of imperial maritime power and the Norman chivalry, had brought itself to a state of relative, systemic collapse through that Fourteenth-century “New Dark Age” brought on by the impact of Venetian usury upon Europe under the rule of a Venetian-Norman tyranny. In the gradual emergence of a ruined Europe from this terrible holocaust, the great ecumenical Council of Florence emerged as the pivotal place of reference for an already ongoing, pro-Platonic, Greek-language eruption which became a great Renaissance which brought forth the first two modern nation-states, Louis XI's France and Henry VII's England.

With this revolution came the birth of modern science, as the impetus for this was expressed by Brunelleschi, and, most emphatically the initiative of Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa's De Docta Ignorantia; and by such Cusa followers as Leonardo da Vinci, the great, direct forerunners of the founding of a comprehensive form of mathematical physics by Johannes Kepler.

The combination of steps toward the conception of government's responsibility for the promotion of the general welfare of living and posterity, was the belated triumph of the great work of Dante Alighieri. This Renaissance brought to an end, at least implicitly, acceptance of a continuation of the arrangements under which a few ruling strata in society were able to subject the remainder of humanity to that relative status of hunted or herded human cattle of virtually fixed technology of practice, which the evil Code of Diocletian had prescribed.

For the leaders of that Renaissance, it was no longer allowable, that the promotion of the wealth and pleasure of the few, should proceed at the expense of the many. Caring for peasants as if they were useful cattle to be owned and maintained, as serfs are, or peons on a latifundist's estate, was not consistent with the notion of the general welfare of human beings whose characteristic quality is the requirement of development.

The revolt in France led and inspired by the sublime Jeanne d'Arc, challenged, and led to the overthrow of the Normans' ultramontane tyranny, bringing forth France as a true nation-state under that master of the principles of strategic defense, King Louis XI. That sacrifice by the sublime Jeanne inspired the Councils of the Catholic Church, fed the process of the Renaissance, and contributed to bringing about the restoration of a shattered Papacy. The birth of England, in Henry VII's defeat of the Norman tyranny represented by Richard III, was the fruit of the preceding work of Jeanne d'Arc, the Councils, and the reign of France's Louis XI.

Under the new conception of the state introduced by the influence of that Renaissance, the government was accountable for improving the general welfare of both the living, and also, more emphatically, posterity. This was a responsibility to the whole of the population and its land-area; in other words, this accountability of the state for the whole population, required the notion of economies self-governed by universal physical principles working to universal physical effect.

So, Nicolaus of Cusa's De Docta Ignorantia, defining the mission of modern physical-experimental science, complemented his definition of a community of sovereign states, in his earlier Concordantia Catholica. What Dante Alighieri had proposed, as in his revival of the Italian language and his De Monarchia, were realized, in principle, by Cusa's typically leading part in the Fifteenth-century Renaissance. Such was the birth of the modern nation-state as the alternative to the relatively bestializing, ultramontane trappings of feudalism, the medieval system of Venice and its Norman partners most emphatically. Under this new conception of government, the concern of society became the discovery and use of those principles of scientific practice by means of which the universal requirements of entire societies might be efficiently addressed. This gave birth to a new conception of physical science, to the universal mathematical physics whose actual founding was accomplished by the witting successor of Cusa and Leonardo, Johannes Kepler. This was a new conception of man's universal relationship to nature, a new conception of science.
Man’s ability to reach, through powers unique to the human mind, beyond the range of sense-perception, to discover, and to master processes lying only in the real physical universe beyond reach of an animal’s senses, is the first step toward actual knowledge of that realm we know by such terms as metaphysical, or spiritual.

This revolution, which erupted in that Renaissance and its aftermath, forced intensive debates in both law and physical science, respecting the nature of the human individual. Who could be lawfully reduced to the sub-human social status of slavery, the status of virtual cattle? Who could be reduced to a status but a little higher than a slave, a Mexico peon, for example?

The Sixteenth-century, Iberian trade in captured persons from sub-Sahara Africa, first by Portugal and then Spain, led the way; the Anglo-Dutch liberals followed, but later dumped the trade, as unpleasant and unprofitable, upon the Iberians deemed sufficiently inferior to be occupied with this unpleasant and poor quality of traffic. The troubled Isabella and Ferdinand resisted, but their decrees were impotent under the prevalent conditions of the ruling oligarchy of their new nation. From the Habsburg (Spanish: Hapsburg) succession, on, Spain became the leading butcher of European civilization, the later model of reference for the development of the Martinist freemasonic cult in France, and the object of nostalgic reference for Spanish-speaking fascists around the world still today. As the Netherlands war and the 1618-1648 Thirty Years War attest, it was the bestiality of the Habsburg dynasty of Spain and Vienna, which led in creating a medieval-like depravity in Europe not superseded until the rise of the Dutch and British India Companies. Those Companies were spawned by the depraved conditions produced by the Venice-Habsburg efforts to turn back the clock of history over the 1511-1648 period, a period which some British historians have aptly described as a “Little New Dark Age.”

By early during the Nineteenth century, Spain, which had never abandoned the slave-trade in practice up to that point, became the world’s principal slave-trafficker, although under British license and supervision, past the time of the Spanish monarchy’s support for the cause of the U.S. Confederacy. Then, by the latter time, the development of the internal economy of Spain, and the collapse of Spain’s African-slave-trade into the U.S. slaveholders’ market, had asserted its own relatively more productive, if poor habits, contrary to those of the decadent monarchy already overripe for the ashcan of history. The argument of the Spanish slave-traders and their like against the ineffective prohibitions of Isabella I and others, was of the form of seeking to demonstrate that Africans were not actually human, did not have actually human souls, but were categorically fit only to be hunted down like wild animals, and the population culled to the remnant assigned to become slaves. A similar argument was employed by the Spanish administration of Mexico,
in which the argument was that poor Mexican peons were not “rational,” and therefore, were virtually humanoid-like cattle, not qualified to share the respect or economic rights accorded their latifundist exploiters; an argument later echoed by Quesnay and other Physiocrats in France, and the curious pseudo-logic of the Carlist roots of the Spanish-speaking branch of the Synarchist tradition in Spain and the Americas today.

The ability of the human individual to increase man's power over nature through discovery, and through re-enactment of the discovery of those manifestly efficient universal physical principles, such as gravitation, quickest time, and universal physical least action, principles not directly visible to sense-perception as such, showed man as possessing, by nature, a power, a quality lacking in all lower forms of life, a power not attributable to living processes in general. This quality defines man as intrinsically a spiritual being, as I have referred to this above.

The physical-scientific meaning of spiritual, was pinned down by the work of the Russian scientist V. I. Vernadsky's definition of the Noösphere. I have addressed this in my 2001 book, The Economics of the Noösphere. Working from the standpoint of experimental physical chemistry, geochemistry, Vernadsky divided the domain among three types of phase-spaces: abiotic, biotic, and noëtic. Abiotic signifies experimentally defined universal physical principles which are not specific to living processes as such. Biotic signifies experimentally defined universal physical principles specific to living processes. Noëtic signifies those creative powers unique to the human mind, by means of which the discovery of experimentally valid universal physical principles of both the abiotic and biotic domains are discovered. In other words, we divide the experimental universe among three interacting, but distinct classes of principles: non-living, living, and spiritual.

It is this latter class of principle, spiritual, unique to the human individual, which defines a reality which corresponds to a valid religious experience. It is the combined generation and transmission of the experience of discovery of valid universal physical principles, of the abiotic, biotic, and noëtic domains, which expresses the functional distinction of the human species, as a species, from all other species.

This noëtic, or spiritual quality references the power of the individual human mind to access knowledge of a class of universal physical principles, whose efficiency is experimentally valid, but which, as principles, are outside the domain of sensory phenomena.

This conception of human nature, intrinsic to Genesis 1 and to Christianity, is sometimes referred to as the Promethean conception of the human individual.

Promethean Man

As long as the scientific-technological and associated cultural progress persisted, that trend militated against the continued influence of still powerful relics of the Venetian-Norman legacy. However, this fact merely made the surviving cultural relics of past feudal traditions the more enraged, the more inclined to desperate measures to crush the Renaissance and its effects out of existence.

A resurgent Venetian power struck back; with the eruption of the already referenced 1511-1648 period of Venice-orchestrated religious wars, the new creation, modern European civilization, was in bloody jeopardy. But, the force of progress was stubborn, and survived. The Treaty of Westphalia was virtually the rebirth of modern European civilization, and the founding of the U.S. republic is the best approximation of the goal in statecraft toward which the Renaissance and the Treaty of Westphalia had pointed. Had an American-style constitution, as drafted under the leadership of Bailly and Lafayette, been adopted by the French monarchy, the model of the young American republic would have transformed the entire sweep of globally extended European civilization. Thanks to the leadership of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, the U.S.A. survived the machinations of the combined forces of the British monarchy, Napoleon III's France, Spain, and the Habsburgs, and the United States went on to become the world's most productive nation and its greatest power.

At the moment the impact of the young U.S. republic of 1789 was about to spread its influence rapidly in transforming European society, the enemy, led by Lord Shelburne's British East India Company, struck back, mobilizing those Martinists who emerged from July 14, 1789 on, as the leaders of the left-wing Terror and, as also the controlling forces of the subsequent right-wing reaction against that Terror, the first modern fascist dictatorship, that of Napoleon Bonaparte. The essence of that 1789-1815 development was a cultural revolution against the conception of man associated with the Renaissance, a conception of man then freshly expressed by the American Revolution.

Even inside the U.S.A., under a confused President John Adams, the New York City publication of British Foreign Office agent Sir John Robison's fraudulent Proofs of a Conspiracy, rallied the endemically treasonous, New England-based Essex Junto tribes to persuade the Adams government that the United States must tend to ally with the British monarchy, against the revolutionary France that Lord Shelburne's British East India Company had brought into being, all for the purpose of crushing the American cause on both sides of the Atlantic! This was that induced delusion of the Adams government, which produced the crisis of the
Alien and Sedition Acts, and which led, by related means, to the disgrace and death of the Federalist Party, especially after the British Foreign Office agent Aaron Burr’s killing of Alexander Hamilton, the clearest head among leading American figures on these issues at that time.

The Martinists and their Synarchist outgrowth have been the principal enemy of our republic, from outside and internally, since our War for Independence. They represent the evil that was the Roman Empire, the evil of the long reign of the Venetian-Norman tyranny over much of the history of medieval Europe. They represented the enemy of the Fifteenth-century Renaissance, the enemy of the creation of the sovereign nation-state republic, and were a continuation of those forces which have launched the religious and kindred wars which have so often nearly destroyed modern civilization. These are the monsters today, who seek to turn back the clock backwards, to what they call today “the end of history.”

The relics of feudalism could not compete, economically or otherwise, with the progress of the emergent modern European civilization’s impulse for progress. Those feudal relics might slow it, or stop it altogether, but they could not compete with it on the proverbial “level playing field.” They might crush modern civilization by force, as they attempted with the Habsburg-led religious warfare of the 1511-1648 interval; otherwise, that failing, they might attack the problem along cultural lines, by seeking to uproot and stifle that new, Renaissance conception of man which had energized the coming into being of modern European civilization.

On the latter account, the Venetian Party revived Aristoteleanism and then also that legacy of William of Ockham known as the empiricism of Paolo Sarpi and Sarpi’s household lackey Galileo Galilei. The degraded conception of man typified by these two assaults on the Christian conception of human nature, has been the main current of those efforts to destroy modern civilization, which are typified and more or less dominated by the Synarchist initiatives of today. The ideological center of the target for the latter attack is the notion of “Promethean Man.”

The modern conception of Promethean man is traced chiefly from the first, surviving part, Prometheus Bound, of the Classical tragedian Aeschylus’ Prometheus trilogy. The tyrannical gods of Olympus, led by the tyrant Zeus, hold mankind in subjugation to bestial conditions of life, by denying man the access to fire and, implicitly, the discovery and development of technology generally. This mankind, so oppressed, is implicitly that of Biblical Genesis 1, man and woman made equally in the likeness of the Creator of the universe, and endowed by Him with the power and obligation to develop the world: in other words, to change it according to laws discoverable only by the mind of the individual human being. This is what the implicitly Satanic oppressor denies mankind, by oppressing us, or corrupting us, or a combination of both; this is what Prometheus fights to free man to do, a fight which Prometheus will win in the end. The tragic figure of Aeschylus’ trilogy, is not the sublime Prometheus, but the depraved potentate Zeus.

In real modern history, the part of the evil, doomed tyrant Zeus, is played by the Venetian-Norman Party as an oligarchy, and a crucified Jesus Christ’s redemption of man’s true nature and destiny, is echoed as the Promethean role. Such is the principle of redemption of humanity expressed in the portrait presented by the Fifteenth-century Renaissance.

The enemy fears, more than anything else, the possibility that the ordinary people, at least a significant ration of them, adopts the Promethean image of man’s assigned role, a role consistent with the Renaissance and the subsequent expressions of progress of globally extended modern European civilization. It is against that prospect that the enemy conducts cultural warfare, including religious war, and any other means for inducing man’s self-degradation. This includes, most notably, attacks against the Promethean image in the misused name of religion, as by that archetypical swine, Aaron Burr’s grandfather, Jonathan Edwards.

The Evil Men and Their Economics

Trace the way in which such swinish cultural corruption of mankind was pursued by the empiricists and their Martinist outgrowth, from the virtually Satanic figure of the founder of empiricism, Venice’s Paolo Sarpi, through his personal lackey Galileo, and Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, François Quesnay, Adam Smith, and Jeremy Bentham. For a more accurate picture, situate the paradoxical features of the case of Karl Marx against that relevant backdrop.

The first premise of that moral depravity which is empiricism, and its outgrowth, positivism, is the denial of the existence of man’s capacity to know experimentally validated universal principles existing outside the domain of sense-perception. Usually, the empiricists do not deny that something unseen might exist, but they insist, that should it exist, its existence must either remain forever unknown to man, or might be inferred as an explanation of sensed phenomena in nothing more than a more or less statistical way. To this, the empiricists add the role of allegedly self-evident, primal impulses of greed, and lust for pleasure and power, presenting thus the image of Hobbesian man.

On this basis, John Locke defines the power of the
landlord over the serf, or the like, to be the principle of the rights of property, a notion sometimes translated today as “shareholder value,” or, under the law of the early 1860’s Confederacy as “slaveholder value.” Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding define this empiricist notion; whereas, Gottfried Leibniz’s belatedly published New Essays on Human Understanding exposed the wickedness of Locke’s design. It was the latter, Leibniz’s work, which informed Benjamin Franklin and his circles; Leibniz’s elaboration of the principle of “pursuit of happiness,” became the basis on which the U.S. 1776 Declaration of Independence was premised, and the Prelude of the U.S. Federal Constitution defined.

With Mandeville, Quesnay, and Adam Smith, the lust to do evil becomes more explicit than it had been with Locke. London University’s stuffed dummy Jeremy Bentham, would make even most modern fascists blush, perhaps even the devil himself, provided they knew most of what Bentham published, and what he actually did in the French Revolution. The explicitly hedonistic principle of utilitarianism, as introduced to the practice of today’s U.S. Federal Reserve’s faking of the data on post-1982 inflation in the U.S. economy to date, is typical of Bentham. See Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legislation, combined with works such as his In Defence of Usury; see, Simon Bolivar’s denunciation of Bentham’s British Foreign Office role in corrupting the South American revolutions of that time.

Earlier, Mandeville, the resident Satanic object of adulation by the Friedrich von Hayek’s post-World War II Mont Pelerin Society, had been explicit in his claims to be, and to promote, evil. Witness the Mont Pelerin Society’s adoption of Mandeville’s paneg to Satan, The Fable of the Bees. Quesnay’s doctrine of laissez-faire, from which Adam Smith copied his “free trade,” had been premised on the argument on which the economic doctrine of the French Physiocrats as a whole, and recent decades’ turns in U.S. agricultural policy have been premised: that the farmers employed on the lazy, titled landlord’s estate were merely human cattle, who had no part in creating the profit of the estate, or society as a whole; rather, the landlord, by virtue of the Satanic magic of his position as title-holder (e.g., “shareholder”), was the only producer of the net wealth of the estate, and of society as a whole.

These eerie dogmas of Mandeville, Quesnay, Smith, Bentham, et al., have a root in very queer sorts of religions, such as the Cathars or Grail cult. Until Shelburne lackey Bentham’s rise to power in the British Foreign Office’s operations, Mandeville was the most openly shameless of that bad lot, but the other empiricists of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth century were not far behind him. The Martinists went further, as they do today, but they only make explicitly religious, the evil which permeates the entirety of the empiricism of the so-called Eighteenth-century “Enlightenment.” Consider the following excerpt, which I have often quoted elsewhere, from Smith’s 1759 The Theory of the Moral Sentiments. Read this, or, perhaps re-read this, from the standpoint of looking at this passage as typifying an underlying, pro-Satanic form of religious belief. That is my intention in excerpting it here; read it from that point of view. I underline the most relevant elements from the excerpt.

The administration of the great system of the universe … the care of the universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and not of man. To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one much more suited to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of his comprehension; the care of his own happiness, of that of his family, his friends, his country. . . .

But, though we are endowed with a very strong desire of those ends, it has been intrusted to the slow and uncertain determinations of our reason to find out the proper means of bringing them about. Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate instints. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of pleasure, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own sakes, and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficient ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them.

Smith’s utterance belongs to a wildly irrationalist, pagan religion, not science. It is like the Cathar doctrine central to Quesnay’s pro-feudalist Physiocratic dogma, a worldview, and a blasphemous definition of God, derived from an a priori set of definitions, axioms, and postulates. Nonetheless, as Shelburne lackey Adam Smith’s argument in his anti-American propaganda-piece of 1776, The Wealth of Nations, was largely lifted from the work of the French Physiocrats Quesnay and Turgot, this eerie, pro-Satanic dogma of laissez-faire, which plagiarist Adam Smith copied as “The Invisible Hand” of “free trade,” became—together with its adoption of the Malthusian doctrine of the Venetian Giammaria Ortes—the entire basis for the British East India Company’s Haileybury School of economics, the so-called English school of political-economy from which Karl Marx derived his own definitions of economics: the axiomatic assumptions of Ortes’ argument, as copied more faithfully in English by Malthus et al., than in Marx’s German.

The spread of this empiricist school of Bentham et al. into the Marxian socialist movement, is underscored most luridly by the expressed influence of Thomas Huxley on Frederick Engels, especially Engels’ scientifically absurd speculation on the derivation of man from apes, allegedly by the development of the opposable thumb! Engels was a thoroughly British empiricist of the Bentham school, a
British manufacturer of goods produced from slave-grown American cotton, and a political dilettante, who foisted his explicit hatred of the greatest economists of his century on his poverty-stricken protégé Karl Marx—first against the German-American Friedrich List, and, later, the Americans Alexander Hamilton, and, by name, Henry C. Carey. Poor Marx was an unwitting protégé of Benthamic pupil Lord Palmerston, who coordinated both the Young Europe and Young America left-wing conspiracies of that time through such channels as Palmerston rival Urquhart’s foreign-intelligence post at the British Library, the place where Marx polished his studies of British political-economy and its included Physiocratic roots. This study occurred, substantially, under veteran British intelligence handler, the same Urquhart who handled the correspondence of the Young Europe network, and also supplied ostensibly helpful advice to a duped Marx.

In an Age of Lies, which the recent three centuries of globally extended official European civilization have largely been most of that time, it were inevitable that dust-layered truth might be retrieved from that attic where unconventional opinions, good, bad, or awful, are customarily stored. The actual progress of modern economy, from its roots in Charlemagne’s census, has come chiefly from the Fifteenth-century Renaissance; was fostered by the work of Cardinal Mazarin and Jean-Baptiste Colbert; and was founded as a body of scientific work with Leibniz’s development of a branch of physical science, the latter known as physical economy, over the interval of 1671-1716. The American System of physical economy was chiefly an outgrowth of the European influence which brought the work of Leibniz into shaping the world-outlook of Benjamin Franklin and his associates, into the form reflected in Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s famous three reports to the Congress, including the famous 1791 On the Subject of Manufactures.

During my own youth and young manhood, the work of Leibniz was the chief influence which I adopted for my own view of my early exposure to then-contemporary manufacturing and related practice of technology. Hence, my own original contributions, dating from work of the 1948-1953 interval, which became my own Leibnizian practice of economic analysis and long-range forecasting from the standpoint of physical economy, for which I am known in various leading scientific and other circles here and abroad today. It was the standpoint of Leibnizian physical economy, as expressed by Hamilton, Mathew Carey, Friedrich List, and Henry C. Carey, which came to reshape the thinking of much of the thunderstruck world after President Abraham Lincoln’s victory over that Confederacy which had been launched by joint efforts of the British monarchy, Napoleon III’s France, and others. From about the time of the 1876 Philadelphia Centennial convention, Hamilton’s legacy, the American System of political-economy, proceeded to transform the economic policy of practice of many of the world’s leading nations, on continental Europe, in Japan, and in Central and South America, too. Later, at Harvard University, and in preparing, later, for his U.S. Presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt had returned to the American System legacy of his celebrated ancestor, the New York banker Isaac Roosevelt, a key collaborator of Alexander Hamilton. So, Roosevelt rescued our republic from the follies of Coolidge and Hoover.

The history of the U.S. republic, from the beginning, has been principally a see-saw struggle between two irreconcilable philosophical systems of political-economics: the standpoint of physical economy, that of Leibniz and his followers; versus the empiricist tradition of Venice’s Paolo Sarpi and the Eighteenth-century Enlightenment. This has been the pivotal feature of the economic history of the U.S. itself, and our republic’s past and continuing philosophical relationship to the world at large.

The cases of Marx, Engels, and their aftermath, are to be situated as Karl Marx himself declared himself a follower of the Enlightenment’s empiricist school of political-economy, that of Quesnay and the British East India Company’s Haileybury School of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Malthus, et al. Thus, Marx’s work and its effects can be understood, only after we have situated him and his influence exactly where he situates it, within the bounds of the Eighteenth-century empiricist adversaries of both Gottfried Leibniz and the American System of political-economy. Today’s generally accepted history of political-economy is not a branch of science; it is the work of the cult known as the Enlightenment, a cult permeated by that strong pro-Satanic component of which Mandeville and Bentham are most flagrantly typical.

Mandeville, the overt Satanist, was already franker than Adam Smith; but, nonetheless, there is no systemic difference in axiomatic assumptions between Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees and the passage which I have cited from Smith. Mandeville only adds the qualification, that that tyrant which Smith terms blasphemously “the great Director of nature,” has crafted the universe to such effect that the unrestrained pursuit of vice and corruption are that Director’s essential means, by means of which the benefits to society as a whole are produced: Mandeville’s god is the great gangster who runs the infinite brothel and gambling casino, and, perhaps is the silent partner in Enron and Halliburton, too! Smith’s anti-American tract of 1776, The Wealth of Nations, makes the connection between the intent of the 1759 work and Mandeville’s argument explicit. The published writings, and secret practice of Smith’s associate Jeremy Bentham, carry Smith’s moral degeneracy...
For the leaders of the Renaissance, it was no longer allowable, that the promotion of the wealth and pleasure of the few, should proceed at the expense of the many. Caring for peasants as if they were useful cattle to be owned and maintained, as serfs are, or peons on a latifundist’s estate, was not consistent with the notion of the general welfare of human beings whose characteristic quality is the requirement of development.

Pieter Bruegel, “The Corn Harvest” (“Autumn”) (detail), 1565.

This was the condemnation of Aristotle by Philo of Alexandria. This was the reactionary folly of the Sixteenth century, which the Venetians imposed in the form of the dead astronomy-systems of a revived pro-Aristotelian hoaxster Cladius Ptolemy, and the sterile, essentially Aristotelian models of Copernicus and Tycho Brahe. Those were the astronomy of a universe which left the Creator, as if handcuffed, outside reality, and degraded man to the behavioral status of just another animal. It was a universe in which a fixed set of definitions, axioms, and postulates ruled, in which history was essentially dead, without as much as the bare possibility of intervention by revolutionary, newly discovered universal principles.

It was a utopian’s universe, in which the only permissible change was a perfection of the enforcement of a fixed set of rules of behavior, a infinite game of chess, in which progress would mean nothing of importance in the end; the rules would not change, and the game, however the players tried, would never really change anything in the real universe. It was the hateful universe of Bertrand Russell’s Principia Mathematica. In effect, it was the universe of the Zeus of Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, the world despised by Goethe’s poetical Prometheus of his Gnesstea, a world in which Zeus and his lackeys played dirty tricks against a mankind allowed to do essentially

into the extremes of florid detail.

The most efficient way in which to destroy a society by its own hand, is to criminalize the behavioral habits of its leaders, while making their underlings the accomplices of such perversions, and holding dissenting honorable men and women up to ridicule and to persecutions which may prompt their cowardly friends to desert them, perhaps in expectation of new benefactor’s for their desired life-styles and careers.

Now, that much said, reconsider what I have said on the subject of evil men up to this point, now from the comparative standpoint of a textbook course in Euclidean geometry. What are the definitions, axioms, and postulates of the empiricist systems of social thought, as a closed system based upon an uncompleted set of mechanical rules of behavior? Then, add several new rules which tend to make a distinction between the pre-Bentham “geometry” of Anglo-Dutch empiricism, and the bloody, Martinist holocaust which Shelburne’s Bentham set into motion as the French Revolution of 1789-1815.

From the start, empiricism, like the influence of Aristotle and Euclid, sought to stop, even turn back the wheels of human progress, by decreeing a universe of fixed principles, ruled by a God who could do nothing to change the set of principles once he had set them into motion.

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nothing to distinguish itself from the beasts. A world whose imaginary god, Zeus, was a cruelly capricious bastard, a Nietzschean Superman, a virtual Satan. It was the world of Shelburne’s Jeremy Bentham, who begat Lord Palmerston, who, in turn, in a manner of speaking, begat the consummately evil Bertrand Russell, who begat his altar boy, the maliciously playful monster, John von Neumann, of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.

With Bentham and the Martinists, the man of unmatched pure evil, a Nietzschean beast-man, struts upon the stage of modern world history, a man like the Roman Tiberius, Caligula, or Nero, or Adolf Hitler, who would commit such monstrous crimes, on a mass scale, as would induce a terrified people to kiss his feet with their ardor, and seek to emulate their new master by excelling today in a greater evil than they had done the day before. This was the quality Shelburne sought in agents such as Philippe Egalité and Jacques Necker; this was Bentham’s London-trained assets, Danton and Marat; this was the Jacobin Terror; this was the transitional part played by the thieving whoremaster Barras; this monster, this Nietzschean supperman, was Napoleon Bonaparte in the role of bandit-emperor. Such a beast was the Napoleon who launched the first modern fascist empire which Cheney has presently aimed to reproduce by nuclear means. This was the Napoleon whose criminal energy prompted the crafting of a philosophy of history, and theory of the state, by that G.W.F. Hegel who had come to adore Napoleon, but would console himself later by serving the Holy Alliance’s Prince Metternich and the fascist-like Carlsbad Decrees.

The cumulative impact of the succession of horrors of the 1789-1815 interval of the Martinists’ rampage, was the birth of the Romantic movement. This turn away from the late Eighteenth-century rise, in tandem, of both the German Classical tradition’s revival of that legacy of human reason represented by Shakespeare, Leibniz, and J.S. Bach, and the 1776-1789 American Revolution, sank early Nineteenth-century Europe into a renewal of the Romantic legacy of Rameau, the pro-Satanic Mandeville, and Walpole. The decadence which was early Nineteenth-century Romanticism, rose to the surface with Napoleon’s coronation and subsequent victory over not only Prussia, but, implicitly, Germany, too, at Jena-Auerstädt. After the awful outcome of the 1814-15, Metternich-hosted, and fairly described as “sexual Congress” of Vienna, Europe was chiefly plunged deeper into the cultural pessimism expressed as the post-Napoleonic Romanticism of Liszt, Berlioz, Schopenhauer, Wagner, and others. This decadence was the source from which later proliferations of Napoleonic tyrants sprang; these were, among others, Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Laval, and Vichy.

The man of evil, hailed by Nietzsche as his reborn Phrygian Dionysus, had come upon the stage of history, and was determined to stay and conquer. It is that heritage against which we must contest today.

Evil As a Religion

Synarchism was not a political doctrine; it was created as a freemasonic form of pro-paganist religion, a Satanic religion, called Martinism. The influence of this Satanic religion is expressed today by, among others, Vice-President Dick Cheney and his professedly neo-conservative “Chicken-hawks.” The latter degenerates typify cowardly tyrants who send others to kill, while they themselves follow the battle-torn procession like predatory carpet-baggers, like the buzzards. Otherwise, the difference between the Promethean, on the one side, and the sophists, empiricists, and Martinists, on the other, is not fairly describable as merely a difference in political commitments, but, rather, a virtual functional difference in species.

There are chiefly four axiomatic qualities of distinctions which distinguish matured, normal men and women, from the sophists and empiricists in general and the Martinists most emphatically.

This can be summarized as a series of four interdependent but respectively distinct theses, as I do, as follows, now.

First, a normal representative of the human species is distinguished from the beasts, by the capacity to distinguish objects of thought which correspond to the existence of experimentally valid universal physical principles, principles which exist beyond the reach of sense-perception as such, but whose existence is susceptible of conclusive experimental proof. The discovery and proof of these principles, first as hypotheses, and then as experimental proof of principle, is achieved through the human mind’s unique capacity to recognize the footprint of anomalies in the ordering of perceived events. The term “cognition” is properly restricted to references to the process of discovery and proof of the principles which solve the relevant anomalous paradoxes.

In the mathematical physics of Gauss, Abel, Dirichlet, Wilhelm Weber, and Rieman, this defines the physical reality reflected as the complex domain. The mastery of that acquired view of the physical reality corresponding to the complex domain, has been the keystone for the educational self-development of the youth movement which I have sponsored.

Second, in many cases, man is able to apply these efficient, universal, but non-perceptible principles to the universe around us; that, to the effect of increasing the relative potential population-density of the human species, or of the particular culture which benefits from that practice. This distinguishes the human species categorically,
ecologically, from all other living species.

This is the basis for my original definition of corresponding principles of a science of physical economy, a practice of physical economy which I have defined as Riemannian in essential form.

Third, the sustainable progress of society depends upon the transmission of these discovered principles, both “horizontally” and “forward,” through induced replication of the relevant cognitive experience of replicable individual discovery by individuals. This process of combined transmission and creation of ongoing new such discoveries, of both physical science and Classical modes of artistic composition, is the proper referent for the term “culture.”

Fourth, the preceding three principles situate the mortal human individual in such a way, that the mortal existence of each is implicitly immortal, not as merely a living creature, but, rather, also as a cognitive being, whose existence is a contributing feature of the continuity of the culture, and of the human species in general. The images of the greatest known scientific discoverers, Classical artists, heroes, and statesmen of history, exemplify the sense of cognitive immortality potentially available to each of us. They who realize this in their outlook and practice, live in a simultaneity of eternity, within which they are immortal presences living with us today. The true interest of the human individual, the only real wellspring of true morality, is to dwell among those companions forever, even after we were formally deceased, to prize, above all other things, that principle of agapē, as uttered by Plato’s Socrates and the Apostle Paul’s 1 Corinthians 13. The true nature of man, and the principle of agapē so defined, are inseparable notions.

Therefore, in summary of those theses: The transmissible qualities of discovered principles represented by these four characteristics of our species and its societies, form a higher geometry embodying them. This geometry is of the form of a Riemannian geometry, composed of an accumulation of known, active universal principles, principles which correspond either to the individual mind’s immortal relationship to nature, or to the principled aspects of the social processes through which society is enabled to cooperate in its mission for the betterment of mankind.

As the best Classical modes of artistic composition attest, the principled features expressed by those modes are as definite and efficient in their domain, as so-called universal physical principles in their own domain of immediate reference. Principles of natural law, such as those of the Preamble of the U.S. Federal Constitution, are included among the category of universal physical principles of Classical artistic composition.

As Riemann writes, in his celebrated 1854 habilitation dissertation, the “geometry” I have defined here knows no principles as existing in the universe but its own. No a priori definitions, axioms, and postulates such as those of a formal Euclidean geometry, are permitted. Geometry as a whole is a complex domain, composed, in the one aspect, of the Pythagorean type of constructive geometry of sense-perception, and, on the other, the geometry of presently known universal physical principles. The efficient intersection of the two geometries defines a higher, Riemannian, notion of a Gaussian complex domain.

At this moment in the history of our planet, it is our proper destiny and potential, to fulfill the intended effects of our creation: the establishment of a community of natural-law principle among a system of perfectly sovereign-states throughout this planet, a work which must be wrought chiefly by rediscovering and invoking the noblest features of our history, by our example, by our good will, and by the influence we should exert to encourage the achievements of other republics. Remove that one bitter adversary, the corrupting worm of those alien species of Synarchist forces from within our political-economic system, and the presently crisis-wrecked economic world has reached a place in history that we are ready to move into a new era in world affairs, the era of a community of principle among sovereign nation-states.

Then, were that done, the Martinists and the kind of extreme evil such sophists represent would vanish into the archives of history. That destiny of their species they are not ready to accept. They are bearers of a religion of terror, a Nietzschean form of Dionysiac, Satanic terror. That is our enemy, whom we must defeat; that is the unfinished work abandoned by the untimely death of one of the Synarchists’ most hated and feared figures of modern history, President Franklin Roosevelt.

It is for that that we must fight. It is that mission which defines the only true meaning presently available for the continued existence of our nation today. For that, we must defeat the Synarchists and what they represent; it is not sufficient to defeat them once again; we must make that defeat irreversible. If we fail, their terrorism will gleefully kill us, and will punish all humanity with a prolonged plunge into the awful planetary dark age which the present intention of those Synarchists implies.

2.

Religion, Passion, and Politics

As I have stressed in many published locations, most recently my “Visualizing the Complex Domain,” and more emphatically in the slightly upgraded edition writ-
The pathological type known as the utopian, is typified by the special case of the single-issue fanatic, who would put the universe itself in jeopardy, should he, or she, fancy that such desperate measures would compel society to submit to the fanatic's choice of single issue. An exaggeration? Not really. Consider those so-called “right to life” cults which would stop at nothing to prevent an abortion, even at the price of killing the infant a moment after it had been born, a fanatic who would not flinch at the ritual execution of the probably innocent, in Governor George W. Bush's Texas, or snuffing a patient to keep health-insurance payments down. These are not exaggerations, but instances of actual controversies, sometimes bitter ones, with which I have been confronted in my role as a prominent political figure dealing with such single-issue groups of sophists.

The supporters of Bertrand Russell were, similarly, prepared to support Russell's proposal for a “preventive nuclear bombardment” of the Soviet Union, or elsewhere, as Cheney is today, all for the sake of terrifying the world into surrendering the right to national sovereignty, to an imperial dictatorship under world government. Or, the case of Moral Rearmament fanatics who found the Hitler regime attractive.

An apparently less extreme sort of fanatic, is the populist who argues, that he or she must concentrate on his or her own local family and community issues, even if that meant neglecting action to save the nation from a depression which would wipe out precisely those family and community conditions which the populist professes to protect. The populist's mind often dwells within in a fantasy akin to the assumption that the universe itself is flat. Being a populist, he knows that he can see that it is flat, even from the steps at his back door!

In economics, for example, the average productivity of labor of an enterprise in any locality, is a subsumed function of the level of development of the nation's and region's physical economy as a whole. Supply and price of electrical power, for example, is a function of the development of a well-regulated, integrated public-utility system of combined production and distribution. Deregulate, and the incurred physical cost of production and distribution must inevitably soar, while the price of a delivered kilowatt-hour must necessarily skyrocket, as it has in Enron-raped California. Getting cheaper goods from abroad through “outsourcing” and “globalization” may seem a benefit, but not if this means shutting down the places of employment and incomes of the people of our nation who can no longer buy. Deregulating real-estate speculation is no boon to the person of average income who can secure no dwelling at less than nearly $1,000 or more per month; nor is that a measure which enhances the security and public health conditions of an entire community.

This brings us to the integrated role played among religion, passion, and politics in the matter of the security of a nation, or, for that matter, the world at large. This overlaps, but is not quite the same issue as the matter of the Synarchist threat itself, but it is an extremely relevant, if only contiguous area, a topic which shows us the kind of corruption which may lead its victim toward degeneration into a sympathizer of Synarchist causes. This source of corruption reveals an additional political dimension in the security concerns which Synarchism touches. It was chiefly by means of that specific quality of popular corruption, that the U.S. was transformed from the world's most productive nation, into the fallen pleasure-dome it has become since about the time of the
assassination of President Kennedy and the launching of the 1964-72 official U.S. war in Indo-China.

The issue is the mid-1960's launching, on a mass scale, of the transformation of the culture of the people of the United States and elsewhere, from the morality of a productive society, into the decadence of a "post-industrial," "feel good," "me" society. It is urgent that the citizens face the fact of the way in which this transformation of our nation, from progress to decadence, was brought about by preying upon the propensity for "littleness" within an emergent adult generation which has tended, more and more, to flee from the terrifying combined realities of a 1962 Missiles Crisis, the Kennedy assassination, and the launching of the Indo-China war.

'But, How Do You Feel, Mrs. Jones!?'

Consider the commonly heard expression, "I feel that . . . "; or, the complementary, "I don't feel that . . . ". The community-activist variety of populist, for example, may not "feel" that national issues should be raised in addressing a community's problem. National policy-issues of health care, education, power supply, water supply, may or may not be the direct factor shaping a corresponding local issue; but, such connections are always implicitly there, and often of decisive importance in the struggle to define a solution for the local matter immediately at issue. For example, our nation's tariff and trade policies, and protectionist measures in foreign trade agreements with other nations, do impinge, often decisively, on local employment and business of a community. The objection to making that connection, is often expressed as, "I don't feel that they do"; or, "Most of my friends and I feel that free trade is the American tradition."

The objection in those cases is not a matter of facts, but simply of a "feeling" which may or may not have any legitimate place in the effort to address the relevant practical problem.

So, during the late 1950's, the advertising world turned to psychiatrists for advice on how to give ordinary products an enhanced, intrinsically irrational appeal to consumers, or other purchasers, for purposes of marketing. A wide range of products was transformed, not only in form, but also content, in a fevered Madison Avenue pursuit of the imagined lucrative mysteries of sex-appeal. Some of us in business consulting practice then, wondered how many advertising executives were writing off their personal visits to their psychiatrists as a "business expense."

The notion of a democracy of "feeling," as distinct from reason, is a potentially fatal contradiction in terms, as the case of what was for many Germans the fatal vote, establishing Hitler as dictator of a formerly democratic Germany, expressed a large overdose of "feeling," but virtually no exercise of reason.

The same kind of emotion-driven aberrations are a major factor of mass political behavior, aberrations usually falling into the category of irrational behavior motivated by a pathological use of "I feel" as a substitute for rational behavior. "How do you feel about the sudden death of your child, Mrs. Jones?" asks the sadistically gloating reporter, while the gloating television camera scrutinizes every nuance of change in Mrs. Jones' expression. The reporter implies that the vast viewing audience "out there" would do something to Mrs. Jones to punish her, if she did not submit to that Tavistock Institute style in line of questioning.

That behavior of the way television news-reporting often defines "human interest" today, tells us something important about our population in general. The TV audience's tolerance of, even fascination with the spectacle of that sort of "peek-show" perversion by the TV broadcaster, is typical of the decadence of American popular culture today! The aberrations of that sort to which I referred as illustration, above, often fit into a psychoanalytical category called "cathectic" by Sigmund Freud, the matter of emotional attachment to the idea of an object, or class of objects. The wrong kind of emotion is attached, irrationally, to the idea of some kind of object.

Cases of such pathological, object-idea fixations, more or less akin to obsessions, occurring among otherwise sane individuals, is a relevant comparison to be made in connection with the kinds of cases of political "I feel" aberrations referenced above. Much of dirty political campaigning, is based on inducing such associated, purely neurotic compulsions among voters, respecting some issue or candidate. The case of the way in which Governor George Romney's Presidential pre-candidacy was summarily ruined by play on his "I was brainwashed" on U.S. Vietnam policy, is an example of this. It was the use of the word "brainwashed," not the practical merits of his statement on the issue to which he was referring—on which he was factually and politically right—which was exploited to bring his candidacy down.

To define the problem, switch attention from the way that kind of neurotic disorder looks to the advertising executive's psychiatrist, to the case of the all-too-typical professional mathematician, or financial accountant, especially Enron-style accountants or empiricist economists of academia. That mathematician, for example, may be a tyrannical rage-ball in family affairs, but prides himself on being passionless, virtually schizophrenic, about matters of mathematical practice.

The following summary of the point touches upon my
The treatment of the subject of the role of passion in science, as stated in a slightly amplified form within the second edition of my “Visualizing the Complex Domain.” This takes us back to the attack upon Plato by that Aristotle who wrote “energy” where Plato had written, in effect, “power.” I now refer to physical geometry as I have described it there, and in other locations, such as that publication.

As I have indicated, there are two respectively distinct classes of ideas. On the first account, the human mind is approximately that of a lower form of life, a repository of sense-certainties and matching learning from experience. On the second account, the human mind is unique, relative to animal life and behavior, in the mind’s noëtic capacity to form validatable discoveries of principle from the evidence of fallacies in a view of experience based on sense-certainty. The animal reacts to sense-certainty experiences with passion, or indifference. When the human mind reacts only as an animal does, that person is rightly considered as either behaving stupidly, or insane.

Sanity is a matter of the appropriateness of response to a choice between two distinct species of mental objects: the first, the objects of merely conditioned sense-certainty; and, the second, objects which lie within the domain of those efficient universal principles which exist beyond the direct reach of our senses. The latter principles are of two distinct, but interacting types. The first, subjects pertaining to the domain of those universal physical principles which exist beyond direct sense-perception. The second, subjects pertaining to principles associated with social processes, with the interaction among individual, human personalities: in other words, social processes. Classical artistic composition, such as the Classical tragedies of ancient Greece, Shakespeare, and Schiller, are typical of the nature and role of those universal principles which govern the effective ordering of responses within the domain of social relations.

Thus, at all times, we must consider both the distinctions and the relations among the simultaneously occurring, three different qualities of experience: first, the simply sensory; second, pertaining to the universal physical principles of the individual mind’s interaction with the physical universe as such; and, thirdly, principles of social processes as typified by the principles of Classical modes of artistic composition. Keeping the three sorted out, such that our response to each is an appropriate choice, is the elementary challenge in defining categorically sane, as distinct from pathological forms of both the individual’s, or culture’s mental, and public behavior.

In this context, so described, the most common of the great difficulties generally experienced by most individu-
als, and within most cultures, is the difficulty of defining the existence of objects corresponding to universal physical principles. In physical science, for example, the pathological state of mind is usually encountered as the typical mental sickness of the empiricist, in substituting algebraic notions of statistics (e.g., Laplace-ian “probability”) for distinct physical principles. He can not think of gravity as Kepler, the original discoverer of a principle of universal gravitation, defines it, as a specifically Platonic object; but only pathologically, statistically (“action at a distance”) as the empiricist Galileo does, for example. The same pathological state of mind of Euler and Lagrange, as pointed out by Gauss’s 1799 paper, also illustrates the point.

The same subject is addressed by Riemann in posthumously published papers commenting on some crucial features of the content of a series of Göttingen University lectures delivered by the influential Nineteenth-century German pedagogue and philosopher Herbart. Herbart, a Wilhelm von Humboldt protégé, who is celebrated for his exposure of the hoaxes of the Scottish school’s empiricist Immanuel Kant, made one genuinely outstanding contribution of relevance to Riemann’s subsequent achievements as a leading scientific thinker of the past two centuries, the notion of Geistesmasse. Roughly translated, to reflect the practical meaning of Riemann’s reference to that term, it signifies “thought-object”: the object-like distinctness of efficient principles residing among the class of those experimentally-validated Platonic hypotheses known as universal physical principles.

This notion of such actually, efficiently existing objects of the mind, as distinct from those merely of the senses, is the subject of Socrates’ allegory of “the Cave” in Plato’s Republic. The subject is the distinction of the unseen object, which casts the shadows impinging upon sense-perception, from those objects which are identified by simple sense-certainty. The simplest illustration from modern scientific practice, is the case of microphysical objects which exist efficiently within a smallness beyond the powers of the light-microscope. Nuclear fission and fusion, for example, exist. The higher view of Mendeleev’s definition of the periodic table, as focussed upon by Chicago University’s late Professor Robert Moon, points to an efficient physical geometry of physical space-time in the microphysical domain, which does not correspond to any physics confined within the geometrical presumptions of the empiricist method.

It is the incommensurability of the crucial anomalous, empirically defined effects which actually point toward the existence of “objects” existing, in principle, within nothing less than the complex domain, which is the most important prompting of mystification in the scientific and related work of those still imprisoned within the usual presumptions of generally accepted classroom mathematics.

So, in the domain of political-economy, the citizen uses the imagery of simple sense-certainty, and associated notions of “proximate cause,” to the effect of presuming that that which is perceptibly nearby is, therefore, the most real; like the man who, failing to find employment, beats his wife—mentally, pathologically, implying that since she is proximate, not only to him, but to the costs of family life, she is the cause of his failure. He may hate Washington, D.C., but only as something strange which he wishes did not exist to confuse, or dilute his desire to solve his problems by beating upon something within his more immediate physical reach.

We see this in pathological forms of religious behavior, such as the “fundamentalist” who hopes that the Battle of Armageddon will recur in time to eliminate the problem of paying next month’s rent, or to escape the lack of ecstasy which he, or she senses lacking in immediate personal life. That poor wretch has no sense of actual immortality within the simultaneity of eternity, and therefore gropes for miracles of a sensuous sort within the reach of something immediately, miraculously at hand: “God will send health and money next month.”

Still today, our society is crippled by a pervasive lack of a sense of the intrinsic beauty of individual mortal life, as the opportunity to relish re-experiencing in our minds the great cognitive and related achievements of those who have gone before us, and seizing with happiness the opportunity to spend the talent of our limited mortal existence for something good in the eyes of both those who came before us, and those to come. The poor fellow who can not locate his existence in the great universe in which we live, can not comprehend the existence of a Creator who produced this universe and who embodied in us creative qualities like His own.

Not knowing our worth as persons, we sell ourselves cheaply, as it were for a bowl of pottage; or, as we were a poor Judas, who had betrayed everything good we represented, for the sake of a moment of fatal corruption.

There are principles out there, universal physical principles, and social principles of the form to be recognized in the greatest Classical artistic compositions. To the degree we can fix our mind’s attention on those efficient objects lying beyond the shadow-world of sense-perception, we are free at last. Free from the pettiness which drags men and women, and entire societies, into the abyss of self-degradation to which the Martinist cult and its present neo-conservative expression threaten to doom civilization for perhaps generations yet to come.
Spain has not always been an imperial, theocratic creature of the Inquisition. During the 1700’s, and especially during the reign of the Bourbon King Carlos III (r. 1759-1788), Spain experienced a renaissance inspired by G.W. Leibniz, which paralleled the American Revolution, and laid the basis for the later emergence of independent sovereign nation-states throughout Ibero-America.

The key features of Carlos III’s reign were: (1) implementation of far-reaching reforms in the areas of economics and education, based upon the principle of the General Welfare, anticipating in Spain what was later realized as the American System in the United States; (2) suppression and eventual expulsion of the Venetian-controlled Society of Jesus (Jesuits, founded 1540), as a reflection of a policy of separation of Church and State, based upon the principle of national sovereignty vs. the oligarchical institution of the Spanish Inquisition; (3) support for the American Revolution against the British Empire, which had been consolidated with the 1763 Treaty of Paris that ended the Seven Years’ War.

This article is dedicated to the memory of Carlos Cota Meza and H. Graham Lowry, to the fighting spirit of Mark Sonnenblick, to victory over the Synarchist Quijano hacks, and to a future for the youth of Ibero-America.

between Britain and France (known as the French and Indian War in North America). These policies led in the early decades of the 1800’s to the sovereignty of the independent nations of Ibero-America, and a community of principle among them and the United States of America.

Because of these policies, the fascist Synarchists in the Catholic Church [SEE Box, page 28] and their Brit-

Continued on page 28
ish allies have always hated the memory of Carlos III, almost as much as they hate the American Revolution. Synarchist fascists like Fernando Quijano, a former associate of Lyndon LaRouche, viciously attacked Carlos III and defended the Hapsburg King Philip II (r. 1556-1598). For this purpose, Quijano twisted Leibniz’s 1703 “Manifesto for the Defense of the Rights of Carlos III [Hapsburg]” into the false argument, that Leibniz implicitly opposed the later, Bourbon Carlos III, when in fact Carlos III’s policies precisely reflected the influence of Leibniz’s ideas in economics and statecraft, as these were later expressed in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution’s support of the concept of the General Welfare.

It is also significant that Quijano, an initiator of the

* The Hapsburg opponent of Spain’s first Bourbon King, Philip V, during the 1701-1712 War of Spanish Succession, was also called “Carlos III.” See below.—Ed.

MSIA (Ibero-American Solidarity Movement) in 1992, a Mussolini-like Synarchist Trojan Horse deployed against LaRouche while he was wrongfully incarcerated in the United States, hated the works of the German “poet of freedom” Friedrich Schiller with a passion. The two works of Schiller that Quijano especially despised, were the drama Don Carlos (completed 1785-1787), and the historical essay “The Jesuit Government in Paraguay” (1788). Schiller, who was born the year Carlos III became King in 1759, wrote both these works during the final years of Carlos’s reign. Schiller was, of course, a close collaborator of the brothers Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt, the latter of whom played a critical role in laying the basis for the independence of the nations of Ibero-America.

Quijano’s line was that Schiller, who supported the American Revolution, was an “Enlightenment Protestant” influenced by the “Black Legend”—the Anglo-Dutch propaganda campaign to depict Spanish policy in

**Synarchism: A Short Definition**

Synarchism” is a name adopted during the Twentieth century for an occult Freemasonic sect, known as the Martinists, based on worship of the tradition of the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. During the interval from the early 1920’s through 1945, it was officially classed by U.S.A. and other nations’ intelligence services under the file name of “Synarchism: Nazi/Communist,” so defined because of its deploying simultaneously both ostensibly opposing pro-communist and extreme right-wing forces for encirclement of a targeted government. Twentieth-century and later fascist movements, like most terrorist movements, are all Synarchist creations.

Synarchism was the central feature of the organization of the fascist governments of Italy, Germany, Spain, and Vichy and Laval France, during that period, and was also spread as a Spanish channel of the Nazi Party, through Mexico, throughout Central and South America. The PAN Party of Mexico was born as an outgrowth of this infiltration. It is typified by the followers of the late Leo Strauss and Alexandre Koëtêve today.

This occult Freemasonic conspiracy, is found among both nominally left-wing and also extreme right-wing factions such as the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal, the Mont Pelerin Society, the American Enterprise Institute and Hudson Institute, and the so-called integrist far right inside the Catholic clergy. The underlying authority behind these cults is a contemporary network of private banks of that medieval Venetian model known as fondi. The Synarchist Banque Worms conspiracy of the wartime 1940’s, is merely typical of the role of such banking interests operating behind sundry fascist governments of that period.

The Synarchists originated in fact among the immediate circles of Napoleon Bonaparte; veteran officers of Napoleon’s campaigns spread the cult’s practice around the world. G.W.F. Hegel, a passionate admirer of Bonaparte’s image as Emperor, was the first to supply a fascist historical doctrine of the state. Nietzsche’s writings supplied Hegel’s theory the added doctrine of the beast-man-created Dionysiac terror of Twentieth-century fascist movements and regimes. The most notable fascist ideologues of post-World War II academia are Chicago University’s Leo Strauss, who was the inspiration of today’s U.S. neo-conservative ideologues, and Strauss’s Paris co-thinker Alexandre Koëtêve.

—Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
July 23, 2003

For a full discussion, see “Religion and National Security: The Threat from Terrorist Cults,” page 4, this issue.
Ibero-America as unmitigatedly genocidal—into unfairly attacking the Jesuits and the Inquisition of Philip II. For this reason, Quijano argued that it was impossible to organize the Schiller Institute in Ibero-America, and that a new organization, the MSIA, based on Quijano’s own pro-Franco, anti-American Synarchist fascism, was required. Leaders of the MSIA, including Quijano and, later, Marivilia Carrasco, resigned from association with LaRouche, over LaRouche’s attack on the fascist nature and terrorist threat of Synarchism. LaRouche exposed the fact that a network of Synarchists is active once again today in France, Italy, and Spain, and is deployed throughout the Americas in association with Spanish fascist Blas Piñar, chiefly under the fascist doctrine of Hispanidad. The Quijanohacks are allied with this network in Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina.

As we shall see, it was the Catholic rulers of France, Portugal, Spain, Naples, and Parma—and not the Protestant North—who suppressed the Jesuits. In fact, among the charges against the Jesuits in Spain, were that they maintained “treasonable relations” with Great Britain, and that the Jesuit policy in Paraguay was to foment warfare against the legitimate Spanish civil government. Thus, Schiller’s essay was not the result of a “Freemasonic, Protestant-concocted ‘Black Legend,’” but was based on the reality of the charges brought against the Jesuits by Carlos III himself.

The American System vs. The British Empire

The expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain and its possessions in 1767, and Carlos’s support for the American Revolution of 1776, strongly suggest that in writing his Don Carlos about the son and heir to the throne of Spain’s Philip II, Schiller was intervening into the world history of his time, to support the efforts of Carlos III against the forces of the Inquisition historically allied with Philip II. (Schiller first conceived of writing Don Carlos in 1782, during the final years of the American Revolution.) It should be further noted that during his reign, Carlos III banished the Jesuit-allied Inquisitor General from Madrid. Thus, in Schiller’s play, Flanders is a metaphor for the American Revolution, which Carlos III supported, and Carlos III is the Spanish monarch who Schiller’s character Don Carlos tragically failed to become, owing to the overpowering control exercised by the Beast-man Inquisition over his father Philip II—something which Carlos III, whose own father was Philip V, successfully fought.

Ironically, although Quijano attempted to twist Leibniz’s 1703 attack on Spain’s Bourbon succession into a defense of the Hapsburgs against the Bourbon kings, Leib-
niz’s actual policies for the promotion of the arts and sciences, and for the development of physical economy for the General Welfare, were implemented by none other than the Bourbon Carlos III. Carlos’s moves against the Jesuits and the Inquisition should also be seen as a reflection of Leibniz’s project to reunite the Christian Churches under an ecumenical policy, based upon the principles which had guided the watershed Council of Florence (1439).

Proof of this is found in the collaboration of the predominantly Protestant, future United States of America with the predominantly Catholic, Bourbon nations of Spain and France, against the imperial policies of Great Britain, and on behalf of a policy which only later became known as the American System. This collaboration would later bear fruit in the community of principle among the sovereign nation-states of the Americas, as expressed in the recognition of the independence of Ibero-American nations by U.S. President James Monroe and his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, a policy uniquely advocated today by the Democratic pre-candidate for the U.S. Presidency, Lyndon LaRouche.

Thus, the true history of Ibero-America is not to be found in the ideology of Hispanidad, as advocated by the Quijanohacks. This anti-American ideology was a Synarchist-Nazi concoction, aimed at wiping out the contributions of Carlos III to the founding of the United States, the development of the Ibero-America nations, and the collaboration between them and the U.S.A.

The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, was based on the ecumenical principle that each nation should act to the advantage of the other. Over succeeding decades, this peace gave way to a three-way rivalry for control of Europe between Bourbon France, the Hapsburg Empire, and the British, who after the 1688 counter-revolution of William of Orange represented an emerging Anglo-Dutch, Venetian-style financier imperial power.

Over the course of the 1700’s, the networks of Leibniz in various European nations, especially those of Bourbon France and Spain, were the only counterpole to the emerging British Empire. These networks worked to continue the policies of the Treaty of Westphalia on a global scale, culminating in their support for the American Revolution of Leibniz-inspired Benjamin Franklin and his followers.

It is therefore no accident that defenders of the Synarchist Cristero War (1926-1929) against Mexico and the Mexican Constitution of 1917, such as Jean Meyer, have slanderously attacked the sovereign government of Mexico on the grounds of “Bourbon Regalism.” In Mexico, as elsewhere in Ibero-America, the battle for national sovereignty and the economic well-being of the entire population required the same fight against the ultramontane, Synarchist policies of the fascist elements in the Catholic Church, as that waged by Carlos III. Thus, the precedents for many of the measures to limit the power of the clergy contained in the Mexican Constitution, can be found in the steps taken by Carlos III in the 1700’s, first in Naples, and then later in Spain.³

The Leibnizian Conception of Man Versus Bestial Feudalism

Spain had been devastated since the rule of the first Hapsburg monarchs, Charles I (V) (r. 1516-1556) and his son Philip II, as a result of policies that degraded man to the status lower than a beast of burden.

The conditions in Spain under the Hapsburgs and their Grand Inquisitor, as described by Friedrich Schiller in his play Don Carlos, were precisely those which characterized ancient Sparta under the dictator Lycurgus. In his essay on “The Legislation of Lycurgus and Solon,” Schiller says of Sparta that all respect for the human species was lost, people were considered as means, not as ends, morality was torn asunder, by law, the minds of the population were deliberately constrained, all progress was hemmed in, all industry stifled, all science neglected.⁴ The same is easily said of feudal Spain.

In 1492, Queen Isabella (r. 1479-1504) and her husband Ferdinand, under the influence of the bestial Grand Inquisitor Tomás de Torquemada, expelled Spain’s Jewish population. In 1609, Philip III expelled the Spanish Muslims, called Moors. These expulsions brought an end to the ecumenical Muslim-Jewish-Christian culture which had flourished in Andalusian Spain in earlier centuries, and had made it the wealthiest and most advanced region of Europe in the arts, sciences, and economy.⁵ They brought about a devastating reversal of the Spain of the great Alfonso X (the Wise), who ruled Castile and León from 1252 to 1282, and who referred to himself as the “King of the Three Religions.” And this policy of expulsion was kept alive in Hapsburg Spain through the cult of “limpieza de sangre” (purity of blood), where government appointments required a “certificado de pureza” (certificate of purity) proving one was not “tainted” by Jewish or Moorish blood, and even the poorest peasant, so long as he was an Old Christian, looked down upon the so-called New Christians descended from Jewish converts (“conversos”).

These criminal expulsions, and the persisting racist mentality behind them, not only destroyed any notion of human solidarity, but also resulted in economic collapse and depopulation, as a result of the anti-human ideology they engendered. The feudal nobility considered productive labor
beneath them; by law known as the caballero, no knight or hidalgo could engage in productive labor without losing his noble status. Intellectual pursuits related to scientific discovery and the development of productive technologies were likewise considered a threat to “honor.” And the educational system, controlled by the Inquisition-allied Jesuits, imposed Aristotelean thought-control, rather than encouraging scientific inquiry.

The nobility, in true Aristotelean fashion, treated the rest of the population as virtual helots, whom they valued less than animals. At its most extreme, this was reflected literally in the privileges of the feudal Council of the Mesta, which had the right to drive its herds of sheep over cultivated fields, while the peasantry was prohibited by law from protecting fields by enclosure. Meanwhile, the majority of the tax burden fell upon these same poor peasants, and the aristocracy, hidalgos, and clergy were tax-exempt.

Thus, rather than treating all human beings as created in the image of the Creator, and nourishing their capacity for cognition for the benefit of the society as a whole, Spain’s feudal oligarchy treated man as a beast, to be ruled over by the oligarchy’s own Beast-man, the Grand Inquisitor. The result was a culture of idleness, in which the talents of the population were never given the opportunity to contribute, through economic activity, to the common good. It was this anti-productive, anti-progress culture of Hapsburg Spain under Philip II, which Miguel de Cervantes so successfully lampooned in his 1605 Don Quixote—in which an idle knight, forbidden to work, spends his time reading feudal stories, goes mad, and sallies out to encounter an entire society which is itself upside-down and totally insane.6

The truly amazing accomplishment of Carlos III is that he attempted, and in large part succeeded in overturning this feudal ideology and replacing it with a Leibnizian conception of man—although ultimately his reforms were undermined, following his death and the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808.

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. has referred to Leibniz as “the first economic scientist, in the strict modern sense of science.” The economic policies implemented under Carlos III were as much a reflection of Leibniz’s thinking as was the American System of political economy implemented by Alexander Hamilton. Leibniz’s writings were widely circulated in Spain under Carlos III, and many of the economic and educational reforms implemented in Spain were actually first attempted in the Sierra Morena, among a colony of German immigrants.

Two works by Leibniz are particularly crucial. These are “Society and Economy,”7 and a memorandum entitled “On the Establishment of a Society in Germany for the Promotion of the Arts and Sciences,”8 both written in 1671. In these works, Leibniz emphasized that man is a mirror of God’s love, and thus an instrument to serve the “common good” and the “happiness of the human race” through scientific discovery and the development of new technologies. Thus, for Leibniz, through scientific discovery “conceived by means of hypothesis,” man is both
capable of, and responsible for, liberating his fellow man from the bestial state to which he is otherwise relegated in a society which suppresses that divine spark. Such was the case in Hapsburg Spain, which under the guise of religion, actually blasphemed God by degrading His image in man.

In the first of these writings, Leibniz argues that the “entire purpose of society is to release the artisan from his misery.” To accomplish this, Leibniz proposes that society play a positive role in fostering a harmony of interest among merchants and artisans, through the development of national industry.

In the deregulated, free-market system of monopoly capital, in which artisans are kept in continual poverty and toil, they are unproductive. However, in a society which considers artisanship “one of the worthiest occupations”—where “the highest rule shall be to foster love” and the “moral virtues shall be promulgated”—the work force will be more productive, to the benefit of society as a whole.

Leibniz explicitly argues for government intervention to foster manufactures: “Monopoly is avoided, since this society always desires to give commodities at their fair price, or even more cheaply in many cases, by causing manufactured goods to be produced locally rather than having them imported.”

Moreover, a community of principle would exist among all countries in which such a conception were implemented, such that “no country . . . will be favored over the other, rather each shall be made to flourish in those areas in which God and Nature have allowed it to excel.”

In the second essay, Leibniz calls for the creation of a society or academy to advance man’s mastery over nature through science and technology. He calls for the creation of “opportunity and arrangements for many excellent and useful thoughts, inventions, and experiments”; “to supply and make useful resources and funds, and other things lacking, on a large scale”; “to join theory and experiment”; “to establish a school of inventors”; “to maintain the nourishment of the people, to establish manufacturing”; “to improve the schools, furnishing the youth with exercises, languages, and the reality of the sciences”; “to test and be able to work out everything in chemistry and mechanics”; “to support poor students”; “to support useful people on the land”; and so forth.

In 1672, one year after he authored these two seminal works on the science of physical economy, Leibniz travelled to Paris, where he worked until 1676 in the political orbit of Louis XIV’s Minister of Finance, Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), whose economic policies, clearly in harmony with those of Leibniz, would later become the basis for the economic transformation of Spain.

As we shall see, the principles Leibniz outlined in these memoranda, were precisely the policies which Carlos III implemented in Spain, assisted by such ministers as the great Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes and José Moñino (Conde de Floridablanca).

The Bourbon Succession

Taken as an isolated fact, it is true that G.W. Leibniz opposed the Bourbon succession in Spain, and supported the succession of the Hapsburg pretender, the Archduke of
Austria. But, what was Leibniz’s intent? As he expressed it in his 1703 “Manifesto for the Defense of the Rights of Carlos III [Hapsburg],” his concern was that France under Louis XIV, who had fomented numerous imperial wars in Europe, would absorb Spain as a province, and pose an imperial threat to the peace of Europe that had been established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Years’ War. Leibniz argued that the will of Carlos II, which established the succession, violated the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), which had brought peace to Europe by ensuring that France and Spain would never be ruled jointly by the French crown.

This was certainly a legitimate concern on Leibniz’s part. Carlos II, who was demented, had indicated previously that he intended the Archduke of Austria to be his successor. However, before his death, a new will was presented to him by his advisers, naming the Duke of Anjou, grandson of France’s Louis XIV of the House of Bourbon, as successor, and arguing that the cause of concern expressed in the Treaty of the Pyrenees was no longer valid.

As a result, the Duke of Anjou became Philip V of Spain (r. 1700-1746), arriving in Spain on Jan. 28, 1701. He was soon challenged by a European Grand Alliance between the Hapsburg Emperor, the King of England, and the Estates-General of the Low Countries concluded at the Hague in September of that year. The statement of this Alliance argued that, “this union of France and Spain shall, before very long, make them so enormously powerful, that they shall be able, at will, to force the whole of Europe to bow down under the yoke of their wretched tyranny,” and it proclaimed the Hapsburg Archduke Carlos of Austria to be “Carlos III” of Spain. This precipitated what became known as the War of Spanish Succession, the struggle between the Bourbon and Hapsburg dynasties for control of Spain, until, in 1712, Philip V brought an end to the war by renouncing his claim to the French throne.

It is ironic that, despite Leibniz’s opposition, the Bourbon policies in Spain under Philip V, his son Fernando VI, and finally Carlos III, were more an expression of his commitment to the General Welfare, than the policies of England, whose first Hanoverian King, George I, had the opportunity to bring Leibniz into his government, but refused. Such are the ironies of history.

‘I Shall Devote My Attention
To Improving the Welfare of My Subjects’

Carlos III was born on Jan. 20, 1716 in Madrid, following the War of Spanish Succession. For the first seven years of his life he was entrusted to the care of a Spanish governess. After that age, he was given his own apartments in the Escorial. He acquired a working knowledge of Latin, Italian, German, and French, as well as a certain amount of history both sacred and secular, under the direction of the Conde de San Esteban. He was also taught the basics of military tactics, naval science, geometry, and fortification. Later, he added an interest in mechanics.
Carlos was the son of a French father, Philip V, and an Italian mother, Isabel de Farnesio of Parma. At age 15, in October 1731, he left Spain to become Duke of Parma, which position he gained through his mother. Not only did he become the Duke of Parma and Piacenza, but also heir to the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, which included the great Renaissance city of Florence.

Two years later, in October 1733, the War of Polish Succession broke out when, at the death of the King of Poland, Stanislaus I sought to regain the Polish throne, supported by his son-in-law, Louis XV of France. The rival candidate was supported by the Hapsburg Holy Roman Emperor, and by Russia. Spain and Sardinia allied with France, the former with the intent of recovering Naples and Sicily, which it had ceded to Austria in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht at the conclusion of the War of Spanish Succession.

It was in response to this conflict between Bourbon and Hapsburg that the first of three Family Compacts between Paris and Madrid was concluded. Although Spain would remain a sovereign nation under the Bourbon kings, for the remainder of the Eighteenth century, there was an alliance between the two sovereign nation-states.

On Jan. 20, 1734, his eighteenth birthday, Carlos emerged from his minority spent under the control of a Regency, and declared himself to be “free to rule and administer our States independently.” As the war raged, Carlos, encouraged by his mother to conquer the Two Sicilies (Naples and Sicily), on May 10 entered Naples, which had been ruled by the Hapsburgs since 1707. He was now not only the Duke of Parma, but also the King of the Two Sicilies.

Carlos surrounded himself with trusted ministers in Italy, who formed a nucleus of advisers throughout his career, including when he became King of Spain. He later added to this nucleus, and in the process succeeded in developing a qualified and unified leadership that shared his political outlook, and became an effective instrument for implementing the revolution he effected. Although he benefited from the talented men who advised him, he was himself clearly the prime mover.

In Parma, Carlos’s chief adviser was at first his old tutor, the Conde de San Esteban (Santo Stefano in Italian). His Secretary of State was another Spaniard—the Marqués de Monte Alegre, who succeeded San Esteban. His Minister of Justice was Bernardo Tanucci, educated in law at the University of Pisa. Tanucci was first appointed legal adviser to Carlos as Duke of Parma, then marched south with the Bourbon army during the conquest of Naples, and then became Minister of Justice.

At the age of 23, five years after he became King of the Two Sicilies, Carlos took two decisive actions, which make clear his absolute rejection of the criminally racist policy of the Spanish Inquisition with regard to the Jews. In 1220, Friedrich II (Hohenstauffen), who ruled in Sicily and was the uncle of Alfonso X (the Wise) of Spain, had arranged for Jews to settle in Naples. This ecumenical policy was reversed in 1540, when Charles V, the first Hapsburg to rule Spain and the grandson of the Isabella and Ferdinand who had expelled the Jews from Spain in 1492, expelled them also from Naples. This ecumenical policy was reversed in 1540, when Charles V, the first Hapsburg to rule Spain and the grandson of the Isabella and Ferdinand who had expelled the Jews from Spain in 1492, expelled them also from Naples. Carlos, acting in the ecumenical tradition of Friedrich II and Alfonso the Wise, issued an edict on Feb. 13, 1739, opening Naples to Jewish habitation. He was denounced for this action as “Prince Carlos, King of the Jews,” by that anti-Christian faction of the Catholic Church allied with the Inquisition. The second, directly
related action which Carlos took, was to prevent the Inquisition from being established in Naples. These two acts, above all, provide insight into the moral intention of Carlos, and are a harbinger of the policies he was later to implement in Spain in respect to the Jesuits and the Spanish Inquisition.

Carlos’s father died on July 4, 1746. In keeping with his opposition to Hapsburg rule, Philip had given directions that he not be buried in the Escorial with the earlier Spanish monarchs, but at San Ildefonso. His son by his first marriage succeeded him as Fernando VI (r. 1746-1759).

With the death of his father, Carlos became his own man. He told the Sardinian ambassador: “I hope to make this kingdom flourish again and relieve it from taxes. . . . Apart from which, I have revoked a tax, and shall devote all my attention to improving the welfare of my subjects, since I wish to save my soul and go to Heaven.” This commitment to the General Welfare of his subjects was the guiding principle of Carlos’s rule not only in Naples, but later in Spain. He used his reign in Naples to prepare for his eventual transformation of Spain, just as King Louis XI of France (1423-1483) had instituted reforms in the province of Dauphine before becoming monarch and turning France into the first modern nation-state. What typified Carlos’s entire philosophy of government was his favorite saying: “First Carlos, then king” (“Primero Carlos, luego rey”). In other words, he was a man first, and his duties as King flowed from his obligations, as a man, to his fellow man. One is reminded of the Marquis of Posa’s appeal to King Philip II in Schiller’s Don Carlos—“Thus become among a million kings, a king!”

In 1746, Carlos put Leopoldo di Gregorio (1700-1785), better known as the Marchese di Squillacci (or Esquilache in Castilian), a Sicilian born in Messina, in charge of customs. He was in due course promoted to become Minister of Finance. In 1755, Tanucci was put in charge of Foreign Affairs as well as of Justice and the Royal Household, and Squillacci was by now Secretary of Finance, War, and Marine.

When Carlos’s half-brother Fernando VI died in August 1759, Carlos was named his successor. Carlos appointed his son Fernando III of Sicily and IV of Naples. He appointed a Council of Regency, with Tanucci at its head, to administer the kingdom during his son’s minority, and embarked for Barcelona in October, becoming King of Spain and the Indies at the age of 43.

As King of Spain, Carlos III was determined to bring about the transformation of Spain begun by his predecessors, but which had been hampered by the combined power of the Inquisition and the emerging British Empire. He would accelerate the economic development in Spain and in Spanish America, but to do that required strengthening the sovereignty of Spain as a nation-state through the suppression of the Society of Jesus, and reduction of the power of the Inquisition. It also meant implementing an aggressive anti-British foreign policy. To accomplish this he would have to assemble around him in his government a group of ministers committed to his vision.

Initially, Carlos made few changes, retaining most of his brother’s ministers. Most significantly, he replaced the Minister of Finance, Valparaiso,
with the Italian Leopoldo de Gregorio (Esquilache), who had headed the financial administration of the Kingdom of Naples, consolidating the functions of both Minister of Finance and of War. He retained Ricardo Wall, an Irishman, as Minister of State, while assigning Gerónimo Grimaldi, an Italian originally from Genoa, to be his chief diplomatic representative.

Spain had avoided participation in the Seven Years’ War between Britain and France, which had begun in 1756 under Carlos’s predecessor Fernando VI. Fernando’s Minister of State, the Marqués de Ensenada (1700-1785), had maintained a policy of strict neutrality, arguing that “[i]t would be idle for Spain to hope to equal France on land or England on sea. France and England will always be enemies: no peace between them will last. Spain will be courted by both, for she can turn the scale; so the right policy for Spain is to trim judiciously, avoid war, and carry out actively internal reform.”10

Carlos’s Minister Ricardo Wall was specifically opposed to an alliance between Spain and France against Britain. Carlos circumvented Wall, by posting Grimaldi as Spanish ambassador to Paris in February 1761, to propose a treaty between France and Spain that would replace Fernando’s policy of neutrality with a policy of opposition to the emerging British Empire. France’s Minister of State Choiseul and Spain’s Grimaldi brought about two treaties, one the Third Family Compact, signed February 1761, and the other signed in secret six months earlier, stipulating that, in the case of hostilities with England, Spain would declare war if no peace was arranged by May 1, 1762. Ensenada remained an opponent of Carlos, and would play a role in efforts to overthrow him during the Jesuit-orchestrated riots of 1766. The Anglophile Wall resigned in 1763, after the Treaty of Paris concluded the Seven Years’ War, and Carlos replaced him with Grimaldi, who held the post until 1776, when he was replaced by Floridablanca.

In the aftermath of the Treaty of Paris, Britain succeeded in establishing a new global empire, run by the British East India Company. But Spain came out better than she was entitled to expect: Cuba and Manilla were restored to her; and, although Florida was ceded to England, she received Louisiana from France in compensation, through a special treaty between the two Bourbon courts.

After 1763, the focus of opposition to the British Empire would center on the effort to establish a Leibnizian republic in North America. Louisiana, now under Spanish control, would become the base of Spanish operations in support of the American Revolution.

The Leibnizian Economic Policies of Carlos III

The Bourbon succession brought with it the impetus for reform of economic policy in Spain, based upon the policies of Jean Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683), minister of finance under King Louis XIV. When the Duke of Anjou arrived in Spain in January 1701 to become Philip V, he was accompanied by Cardinal Portocarrero. Portocarrero then asked Louis XIV for an economist capable of putting the Spanish finances in order, and Louis responded by sending Jean Orry (1652-1719), a disciple of Colbert.

Progress was slow in reforming the Spanish economy, owing to the entrenched power of the feudal nobility and Inquisition, and their Jesuit allies, and because of the ingrained habits of thought of an oppressed and uneducated population. However, under Philip’s son, Fernando VI, and finally under Carlos III, a revolution in political economy was accomplished, based on the dirigistic policies of Colbert and Leibniz, in opposition to both Hapsburg feudal policies, and the British policy of free trade. (Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, the “Bible” of British economic liberalism, did not even appear in a Spanish translation until 1794, six years after Carlos’s death.)

The implementation of Colbertian economic policies was done in direct opposition to the bestial policies which had wrecked Spain under the Hapsburgs. It was widely observed in Spain during the 1700’s, that the Hapsburg policies, beginning with the expulsion of the Jews and the Moors, had destroyed what Lyndon LaRouche has defined as the “relative potential population-density” of the nation. The Spanish population had fallen to its lowest-ever modern level between 1650 and 1680. In 1650, the population was less than 7.5 million,11 compared to France, with a population of 18 million, or Spain’s own population of 8.5 million at the turn of the Seventeenth century. Under the Bourbons, it surpassed 8.5 million by 1723, and by 1747 was approximately 9.5 million. In 1768, nine years after Carlos III came to power, it was 11 million; and in 1787, just before his death in 1788, it exceeded 11 million.

Leading political thinkers in Spain put the blame for its decline on the feudalistic policies of the Hapsburgs. Around 1764, a writer using the pseudonym Antonio Muñoz, attacked the policy of Philip III, which had brought about the decline in Spain’s population by expelling the Moors, who were good farmers and artisans. Nicolás de Arriquibar wrote a series of letters between 1764 and 1769 saying the country’s
prime need was to revive the industry that Philip II's erroneous taxation policy had ruined. And Juan Pablo Forner asserted in 1787 that the revolutions of Charles V's day were the “origin of our decadence.” He called for the writing of histories that would tell the truth about the period of Hapsburg rule, during which Philip II had furthered the decline by squandering Spain's wealth throughout Europe, and the growth of the clergy had quickened the depopulation of the country. According to Forner, one had also to study the expulsion of the Jews and Moors. He asked: “Was the exile of four million Spaniards, in whose hands lay the nation's commerce and agriculture, just and necessary, or senseless?”

Gerónimo de Uztariz’s Teorica y práctica de comercio y de marina (Theory and Practice of Commerce and Merchant Marine), published in 1724 and re-published under government auspices in 1742, was based on Colbert. Two other writers, Bernardo de Ulloa and Minister of Finance José del Campillo y Cossio, joined Uztariz about 1740 in urging the need to increase Spain's manufactures, commerce, and population. Under their influence, Philip V ordered the translation of all of Colbert’s works into Spanish. Further reflecting this influence, in 1762 Miguel Antonio de la Gándara urged the government to encourage a growth in population and build factories.

Bernardo Ward, an Irishman, settled in Spain and became a royal official under Fernando VI. He was sent by this king on a tour of Europe and of Spain, to observe foreign economic progress and recommend domestic improvements, and was eventually made Minister of Commerce. He wrote down recommendations in 1762 in a work entitled Proyecto económico (Economic Plan), although he died before it was published in 1779. (The role of Bernardo Ward in promoting physical economy in Spain is especially interesting, given the role of two other Irishmen, Mathew Carey and his son, Henry C. Carey, in later promoting the American System of economy in the United States and internationally.)

Carlos III’s most famous ministers, Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes (1723-1803) and José Moñino (later Conde de Floridablanca) (1728-1808), took up where Ward had left off. Campomanes often drew on Ward. In 1774, he wrote his Discurso sobre el fomento de la industria popular (Treatise on the Promotion of Public Industry). This treatise was sent with royal approval by the Council of Castile to all local governing officials and bodies of Spain, and to the bishops for distribution to the parish priests and religious orders.

This and another work which he wrote a year later in 1775, entitled Discurso sobre la educación popular de los artesanos y su fomento (Treatise on the Public Education of Artisans and Their Advancement), were crucial instruments in educating and mobilizing the population through Economic Societies, to implement a Leibnizian economic policy in Spain during the reign of Carlos III. Like the reports submitted in the 1790’s by U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton to the U.S. Congress on
the subjects of Manufactures, Public Credit, and National Banking, these treatises helped to promote the political-economic thinking among the elite, as well as the population as a whole, necessary to promote the General Welfare.

The following excerpts from Campomanes’ work clearly reflect his Leibnizian commitment to the General Welfare as a reflection of the Platonic-Christian concept of agapé, or love. They feature the commitment on the part of Carlos III’s regime to public education, scientific research, industrial development, population growth, and productive employment, as a radical replacement for the feudal policies which characterized over two centuries of Hapsburg rule:

FOREWORD

. . . This treatise is directed to the praiseworthy end, that the people and the Magistrates come together with patriotic fervor to promote, in accordance with their abilities, general utility in Spain, and to destroy the injurious and vulgar opinion by which, without justification, Spaniards are labeled lazy, providing them the means not to be so . . .

Charity toward one’s fellow man, so commended in Christian morality, is surely the means by which to assist the state, whose true wealth resides in no one within the kingdom lacking a productive occupation, fitting his abilities, with which to support and raise his children . . .

. . . It is impossible to love the public welfare, and praise the unruly passions of idleness. The activity of the common people is the true motor which can lead to prosperity, and toward that end this presentation is directed.

I.

Agriculture without the arts [skilled crafts] is feeble. . . . What is to become of a large portion of the people, if the arts are ignored, and attention is placed only on agriculture and cattle-raising?

V.

The means by which to engender both basic and more developed industries are very simple, but require effort and instructors to educate the people, as well as offering them any assistance necessary . . .

3. . . . The establishment of economic and agricultural Academies, to examine the means of promoting these industries, translating the best works written in this field outside of Spain, can make accessible the most important discoveries . . .

8. Mathematics can facilitate the knowledge, invention, and perfection of machines, in order to use them in the arts or any employment. For the same reason, at least one Master or Professor of mathematics with a good salary should be assigned to the capital of the province, and there give classes to everyone wishing to learn, and resolve any doubts they might have in the application of the arts and its instruments, machines, and activities subject to calculation. These same methods, which have instructed much poorer and undeveloped nations, must necessarily produce important effects in Spain. . . .

VII.

. . . So long as there exists in any province, a tree, herb, fruit, mineral, or living product whose use is unknown, it should be admitted that its inhabitants are still deprived of the essential information demanded of well-established industry. It is a great error to bring from abroad that which can be produced in the country more cheaply, and without losses to the national accounts.

VIII.

. . . Where public industry is well established, parents don’t complain about having too many children, or that they lack daily employment and sustenance; rather, they rejoice in having a large number of children . . .

If it is true that a nation’s strength consists in having a large number of common people, it is axiomatically certain that public industry is the real nerve center by which this power is sustained.

IX.

The quantity of manufactures is multiplied in proportion to the facility of producing them . . .

[Such] comparisons and observations can only be done by patriotic corps modelled on the Basque Society of Friends of the Country (Sociedad Vascongada de los Amigos del País), analyzing through experiment and calculation all applications and savings. It is not possible for the common people to do such comparisons with guaranteed accuracy and certainty, without the attendance and aid of the distinguished and serious individuals of each province, united by association and correspondence, who summarize their observations in “Academic Memoranda,” and make them available to the public on a continuous basis.

Everyone desires, and with good reason, the promotion of industry, but if they are asked in what the industry consists, what its current status is in their province, what areas or crops are increasing or decreasing, what causes lead to their decline, and what aids are required to prevent this, we should have to confess that there is not a man who possesses, or is able to acquire, this practical knowledge.

Don Bernardo Ward, the Minister who left the Junta de Comercio (Board of Trade) and who was knowledgeable about Europe’s general situation in terms of trade and manufactures, felt that this lack of information was very harmful to the government, but could be obtained by designating individuals to visit the provinces, and inform themselves of the products, industry, and condition of the whole . . .

The nobility of the provinces, which normally lives in idleness, would in the Economic Societies usefully occupy their time in experiments and research . . . and, without incurring any state expense, the nobles would become the promoters of industry and a permanent support to their
compatriots. The kingdom would have a growing number of educated people to consult and employ according to their talents, and they would dispel the concerns and political errors which ignorance propagates, to the detriment of the nation. In this way, there would be no inhabitant of Spain who, according to his class, would not contribute to our national wealth.

XV.

Nothing is more detrimental to public industry than the establishment of guilds or special privileges, dividing the people into small groups, and exempting them in many cases from the laws. Should this practice be repeated, negative consequences are to be feared against the growth and benefit of manufactures.

Promotion of the arts is incompatible with the imperfect existence of guilds.

XVII.

As they are beneficial, those arts lacking in a nation must be introduced, and this is achieved either by sending citizens abroad to learn them and return, or by bringing skilled foreigners here to teach them in Spain. If either of these is done at public expense, these occupations will more easily be fully perfected. The difficulty sometimes arises from not having the means to defray these expenses, or in depriving people of the arts so beneficial to them, or not applying the policies needed to promote such industry.

If the sciences require well-endowed public schools in the absence of private institutions, then public industry is no less deserving of a free and adequate educational system.

XVIII.

The way that prisoners are treated is a great loss to industry. This is a point which deserves careful study and better regulations. Housing so many criminals in a prison, without employment, indirectly offers them new ways of learning how to break the law and they generally leave more incorrigible.

A sizeable population is the state’s greatest good, and the foundation of its true power. It is therefore not unimportant to consider making use of vagrants and criminals, commuting many harsh sentences found in our antiquated laws, which no longer reflect the customs and enlightened thinking of this century. This is not to criticize things of the past, but to present our reflections to our legitimate superiors, in the event that some might meet with their approval.

XX.

In order to be useful, the Economic Society should be made up of the country’s most educated nobility. They possess the most abundant and best lands, and have the greatest interest in promoting the people’s well-being, whose industry renders a return on their holdings.

1. The Society shall take care to promote the education of the nobility, love of the King, and of the nation. A nobility lacking education doesn’t display the honor which by birth it should. The Basque Society knows that this education is the basis for insuring the stability and usefulness of such political associations.

8. . . . Agriculture, cattle-raising, fishing, factories, trade, navigation, . . . and the scientific studies needed to promote these activities, should be the subject of examination by the Economic Societies, by translating those good works published abroad, with notes and reflections adapted to our country, and doing experiments and political calculations in these areas.

18. These Academies can be considered as a public school for the theory and practice of political economy in all of Spain’s provinces, entrusted to the nobility and well-to-do individuals, who are the only ones with the means to dedicate themselves to this kind of study.

What is not taught in the universities or in other schools, will be taught to the kingdom’s nobility in these Societies, and within a short time, shall be extended to the people, so they shall learn the means of enriching themselves, and serve the King and the nation, in whatever exigency. Then these projects would not be chimerical and based on privileges and oppression, as is now the case in those normally presented, whose authors do not have a vision of what is compatible or repugnant to the general welfare of the state, as they lack the necessary studies and books.

22. . . . The use that any product might have for industry or trade should immediately arouse the curiosity and study of the Friends of the Country, in its conferences and academic treatises. Nor should they fail to read primary works that facilitate their perfect understanding, so as to be able to speak knowledgeably and appropriately to the groups or individuals, so deserving of our common respect.

We can conclude that, basing itself on the method of inspiring in these Societies the love of the common good, Spain will be able to gather unto itself the knowledge which has taken other nations centuries and immense expense to acquire, and through great effort on their part, eventually attaining the due state of perfection.

Cross-Fertilization of Ideas

This “love of the common good,” a uniquely Leibnizian conception later expressed in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, was what led the Bourbon kings of Spain, and especially Carlos III, to promote scientific research and education in collaboration with like-minded Leibnizian networks in other nations. This cross-fertilization of ideas occurred in respect not only to other European nations and to Spanish America, but also to the Leibnizian circles of Benjamin Franklin’s American Philosophical Society.

In 1751, a favorite student of Linnaeus was brought to Spain to improve its botanical studies. Three observatories were erected in Spain by Fernando VI and Carlos
III. A botanical garden was created in Madrid in 1755; later, four others were established in major provincial cities. The Royal Academy of Fine Arts and the Royal Academy of Language were both founded in 1752. A Museum of Natural History (Gabinete de Historia Natural) was instituted by Carlos. Carlos founded new schools of medicine, and began a campaign to make common in Spain the recently discovered inoculation against smallpox.

As pointed out by Carlos Cota in a speech given in 1982, Carlos III also launched a series of botanical expeditions in the Americas and the Philippines, the results of which were utilized by the later work of Alexander von Humboldt and Aime Bonpland. (In fact, it was Carlos III’s minister Floridablanca who was responsible for obtaining permission from Carlos IV for Humboldt’s 1799 mission.) The first expedition was sent to Peru and Chile in 1777-1778. At the very end of his reign, Carlos III sent a botanical expedition to Mexico, which visited California, Mexico, Guatemala, and several islands in the Atlantic. Before his death, Carlos III initiated the exploration of the Philippines, and sent a botanical expedition to New Granada (present-day Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama).

There was extensive cooperation between Spain and the networks of Benjamin Franklin and his Philadelphia-based American Philosophical Society. In 1784, near the end of Carlos’s reign, the Spanish Academy of History (established 1738) honored Franklin with membership. Also, late in the reign of Carlos, Campomanes became a correspondent of the American Philosophical Society.

Periodicals promoting the sciences sprang up: One, the Espíritu de los mejores diarios literatos que se publican en Europa (Spirit of the Best Literary Publications Published in Europe), a private journal, was begun in July 1787. It published several letters by Benjamin Franklin on naval science and his smokeless stove, on July 9, Dec. 10, and Dec. 13, 1787.

Of Espíritu’s total subscribers in 1789, some 36% were in Madrid, 53 percent in the Spanish provinces, and the rest in North America. It even boasted readers in New York: “El Excmo. Sr. D. Juan Jay, expresidente del Congreso Americano,” and “El Dr. D. Benjamin Franklin.” Knowledge of Franklin was promoted: The Correo de Madrid gave a biography of Franklin in an article on natural science; on Jan. 12, 1789, the Espíritu translated the French epigram, “Franklin snatched lightning from the heavens, and the scepter from tyrants.”

Education was encouraged by every possible means.
The “Reales estudios de San Isidro” were established in what had been the Imperial College of the Jesuits, while the universities were improved by the reform of the “Colegios,” especially the six “Colegios mayores,” to include emphasis upon the sciences and economics. The library of the Jesuits at Madrid was turned into a public institution after their expulsion, and the city’s Royal Library was enlarged, receiving by right one copy of every book printed. Primary instruction was made obligatory in the new settlement of the Sierra Morena, schools for girls were founded in Madrid, and the education of the lower classes was encouraged.

The battle for these educational and scientific policies did not occur in a vacuum. Even though, for example, the Swiss jurist Emmerich de Vattel’s *Le droit des gens (Law of Nations)—a book which influenced the thinking of Franklin, Hamilton, and other American Founding Fathers—was available in Spain under Carlos III, it was listed by the Inquisition on the Index of proscribed books. In 1774, the Council of Castile held a contest for the best philosophy text by a Spaniard that would include the theories of Leibniz, but also those of Descartes and Malebranche. And in 1781, when the General of the Spanish Discalced Carmelites urged all his teachers to read Plato, Leibniz, and Cicero, he also included Aristotle and the modern Aristoteleans, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, Locke, and Condillac.

**Economic Reforms Under Carlos III**

* • Promotion of Manufacturing

In 1679, the task of reviving Spain’s commerce had been assigned to the Junta de Comercio (Board of Trade). The Bourbon kings increased its authority to include mining, manufacturing, and minting. After 1730, it was renamed the Junta de Comercio y Moneda (Board of Trade and Currency).

The Bourbons implemented a Colbertian policy: A number of government-supported factories were created, each with a monopoly in its field to produce luxury goods then being imported from other European countries. In 1718, a factory was built in Guadalajara for fine woolens. Factories were established at Madrid for tapestries, elsewhere for mirrors and fine glass, and silks. When Carlos III came from Naples he brought Italian artisans to establish a porcelain factory. Other factories were created for paper, pottery, swords, and stockings.

Carlos III appointed Campomanes, the civil prosecutor of the Council of Castile, to the Board, and it was Campomanes who led the movement in Spain to encourage industry. In his *Industria Popular* quoted above, he wrote that it was necessary to repeal those laws which treated labor as dishonorable and industry as degrading, to found industrial and agricultural schools, and to get the village priests to exhort their parishioners to work. Under the *caballero*, no knight could exercise the trade of a tailor, skinner, carpenter, stone-cutter, smith, shearer, barber, or any other “base and vile” trade, without being dishonored—a situation held up to ridicule throughout Cervantes’ *Don Quixote*. Moreover, nearly half a million Spaniards claimed to be nobles, more than in France, which had more than double the population of Spain. In March 1783, a decree of Carlos III entirely removed the *caballero*, and all trades were declared to be “honest and honorable.”

Manufacturers, who had been restricted in every way, were allowed to work as many looms and produce as much as they pleased, and woolen and linen goods were freed from internal duties. Duties were taken off foreign flax and hemp, as well as off all machinery for Spanish factories, and native flax and hemp were exempted from the taxes known as “alcazaba” and “cientos.”

At the same time as internal duties were removed, protective tariffs were erected. In 1775, the importation of foreign hardware was banned, in order to favor the growing Basque iron industry. Three years later, many small cloth articles, such as gloves, caps, and stockings, were kept out, so that domestic crafts employing women might prosper. Foreign furniture was also prohibited, and in 1788, all cloths and other products of linen, wool, and cotton. Export of raw materials produced in Spain was restricted, so that domestic manufacturers would not have to compete in the European market for their supplies.

The three regions that were centers of industrial activity were Valencia, Catalonia, and the Basque provinces. Industry grew during the 1700’s, encouraged by the royal ordinances, which permitted more and more direct trade with America. Spain’s trade with its colonies had been hampered by the system of monopolistic “flotas,” or fleets, which were supposed to sail every two years from Spain to the colonies. In 1778, the “flotas” were abolished, and trade began to expand between Spain and her colonies.

The woolen industry abandoned the feudalistic guild system in favor of wage work. The cotton industry was promoted by a royal decree of 1730 forbidding imports of all foreign cotton cloth, to protect those Spanish factories already in existence. In 1741, the government gave tax and tariff concessions to the factories of printed cottons and other cotton cloths.

In 1765, restrictions on the corn trade were removed, and two years later all interior trade was freed from any regulation. These measures destroyed the guild structure so admired by today’s Synarchists.
• Infrastructure Development

The essential effect of infrastructure development is to cheapen the cost of production throughout all phases of the national economy, thus expanding the free energy available for further progress in living standards and the rate of technological development.

Under Philip V, a system of wagon roads was begun, radiating out from Madrid to the Basque region, the Mediterranean ports, and Cadiz. Carlos III built highways during his reign in the Basque region and along the Mediterranean coast from Valencia to the French border. Stagecoaches were initiated, and a regular postal service was established.

For purposes of navigation, communication, and irrigation, Carlos’s councillors proposed a series of canals that would tie central Spain to the sea. One, which had already been conceived by Carlos V, was to run beside the

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**Excerpts from Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes, ‘Treatise on the Promotion of Public Industry’ (1774)**

**FOREWORD**

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. . . Where public industry is well established, parents don’t complain about having too many children, or that they lack daily employment and sustenance; rather, they rejoice in having a large number of children. . . .

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A sizeable population is the state’s greatest good, and the foundation of its true power.

XX.

We can conclude that, basing itself on the method of inspiring in these Societies the love of the common good, Spain will be able to gather unto itself the knowledge which has taken other nations centuries and immense expense to acquire, and through great effort on their part, eventually attaining the due state of perfection.

—translated from the Spanish by Cynthia Rush
Ebro River, from Tudela to the Mediterranean Sea, and give new life to Navarre and Aragon. A second was planned from Segovia along the river beds of Old Castile, past Valladolid and Reynosa, to enter the Bay of Biscay near Santander. Late in Carlos's reign, a French engineer proposed to build a third canal from Escorial and Madrid south to the Atlantic, crossing New Castile and La Mancha by the best river valleys, and entering the Guadalquivir River above Cordoba. All but the third canal were completed.

**National Banking**

During the American Revolution, when an increase in taxes and loans from merchants and bishops failed to supply enough money to fund the war, Francisco Cabarrus, a French-born financier, was authorized to issue interest-bearing royal bonds, known as “vales reales,” which would circulate as legal tender. Repeated issues finally forced them off par, and in October 1782 they were being discounted at 22%. In part to meet this threat to royal credit, Cabarrus was authorized in June 1782, in response to a proposal by Floridablanca to the King to found the first national bank of Spain, the Banco de San Carlos, with the task of redeeming the vales. To ensure its financial strength, the bank was given a monopoly on contracts to supply the army and navy and on exporting specie, and was to receive a commission for services in both cases. After the signing of the Treaty of Paris in January 1783, the bank began to retire the vales. These not only recovered their value, but circulated at 1 to 2% above par in the years 1786 to 1792.

The bank encouraged industry, by providing an outlet for capital. It supplied funds for new bridges, roads, canals, and other improvements. It furthered industry by promoting the capacity of the government to borrow, and the readiness of the public to lend.

This bank, which was formed prior to the creation of the First National Bank of the United States by Alexander Hamilton in 1790, may very well have been an inspiration to that undertaking.

**Societies to Promote the Arts and Sciences**

Reflecting the influence of Leibniz’s memorandum of 1671 “On the Establishment of a Society in Germany for the Promotion of the Arts and Sciences,” in 1765 a license was granted to form the “Sociedad Vascongada de Amigos del Pais” (Basque Society of Friends of the Country) to encourage agriculture, industry, commerce, and the arts and sciences. Three years later, Carlos III became its patron, and the society added “Real” (Royal) to its name. As reported above, Campomanes supported it in his *Discurso sobre el fomento de la industria popular*. In June 1775, a license was granted to found a similar society in Madrid—the “Real Sociedad Económica de Madrid” (Royal Economic Society of Madrid).

These societies largely followed the outlines drawn up by Campomanes in his *Industria Popular*. They encouraged industry, proposed reforms in taxation, commerce, agriculture, and looked after the poor. They offered prizes for the best essays on given subjects, founded free schools, and organized committees for the purpose of providing poor women with work.

The society in Segovia, for example, got the bishop to reduce the number of religious holidays, so that artisans could put in full weeks of work. The society in Madrid opened its doors to women in 1786.

Reactionary elements of the Church were hostile to the economic societies, while other clergy gave them their active support. Between 1770 and 1786, the Sociedad Vascongada had 96 ecclesiastical members, nine of whom were officers of the Inquisition. Five bishops and a monk were directors of societies in 1789.

**Land Reform in the Interest of the Public Good**

In the 1760’s, a situation existed in Spain very similar to that which existed in Mexico prior to the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Fully one-sixth of the land of New and Old Castile and Leon were owned by various religious institutions. Clergy could sell their crops without paying the “alcabala,” a tax collected in Castile on most sales.

Contemporary economists lamented that the growth of feudal landholdings, both “mayorazgos” (private hereditary estates) and the “manos muertas” (mortmain: ecclesiastical property held in perpetuity), had taken too much land out of circulation.

Moreover, vast flocks of merino sheep, held by the nobles’ official monopoly called the Mesta, were allowed to overrun pasture land, destroying both local farm crops and livestock. This situation had been described by Cervantes two centuries earlier—and also by Sir Thomas More for England, in his *Utopia*.

Carlos III, as well as his two Bourbon predecessors, sided with the small farmers and tenants, and favored grain cultivation over the sheep-raising of the Mesta.

In 1760, Carlos decreed a special committee of the Council of Castile, known as the Contaduría General de Propios y Arbitrios (General Accounting Office of Property and Rates), to supervise municipal finances. In 1766, two new sets of officials were established in each municipal council, to be elected by all local taxpayers. They were known as “procuradores síndico personeros del público” (Prosecutors Representing the Public Interest) and “diputados del común” (Deputies of the People), and were to intervene in the supply of food for the cities and towns.
After the Jesuit-instigated riots in 1766 (see below), Carlos encouraged more wheat cultivation. The Council of Castile, now headed by the Conde de Aranda (1719-1798) and advised by Campomanes, ordered the distribution of land to local citizens at a low fixed rent.

In 1771, Campomanes and Moñino (Florida Blanca) proposed to distribute privately held pastureland, if necessary, in the interest of “the public good.” The objective of these reforms was to repopulate the vast tracts of pasture and wasteland with the laborers and tenants who were suffering exploitation under the system of feudal landholdings.

In 1779, Campomanes was appointed president of the Mesta, and during the remainder of Carlos’s reign, he used his authority to weaken the institution, gradually abolishing the ban on enclosure.

To reverse the horrendous depopulation achieved by the Hapsburgs, it was undertaken to repopulate uninhabited areas with foreign colonists. German states had used this method for a century, and a Prussian entrepreneur named Thurriegel proposed to the Council of Castile to bring German Catholics to Spain for this purpose. Campomanes commended the plan, and Thurriegel was commissioned to negotiate the affair. It was decided to settle the newcomers in the Sierra Morena, a range of mountains on the boundary line of La Mancha and Andalusia, completely deserted except for four inns. The government entrusted the new settlements to Don Pablo Olavide, a Peruvian. Over a few years, 44 villages and 11 flourishing towns of German and French immigrants spread over more than 1,000 square miles.

This settlement became a laboratory in which various reforms were tried, and then implemented elsewhere in Spain. For example, the freedom of election to municipal office, the right of enclosure, and educational reforms were first tried out in the Sierra Morena, before being extended to the whole nation in 1788.

**Tax Reform to Benefit Labor**

Carlos III introduced reform of the tax structure, to shift the burden of taxation from the poor to the nobility.

There were three kinds of oppressive taxes in the kingdom: (1) national levies, consisting of the customs, the tax on trade with America, and various monopolies; (2) provincial levies, such as the “alcahala” and “cientos,” the “milones,” and the “tercios reales”; and (3) regional levies, such as the tax on mines, rights of chancery, fines, imposts on the clergy, and others.

The alcabala was a sales tax of 10%, to which was added the cientos, a tax of 4%, making 14% in all; it was imposed each time an article changed hands. The mil- lones was an excise levied on various articles, such as wine, oil, vinegar, and soap. The tercios was nominally 3/9, in reality 2/9, of the ecclesiastical tithes, which went to the Crown. The provincial taxes were raised only in Castile and Leon. In Catalonia, they were replaced by the “cadastro,” a sales tax of 10%, similar to the alcabala; in Aragon, by the “equivalente”; and, in Majorca, by the “talla.” In addition to the tercios reales, the clergy contributed to the royal exchequer the “media annata,” or half a year’s income, on appointment to office, and in some cases the “mesada,” or income of one month.

Under Carlos III, the alcabala and cientos on meat, oil, wine, and vinegar were reduced by 5% in Castile and 8% in Andalusia, while the duty on fish, vegetables, and other articles consumed by the poor was fixed at 2%, and hens, eggs, pigeons, and so forth were free from any tax. Cattle dealers and farmers were allowed to sell their produce at 4%; manufacturers paid no tax, and their goods in retail were taxed at 2%.

These measures were implemented to alleviate the burden which weighed upon the working classes, for, as Carlos wrote in a confidential memorandum entitled “Instrucción Reservada” (see below): “As regards the tax of 5% on property, which is called a new impost, the reason for imposing it was the just and equitable one of relieving the poor consumers, laborers, farmers, artificers, and mechanics, on whom fell nearly all the burden of the taxes which I have reduced. It was an insufferable and crying injustice that the most powerful persons in the kingdom, living in luxury and abundance, should not pay taxes in proportion to their wealth.”

**The Economic Legacy of Carlos III**

Carlos III often would say: “I have not had time to do this, but it should be done in time.” When he died in 1788, it was his promotion and encouragement of economic development which was most highly praised in an eulogy written by the royal councillor Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos:

> It was reserved for Carlos III, to take advantage of the rays of light which these worthy citizens [the economists] had deposited in his works. The pleasure of disseminating them throughout his kingdom was reserved for him, and the glory of wholly committing his subjects to the study of economics. Yes, good King, see here the glory which shall most distinguish your name in posterity. The sanctuary of sciences is opened only to a small sector of citizens, dedicated to quietly investigating the mysteries of nature to then explain them to the nation. But yours is the job of assimilating your visionaries; yours that of communicating the light
of their investigations; yours of applying it to the benefit of your subjects. Economic science belongs to you exclusively, and to the repository of your authority.\textsuperscript{16}

A year before his death, Carlos III issued the “Instrucción Reservada” (“Confidential Memorandum”) to the State Council. It had been drafted for him by Florida-

The “Confidential Memorandum” which the State Council, formally created by me, should observe in all its points and areas, for the purpose of their knowledge and examination, decreed by me the eighth day of July of 1787:

12. The primary harm done by mortmain \textsuperscript{12} “manos muertas”: feudal landholdings, often ecclesiastical, held in perpetuity. The lesser disadvantage, although it is not a small one, is that such possessions remain exempt from taxes. But there are two greater ones, which are: imposing taxes on the remaining subjects, and letting the amortized [undeveloped] lands go to waste, deteriorate, and be lost, if the owners cannot take care of them, or if they are lazy or poor, as is the case, and as we so painfully see everywhere. There are no lands, houses, or real estate more abandoned and destroyed than those belonging to the beneficiaries or permanent foundations, causing untold harm to the State.

51. Asylums, hospitals and almshouses. During my reign, I have as much as possible promoted good policies for the people, prosecuting the idle, vagabonds, and lazy; banning indigence; rescuing the poor, disabled, orphans, the abandoned and sick; establishing financing, and aiding the hospitals and almshouses, and other establishments of this kind. There is, and always will be, much more to be done in this area, and [this area] shall demand much care. It would primarily be appropriate to have a regulation for these very important areas of policy, separating out aid to the poor and prosecution of the idle from the government’s [work] of maintaining asylums, hospitals, and orphanages, such that one group of authorized people would be in charge of the first area, and a second group the other. I wish to state to the Council my ideas, which have already been put into practice in part, so they may be continued, improved, and perpetuated, creating from them a system to support and propose the relevant measures for these groups.

52. Measures to eliminate idleness. It is not possible to eliminate or reduce [the number of] idle and indolent, if at the same time jobs are not provided in which these and others can work. Nor is it sufficient for this purpose to establish and promote factories, protect the arts, agriculture, and trade, if all professions and means of sustaining man are not honored, banishing that old concern that there are some dishonorable professions, or that any mechanical or manual labor injures the nobility and its self-conception. I have taken steps, in consultation with the Council of Castile, to eliminate these wrongs. But it would be good to encourage this idea further. Men, and especially the Spaniards, love honor; and everyone wants to be, or appear to be, a nobleman.

53. The Economic Societies promote the arts and seek to banish idleness. The creation of the Economic Societies, and the care these have taken to promote the arts, can banish this concern in part; they have incorporated many noblemen, and should be encouraged in this. It would also be useful to use the example of my beloved children, the Prince and Infante, who spend many hours of the day in all kinds of exercises and work in the useful arts. . . .

60. Academies of Science. The purpose of public instruction and the academies is to complement education, which is the solid instruction of my subjects in all [areas] of human knowledge. In this area, what is most lacking is the study of the exact sciences, such as mathematics, astronomy, experimental physics, chemistry, natural history, mineralogy, hydraulics, machinery, and other practical sciences. For the purpose of promoting among my subjects the study, application, and perfection of this knowledge, I have resolved to found an Academy of Science, and I particularly charge the Council to cooperate in this, and to frequently and opportunely remember it.

72. National Bank. I have found it appropriate to similarly charge the Council with the protection of the National Bank, without which trade would be lacking one of its most important supports, and the Crown its greatest and most efficient resource. All of the complaints, rumors, and attacks against an establishment of this kind, which have cost me some sleepless nights, are nothing compared to the usefulness which the nation and the government have derived, and will derive, from it. The Council should take care to address any particular defect that might exist, and can be remedied, but not to confuse that with the Bank’s general and solid usefulness and its permanence. To that end, I order that all the concessions and benefits I have granted be protected, and that the necessary ones be increased.

73. Communication in the kingdom’s interior. General foreign trade and domestic traffic must also be very protected, so as to facilitate the progress of [trade] with the Indies, and the export of its products, to provide a variety of supplies to the people, the circulation of its manufactures and products, and the mutual aid of the provinces of my dominions.

74. Canals for irrigation and navigation. Roads and canals for irrigation and navigation are necessarily used to this end; without them, there can be no facility of, or savings in, transportation [time]. The Council must make every effort to aid the respective ministers responsible for these areas, invent and propose to me the most effective means, and without constraint hasten the complete execution of these projects.

161. Employment of troops in public works. One important way to maintain and improve the vigor and robustness of the troops, their customs, and discipline, is to
employ them in public works, as was begun under my reign.

194. So that the Treasury may flourish, it is necessary to develop the kingdom; that is, its population, agriculture, arts, industry, and trade. I fear that more time and effort have always been spent in exacting or collecting taxes and rents, or in other areas of the royal Treasury, than in the cultivation of productive lands and the development of its inhabitants, who make this production possible. Today, we think differently, and this is my first charge to the Council, and to the minister in charge of my royal Treasury: that is, that more thought be given to cultivation than to enjoyment, by which means the end product will be greater and more secure.

Cultivation consists of developing the population, as well as agriculture, the arts, industry, and trade. I have indicated in another part of this memorandum the means by which to promote and develop these areas. I won’t repeat this to the Council, but trust my royal Treasury will do its part in covering the cost of its increase and improvement.

Excerpts from Carlos III’s ‘Confidential Memorandum’
To the State Council (1787)

This memorandum was drafted by Carlos III’s Minister José Moñino, Conde de Floridablanca.

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Cultivation consists of developing the population, as well as agriculture, the arts, industry, and trade.

205. Products made or produced in foreign kingdoms should be prohibited, because they harm our national industry.

—translated from the Spanish by Cynthia Rush
The menticide committed by the Inquisition and its defenders, epitomized by the racist expulsion of the Jews and Muslims who had been responsible for the flourishing of Andalusian Spain in earlier centuries, wreaked havoc on the economy of Spain and its possessions. Since the sole source of wealth is the human mind, any attempt to hamper the creativity of any human being, is to destroy the very basis for human progress and is therefore unjustifiable from any standpoint. Imagine the effect of such menticide on a whole nation!

In his essay, “The Legislation of Lycurgus and Solon” (1790), Schiller writes:

In general, we can establish a rule for judging political institutions, that they are only good and laudable, to the extent, that they bring all forces inherent in persons to flourish, to the extent, that they promote the progress of culture, or at least not hinder it. This rule applies to religious laws as well as to political ones: both are contemptible if they constrain a power of the human mind, if they impose upon the mind any sort of stagnation. A law, for example, by which a nation were forced to persist in a certain scheme of belief, which at a particular time appeared to it most fitting, such a law were an assault against mankind, and laudable intents of whatever kind were then incapable of justifying it. It were immediately directed against the highest Good, against the highest purpose of society. [Emphasis added]

The Jesuits were a supranational institution, which opposed the sovereignty of independent nation-states committed to the economic and educational development of their peoples. Their financial investments and privileges functioned as a brake on economic development, and their control over education functioned to control the population on behalf of the oligarchy. It was only natural, therefore, that they would form an alliance with the British and the Hapsburgs against the reforms of the Bourbon monarchs.

Carlos III’s first experience of the alliance of the British with pro-Hapsburg elements within the Catholic Church was while he was King of Naples, during the War of Austrian Succession, which broke out in December 1740. Carlos declared neutrality, but in December 1741 he was ordered by his father Philip V to send an army to join the Spanish force in Italy.

In August 1742, a British squadron approached the city of Naples and threatened the city with bombardment if Carlos did not halt his troops from acting in conjunction with those of Spain. According to one historian, “the insult to which he had been subjected rankled Carlos for the rest of his life, and influenced his attitude towards Great Britain when he succeeded to the Spanish throne.”

The appearance of the British squadron not accidentally coincided with an insurrectionary attempt against Carlos by a Hapsburg “fifth-column” in the city, which was led by the clergy. More than 800 people were arrested; one of the ringleaders was an Augustinian monk.
operating in Calabria, another Austrophile priest was a certain Abate Gambari. The same author notes: “Here, again, the effect upon the King personally was considerable, for he did not forget the part played by the clergy in the movement against him, and it undoubtedly weighed with him when the time came to investigate the charges against the Jesuits.”

First Portugal and France

Carlos III was not the first Catholic monarch to expel the Jesuits: They had been expelled from Portugal in 1759, and from France in 1764. Even earlier, the Jesuits had come under attack from the Papacy itself. In 1741, Pope Benedict XIV issued a Bull in which he disowned the Jesuits as “disobedient, contumacious, captious, and reprobate persons.”

The Jesuits thus considered themselves to be above the authority of the Pope, like today’s sede vacante (empty seat) opponents of the post-Vatican II Papacy, in addition to owing no allegiance to sovereign nation-states. This mentality led the Jesuits to support regicide against those kings who opposed their oligarchical influence. Friedrich Schiller accurately portrayed this mentality in his play Mary Stuart, in respect to the numerous attempts on the life of England’s Queen Elizabeth. Nor was the justification of regicide limited to kings, as the Jesuits were also suspected of assassinating Popes.

In Portugal, following an attack and wounding of King Joseph in September 1758, the Jesuits were accused of regicidal principles and practices by the Minister of State, the Marqués de Pompal. After an inquiry of three months, all members of the prominent Tavaro and Aviero noble families were arrested. It was reported that their papers proved the complicity of the Jesuits in a plot to assassinate the Portuguese monarch.

Sentence was pronounced against the Society in January 1759. It declared “legitimate suspicions” against “the perverse regular clergy of the Society of Jesus.” Of these, the most important were: their ambitious intent to make themselves masters of the reins of government; their arrogance prior to the criminal attempt upon the King, combined with their despondency after its failure; and, their intimate connection with the chief defendant, one Mascareñas. A certain Father Costa was even reported to have declared that any man who should murder the King, “would not be guilty of even a venial sin.”

Carlos was in Naples when these events took place.

In France, the fundamental issue was again that of national sovereignty. In an effort to rein in the Society, Louis XV of France appointed a commission, which ruled unanimously that the obedience owed according to the statutes of the Order to the General of the Jesuits, Lorenzo Ricci, who resided in Rome, was incompatible with the laws of France, and with the general obligations of subjects towards the sovereign. Louis proposed to Ricci that a Vicar be appointed for France, who would reside there, and be pledged to render obedience to its laws.

When, in 1762, Ricci refused, the French Parliament decreed that the Order should be excluded from the kingdom irrevocably and forever, citing its opposition to all authority, spiritual and temporal, ecclesiastical and civil; and, its having been designed with a view, first, to render it independent of such authority by any means, secret or open, direct or indirect, and, second, even to favor its usurpation of the government. The expulsion was widely supported by the Church in France.

The 1766 Riots in Spain

Carlos’s personal policy in Naples had been to limit the power of the Church to the sphere of religion. This policy was reflected in the Concordat of 1737 between Naples and the Holy See, which permitted the taxation of some ecclesiastical property and limited clerical jurisdiction and immunities, besides restricting the number of clergy in the kingdom. The clergy were restricted to spiritual duties; no priestly interference in the machinery of government was allowed; no bishop was entrusted with an
office of state; and all ecclesiastical censure on governmental acts was severely punished. Since the power of the clergy resided largely in their enormous wealth, measures were undertaken to check this power, both from the standpoint of national sovereignty, and also according to economic principles.

Soon after Carlos became King of Spain in 1759, these policies were tested by the head of the Inquisition, the Inquisitor-General Quintano. In 1761, Carlos III banished Quintano from Madrid for having published, without royal approval, a Papal Bull condemning the “Exposition de la Doctrine Chrétienne” of the anti-Jesuit French priest Mesenguy. From that time on, the Inquisition was forbidden to publish any Papal decrees without the King’s permission.

The immediate events which led to the expulsion of the Jesuits, however, occurred in 1766, when riots broke out against Carlos’s Minister of Finance, the Italian Esquilache (Squillacci). The Jesuits manipulated popular discontent against Esquilache in a broad plot to replace Carlos III himself with his brother Luis, possibly through assassination. Esquilache had angered the Church by previously restricting the power of ecclesiastical judges, and was now attempting to prohibit clergy from residing in Madrid without certificates of residence—i.e., imposing further government control over the Church institution. Most important, he had already obliged them to pay taxes.

Esquilache had also alienated the populace, by creating a monopoly in the sale of bread and oil, and by raising the price of both. Drought had caused crop failures for the previous two years, and the King and Esquilache, at great expense, had been importing corn from England, France, Naples, and Sicily. In spite of their efforts, however, the price of bread rose, and the hungry mobs were easily manipulated.

The riots were sparked by an order of March 10-11, 1766, drawn up by Esquilache, which forbade the wearing of wide-brimmed hats and long capes, which could be used to conceal the face, mandating instead that short capes and three-cornered hats be worn. This order was issued primarily to ensure that criminals not disguise themselves to avoid apprehension.

Immediately thereafter, on March 13, two civilians ran into the Calle de la Paloma shouting “Esto no ha de prohibirlo el marqués de Esquilache!” (“This won’t be prohibited by the Marquis Esquilache!”). Small riots followed on March 15 and 18, and from March 20 to 22, larger groups milled about the streets. There were more riots on March 23, Palm Sunday. Rioters ran to the Calle de Atocha yelling, “Viva el Rey! Viva España! Muera Esquilache!” (“Long live the King! Long live Spain! Death to Esquilache!”). They broke into Esquilache’s home and sacked it, burning his furniture. They also broke the windows at Grimaldi’s house (Grimaldi was also an Italian). On March 24, several members of the royal Walloon Guard, whose responsibility it was to guard the King, were killed—thus underscoring the threat to the life of Carlos himself.

It was widely suspected in official circles that the riot was not spontaneous, but had been carefully prepared. The dissatisfaction at the rise of food prices was merely the pretext for an insurrection against the policies of Carlos III. Some thought that the Marques de la Ensenada who, just freed from his exile at Medina del Campo, was hoping to take Esquilache’s place, was behind the riots. Ensenada hated the power of the Italians. “And what could be more understandable than that the Jesuits, so much beloved by Ensenada, had supported him?”

How serious the threat was to Carlos III personally is reflected in a report by the French Ambassador to Spain,
the Marquis de Ossun, of a conversation he had with the King:

The insurrection of 1766 had, however, opened his eyes, for he was certain that the Jesuits had fomented it, and had proofs that it was so, since several members of the Society had been arrested while distributing money to groups of rioters. They had been corrupting the bourgeoisie by calumnious insinuations against his government, and had only been waiting for a signal. The first opportunity had sufficed them, and they were content to concoct a pretext out of the most puerile trifles, the form of a hat here and a cloak there, the malversations of some superintendent, the knavery of some corregidor. Their enterprise had failed because the tumult broke out on Palm Sunday.

It was on Holy Thursday during the Stations that he was to have been surprised and surrounded at the foot of the Cross.21

Carlos suspected the Jesuits as a result of their increasing cooperation with the Inquisition against his reform policies. He further concluded that the Jesuits and the Inquisition wanted to replace him on the throne with his brother, Luis, a conclusion supported by a letter from Jesuit head Ricci to the Jesuit Rector of the Imperial College in Madrid, which was seized by police. It contained the slander that Carlos was not the son of Philip V, but of an adulterous connection between Isabel de Farnesio and Cardinal Guilio Alberoni, who was from Parma and became prime minister under Carlos’s father. If Carlos were illegitimate, then the rightful King was Luis.

One difference between Carlos III and the later Louis XVI in France was that the King of Spain, contrary to all his advisers, decided to face the mob and address their demands before leaving Madrid. Louis XVI, on the other hand, took no actions and fled without establishing control over the situation.

The demands of the rioters were presented to the King by a Father Cuenca, who allegedly persuaded them to put their demands in writing, and then personally waited upon the King with the petition demanding that: (1) Esquilache and his family be banished; (2) all foreign-born ministers be dismissed, and their places taken by Spaniards; (3) the Committee of Supplies (Junta de Abastos), which had a monopoly on supplying the city with provisions, be abolished; (4) the Walloons leave Madrid; (5) the people be at liberty to dress as they pleased; and (6) the price of provisions be lowered.

On March 24, Carlos promised to dismiss Esquilache. He appointed Don Miguel Múzquiz as Minister of Finance, and the Department of War was given to another Spaniard, Gregorio Muñíain. Carlos also promised to repeal the offending edict on dress; to reduce the price of bread, oil, soap, and bacon; to suppress the monopoly for supplying the city with provisions; and to pardon the insurgents. Then, that same night, Carlos, accompanied by the entire royal family, left Madrid for the country residence of Aranjuez, in order to ensure that he would not be held captive by the Jesuit-organized rioters in the capital.

At the same time he made these concessions, Carlos moved to gain control of the situation by appointing the Conde de Aranda, a confirmed enemy of the Jesuits, to head the Council of Castile, in place of Diego de Rojas, whose conduct had been very suspicious during the Madrid riots.

Aranda had been educated at Bologna and at the Military Academy of Parma, and had considerable experience in public life as Ambassador to Poland and as Minister of War. At the time of his appointment, he was Captain-General of Valencia. He was not only appointed President of the Council of Castile, but also Captain-General

Francisco Goya y Lucientes, dogmatic control of Church doctrine, from “Los Caprichos.” Left: “Devota profesion” (“Devout profession”). Right: “Tragala perro” (“Swallow it, dog”).
of New Castile. Along with Aranda, another enemy of the Jesuits was Carlos's long-time Italian adviser Bernardo Tanucci, who repeatedly denounced them: “The Jesuits are always the same, everywhere seditious, enemies of sovereigns and nations, public thieves, full of vices, and generally atheists.”

**Augustinians vs. Jesuits**

The conflict that erupted in the 1700’s between the Bourbons and the Jesuits was, in fact, a struggle that dated back to the efforts of Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa (1401-1464) to reform the Church, and to encourage the development of sovereign nation-states, by freeing the Church from the control of the Venetian feudal oligarchy. Cusa’s principal exposition of these ideas appears in his 1433 *Catholic Concordance*. Cusa exposed the so-called “Donation of Constantine,” which justified the Church’s ultramontane control over the affairs of civil states, as a fraud.

Later, during the 1545-1563 Council of Trent and the so-called “Counter-Reformation” which followed it, the Jesuits played a critical role in defending the ultramontane powers of the Church, in opposition to the emergence of sovereign nations, which had begun under Louis XI of France and Henry VII of England.

The philosophical divide in this conflict was between Plato, whose ideas were reflected by St. Augustine, and whose works were revived in Europe during the Golden Renaissance, and Aristotle, whose bestial views formed the basis of the ideology of the feudal oligarchy and their Jesuit agents. The fundamental issue was the conception of man and of society. Plato and St. Augustine viewed man as created in the living image of the Creator, and thus capable of cognition, or creative thinking. The Jesuits, in the tradition of Aristotle, denied that man was characterized by cognition, and insisted instead that he was only capable of “logic”—the deductive manipulation of concepts—derived ultimately from sense perception.

These two contrary views were of the utmost importance in the battle for economic development and for educational reform emphasizing scientific discovery and technological progress. Thus, when Cusa effectively launched modern science in the Renaissance with his 1449 *On Learned Ignorance*, his Aristotelean opponents mobilized almost immediately to suppress the influence of this work.

During the 1700’s, this fight was reflected in an ongoing battle for control over the direction of the Catholic Church, between the Augustinians and their Franciscan allies, on one side, and the Jesuits and their Benedictine allies on the other. The Franciscans had been philosophically Augustinian since St. Bonaventure became Minister General of the Order in 1257.

Throughout the century, the Jesuits fought the Augustinians over the writings of St. Augustine. In 1732, they attacked the works of the Augustinian Cardinal Enrique Noris (1631-1704), whom they accused of Jansenism. The Spanish Inquisition in 1732, and later in 1748, included on its Indexes various works which defended Noris, and in the latter year works by the Cardinal himself, despite Papal ordinances in his favor.

The conflict continued to rage within the Church hierarchy. In 1759, Pope Clement XIII, whom Carlos III considered to be controlled by the Jesuits, felt compelled to defend the Jesuits against alleged “libels in which glimpses are afforded of a plot to suppress the Society and to
foment disapproval of leave granted by the Bishops to the Jesuits to administer the holy Sacraments and to act as confessors. . . . [It is therefore the wish of His Holiness that any person who has been led to believe such falsehoods should now be undeceived, and should know that such an attitude is utterly foreign to the spirit of the Catholic Church. . . .]"

At the same time, Padre Francisco Xavier Vázquez, the General of the Augustinians based in Rome, was a declared opponent of the Jesuit Order. The Spaniard Manuel de Roda y Arrieta became a close friend of Vázquez, when he was stationed in Rome before his appointment as Carlos III’s Minister of Justice.

In Spain, all pre-university education was in the hands of the Jesuits, where they prevented the study of the physical sciences. They were powerful in America. This stranglehold would eventually be broken, with the Augustinians and their Franciscan allies playing a decisive role.

Carlos III himself loved the Franciscans, was a tertiary of the Order, and venerated the memory of Palafox y Mendoza (1600-1659), the Bishop of Puebla de los Angeles in Mexico, who had fought the Jesuits both in Spain and then later in Mexico.

Thus, although the immediate trigger for the expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain was the riots of 1766, the underlying issue was the philosophical question of the nature of man, and its implications for how human society should and must be organized.

Legal Proceedings Against the Jesuits

An Extraordinary Council was appointed, with Aranda as its head, to inquire into the cause of the riot. Aranda chose as his colleagues Miguel María de Nava and the civil prosecutor, Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes. They were later joined by Pedro Ric and Luis del Valle Salazar, and later still in October by the Conde de Villanueva, Andrés de Moraver y Vera and Bernardo Caballero. José Moñino (Floridablanca), the criminal prosecutor of the Council, was sent to Cuenca to investigate the causes of the riot there.

The first report, signed by Campomanes and his adviser Nava on June 8, 1766, condemned the Jesuits. Suspicions were laid at the door of Padre Isidro López, Procurator of the Society of Jesus in the Province of Castile, and proceedings were opened against Miguel Antonio de la Gándara, the Abbate Hermoso, and Benito Navarro. It was stated as almost a certainty that the Marqués de Valdeflores and Ensenada had participated in the events.

This report was confirmed at the meeting of the Council of Castile on September 11. Their report to the King on Jan. 29, 1767, advised expulsion. This report had
two parts: first, the motives for the necessity of expelling the Society of Jesus; second, the details of how this was to be done (the first part had vanished by 1815, some years after the 1808 Napoleonic invasion of Spain).

Another Committee examined the report, and on February 27 the royal decrees were signed by Carlos III.

The Council enumerated the charges against the Jesuits on April 30: despotic behavior of the new General Padre Aquaviva; its defense of probabilism, molinism, the doctrine of regicide; Malabar rites (adaptation to the practices of non-Christians, as in the case of missionaries in Malabar); its opposition to the reduction of its powers in Paraguay; its collaboration with the British (at the taking of Manila by the British, they had been in communication with Brigadier Draper); and even the constitution of the Society itself.

After the expulsion, the Inquisition made a feeble attempt to indict Aranda, Campomanes, Floridablanca, and the bishops who sat on the committee, as enemies of the Church. But it was easily silenced by a royal order to halt its proceedings. In 1770, the jurisdiction of the Inquisition was limited to cases of heresy and apostasy. It would be completely abolished only in 1813. Hence, it was the expulsion of the Jesuits which created the political conditions for the final containment of this bestial institution.

Five to six thousand Jesuits were expelled from Spain and Spanish America. A year later, in 1768, Carlos III decreed that the possessions of the Jesuits be confiscated.

In the night of March 31, 1767, all the Jesuit establishments in Spain were surrounded by the military. In the morning, when they were already a good way off, a decree was published forbidding any communication with them, or any comment either in speaking or writing upon the subject. The Pope refused to let them disembark at the Pontifical states, so they were taken to Corsica, and finally allowed to settle at Bologna and Ferrara.

As in France earlier, the decision to expel the Jesuits was supported by the vast majority of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Forty-six out of the 60 Spanish bishops approved of the expulsion.

The example of Spain was followed by Naples and Parma. In Naples, the moving spirit was Tanucci. Parma was governed by William du Tillot, a Frenchman, who had pressed for ecclesiastical reforms. A Papal Bull was published (“El Monitorio de Parma”—“The Monition of Parma”) nullifying du Tillot’s anti-ecclesiastical legislation, and excommunicating all those who had a share in it, or continued to obey it. In response, Naples occupied Benevento, France seized Avignon; the Jesuits were expelled from Parma; and negotiations were begun between the Bourbon Courts and Portugal, to arrange for a collective petition to Rome for the abolition of the Jesuits.

Spain, France, Portugal, and Naples presented memorials on the subject early in 1769. The death of Pope Clement XIII a few days later (February 2) cleared the way for a settlement, by the election of a new anti-Jesuit Pope. Clement XIV promised to concern himself with the question of the canonization of Palafox, the anti-Jesuit Bishop of Mexico, as advocated by Carlos III, and in November 1769, the Pope promised Carlos III he would disband the Jesuits.

On July 21, 1773, Clement published the Encyclical Dominus ac redemptor nostre, suppressing the Jesuits. Moñino had gone to Rome to pressure for this, and was repaid with the title of “Conde de Floridablanca.” Shortly thereafter, on Sept. 22, 1773, the Pope died, “not without suspicion of poison.”

Carlos III on Church-State Relations

Carlos III’s views on the respective roles of Church and State are most succinctly expressed in the “Confidential Memorandum” drafted for him by Floridablanca in 1787:

1. I charge [to you] the protection of the Catholic religion and good customs. Given that the first of my obligations, and that of all successors to my throne, is protecting the Catholic religion in all the dominions of this vast monarchy, it seemed appropriate for me to begin with this important issue, to manifest to you my strongest desires, that in all its deliberations, the Council have as its primary objective, the honor and glory of God, the preservation and propagation of our holy faith, and the change and improvement of customs.

2. Obedience to the Holy See in spiritual matters. The protection of our holy religion necessarily demands the faithful correspondence of Spain and its sovereigns with the Holy See; and thus the Council should contribute with all its efforts to sustain, affirm, and perpetuate this correspondence, such that, in no case, or by accident, would we cease to obey and venerate the resolutions affirmed canonically by the Pontiff, as the vicar that he is of Jesus Christ and primates of the universal Church.

3. Defense with prudence and decorum of the Crown’s right to appoint bishops, and of its royal prerogatives [jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters]. But, as, in addition to the Pontifical decrees issued canonically for spiritual matters, others might be included or issued related to the decrees of patronato [appointment of bishops] and royal prerogatives, or to matters of external discipline in which, by the same ecclesiastical decisions, and by royal laws as well as by customs immemorial, I have certain powers which can not and
should not be abandoned, without slighitng the most rigorous obligations of conscience and justice, it would behoove the Council, when it perceives some offense to those rights and prerogatives, to consult with me on the prudent and vigorous means of sustaining them, combining the due respect to the Holy See with the defense of royal preeminence and authority.

27. Instruction which should be promoted among the clergy. In the universities as well as in the seminaries, and among the regular orders, the study of the Holy Gospels and of the best-known Fathers of the Church should be promoted, as well as of the General Councils' original sources, and of healthy morals. It would be equally appropriate for the secular [parish priest] and regular clergy [in Orders] to study and cultivate public law... known as political and economic, and the exact sciences, mathematics, astronomy, geometry, experimental physics, natural history, botany, and similar things.

30. The spirit the clergy should possess in the education of the people. The conduct of the people will in large part depend on that of the clergy; and thus it, and its prelates, will be moved to banish superstition, and promote that solid and true piety consisting of love and charity toward God and one's fellow man, combatting relaxed morals and the opinions which have caused it.

31. That the bishops, through their pastorals, mandates, and exhortations, take care to root out superstitious practices. Superstition and false devotions promote and maintain idleness, vices, and spending of money, and undermine true religion and aid of the poor. For this reason, the Council should find the means to encourage bishops, priests, and ordinary prelates to contribute to these ends with their pastoral mandates, frequent exhortations, and even with spiritual punishments, thus enforcing those resolutions approved to reduce or shut down the congregations or guilds not committed to the sole objective of the true worship of God and aiding his fellow man. [There is no need] for profane and perhaps sinful parties and distractions, spending money on food, drink, and various pompositions which are harmful to my subjects.

32. The Inquisition could also cooperate toward this same end. Although by their ministering, the bishops are the ones primarily charged with guarding against superstition and abuses of religion and piety, in these and other points, the tribunal of the Inquisition of these kingdoms might very well do the same thing, contributing not only to punish, but to also instruct people in the truth, so they will know how to separate the wheat from the chaff: that is, religion from superstition.

33. It is therefore worth favoring and protecting this tribunal. In this matter, the Council should agree to favor and protect this holy tribunal, as long as it does not deviate from its purpose, which is to prosecute heresy, apostasy, and superstition, and charitably illuminate the faithful on [these matters]. But, as abuses tend to accompany authority, because of human misery, in the largest and most useful actions, we should take great care that under the pretext of religion, [the Inquisition] does not usurp the jurisdiction and royal prerogatives of my Crown, or disturb public tranquility.

Here, vigilance is crucial, because lacking in discernment, the people easily tend toward everything dressed in the disguise of religious fervor. Thus, the way to perpetuate among us the work of the Inquisition and the good effects it has had on religion and the state, is to moderate and contain it within certain limits, and restrict its results to all that is gentle and most in conformity with canonical law. Every moderate and lawful power is durable; but the excessive and extraordinary is abhorrent, and arrives at a moment of violent crisis, in which it tends to destroy itself.25

Thus, although Carlos III did not abolish the Inquisition, his defense of Spain's sovereignty against its interference, his insistence upon the education of the clergy in economics and the sciences, and his enlistment of the clergy and the Inquisition itself in an educational rather than punitive campaign against superstition, effectively contained the Inquisition and set the stage for its eventual abolition.

Spain’s Role in the American Revolution

Although the role of Bourbon France in supporting the American Revolution is highly celebrated, the role of Spain under Carlos III is less known. As we have documented, Carlos III, Europe's other Bourbon monarch, was firmly persuaded beginning with his experience in Naples, that Britain was his natural enemy, and that her defeat was absolutely necessary. In this, Carlos was not motivated by merely strategic designs, but rather by a commitment to promoting the General Welfare not only of the people of Spain and the Spanish possessions, but of the North American colonies as well. As was the case with France, Spain under Carlos was open to the republican reforms expressed by the movement led in North America by Benjamin Franklin.

In 1774, France's Louis XV died. Louis XVI, his grandson, came to power, and with him the ministers Anne Robert Jacques Turgot and Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes. When the American Revolution began, Vergennes strongly advocated that the revolution be secretly aided, whereas Turgot maintained that the true interest of France was to remain perfectly neutral.

Even before the arrival in Paris of the American representatives Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee, France had adopted Vergennes' plan, and Turgot had been dismissed.

A month before the signing of the Declaration of
Independence on July 4, 1776, France and Spain had set about giving financial assistance to the revolutionaries. Grimaldi wrote a letter from Madrid on June 27, 1776 to Aranda in Paris, in which he told Aranda that he had informed Carlos III of “secret discussions with the Comte de Vergennes on the subject of the aid which His Crown proposes to make available to the rebels in the British colonies and the other assistance they plan to afford them in secret. . . . His Majesty applauds the actions of the French Court and deems them well suited to the common interests of Spain and of France. . . . His Majesty has accordingly instructed me to send Your Excellency the enclosed credit of one million ‘livres tournois’ to be used in this enterprise. . . . Your Excellency is hereby granted leave to discuss with the Comte de Vergennes the best method of utilizing this sum of money and how best to ensure that it reaches the rebel forces.”

Silas Deane had come to Paris to see Vergennes. He was soon in communication with Aranda, the man who had expelled the Jesuits from Spain, and who had been appointed Spanish Ambassador to France by Carlos III in 1773.

Both Spain and France were, in principle, of like mind to aid the American Revolution against the British. Spain’s Minister of the Navy, José de Gálvez, ordered the Governor of Havana to send agents to Pensacola, Florida and to Jamaica.

Dispatches between Vergennes and Grimaldi discussed the conquest of Portugal, Minorca, and Gibraltar, all strategic assets of the British. Aranda considered an attack on Ireland.

In 1776, there was a ministerial upheaval in Spain. Floridablanca was recalled from his embassy at Rome to replace Grimaldi, who had resigned in November 1776. Grimaldi became ambassador to Rome.

Beaumarchais headed the Roderique Hortales et cie., founded to aid the American revolutionaries. Spain and France contributed one million livres each to form this company.

The American George Gibson visited the Governor of Louisiana, Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, to request a commercial treaty. By December 1776, Unzaga had received arms, munitions, clothing, and quinine, with orders to send them to support the Revolution. Powder and guns were also sent to them from Havana and Mexico.

On Oct. 26, 1776, Benjamin Franklin arrived in France. Arthur Lee, who was in London, joined him in Paris. Deane, Franklin, and Lee met with Aranda on Dec. 29, 1776, and then later on Jan. 4, 1777. They proposed an alliance among the American revolutionaries, France, and Spain. Aranda was in favor of a direct alliance.
Franklin was ready to go to Spain to make a treaty of alliance, as authorized by the American Congress, but Aranda dissuaded him from going at that time, knowing that Spain was not yet ready for a formal treaty.

Franklin, nonetheless, asked Aranda to communicate the following proposal to Carlos III, based on a resolution of the Congress (Dec. 30, 1776):

Should His Catholic majesty wish to make an alliance with the United States and wage war on Great Britain, the United States shall undertake to support any attack He may make on the port and city of Pensacola, always provided that the United States shall continue to be permitted to sail freely up and down the Mississippi and to make use of the port of Pensacola. The United States shall declare war on the King of Portugal (assuming that it prove true that the said King of Portugal has indeed provoked the United States by banning all her shipping from his ports and confiscating some of her vessels), always with the proviso that such an enterprise does not incur the displeasure of the French and Spanish Courts and that they are in a position to support it.

Franklin continued to Aranda:

On the assumption that the two nations be closely united in this common enterprise, and that they both deem it tactically sound to mount an attack on the British Isles in the Caribbean, Congress, in addition to what is set out above, proposes to provide supplies to the value of two million dollars and to furnish six frigates, each of at least twenty-four guns, fully equipped and ready to go into service in the joint fleet, and also to take all other measures at its disposal, as befits a true ally, to ensure the success of the said attack, and to do all this without being motivated by any desire whatever to occupy the said isles in her own name.

The ministers in Spain refused an immediate alliance as proposed by Franklin, but proposed to aid the Americans secretly. Arthur Lee left Paris for Spain in February 1777, returning after being told he would get help directly from Spain or from New Orleans, principally by the Gardoqui banking house, whose principal, Diego de Gardoqui, was a Spanish merchant who was to play a critical diplomatic role.

Gardoqui received from the Spanish Treasury first 70,000 pesos, and then another 50,000 pesos, to be sent to the Americans. Drafts in the amount of 50,000 pesos were also sent to Lee, and Gardoqui himself sent merchandise worth 946,906 reales, including 215 bronze cannon, 30,000 muskets, 30,000 bayonets, 512,314 musket balls, 300,000 pounds of powder, 12,868 grenades, 30,000 uniforms, and 4,000 field tents.

Diplomatic contact between Carlos and the American revolutionaries was ongoing. Juan Miralles was sent by Spain to the North American Congress, and John Jay and his secretary, Carmichael, went to Madrid to petition for continuing financial aid. When Miralles died at the end of 1780, Diego de Gardoqui was nominated to take his place.

The capitulation of Gen. Burgoyne at Saratoga in October 1777 had a major effect, both on the combatants, and on France and Spain. The American victory at the battle was the result of the supplies in arms, ammunition, uniforms, etc., sent by France and Spain to the newly formed Continental Army. Winning this battle was a turning point, both for the Continental Army and for Britain. The former was remoralized by its victory over the “greatest army” in Europe, while the latter was demoralized by its defeat.

In the case of Carlos III, the victory at Saratoga went a long way towards convincing him that Britain’s days of greatness were at an end. Spain was not yet ready to declare war against Britain, however. Burgoyne’s surrender, on the other hand, did convince the Court of France to declare openly against Britain, and in February 1778, France recognized the independence of Britain’s North American colonies, concluding treaties of alliance and commerce with them. Communication of this to England was met by a declaration of war. France officially entered the war on June 17, 1778.

While secretly supporting the American Revolution, in 1778 Spain offered to intervene, with Carlos III playing the role of mediator between Britain and the colonists. France agreed, and the Spanish embassy bargained with Britain for Gibraltar as the price of mediation. Britain refused, both because it refused to surrender Gibraltar, and because mediation would have given de facto recognition to the independence of the colonies.

When the British frigate Arethusa fired on the French Belle-Poule, Vergennes advised Floridablanca to put the Family Compact into action. Spain addressed a list of grievances to Britain, which were rejected in an answer written by none other than British Empire historian Edward Gibbon.

Spain Declares War on Britain

Spain finally declared war on Britain on June 21, 1779, at the same time recognizing the independence of the thirteen colonies.

Spain then undertook military activity against Britain, both in Europe and in the Americas. At Spain’s insistence, as a condition for entering the war in alliance with France, a plan was launched for a joint French-Spanish invasion of Britain. The initial plan was to capture the
Isle of Wight and Portsmouth, thus establishing French-Spanish control over the English Channel, while severely damaging Britain’s shipbuilding capacity, which was centered at Portsmouth. Even though the joint fleet sailed, the invasion, which was scheduled to take place soon after the Spanish declaration of war in the summer of 1779, was called off after a number of delays.

Nonetheless, the deployment of this French-Spanish fleet did have the effect of tying up British forces. The very threat of such an invasion prevented the British from deploying more heavily in the war against the colonies. Spain also decided on a blockade of Gibraltar, which was announced in June 1779. The blockade was ultimately unsuccessful, but again forced the diversion of British forces from North America.

The most important Spanish military actions took place in the Americas, however, where José de Gálvez, Minister of the Indies, whose nephew, Bernardo, was Governor of Louisiana, wanted to fight the British. He had been sent to Spanish America by Carlos III in 1765, had therefore supervised the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767, and had thereafter implemented educational reforms to promote economic development. Gálvez reported that, had Carlos not expelled the Jesuits, “America would have been lost” to Spain.29

On May 18, 1779, prior to the official declaration of war, the Spanish court sent notification to her colonial officials that war had been declared against Britain. The news reached Havana on July 17, at which point an order, reflecting Benjamin Franklin’s early military proposal to Carlos III, was sent to Bernardo de Gálvez in Louisiana “to drive the British forces out of Pensacola, Mobile, and the other posts they occupy on the Mississippi.”

A subsequent royal order was more precise: “The King has determined that the principal object of his forces in America during the war against the English shall be to expel them from the Gulf of Mexico and the banks of the Mississippi, where their establishments are so prejudicial to our commerce, and also to the security of our more valuable possessions.”

Hostilities between Spain and Britain began in 1779, when Roberto de Rivas Betancourt, Governor of Campeche in Mexico, sent two detachments against the British forces in the area. One detachment, under José Rosado, took Cayo Cocina; the other, under Colonel Francisco Piñeiro, destroyed the factories of Rio Hondo, and drove the British out of the Campeche region.

In August 1779, Bernardo de Gálvez mobilized a force of 2,000 men in Louisiana to capture the cities of Manchak, Baton Rouge, and Natchez from the British. The Choctaw Indians, with their 17 chiefs and 480 leading warriors, made a pact with Gálvez, promising 4,000 men. In the opening months of 1780, Gálvez, with 1,200 men, marched on Mobile and besieged it, and in March of the following year, Colonel Dunford surrendered with his garrison.

On March 9, 1782, Gálvez anchored his 74-gun flagship, the San Ramon, in Pensacola Bay. He had 1,315 troops from Cuba. Another 2,253 men came from
Mobile and New Orleans. On April 19, another detachment of some 1,300 Spaniards arrived. On May 7, Pensacola surrendered to Gálvez. General Campbell and Admiral Chester were taken prisoner, together with 1,400 soldiers.

Another member of the Gálvez family, Bernardo's father, Matías Gálvez, President of the Audiencia (High Court) of Guatemala, captured the fortress of San Fernando de Ornoa, held by the British, on Nov. 28, 1779. This led to a general attack on the British settlements on the Gulf of Honduras and the Mosquito Coast. The British temporarily took San Juan de Nicaragua, but Gálvez organized to retake it, making Masaya his headquarters and ordering Tomás López de Corral to keep watch on enemy movements in Costa Rica. López kept watch, and also captured the British settlements of Tortuguero and Bocas de Toro, while early in 1781 Matías Gálvez clinched the campaign with the capture of San Juan de Nicaragua.

On other fronts, Floridablanca was instrumental in procuring the declaration of Armed Neutrality from the Empress of Russia and the formation of the Northern League.

The Independence of the Nations of Ibero-America

The support given to the American Revolution by Spain and its colonies, including Mexico and Cuba, laid the basis for the later recognition by the United States of the independence of the sovereign nation-states of Ibero-America. The death of Carlos III’s favorite son Gabriel in October 1788 presaged his own death shortly thereafter, on Dec. 14, 1788. He had said: “Gabriel is dead, I shall soon follow him.” Unfortunately, Carlos was succeeded by a weak son, Carlos IV, who was not capable of providing the leadership necessary to continue his father’s vision.

Clearly, the British wished revenge against the Bourbons. In France, the British, using the same methods employed in 1766 against Carlos III, orchestrated the French Revolution to prevent an American-style constitutional republic from being established in Europe. After the Jacobin terror and the coming to power of Napoleon Bonaparte, Spain was targeted next. Lacking Carlos III’s leadership, and weakened by the destruction of its Bourbon ally France, Spain was invaded in 1808 by Napoleon, who imposed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne.

Napoleon’s invasion of Spain served as a model for what Hitler did during the 1930’s. Spain was the key not only to the control of Ibero-America, but was also the means to attempt destroying the United States from the south. In the 1930’s, the Nazis put the fascist General Francisco Franco in power in Spain, and then used the fascist Falange as the instrument to organize a Synarchist apparatus in Ibero-America, with special emphasis on Mexico, in an effort to gain a flank against the United States. This was precisely what Napoleon attempted in the early 1800’s.

This plan did not succeed under Napoleon any better than it did later under the Nazis, primarily because of the legacy of Carlos III in Ibero-America, and because of the community of principle which had developed between the sovereign nations of the Americas.

Any treatment of Carlos III must take into account the continuing impact of his contribution in the Americas, as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine of President James Monroe and his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams.

During his reign, Carlos had developed the conception of forming a commonwealth of Spain and the Spanish colonies. Moreover, his efforts in Spanish America, including most emphatically the expulsion of the Jesuits, were focussed on bringing about the scientific, educational, and economic development of the peoples of Spanish America.

When he became Carlos’s minister of the Indies in 1776, Jose de Gálvez ordered the abolition of the “repartimiento” system, a form of de facto slavery of the Indians, and began the task of reorganizing New Spain’s banking and financial institutions along Colbertian lines, to increase trade and state revenues, and promote and protect industry. Gálvez was committed to the principle that “Indians and other castes [i.e., mestizos] must be permitted to enjoy the rights which human and divine law grants to all men”—a principle denied by the Jesuits, whose expulsion from Spanish America Gálvez had overseen in 1767. Father Hidalgo y Costilla, later leader of Mexico’s independence movement, was an administrator in the new intendency system which replaced the repartimiento.

During the 1780’s, Leibnizian “Economic Societies of Friends of the Country,” like those in Spain, were set up by Carlos’s envoys in all the major Ibero-American capitals. These served as centers of intellectual debate and dissemination of republican ideas, and in most cases they were in direct contact with the American Philosophical Society in the United States, and knew and admired the work of Franklin.

Thus, even though the spread of the American Revolution into Europe was thwarted by the British-orchestrated French Revolution, the international conspiracy
involving the Leibnizian networks of Benjamin Franklin and his European allies established the institutions that brought the vision of Carlos III to fruition in Spanish America in the early decades of the 1800s.

The first nation to declare its independence after the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, was Mexico. Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla was elected Captain-General and Lord Protector of the Nation on Sept. 15, 1810, and issued a statement, as he wrote, amounting to “a proclamation of Independence and natural freedom.” Then, on July 5, 1811, the Congress of Venezuela declared its independence: “We, therefore, the representatives of the United Provinces of Venezuela, with the Supreme Being as a witness of the justice of our proceeding . . . in the name and with the support of the virtuous people of Venezuela, solemnly declare to the world that our provinces are and shall be from this day forward de facto and de jure free, sovereign, and independent nations, owing allegiance to no one, and independent of the Spanish crown and of all who claim either now or at any time in the future to be her proxy or her representative.” In Venezuela, Juan German Roscio translated Tom Paine’s *Rights of Man* in 1811, and then wrote the Constitution of Venezuela modelled on the U.S. Constitution.

Other nations followed, although it would not be for another decade that the independence of several Ibero-American nations was consolidated, and the United States of America was in a political position to give recognition to its natural allies, who had been inspired by its own fight for freedom. The reason for this was straightforward.

After the French Revolution and the Napoleonic “counter-revolution,” the republican United States of America was politically and militarily isolated internationally. Britain was still its primary adversary, as evidenced by the invasion and War of 1812. The Holy Alliance, established by the Hapsburg and British Empires at the 1815 Congress of Vienna to contain the spread of “American” ideas and prevent the overthrow of the oligarchic system, dominated Europe. As a result, the policy of the United States was one of support for liberty, while at the same time, not openly embracing the cause of liberty abroad. Its poli-
cy, therefore, was based upon principle, but required a neutral position until the United States had the necessary political and military power to stand up to the European powers—something possible only after Lincoln’s defeat of the British- and Hapsburg-supported Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War.

**Growing Ties Between the U.S. And Ibero-America**

Napoleon’s invasion of Spain shook the tree of liberty in the American colonies of Spain and Portugal, and set the stage for the beginnings of a movement for independence. However, even before that, the weakened condition of Spain and France had led to increased ties between the United States and the Spanish colonies. A royal order dated Nov. 18, 1796, opened the Spanish colonies to “neutral trade,” of which the United States was chief beneficiary. The British victory at Trafalgar in 1805 reduced the navies of France and her Spanish ally to insignificance, further opening the door to collaboration in the Americas.

Trade between U.S. merchants and Spanish America increased during the 1790’s. The Philadelphia merchant Stephen Girard, who was heavily interested in the trade with St. Domingue (Haiti) in the 1790’s, engaged in large-scale trade with continental Spanish America. Later, Girard was among the first five government directors of the Hamiltonian Second Bank of the United States, appointed by President Madison in 1816.

American agents established ties to republican circles throughout Spanish South America. William Shaler and Richard Cleveland, for example, travelled to Montevideo and Buenos Aires in 1799. In 1802, they sailed by way of the Canary Islands and Rio de Janeiro to Valparaiso, Chile, where they circulated a copy of the U.S. Constitution and a Spanish translation of the Declaration of Independence. When they continued on to San Blas, Mexico, they repeated their organizing there. Shaler later served as an agent of the United States government in revolutionary Spanish America. Condy Raguet, who was later to serve the government in Brazil, visited Haiti in 1804, and in 1809 published his *Memoirs of Haiti*.

Presidents Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), James Monroe (1817-1825), and many other Americans, knew Spanish. Monroe learned the Spanish language when in Spain on a special mission in 1805.

After the 1808 Napoleonic invasion of Spain, President Jefferson authorized agents of the United States to say officially to influential persons in Cuba and Mexico:

Should you choose to declare your independence, we cannot now commit ourselves by saying we would make common cause with you, but must reserve ourselves to act according to the then existing circumstances; but, in our proceedings, we shall be influenced by friendship to you, by a firm feeling that our interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest repugnance to see you under subordination to either France or England, either politically or commercially.31
At the same time, Jefferson instructed Governor Claiborne of the recently acquired Louisiana Territory:

If [the Spanish patriots] succeed [in their resistance to Napoleon], we shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence [on Spain], but very unwilling to see them in that of France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere.32

The first agents of the United States to the governments of Spanish America were sent while Robert Smith was Secretary of State under President James Madison (1809-1817); Smith’s brother Samuel was a Baltimore merchant engaged in trade with Ibero-America. Thomas Sumter, Jr., for example, was commissioned to Rio de Janeiro, where the Portuguese court had relocated in 1809, after fleeing Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal.

The year 1810 saw the appointment of three agents to Ibero-America: William Shaler to Havana and Vera Cruz, Mexico; Robert K. Lowry to La Guaira, Venezuela; and Joel Robert Poinsett to Buenos Aires, Chile, and Peru. Shaler and Poinsett were instructed, in light of the possibility that Spanish America might “dissolve altogether its colonial relations to Europe,” to “diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good will towards the people of Spanish America as neighbors,” and that it would “coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to promote the most friendly relations, and the most liberal intercourse, between the inhabitants of this hemisphere.”33

President Madison also permitted revolutionary agents from Spanish America to reside in the United States, and did not prevent them from purchasing munitions in this country. From Buenos Aires came Diego de Saavedra and Juan Pedro de Aguirre; from Venezuela, Telésforo de Orea and Juan Vicente Bolivar, the brother of Simón Bolivar, who was in England at the same time and who was as a result influenced more by the British than by the patriots of the United States; from Mexico, José Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara; from Cuba, José Álvarez de Toledo; and from Cartagena (in what is now Colombia), Manuel Palacio Fajardo.

The mission of the Buenos Aires agents was to obtain military supplies. They first contacted Manuel Torres, a Spaniard with Colombian connections who had been living in Philadelphia since 1796, and then the merchant Stephen Girard and the Venezuelan agent Telésforo de Orea.

A “Committee on the Spanish American Colonies” was formed in the U.S. Congress in November 1811 with Samuel Latham Mitchill as its Chairman, to inform the Congress on developments in Ibero-America, in the context of the growing independence movement and expanding relations with the United States.

Preparation for Recognition

Critical to preparing for the recognition of the independence of the nations of Ibero-America by the United States, was the effort to educate the public and policymakers about Ibero-America. Alexander von Humboldt’s Essay on New Spain was an important contribution. Another
important contribution was Washington Irving’s translation of François R.J. Depons’ *Voyage à la partie orientale de la Terre-Ferme (A Voyage to the Eastern Part of Terra Firma, or the Spanish Main in South America, During the Years 1801, 1802, 1803, and 1804)*, which was published in New York in 1806, with a foreword by the same Samuel Latham Mitchill.

President Jefferson wrote Humboldt in December 1813: “I think it most fortunate that your travels in those countries [of Spanish America] were so timed as to make them known to the world in the moment they were about to become actors on its stage . . . [I]n truth, we have little knowledge of them to be depended on, but through you.”

Humboldt’s report, so much appreciated by Jefferson, was of course the continuation and fruition of the work launched by Carlos III’s botanical expeditions.

In his *Essay on New Spain*, Humboldt wrote that “no European government sacrificed greater sums” than the Bourbon kings, to advance scientific knowledge in the New World, and that, when he arrived in Mexico at the end of the Eighteenth century, he found that,

[n]o city of the new continent, without even excepting those of the United States, can display such great and solid scientific establishments as the capital of Mexico. I shall content myself here with naming the School of Mines, directed by

American patriots laid the basis for the recognition of independent Ibero-American nations.

Clockwise from top left: Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, President James Monroe, Captain David Porter, William Duane, Attorney General Caesar A. Rodney.

the learned Elhuyar . . ., the Botanical Garden, and the Academy of Painting and Sculpture. This Academy bears the title of Academia de los Nobles Artes de Mexico. It owes its existence to the patriotism of the minister Gálvez. The government assigned it a spacious building, in which there is a much finer and more complete collection of casts than is to be found in any part of Germany.

The three men perhaps most responsible for the eventual recognition of the nations of Ibero-America were President Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay. Only Monroe, as indicated above, had a good reading and speaking knowledge of Spanish. In 1824, Henry Clay acknowledged his indebtedness to, and reliance upon Joel Poinsett, for his own leading role in advocating recognition.

Joel Poinsett served successively at Buenos Aires, Valparaiso, and Mexico City. He was a native of South Carolina, a member of the American Philosophical Society, and subsequently, a member of Congress and Secretary of War. In 1825, Poinsett wrote his own *Notes on Mexico*.

Condy Raguet, who served at Rio de Janeiro for several years, was also a member of the American Philosophical Society. John Murray Forbes, special agent and chargé d’affaires in Buenos Aires, was a classmate of John Quincy Adams at Harvard University, and had served as consul in Hamburg and Copenhagen before being sent to South America. William Tudor, special agent and consul at Lima, had been a founder and the first editor of the *North American Review*, and one of the leading literary lights of Boston, before his diplomatic posting.

Several agents of Ibero-American governments and the exiled Argentine patriots operated in the United States. Among the latter was Vicente Pazos, author of the well-known *Letters on the United Provinces of South America*, addressed to Henry Clay, written in Spanish and published in English translation in 1819.

Two of the propagandists on behalf of Spanish America deserve particular notice: One of these was a foreigner,
the above-cited Manuel Torres; the other, an American citizen and U.S. naval officer, Captain David Porter. Torres published two books: An Exposition of the Commerce of Spanish America (1816) and An Exposition of South America, With Some Observations upon Its Importance to the United States (1819). Captain Porter waged his propaganda campaign on behalf of Spanish American independence while he was a member of the Navy Board in Washington, D.C. Porter later served in the West Indies, and then entered into the naval service of Mexico.

Friends of Spanish American independence were active in several cities, such as William Duane (editor of the Philadelphia newspaper The Aurora, and an Irish immigrant) and Torres in Philadelphia; and Porter, H.M. Brackenridge, and U.S. Postmaster General Joseph S. Skinner in Washington, D.C. and Baltimore.

In 1817, a commission was appointed to help prepare the United States population for recognition of the independence of the nations of Ibero-America. The three commissioners appointed were: Caesar A. Rodney of Wilmington, Delaware, a former member of Congress and Attorney General of the United States; Judge Theodorick Bland of Baltimore, father-in-law of Postmaster General J.S. Skinner and friend of David Porter; and John Graham, former secretary of legation and chargé d'affaires in Madrid. The pamphleteer H.M. Brackenridge accompanied them as secretary on a mission to Ibero-America.

This then was the close-knit network of patriots of the United States and of Ibero-America, who played the critical role in preparing the way for the recognition of the independence of the first several Ibero-American nations by the government of the United States of America in the early 1820's, a recognition based upon a community of principle among a family of sovereign nation-states as formulated in the Monroe Doctrine.

Every Human Being a King

Today, the only possible way to finally dismantle the British Empire that has ruled the globe since 1763, and to defeat the Synarchist international deployed on its behalf, is to support the leading Leibnizian thinker of the day, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., and to thus revive the Leibnizian legacy which both inspired the work of Carlos III, and gave birth to the United States of America.

We are fighting a war between two diametrically opposed ideas of government, as expressed by Friedrich Schiller in the contrast between the legislation of Solon of Athens and Lycurgus of Sparta, based, as LaRouche has emphasized repeatedly, on the difference between Man as imago viva dei (created in the living image of God), and the beasts.

It is a war now being fought politically throughout the world between, on the one hand, Democratic pre-candidate for the U.S. Presidency, Lyndon LaRouche, and, on the other, the Beast-man Synarchist, Vice President Dick Cheney and his Synarchist neo-conservative circles, including his Quijanohack assets in the Spanish-speaking world.

Carlos III was a patriot and a citizen of the world, as Schiller stipulated a true patriot must be. He was educated to be a true Christian prince, and as such, would have made Nicolaus of Cusa, the Brothers of the Common Life, Erasmus of Rotterdam, and Friedrich Schiller proud.

In his “Letters on Don Carlos,” Schiller wrote:

Recall, dear friend, a certain discussion, about a favorite subject of our decade—about spreading of a purer, gentler humanity, about the highest possible freedom of the individual within the state’s highest blossom; in short, about the most perfect condition of man, as it in his nature and his powers lies given as achievable—among us our fantasy became lively and enchanted in one of the loveliest dreams, in which the heart revels so pleasantly. We concluded at that time with the fanciful wish, that chance, which indeed hath already achieved greater wonders, might be pleased in the next Julian cycle, to awaken once again our sequence of thoughts, our dreams and convictions, fertilized with the same vitality and just so much good will, in the firstborn son of a future ruler of this or another hemisphere. . .

Our conversation had long been forgotten, as I in the meantime made the acquaintance of the Prince of Spain; and soon I took note of this inspired youth, that he indeed might be that one, with whom we could bring our design to realization. Thought, done! Everything found I, as through a ministering spirit, thereby played into my hands: the sense of freedom in struggle with despotism; the fetters of stupidity broken asunder; thousand-year-long prejudices shaken; a nation which reclaims its human rights; republican virtues brought into practice; brighter ideas into circulation; the minds in ferment; the hearts elevated by an inspired interest—and now, to complete the happy constellation, a beautifully organized young soul at the throne, come forth under oppression and suffering in solitary unhindered bloom. Unhappy—so we decided—must the king’s son be, in whom we wished to bring our ideal to fulfillment. “Be you a man upon King Philip’s throne!”36

For Schiller, Don Carlos and the Marquis of Posa form “an enthusiastic design to bring forth the happiest condition which is achievable to human society.”

Is it any wonder that the Quijanohacks hate the very memory of Carlos III, a man who was dedicated to making every human being a king?
NOTES


9. Quoted in Petrie, King Charles of Spain, p. 56.

10. Quoted in Addison, Charles the Third of Spain, p. 38.


13. Translated from the Spanish by Cynthia Rush.


15. Quoted in Addison, op. cit., p. 121.

16. Translated from the Spanish by Cynthia Rush.

17. Translated from the Spanish by Cynthia Rush.


19. Quoted in ibid., p. 51.


22. Quoted in Addison, op. cit., p. 67.

23. Quoted in Hargreaves-Mawdsley, Spain Under the Bourbons, p. 121.

24. Quoted in Hargreaves-Mawdsley, Eighteenth-Century, p. 120.

25. Translated from the Spanish by Cynthia Rush.


27. Quoted in Hargreaves-Mawdsley, ibid., p. 156.

28. Quoted in ibid., p. 156.

29. Quoted in Rush, “Real Cultural History of Latin America.”

30. Quoted in ibid.

31. Quoted in Arthur Preston Whitaker, United States and the Independence of Latin America, p. 42.

32. Quoted in ibid., p. 43.

33. Quoted in ibid., p. 65.

34. Quoted in ibid., p. 142.

35. Quoted in Rush, op. cit.


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Theater-goers in Los Angeles during November and December 2003 had the privilege of seeing a live demonstration of one of the leading principles emphasized in numerous recent discussions by Lyndon LaRouche: that of the power of an effective presentation of a Classically composed tragedy to move an audience. Well-known stage, screen, and television actor Robert Beltran produced an excellent presentation of Clifford Odets’ 1948 drama *The Big Knife*, in which Odets provided a penetrating insight into the socially corrupting effects of the onset of “Trumanism” in America.

Serving as producer and playing the lead role of Odets’ character Charlie Castle, Beltran brought to the drama a highly refined sense of both the historically specific context of the play, and the principles of Classical tragedy. The result was a gripping journey back to the period following the death of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, providing a prescient sense of the tragedy which accompanied the ascent of Harry Truman to the Presidency—the consequences of which still haunt us today.

The dating of the play is notable, as it was written during the period when the “Red Scare”—a central feature of Trumanism—was being launched to silence opposition to the emerging Cold War, and to the post-war economic collapse precipitated by Truman’s rejection of FDR’s anti-Depression national economic development policies. Among the first victims of the Red Scare were screen writers, ten of whom were sent to prison for their refusal—during their testimony before the House Un-American Activities Committee, the infamousHUAC—to “name the names” of “Communists” working in Hollywood. Many of these writers, and others brought before HUAC, were known by Odets. In *The Big Knife*, there are several innuendoes about Charlie Castle’s wife, with the implication that she has contributed to pro-Communist causes.

In Odets’ play, Charlie Castle is a popular, yet demoralized actor, who came to Hollywood with the dream of...
I haven’t seen it, but a professional actor and friend of ours in California, Robert Beltran, has produced a play from the 1940’s by Clifford Odets. Clifford Odets is a writer of plays, dramas, which are well known to people of my generation, from the 1930’s and 1940’s. He went on to Hollywood, and he had a tragic life, in the sense that he allowed himself—in the play, which is autobiographical—he allowed himself to be corrupted by adapting to Hollywood, and then realized he’d adapted to evil; and then committed suicide as a result of seeing his life as futile, and the outcome hopeless, that he’d gone too far. That was wrong. But nonetheless, it gets the point across.

So therefore, in this case of Odets and his drama, which is produced by professional actors—and is rather moving, as I understand—you have a case of the Classical principle of drama being used in a modern setting. Because the reality was, that from the period from the end of the war, World War II—from the summer of 1944, where a decent Vice President, Henry Wallace, was replaced by the Democratic Party, through the nomination of a bad, very bad, Vice President, Harry Truman—and thus, the sickness and death of Roosevelt led to the evil which took over the United States in the post-war period. Roosevelt was no longer there, and Truman went over to the other, Utopian side.

During this period of evil, I saw a transformation of my fellow soldiers and similar people, who in the main had been fairly good in their attitude about the post-war world, when I knew them during times of military service. But immediately at the end of the war, the United States made a right-wing turn; and what we called “McCarthyism” later on, was actually “Trumanism,” which began in 1945-46. It began essentially with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Iron Curtain speech by Churchill and Truman’s endorsement of it. We had a right-wing terror, police-state terror, in the United States. This produced a transformation in the U.S. population. It turned people who had been my friends, into pigs, who adapted to the terror, out of what they perceived to be their self-interest. They turned against each other like animals. So, what Odets presents in this drama, as presented by these actors, is that situation.

So here we have a truly Classical tradition in drama, by a person who might be figured a minor dramatist in the Classical tradition, but a skilled one, who presents a very anguished picture of the horror, the corruption which seized so many people in the United States in the immediate post-war period. We look back at early history, and we see that. And that kind of understanding into ourselves, is the understanding of what we need to know to determine how we’re going to respond, in terms of the effect of our decision on not only the society around us now, but on honoring the past who made us possible, and providing a basis for the hope of the future for those who come after us. That is what is essentially necessary. There’s no other drama that’s worth doing, and there’s no other way to perform Shakespeare, or to perform Schiller.

—from a cadre school discussion, Nov. 26, 2003

All which deserves the name of Classical drama is a reflection of an impassioned reach toward a certain specific time and place in real history, and to be a special way of reviving a notable experience of that culture at that time, especially an experience which has radiated its effects across the intervening processes of human development, to the present time of that playwright, those actors, and that audience. It must, so to speak, bring a Socrates truly to life on the present living stage of the imagination of an audience. It must bring Julius Caesar to life, in the actual time and circumstances, which that audience must experience within its own mind and passions—the acts of his assassination and death-agony, in that actual time and place in which those events occurred.

The principle which governs, absolutely, the requirements for the composition, performance, and witnessing of Classical drama, is what theologians have sometimes identified as “the simultaneity of eternity.”

Take the case of a certain play by Clifford Odets. I have not witnessed the . . . performance of that play, but I have enjoyed a meaningful discussion of the problem the play represents, and the authentically Classical intention of the director of the performance.

I reference this case, in large part, because of the appropriateness of my recollection of the relevance for the effect on today’s Baby Boomers and also their offspring, of the real history which Odets’ drama brings back to life. I recall Odets from radio productions of
producing great works of art that could improve the world. Instead, he finds himself the captive of the studio system, which asserts total control over what he can and cannot do in films. The story is autobiographical, as Odets came to Hollywood after establishing himself as a dramatist in New York City, where he had begun his career as a member of the experimental, leftist Group Theatre. He had hoped that, given the positive changes which had occurred during the FDR Presidency, he could use his writing skills to produce films that would inspire audiences to pursue the ideals of social and economic justice which he believed to be the basis of American greatness.

We see these idealistic beliefs in Charlie Castle at the beginning of the play. Charlie, who we later learn is a World War II veteran, is being interrogated by an influential gossip columnist, who is probing for salacious material to feed to her millions of hungry readers (some things never change!). While poking around to find out if he and his wife have separated, or if she is contributing funds to questionable causes, she says, “The first time we met, all you’d talk about was FDR.” And Charlie replies, “I believed in FDR.”

Thus, from the outset, Odets conveys to the audience that an actual historical event—the death of FDR—is a matter of central concern in the drama. For Charlie, as for much of the nation, FDR’s death became a metaphor for the death of idealism, of hope for a better future. Charlie returns to this theme often, as he is sinking ever deeper into a seemingly inescapable trap—one set largely by his own embrace of the corrupting influence of Hollywood.

We see this, for example, in an intense argument with the one character who seems to stand up to the corruption, Hank Teagle, who serves as an explicit Horatio (Charlie’s nickname for him) to Charlie’s Hamlet. When Teagle challenges him to fight to return to his ideals, Charlie says that is no longer possible: “When I came home from Germany, I saw most of the war dead were here, not in Africa and Italy. And Roosevelt was dead, and the war was only last week’s snowball fight; and we plunged ourselves, all of us, into the noble work of making the buck reproduce itself.”

The drama is full of this kind of dialogue, as Odets uses these characters to demonstrate the depth of corruption in the whole society—his society. This is difficult for a dramatist, as it is much easier to make such truthful comments about times past. Yet Odets faced his society with courageous truthfulness, and pungent observations.

Thus, Odets takes on the post-war American obsession with being “popular”—what Lyndon LaRouche often refers to as “wishing to be overheard as having the right opinion.” When one character states that the eagle
Sins of the Baby Boomers’ Fathers

The real menace exposed by Odets was not that represented by Hollywood, though he made it clear that he had had his fill of it. Rather, there are repeated references to the subtle but unmistakable results of “Trumanism,” which, in the hands of a skilled dramatist, provide truthful insights into how the generation of World War II veterans capitulated, owing to fear and venality, to the overall corruption of the society—so much so, that they proceeded to raise today’s degenerated Baby Boomer generation.

This was brought out beautifully by the collaboration of Beltran and director Tonyo Melendez. It is expressed in the “Director’s Note” which Melendez wrote for the playbill: “The Big Knife is a cautionary tale written as a deeply felt reaction to the political and social trends of America immediately after World War II. Clifford Odets senses a cataclysmic paradigm-shift that profoundly disturbs him. Today, more than half a century later, his vision of America seems prophetic. At the very moment America is at its mightiest, Odets points to its flaws. Not a popular view, then or now.”

Beltran brought out the paradoxes posed by Odets in a stunningly powerful portrayal of Charlie; but his understanding of Odets’ intentions in this play is reflected in the performances of all the actors. Prior to the production, Beltran and Lyndon LaRouche had a lengthy discussion of the drama, and of LaRouche’s conception of tragedy, principles which Beltran is applying in his ongoing drama coaching in the works of Shakespeare and Friedrich Schiller with members of the LaRouche Youth Movement.

Most importantly, in this production, Beltran demonstrates that he fully shares what LaRouche has stated to be the essential commitment of Classical tragedy—to historical specificity. Real history is brought alive by the portrayals on the stage, a history that you may see only in part—as in Odets’ use of his Hollywood, or Shakespeare’s use of the royal court, as the setting—but the slice of the society that you see on stage, portrays truthfully what exists in that society as a whole. The pragmatism and corruption which ultimately bring down Charlie Castle were pervasive throughout post-war America.

LaRouche has addressed this during his Presidential campaign, in his polemic on the “three generations”: how the demoralization and eventual corruption of his own World War II generation, led directly to the general immorality of their children, the Baby Boomers; and how this must be overcome if we are to prevent the final act of this tragedy from being played out today—i.e., the destruction of the United States by Cheney, Ashcroft, and the band of neo-conservative fanatics bent on reviving the most dangerous aspect of Trumanism, the American “prerogative” to launch pre-emptive nuclear strikes.

The final paragraph of Melendez’s “Director’s Note” shows that this principle of Classical drama can be brought back to life today—ironically, in this case, in Hollywood: “A great dramatist, Odets frames all these questions within the context of an American film star’s fall from possible greatness. He skillfully weaves a Hollywood web of deception and despair that has become all too familiar to modern audiences. An American playwright at the height of his powers, Odets educates, enlightens, entertains. Could we ask more? We hope the metaphor continues to live in your imagination long after you leave the theater.”

Having seen this production three times, and watched its evolution and development under the creative guidance of Beltran and Melendez, this author can attest that their intention was fulfilled, and that the tragedy of America brought on by the advent of Trumanism remained in the imagination of the audience. Classical works, well written, and performed to meet the expectations of the gifted dramatist, can move audiences even in the jaded America of today.

Harley Schlanger examines the historical roots of Clifford Odets’ Classical approach to drama, in part three of the Symposium, “The Big Knife and Trumanism,” which appears on page 78 of this issue.
Approaching Classical Tragedy In American Life
An Interview with Robert Beltran

“The LaRouche Show” Internet audio broadcast for Dec. 20, 2003, featured a discussion with actor, director, and Lyndon LaRouche collaborator Robert Beltran, after the end of the run of his production of Clifford Odets’ “The Big Knife” in Los Angeles. The dialogue on “Trumanism and Tragedy” was moderated by Harley Schlanger, and included questions and discussion from LaRouche Youth Movement organizers Freddy Coronel and Vicky Overing—currently also students in Beltran’s Classical drama workshop—and others listening by phone and Internet around the country.

Harley Schlanger: Our topic, and our focus, is going to be on the question of Classical drama, and how you move a population that otherwise is subjected to non-stop bombardment of propaganda—between CNN and Fox-TV, MTV, modern Hollywood, and so on. It’s very hard for people to actually have time to sit back and reflect, and realize that they are living in contemporary history.

Our special guest today is someone who has just taken on a project—and I might say, performed it brilliantly—as a way of demonstrating the relevance of Classical drama and tragedy. How you can change a population by presenting a play which gives a real understanding of the actual history of its time?

I’m talking about Robert Beltran, who is familiar to many of our listeners. He is an actor, a director, and now a producer. He recently put on a brilliant performance of The Big Knife, a 1948 play by Clifford Odets, which we’ll be talking about with him.

Robert is probably best known for his role on Star Trek: Voyager, in which he was “exiled” for seven years, on the Voyager. But he’s a Classical actor, one who has Classical training, but whose actual passion and love is for the way in which Classical drama can affect an audience, and change them. So, Robert, welcome to the show.

Beltran: Thank you. Good to be here.

Schlanger: The first question that struck me, when we’d been talking for quite a while about your desire to get back into theater, and I was hoping you’d do Othello—several years ago, you directed and starred in a production of Hamlet out here in Los Angeles—I was a little disappointed at first, when I heard you were going to be doing a play, The Big Knife, which I was not familiar with, by a play-
wright with whom I had some vague familiarity. How did you happen to choose *The Big Knife* as your project?

**Beltran:** Well, it was really a choice between *Othello*, and something else! Because I had pretty much made up my mind that I was going to do *Othello*. However, it had been a few years since I had been on the stage; and I thought, maybe I should do something prior to tackling *Othello*, which is a monstrous role, and a monstrous play to perform and to put up, as a total production.

So I was looking around for other things to, possibly, do, when I remembered *The Big Knife*, which was a play that I had always loved, and first read in college. And in re-reading it, the relevance and the timeliness, with where we are in our country today, paralleling what Odets was writing about in 1948, it just seemed so glaringly obvious and necessary, probably because I saw the larger metaphor more clearly in *The Big Knife*. I was still searching, and am still searching for that huge metaphor for *Othello*.

So the play was clearer in my mind, as to what I could do with it, and what I wanted to say with it.

**Schlanger:** Now, when you say, the relevance and timeliness: What was it about Odets’ play *The Big Knife*, that you saw as relevant and timely for the present audience?

**Beltran:** Well, it goes back to what I had been listening to, and absorbing in Lyn’s various speeches, about Classical drama, the relevance, and the way to approach Classical drama. I was hoping that I could find a way to demonstrate that, because I believe wholeheartedly in everything that Lyn has said about that.

**Schlanger:** And Lyn has written quite a bit about, in a sense, the backdrop to the play. Perhaps, in a moment, you can tell people a little about the play. But, what struck me, the first time I read it, and then when we started talking about it, is that it leaps off the pages: He’s writing about what Lyn calls “Trumanism”! The post-World War II destruction of the optimism that came out of the victory over Nazi Germany. The sense of optimism about getting out of the Depression, which was associated with Franklin Roosevelt. And then, immediately after the death of Roosevelt, Harry Truman became President, and there was a complete transformation.

So, I assume that was something that leaped off the pages for you as well.

**Beltran:** Yeah, it did. And it’s not stated explicitly in the play, that this is a reaction to Trumanism. But it is quite clear that it’s a reaction to the way the country shifted, after the great buildup and optimism before and during the war, the Roosevelt policies going into effect, and the great optimism that that caused in the population. And then, the complete turnaround in the opposite direction, that the country went into the paradigm-shift, as Lyn describes it—that’s exactly what Odets was writing about.

The fact that Charlie Castle—

Think of Charlie Castle, when you read the play, as the United States, in that he is fabulously wealthy, has virtually anything that he needs at his disposal, and yet, he’s profoundly unhappy. The very core of his soul is *sick*.

This play is one of those fossils that you find in an archeological dig, that validates what Lyn has been saying about the rampant corruption that happened to that generation, and has been developing to the present day. That’s why the play is so relevant now, because it’s based on a truthful current of thought about ideas that took hold of our society.
who is the protagonist in the play—

**Schlanger:** That's the character that you played.

**Beltran:** Yes—saw very clearly what was happening to him, and what was happening to the rest of the country, but couldn't find a way out. Couldn't find the way to deal with it. In fact, the whole play is about—if you want to think of Charlie Castle as the metaphor for the country itself, America itself—you saw the corrupting elements that were slowly killing him.

**Schlanger:** Now, just so that people know a little bit about this (and I would actually recommend that, if people can find this—because it's not that easy to find, it's not in most of the Odets anthologies): The play is called *The Big Knife,* it was written in 1948, and it's about a character, Charlie Castle, who's a very well-known and famous actor, who is, in a sense, an indentured servant to "Hoff Industries," Marcus Hoff, the studio chief. And in this sense, when you say he's a metaphor for the society, how does this unfold in the play?

**Beltran:** Well, if you think of Charlie Castle, when you read the play, as the United States, in that he is fabulously wealthy, has virtually anything that he needs at his disposal, and yet, he's profoundly unhappy. The very core of his soul is sick. And he knows why. And yet, he's juggling so many—so many people are living off of him, and making the golden goose lay his eggs, and as long as the golden goose is laying those golden eggs, everybody is happy, except for him.

So, everybody is living off of this man, and feeding off of him. And they're not at all concerned with the fact that he's slowly dying, and that they are contributing to his death.

**Schlanger:** Now, the scene is set right at the beginning, when he's talking to a gossip columnist who's trying to get a story—typical gossip columnist, trying to find out what's happening with his marriage—but it's really a telling thing, because you're less than two minutes into the play, and she says to him, “The first time we met, all you’d talk about was FDR.” And he replies, “I believed in FDR.”

**Beltran:** Right. I think—she’s referring to when he first came to Hollywood, the idealist stage actor who came with all these ideas about how he was going to carry on his ideals into the movie industry, and make movies that meant something, and said something.

**Schlanger:** And you would say this was autobiographical for Odets?

**Beltran:** It's autobiographical for Odets, and possibly me! [Laughs] But for Odets, definitely. Odets was very good friends with John Garfield, and I think a lot of the story was drawn from John Garfield’s personal experiences with Warner Brothers—with Jack Warner.

We understand that Charlie Castle came to Hollywood as a different person. He's become something exactly opposite to how he first came to Hollywood—full of idealism, full of the political enlightenment of the Roosevelt policies, and what Roosevelt stood for and was trying to implement in the country. These were things that he believed in.

**Schlanger:** And there's even the shadow at the very beginning, and again, in an elliptical way—what Lyndon LaRouche said in the discussions we had with him—almost out of the corner of your eye; the Trumanism. When he's asked by the gossip columnist about his wife's contributions to political parties.

**Beltran:** Right. It's a veiled threat, in that she's trying to get gossip about his failing marriage and the impending divorce, and he's reluctant to give her that information.

**Schlanger:** So, everybody is living off of this man, and feeding off of him. And they're not at all concerned with the fact that he's slowly dying, and that they are contributing to his death.

**Beltran:** Well, I think what the audience is meant to see, is how Charlie Castle is trying to save himself. And he is still trying to rise above the mediocrity, and the mercenary qualities of all the people who are around him.

For instance, he tries to have a meaningful discussion with his agent, and his agent says, “Charlie, you and your wife are two beautiful humans, and you can’t settle one little problem—your marriage.” And Charlie says, “Well, maybe that’s why empires have fallen, Nat, because just like me, millions can’t settle one little problem.” And his agent says, “Who’s got time to worry about empires? I just want to live in peace, and please my clients.” And
Charlie says, “How do we know that America isn’t dying of trying to please its clients? Did you ever think of that?” And he replies, “No, I never did, actually.” And Charlie says, “Don’t you feel it in the air? Don’t you see them pushing man off the Earth, and putting the customer in his place?” And his agent says, “That’s a very intelligent remark. By the way, getting back to this contract . . . .”

So nobody wants to—This is a man who’s dying to live a life that is consistent with his ideals. But nobody is interested. The bottom line for everybody is, how much money can you make for me? How can we keep the status quo? You are a commodity. We don’t want the commodity thinking too much, because the commodity might see just how miserable he really is. And that’s what Charlie’s beginning to see.

Schlanger: Now there’s an interesting problem that comes up for the audience. Because Charlie’s wife appears to be relatively sympathetic, the person who’s the noble sufferer. And it was interesting, for people who I know who went to see it, they were somewhat confused by the character of the wife. How did you see the character of Marion? And how does this fit in with the question of the draining of any remaining morality? Because he does say that she represents his idealism. So, how did you see that?

Beltran: The wonderful thing about this play is that everybody is deeply flawed. Everybody is sick in some way. And dealing with a huge problem at their very core. The wife was complicit in the—the play hinges on a car accident that happened before it starts. Charlie Castle was drunk with a woman in his car, a woman he was having an affair with, and he accidentally ran over and killed a young child; and then he had his best friend take the rap for him, and go to jail for him. This is the great secret, and the great blackmailing event, which the studio has over him, which is why he’s basically a blackmailed, indentured servant. But the wife was complicit in that. She didn’t fight that plan to send his friend to jail in place of Charlie.

But, she has come to the conclusion that they cannot live this way anymore, and she begs him to leave Hollywood. Not to sign the new contract that Hoff is threatening, blackmailing Charlie to sign, to keep him there in Hollywood for 14 more years. She’s threatening to leave him, and she says, “Just leave it. Leave it all! We’ll go back to New York. You can go back and do theater. And we’ll live a relatively fine life, you can make a nice living in the theater still.”

So she is not so angelic—he calls her “Angel” all the time, and I think it’s kind of ironic. Because at one point in the play, after he’s decided that he’s got to sign the contract, and commit himself for 14 more years in Hollywood, she decides to kill the young baby that—she’s pregnant at the outset of the play, and she decides to have an abortion, because he’s decided to stay in Hollywood for 14 more years. And she doesn’t tell him. She doesn’t discuss it with him, she just does it on her own.

Schlanger: And he doesn’t even know that she’s pregnant.

Beltran: That’s right.

So, all of these people are deeply flawed, and I think they’re meant to be, not in any kind of simplistic way, but I think they are meant to be indications of a society at large, the general society, American society at the time. All of them—the agent, the wife, the best friend, the journalist, the studio head, the studio head’s right-hand man—all of these people are a microcosm of the society as a whole.

Schlanger: Well then, here’s the question that many people have about tragedy. Some of the people here—some of the LaRouche Youth members who first saw it—said, “It was depressing, it wasn’t uplifting.” And the purpose of tragedy is to actually change the audience, force the audience to rethink their own assumptions. How does that work in this play? And in tragedy in general?

Beltran: Well, yes, I don’t think that when you go to *Hamlet*, you leave ready to have a party. It’s meant to stimulate and provoke thought, and thinking about what actually happened on stage, and what is the playwright trying to convey? And so, when you have these events that happen in the play, this onslaught of terrible events, one after the other, that finally end in suicide, I think it’s meant to provoke the audience into thinking, “How could he have saved himself? What could have possibly happened to change the course of events, and what were, really, the causes? What really caused this suicide?”

And that’s where the Classical principle takes its effect—making people think about how things could have changed, how the outcomes could have changed. What happened, why did these events happen, and how they relate to people individually, and to our society as a whole?

That’s the Classical principle. The Classical principle is not that everybody comes away happy, but that everybody comes out thinking, which is a validation of ourselves as human beings, as opposed to the animals that go to a rave or a hip-hop concert, and just dance away in some kind of flagellant hysteria. The Classical principle is that you go and you sit and absorb the events of the play, and you think about it afterwards.

Schlanger: Now, in the discussion that you and I had with Lyndon LaRouche before the play first opened, one of the things that you talked about with Lyn was the importance for you, of reading the *Journal of Odets* from 1940. What did you get from that?

Beltran: Well, Lyn said it beautifully. He said, “Ah, you’re
I don’t think that when you go to Hamlet, you leave ready to have a party. It’s meant to provoke the audience into thinking, ‘How could he have saved himself? What could have possibly happened to change the course of events, and what were, really, the causes?’

Beltran: That’s one of the great things about the discovery of this play. It’s almost as if Clifford Odets had gone to a national Schiller Institute semi-annual conference, and listened to Lyn, and then decided to write a play.

What I had always caught from Lyn, was the importance of that paradigm-shift after the war, the beginning of “Trumanism.” Although I had no—That’s a problem with a lot of people. You have LaRouche talking about something, and you ask, “How can I validate this? How can I verify that this is exactly what happened?” And this play is one of those tools that you have, to see. And this is one of the things that Lyn said to me, when we were having our discussion together, that he was not the only one to see this.

Clifford Odets clearly saw what was going on. But this play is one of those fossils that you find in an archeological dig, that validates what Lyn has been saying about the paradigm-shift that happened. The rampant corruption that happened to that generation, and has been developing to the present day. And that’s exactly why the play is so relevant now. Because, it’s based on a truthful current of thought about ideas that took hold of our society. And Odets saw it clearly. And this play, I think, is like a valuable fossil, that is a piece of the puzzle which helps to see the bigger puzzle.

Schlanger: The way Lyn put it to me, in a discussion, is that from this slice of what is American “royalty”—Hollywood—you can see the corruption that, in fact, was in your own family, in your own generation, for the Baby Boomers to see it. And all the talk from Tom Brokaw and others, about “the greatest generation”—and it’s true, the sacrifices and everything else, from the Depression, through the war—and yet you also see the acceptance, after the war, of mediocrity, in the mass media. . . .

I’d like to introduce our LaRouche Youth Movement panel. We have with us Vicky Overing and Freddy Coronel, two members of the LaRouche Youth Movement, who are very heavily engaged, right now, in the 2004 Presidential campaign. But they’re taking a few
minutes to join us today. Both of them are in the drama class that Robert does here at our Los Angeles office on a regular basis. Freddy and Vicky, welcome to the show. Does either of you have a question for Robert?

**Vicky Overing:** Yeah. I was just wondering, what was the development process, or change, that you saw in the characters that worked with you in the play, and if it had a huge impact on them? What was their response to it?

**Beltran:** Are you talking about the actors, my fellow cast members?

**Overing:** Yeah.

**Beltran:** The cast was very, very united in the purpose of the play. And I know that one of the things that helped was Harley coming, very early, to one of our rehearsals, and discussing Trumanism. It was a wonderful discussion that we had with the entire cast, for about two or three hours. And what it did was open up the society—American post-war society—and it made clear what Odets was really saying.

And so, once the actors are all on the same page, concerning what the playwright is trying to say, then it makes the message clearer. It makes the goal of the entire production much clearer. And everybody is working towards the same goal.

**Schlanger:** Well, I think also—and Vicky, I know the question that you’re asking is one that you, as a budding young actress, are also experiencing, as you’re getting deeper and deeper into the *Julius Caesar* that we’re doing with Robert. But, I had a chance to meet and talk with some of the actors, and there really was a change, throughout the period of the almost three months that Robert was working with them. To the point that, I remember one of the last discussions that we had with someone, the first thing he said was, “Before we go in to talk, let me check to see if I’m still wired.” A not-so-subtle reference to John Ashcroft.

But I think also, Robert, that this was a tribute to you. Because it was your vision, in bringing to life the idea of Classical tragedy, which had the impact.

**Beltran:** Well, definitely. You know I’ve been studying LaRouche for a good two-and-a-half years now, and I’ve really been chomping at the bit to implement those things that I have learned, and believe in, as far as how to present Classical principles on stage. This play gave me that opportunity. As I said, it’s almost as though Odets had gone and listened to one of Lyn’s speeches.

It was a great way for me to try to demonstrate the Classical principle in drama.

**Schlanger:** I’m not a critic, but I saw the play several times, from the beginning of rehearsals, and I think it performed that function brilliantly.

One interesting thing is the tragedy which became Odets’ own life, after this play.

Odets was one of the people who got caught up in the web of McCarthyism, which is Trumanism extended through Sen. Joseph McCarthy. Odets’ name was presented to the infamous HUAC, the House Un-American Activities Committee. And then he himself went before the Committee, and testified, and gave some names. I think this makes very clear what Lyndon LaRouche has been saying on this: That the tragedy is, that out of a whole generation, even the best people—even someone who was conscious of this process himself—under the relentless pressure of the “let’s get on with” society, “let’s not try to improve things,” “let’s be practical,” “let’s be like cocker-spaniels, paws up, saying ‘Like me, like me,’”—as Odets says in the play—unfortunately, most of the generation went through that corruption.

**Beltran:** As I said, Harley, that was always a theory in my head listening to Lyn’s speeches, with him emphasizing this over and over. It became clear to me when I started working on the play, and reading Odets’ *Journal*. Because Odets, in the *Journal*, quotes, and writes of extended conversations that he had with other luminaries of the time—people like Steinbeck, and F. Scott Fitzgerald, and so many people around Hollywood and New York at the time, in those circles. So, a lot of people were discussing those things, and a lot of ideas were being tossed around. Odets was prescient enough to see all of this happening, and was able to distill it into the thoughts that he presents in this play.

**Schlanger:** But unfortunately, not strong enough to avoid being a victim of the same corruption.

**Beltran:** Yeah. In the play, Charlie Castle always sees himself as half a man, and that is directly from the *Journal*. Odets says, he’s got to become a whole man, that he’s only a half a man.

**Schlanger:** On that topic, we have an e-mail question here, we don’t have the name of the questioner, but they ask you: “Can you elaborate on what it means to you when Hank Teagle”—who is Charlie’s, maybe one of his few friends in the play—“tells Charlie, ‘You still know that failure is the best of American life?’”

**Beltran:** To me, it meant that, even if Charlie were to leave everything, public opinion would clearly see him as a loser, someone who failed, someone who was taken from his lofty perch and thrown down into the mud. But yet, it’s that acceptance, it’s that willingness to fail. The failure, in American life, is the person who may not necessarily reach his goal, but has, at least, striven to get there, and strives to get there with a clear conscience and a clear idea of what he would like to accomplish.
And that, I think, is really true of what’s the best in American life.

Schlanger: So in a sense, the fact that Odets, though he himself never achieved the bright promise that he may have had in the 1930’s, his play left with us an ability to reflect on that, so that we can improve. What Lyndon LaRouche talks of as the “simultaneity of eternity.” Odets’ words came to life through that presentation of the play, which now is living in the minds of everyone who saw it.

Beltran: Well, look at some of the people who, probably, we would classify as failures. Is John Kennedy a failure? Was Roosevelt ultimately a failure, because the society turned right around as soon as he died? Who’s a failure, and how to you define failing? Surely Odets meant it to be a person who strives, and may not, ultimately achieve what he was hoping for. But, it’s the example of that person striving, which remains behind, and is the best of American life.

Schlanger: That’s the interesting irony at the end, where Hank Teagle—who is called, during the play, by Charlie, “Horatio,” and actually performs the same role that Horatio performed in Hamlet—

Beltran: He says, when Charlie kills himself—and Hoff’s right-hand man says that he’s going to “spin” the story, and call it a heart attack, and that his good friend and associate Hoff was there at his bedside, his doctor, his little son, his wife; it was a nice death that Charlie had, just a heart attack; he’s going to completely whitewash the fact that Charlie committed suicide, cut himself in three places—Hank Teagle says, “No, that’s not going to happen. I’m going to tell the truth. He killed himself because that was the only way he could live. You don’t recognize an act of faith when you see it.”

That’s exactly what Horatio does in Hamlet.

Freddy Coronel: One question, in seeing the play: It seems as though the development of the entire play had “two personalities.” From one standpoint, it was holding on to that which was moral. And then, from the other, it was like you could see, more and more, a giving in to the whole Hollywood scene, and just a whole paradigm-shift that was taking place. I know there were certain points in the play—I remember a particular one, where you were drunk, just sloshed, and even though, in that state, you were telling this one woman, who was just a whore, “No, I’m not like you, I’m different!” And it seemed like you were just kind of fighting.

In acting, having the audience be able to recognize that fight, within that one personality, or within that one actor that’s presenting these two personalities—the difficulty in doing that, and the challenge of just performing the same play—how many times, you played it four nights a week?

Beltran: Five nights.

Coronel: For how many months?

Beltran: It was five weeks.

Coronel: The challenge in being able to do that every day, to keep it new for people. You yourselves, as actors, being able to keep reliving, I would assume, something new, so that it can stay fresh—I’d like to have some discussion on that.

Beltran: I think that question comes up a lot in our drama classes: How do you keep something fresh after having rehearsed it for so many weeks, and performing it night after night? Really, the only thing that keeps it fresh, is to know it better, and better and better, so that you’re always investigating, and trying to broaden and deepen it, give it more breadth, give it more depth. That’s how you find the spontaneity in it.

Because in a great play—and I think that this qualifies as a great American play. Calling it a great “American” play is a qualifier, in itself. But within the context of American literature, it certainly is one of our great plays. You find the little nuggets that are there, the more you keep searching, the more you really try to find the crux of each scene, and the crux of the relationships of the characters. That’s how you keep it fresh.

And also, the fact that you believe in the play. You respect the playwright. You respect what his intention was. And you give yourself over to the intention.

Schlanger: You approached this as a mission-orientation, then.

Beltran: Definitely. For me, it was. The reason why I did this play—besides the fact that I love it, and it’s a wonderful play—it has the capability to wake people up. It has the capability to provoke thought, and possibly touch one or two, or maybe more people in the audience, and make them think, “You know, that’s exactly what’s happening today, and that’s why we cannot allow this to go on.”

Schlanger: In that light, we have an interesting e-mail question for you, Robert, or anyone else on the panel, from Matt, in Wichita, Kansas. He says, “I’d like to hear anyone’s feedback regarding the situation in Iraq and the issue of tragedy, and what it can teach us—especially in light of the current, triumphalist feelings in the United States, after Saddam Hussein’s capture.”

Beltran: What if Paul Bremer, all of a sudden, decides to walk into his bathroom, and sees his razor there—he’s going to shave—and all of a sudden, he has a catharsis? And the catharsis is, he cannot continue this sham, and he decides to commit suicide?

Or, what if he walks into his bathroom, sees his razor...
If you cannot read a play like Miller’s *Death of a Salesman*, or *The Big Knife*, or *The Crucible*, and see a larger metaphor, then you’re missing a crucial element. Playwrights like Miller, and O’Neill, and Odets—even though they didn’t always achieve greatness—in certain plays, they did. And they achieved the status of a tragedy.

Lee J. Cobb plays Willie Loman (center) in a 1947 production of Arthur Miller’s “Death of a Salesman.”

there when he’s going to shave, and he looks into his mirror and says, “I cannot continue this sham, I’m leaving, and I’m going to do anything I can to stop the occupation in Iraq”? Paul Bremer has that choice. If he came to see this play, he would see himself in the person of Charlie Castle.

That’s what I mean. People came to see the play, and I think that Odets was hoping that people would see themselves in Charlie Castle. And even on a larger scale, they would see their country in the person of Charlie Castle.

**Schlanger:** On the conference line, Angela would like to ask you a question.

**Angela Vullo:** Hi, Robert, this is Angela from LaRouche’s campaign office in Virginia. I’m presently reading a newly released biography of Arthur Miller*—who, as you know, wrote tragedies in the same period as Odets, the most well-known being *Death of a Salesman*—and Miller has referred to *Death of a Salesman* as a Classical tragedy. He has compared it to *King Lear*. But he’s been criticized, people have said, “Well, Willie Loman, he wasn’t a king, or a JFK, or an FDR, or even a Charlie Castle. So, he didn’t fall from any great height.”

I’m curious what you think about “the tragedy of the common man,” and if you think that *Death of a Salesman* was a Classical tragedy?

**Beltran:** Yes, I think so. I think it’s so simplistic to think that tragedy can only happen to kings and queens. If you think of the sovereignty of each individual human mind—we’re all equal, and we all have the capacity to fall from a great height. Any time a human being contemplates taking his life—to exit this life, and this gift that we have, of being alive and being able to accomplish things for our fellow-man—once you start actually considering exiting, by your own hand, the world that you live in—that’s tragic. That’s a subject for tragedy.

And I think that if you cannot read a play like *Death of a Salesman*, or *The Big Knife*, or Miller’s *The Crucible*, and see a larger metaphor, then you’re missing a crucial element. And that is the element of the large metaphor. And I think great playwrights like Miller, and O’Neill, and Odets, even though they didn’t always achieve greatness, in certain plays, they did. And they achieved the status of a tragedy.

**Schlanger:** To follow up Angela’s question, then: Do you think, as someone who’s acted in Hollywood, who’s done a number of movies, you’ve been on television—besides *Star Trek*, you’ve done a good bit of other television—do you think that the current mass media have destroyed the potential for someone to write tragedy today? Or do you think it’s possible that we could still have great writers of tragic drama, who live contemporaneously with Hollywood, and the networks, and cable?

**Beltran:** I think that what has to happen is that—the society is what produces individuals; and the ideas that prevail in a society are what creates individuals. So, yes, I think so. I think that maybe, there may be a budding playwright or two in the LaRouche organization. I hope

* See Book Review, page 121, this issue.
so. I think that should be encouraged.

The mass media are a money-making machine. They’re totally at the mercy of making money, and the bottom line is, how much can you make? And that’s one of the wonderful lines that Charlie Castle has, one of the great revelations that he has. He says, talking about the studios and the whole movie industry, “Why am I surprised at them? Isn’t every human being a mechanism to them? Don’t they slowly, inch by inch, murder everyone they use? Don’t they murder the highest dreams and hopes of a whole great nation with the movies they make? This whole movie thing is a murder of the people, only we hit them on the head under the hair, nobody sees the marks.”

That’s what we’re fighting. The media have such a grip on our society, that we really have to nurture those people that can see through it, see beyond it, and rise above it. And nurture them into helping them create. And go beyond prolonging all of this mediocrity in pop culture, and try to nurture them into creating something greater and more worthy, closer to the Classical principle.

Schlanger: To ask a question about the work you’re doing with teaching, working with younger people: You see the same kind of problem when you hear the way people speak; and also, just as important, the way people listen, or rather, don’t listen. How do you deal with the domination of this kind of media culture, with the “uptalk,” and everything else, to get people to start reciting Shakespeare, so that the actual Classical intention, and the beauty of the language, come through?

Beltran: It really boils down to listening and hearing: How acute is your hearing? And you can develop that. My struggle with the students, is trying to get them to hear acutely, and to develop that.

Schlanger: When you say, “acutely,” you’re basically talking about hearing with their “inner ear.”

Beltran: You’re hearing intention; and you’re giving back intention. And going back to Freddy’s question about “keeping it fresh”: As long as you’re continuing to study the scene and trying to find things, once you start finding new things, it’s because you’re hearing something new. And when you hear something that you hadn’t heard before, it stimulates something in you that causes a spontaneous reaction. Even if it’s minutely subtle, it registers with the audience. And that’s how you keep spontaneity. You keep it by the way you hear it. You keep hearing it freshly; you don’t hear it the same every night.

And so, I’m talking about acutely hearing what you’re reading off the page. It starts there. Acutely hearing how you prepare your scenes. I’m always asking the actors to pare down the thought to a concrete thought—you’re emphasizing too many words; pare it down to the absolutely essential thought. And until you can hear the superfluousness of certain words, that are clouding the thought—until you can hear that, you’re not quite there.

And that’s what I mean. The essential thing is, how are you hearing? How acutely are you hearing?

Schlanger: So, to use the language of Lyndon LaRouche, acting, and drama, take place in the complex domain, rather than in the realm of the senses.

Beltran: Last night, Harley, I was auditing a production of King Lear. And it was amazing to me to go through being totally caught up in the play, because of the truthfulness of what was happening, and then be taken out of it by certain actors who, for whatever reason, destroyed the illusion. And suddenly I was back in this little barn of a theater, I was back looking at the interesting choice of lighting colors that they used, and taken out of the play. And then, how I would be sucked back into the play, back into my imagination, when the truthfulness was resumed.

That principle is absolutely essential for everyone to understand, especially the actors who I’m working with. That, as long as you’re on that line of truth, the audience is with you. When you stop acting as a human being within the context of the play, then the audience is taken completely out of it, and they’re thinking about what they’re going to eat after the performance.

Schlanger: This hour has gone by quickly. I had some questions for you on how you present a historical period. One of the things that struck me very much, in seeing the play, is that your set really resurrected the late 1940’s, complete with—one of the actors said—the bar “serving as a kind of altar around which people engaged in worship.” We’ve got a little more than a minute: Can you give a little sense of how you presented that? Also, I noticed you did the whole play. The movie version leaves out sections. That was a deliberate decision on your part?

Beltran: Oh, yes. I wouldn’t have cut anything from this play. If we were to compare it to a piece of music, I would say it’s comparable to a great symphony by Shostakovich, maybe. Is it a Beethoven symphony? I don’t think so. But in listening to Shostakovich, I note there’s rigor there, there’s an intention that is there. And this play deserved all the respect. You just don’t go ahead and cut stuff from a play like this. It’s pretty thoroughly composed. There aren’t any loose ends.

Schlanger: I’ve really enjoyed having this opportunity, and I’m sure the listeners have, to discuss The Big Knife tragedy by Clifford Odets, with Robert Beltran. Thank you, Robert.

Beltran: You’re very welcome.
In his keynote address to the conference yesterday, Lyndon LaRouche warned that we face the most profound crisis in the history of civilization, and we discussed this over the two days: The deepening global depression, the spread of war, the danger that this will continue to spread under the Cheney doctrine, and also we’ve talked about a new dark age, something that LaRouche has been discussing for many, many years. And which, for many years, we have also discussed in the organizing.

And, I think, too often it has become a catch-phrase, or a slogan, as opposed to really understanding what we mean by a dark age, a new dark age. What LaRouche said yesterday, very strongly, is that what humanity faces today, is something much worse than what we faced in the 1930’s, with the Depression and fascism.

Now, there are still some people who don’t get that point. They say, “Isn’t Lyn exaggerating? I don’t really see that.” I would call to their attention events that we here on the West Coast know very clearly from last year. We had an event which occurred last year, which was the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger. This is a picture of our famous leaflet [SEE illustration]. We discussed with Lyn how to bring home the horror of the Recall election, in which a bad actor, a product of steroids and special effects, was about to become the Governor of the largest and wealthiest state in the country, which, in the past anyway, proclaimed itself to be the sixth-largest economy in the world, if it were a nation.

How did Schwarzenegger become Governor of California? This should tell you something about the cultural crisis we face today. What have the voters of this country become, and what will we tolerate? The idea of man seeking pleasure, a pleasure-seeking society, a post-industrial economy, an entertainment culture: Isn’t this exactly what preceded the takeover of Hitler in Nazi Germany?

What we saw in the 1920’s, nihilism, pessimism, the
philosophy of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Nazi philosophers, who promoted the idea of man as a beast. This was the cabaret society of Berlin in the 1920's. And yet, what do we have today, in 2004? What characterizes our popular culture today? Janet Jackson's famous moment at the Super Bowl. And, if you look closely at that, how is that different from the movie Cabaret? [See illustrations] I would say it's worse in many ways.

So, we are in a tragedy, we face a dark age. And we've come to a moment of punctum saliens, a moment of decision, as in Classical tragedy, where we are all on the stage of history—or, as Lyn has been saying, we are in the arena of the Colosseum, and either we make the right decision now, or we face one of the darkest tragedies in history.

The Problem of ‘Trumanism’

Now, LaRouche recently, in the “Tariffs and Trade” paper, took up this question. He asks, “What is tragedy? It is the failure to meet the challenge of the future; it is the failure to bring forth today, that which the small mind deems a ‘seemingly impractical’ action, but an action on which the possibility of existence of an acceptable tomorrow depends.”

If we are to survive today, we require two “seemingly impractical” events. The first is to elect Lyndon LaRouche President of the United States. Which is, seemingly, impractical. But second, as part of that same process, especially through the work that is being done by the LaRouche Youth Movement, we want to launch a renaissance in the United States, and worldwide, which would sweep away today's all-powerful culture of fast food, fast sex, fast money—the culture of decadence which all of us have grown up in.

Now, we got a glimmer of that over the last two days with the two youth panels—the potential for a renaissance in the United States, one which includes scientific discoveries and breakthroughs, by looking at the time of the American Revolution, the precedents for the American Revolution, and the antecedents, rather, of Leibniz, Franklin, Gauss, the work in science.

We see the same thing on the cultural side: Germany's Weimar Classical period, built upon the work of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, as well as the literary-dramatic side, Shakespeare, Moses Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Schiller. Now, there's an interesting question, if we look at this 250-year cycle, the one which we have come to the end of: The United States did emerge as the one alternative to an otherwise unbroken era of oligarchical domination, an era of men as beasts, men as animals. The United States demonstrated, through the work of Hamilton,
Franklin, Washington, courageous leaders such as Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt, that a republic will work, a republic can function. The question, then, is, what about the culture that is necessary to sustain a republic? Why have we had no cultural renaissance in the United States? Helga Zepp LaRouche gave us part of that story in her presentation this afternoon on the Congress of Vienna: the deliberate deployment of what were essentially fascist, police-state tactics, to destroy the potential among the young to reap the benefits of the great work of the Weimar period of Schiller, Beethoven, and others. A deployment to impose an anti-human culture of pessimism on the population.

But, what about the United States? What’s the problem here?

We had the great fortune on the West Coast this last year, to be in a sense in the middle of a production by Robert Beltran of a play called The Big Knife, by an American playwright, Clifford Odets.

For me, Odets was a name I knew, but I couldn’t place, and I knew none of his plays. But, by working with Robert, having the chance to meet with some of the actors, and to participate in some limited way in a discussion around the play, and then the discussion with Lyndon LaRouche, when he was here last September and he and Robert had a very productive session, and then the continued indirect discussion back and forth, we got a new insight—yes, it can happen, even amongst Boomers, to develop a new insight!—into “Trumanism.”

But, not just into Trumanism. And not just into the tragedy of the life of Clifford Odets, which I’ll be covering in a few moments. Because the play, The Big Knife, although somewhat autobiographical, is also metaphorical. The Big Knife is also a Classical tragedy, which combines those elements which are essential to Classical tragedy.

One element is the question of historical specificity, which is really the true issue of drama as history. And Lyn wrote about this most recently again in his paper on the journal Maritornes, where he said,

I have recently and repeatedly expressed my delight at the news of the then-coming production of that Clifford Odets play, The Big Knife. This delight was prompted by my recognition of the great value of that play for providing younger generations of today an insight into the causes of the widespread moral failure, by omission or otherwise, since about 1946, of most representatives of their parents’ and grandparents’ generations. . .

This was a valuable experience, because the experience of that play helps us now to make something of importance clear to today’s Generation X, and 18-to-25-year-old young adults. That play, and similar work, point attention to the source of that corruption, generated during the Truman years, which was passed down over subsequent successive generations by the young adults of that former time, to produce the horror which threatens the world of the young adult of today. . . .

The beauty of Odets’ theme in that play is that it expresses a typically Classical artistic approach, one of exemplary historical specificity toward understand an awful downward turning point in the 1944-52 history of our United States. This drama thus expresses the same principle of prescience, which is to be found as the controlling principle of composition in Plato’s critical view of the Classical Greek tragedy of his time, and the plays of Shakespeare and Schiller.

Prescience in Classical Tragedy

Now, this question of prescience with Odets: Odets was on the scene in 1947-48, at the beginning of Trumanism. And in this play, he wrote with precision of the tragedy which was only then unfolding as he was writing the play. And this raised for me an interesting question.

First, where did Odets come from? And I don’t mean Philadelphia, which is where he’s from (which is interesting in itself, he was the son of Russian-Jewish immigrants), although he spent many of his early, formative years in the Bronx—and, by the way, he dropped out of school at age 16! But the question: What produced Odets? Where did Odets come from? How did we have this playwright, who I’ll think you’ll see from the discussion tonight, was a great American dramatist? How did he come about, and why don’t we know of him?

Well, he came from another seemingly impractical movement. That is, something which was launched by Moses Mendelssohn in the middle of the Eighteenth century in Germany, a lifelong campaign by Moses Mendelssohn, to emancipate the Jews of Germany, and by so doing, to emancipate Germany itself. And it was Moses Mendelssohn’s work, along with his close collaborator, Gotthold Lessing, which created, or laid the basis for the work of Schiller. And Mendelssohn and Lessing served as a bridge between Leibniz and Gauss, partly through a collaborator of Lessing’s named Abraham Kästner.

The issue for Mendelssohn and Lessing was always the nature of man: That man is not a beast; that man has a distinct difference from the animal kingdom, and that society must be organized around that difference, the difference of the creative potential of each human being. And so, even for the Jews of Germany, who at that time were not citizens, had no rights, who lived largely confined in ghettos—both physical ghettos, and also their own mental ghettos—Mendelssohn approached them
with an optimism, going to the most downtrodden population to uplift them.

His movement first went to the Jews of Germany, and it was to bring to the Jews of Germany German culture and the German language, as a way of breaking them out of the self-imposed ghetto, which was the tradition of the Jews in the European diaspora. And second, in connection with this, was the recognition of the validity of the scientific and cultural discoveries of the world outside the ghetto, to enrich the Jewish population. Not to give up the 4,000-year history, but to enrich it, through contact with the developments of their time.

This had a profound effect in Germany, which goes beyond the scope of our discussion tonight. And, it also had a profound effect on the Jews in Eastern Europe. It was a little different being Jewish in Russia or Poland than in Germany, largely because Poland and Russia at the time were much more backward, difficult countries to live in.

Rather than develop this emancipation movement in the Russian or Polish language, a decision was made by a handful of writers, the most famous of whom is Sholem Aleichem, but there are two others, I.L. Peretz and Abramowitz—his pen name was Mendele Mocher Sephorim, “Mendele the Book Peddler”—who are well worth reading, who decided to develop a literate language, to transform Yiddish, which was the language of the home, the mother tongue (largely because it was the language that the mother used to tongue-lash the children!), to develop a literary language, consciously modeled on what Dante did for Italian with the Commedia, and what Cervantes did for Spanish with Don Quixote. And, to introduce with it a culture of hope, and most importantly, a culture of change. To take on the axioms of oppression, the axioms of self-slavery, with humor, with irony, with paradox, to give them the potentials of the modern world, and help them break the chains of ancient tradition.

The Yiddish Theater

Simultaneous with the development of Yiddish as a literate language, was the creation of the Yiddish theater. This began in 1876 in Romania, and quickly spread to Russia. In 1881, Tsar Alexander II was assassinated. He had been known as the “Tsar Liberator” because he had freed the serfs, but he was also the collaborator of Lincoln during the U.S. Civil War, and had given a measure of independence and freedom to Russia’s Jews. But, after he was assassinated, in the midst of the ferment of the beginning of the revolutionary movements in Russia, his successor enacted anti-Jewish laws. There were pogroms.

In 1883, an order was issued forbidding the Yiddish theater from continuing. Between 1880 and 1910, between one-third and one-half of the Jews of Eastern Europe emigrated, most of them coming to the United States, and a large number of them coming into New York City. And so the Yiddish theater was transplanted from Eastern Europe and Russia, to the Bowery in New York City, which was quite a bit different from the Bowery you might know if you are a Baby Boomer who travelled in New York in the Fifties and Sixties.

There were two tendencies in the Yiddish theater. One was a vaudeville tendency, slapstick, or, if you went to the summer resorts in the Catskills, you would probably call it “slapschtick.” Melodramas, family stories, attempts to give people a little bit of lightness and humor in their lives. But gradually, and importantly, there was the development of serious tragedy. And this was centered around a towering figure of the Yiddish theatre, a man named Jacob Adler. This is a handbill from the Yiddish theater, the play Hamlet, and you can see the language, the writing, is in Yiddish, with Hebrew characters
[see illustration]. For those of you who don’t know, Yiddish is a Germanic language, but it is written in the Hebrew alphabet.

So, the plays were done in Yiddish. Occasionally, they changed them: For example, there was a Jewish King Lear done, a Yiddish “Kenig” Lear, in which, at the end, the king, who is really a Jewish businessman, gives his belongings to his children, moves to Palestine, things don’t work out, and he comes back blind and poor, and says to his children, “Kinder, I forgive you”—so everyone leaves the theater “happy.” But they also did serious tragedy and drama, as in the case of this Hamlet. The next picture shows Jacob Adler in one of his most famous roles, that of Shylock in The Merchant of Venice [see illustration].

Adler was born in Odessa, Russia. In 1883 he came to London, and in 1889 he came to New York. And here’s what he said about the change, the development in the Yiddish theater: “To live forever with jest and song was hardly my idea. The time had to come when our theater would touch on the deeper side of life, when plays of a more serious kind would have a place on our stage. And this task of deepening our theater, of, so to speak, ‘tragicizing’ it, fell in large measure, to me.” He became known in London for his playing of Karl Moor in Schiller’s The Robbers, which to the day of his death was his favorite play. He played Nathan the Wise of Lessing repeatedly, he played Shylock, he played Iago, and he played Hamlet.

Jacob Adler worked to expand Classical performances in the Yiddish theater. Far left: Handbill from a Yiddish production of “Hamlet.” Left: Adler as Shylock in Shakespeare’s “Merchant of Venice.”

Now, Adler wrote about this principle of emancipation, the Haskalah, or Enlightenment, as it was called in Hebrew. He said that, “If the world would not break the wall of the ghetto down from the outside, the Jews must break it down from the inside. Education—secular education—was the tool that would break the wall. Free, no longer isolated, the Jew would take his place in science, in art, in political action, in every great endeavor of the time.”

Adler was a profound admirer of the works of Schiller. He wrote of the “heroic epoch of Schiller, which would endure on the Yiddish stage for some 25 years, and which began in London with his masterpiece, The Robbers. Whatever the reason,” he wrote, “the great Schiller seems to have as many ‘patriots’ among us Jews, as in his own German public. I do not know why this is so. I believe it must go back to the time of Moses Mendelsohn and his Enlightenment.”

Now, it was not just Schiller, but also Shakespeare, as you saw from that handbill. Adler wrote that “the Yiddish public would thrill to Shakespeare. Then how could they not respond to the playwright who, they say, begins

Funeral procession for Jacob Adler, New York City, 1926.
where Shakespeare leaves off! The great Schiller, the thinker and historian, who was, God forbid, no plagiarist, but Shakespeare was his school, and he learned from him with a passion that still smokes on the page.” So you get an idea of passion from Adler.

Adler died in 1926, and just as was the case for Sholem Aleichem nearly a decade earlier, there was a large funeral procession in New York City, and not just of Jews, but of all the population [see illustration].

One interesting play that Adler did—his performance of Shylock was so powerful. He played Shylock, not as a monster or a comic figure, but as a bitter, angry character bent on revenge, but nevertheless proud, in a way that showed that it was not just Shylock, but all the Venetians who were corrupt: the principle of tragedy. Adler understood that. And Adler was playing Shylock in the Yiddish theater, and people from uptown came down to see it. And they organized to have him perform on Broadway in the Merchant of Venice, where the performance was in English, with the exception of Adler, who spoke the lines of Shylock in Yiddish. The New York theater-going public loved it, it was the smash hit of 1903. So, as you can see, when he died, it affected the whole city.

Jacob Adler had a profound effect on the theater in the United States, not just the Yiddish theater. In the photograph, Jacob Adler is the elderly man on the right [see illustration]. The little girl who is second from the left is Stella Adler, who became one of the great actresses and teachers in the United States, until she died at the age of ninety.

Stella Adler married a man named Harold Clurman, who I will tell you about in a moment, and Clurman was the founder of The Group Theatre, and was the mentor of Clifford Odets. So Odets is directly connected to the Adler tradition. In fact, the fourth person from the left in the photograph is Jay, or Jake Adler, whom Odets described as “my adopted brother.” And there are scenes or stories in one of the Odets biographies, of how Odets, when he would go over to see the Adlers, Sarah Adler, the wife of Jacob, who herself was a great actress, would put some challah, the Jewish bread for the Sabbath, on the table, and Odets would devour the whole loaf. And so they said that Odets got everything he could from the Adler family.

Beyond the Yiddish Theater

Now, Harold Clurman, the man who became the husband of Stella Adler, first got interested in the theater when, at six years old, his father took him to see Jacob Adler playing Shylock. The question for Clurman was, Could we move from the Yiddish theater to a national theater?, as advocated by Schiller, for instance, in the piece, “Theater Considered as a Moral Institution,” in which he writes, “If we could witness the birth of our own national theater, then we would truly become a nation.” And as he closes that essay, Schiller says, “the goal of this is to become truly human.”

Clurman said this was his goal in launching The Group Theatre: To establish a national theater which would help the people of the United States to become truly human. Clurman wrote, in a New York Times essay about the founding of The Group Theatre, that his goal was “spreading hope and love of life to combat despair . . . and the way I have chosen to do it, is through the great art of theater.” He wrote that, for him, the purpose of the theater is “to affect men’s hearts, to change their lives in matters of aspiration, sentiment, conviction. I wanted . . . a play to make men more truly alive.”

But there was a paradox in the 1920’s, which Clurman was very aware of. The United States, seemingly, was very wealthy, the way that the United States was again in the 1990’s. So, with all of this wealth, why was there no culture? I’d like Robert Beltran to read Clurman’s discussion of this in a book he wrote called The Fervent Years.
Robert Beltran on *The Big Knife*

The play, *The Big Knife*, was—now less of—an obsession, but was quite an obsession with me. I felt that I had to get some actors together to produce the play, and do it. And, I was lucky to get a very good cast together, very good director, and we got to work on the play. We started rehearsals, and in the rehearsal process—I was playing Charlie Castle, who is the central character in the play—in the process of rehearsal, several times, Charlie hears the doves outside the window of his house in Beverley Hills, and it wakes him up, he can't get a good night's sleep. And several times in the play, he mimics the sound of the doves that he hears. There is a scene where he is with his agent, and he hears the doves in the middle of his conversation, and he says,

“Those damn doves, those mourning doves,” (mourn-ing, m-o-u-r-n-i-n-g, those mourning doves), “they woke me up this morning.”

He hasn’t been able to sleep. And he mimics the sound of the doves, he goes—I have them outside my house, too, so I know it quite well—mimicking the doves, he says,

“Coo-Coo-Whoo, Coo-Coo-Whoo.”

And he has to do this three times in the play.

So, my director, once, when we were rehearsing these scenes, had the disconcerting habit of coming up to you, and saying, “Hmmm, what’s that really about?” And I said, “Well, it’s mourning doves, you know, mourning doves, they’re grieving, they’re grieving over Charlie Castle. They see that he’s dying.” And he just looked at me, and he says, “Is that all?” [Laughter] So, a few days later, I’m still rehearsing these scenes, and I have to do that sound, in the middle of a scene—“Coo-Coo-Whoo, Coo-Coo-Whoo.”

And he comes up to me after we had run through the scene a couple of times, and he says, “Robert, uh, what is that? What do you think that is?” And I wanted to scream, I said, “Damn it, it’s the mourning doves! Don’t you get it, they’re mourning for Charlie Castle!” [Laughter] That’s what I said to him. And again, he said, “Is that all? Is that all?” [Laughter]

So, the next couple of days we were rehearsing, and then one morning he came into our rehearsal smiling, and he says, “Robert, have you looked at how Odets spells the ‘Coo-Coo-Whoo, Coo-Coo-Whoo?’” And I said, “Yeah, yeah.” He said, “Have you really looked at it?” “Yeah!” He says, “Well, look,” and so he showed it to me. It’s spelled “C-o-o—C-o-o—W-h-o-o.”

So, we both smiled very broadly, and said, “Yes, that’s it, “Whoooooo.”

Who?

That’s what is waking Charlie Castle up. That’s why he can’t get sleep. The mourning doves, all those billions of mourning doves, are waking him up out of his sleep. “Who—Who—Who?” And if you take the question further, the question is, “Who are you, really? Who? Who are you really, Charlie Castle? Who have you become? Who were you, and who have you become? Who are you, really?”

And then later, the big question is, “Who, if not you? Who, if not you?”

So this, of course, opened up the whole play for me, really, and the character of Charlie. He’s got everything, he’s a fabulously wealthy, successful movie star, money, fame, all the luxuries of success, but he’s miserable, and his wife is miserable, their marriage is in shambles, and during the course of the play, we find out why.

* * *

Lights fade. End of play. So the audience goes home, and now that you know something a little bit more about Clifford Odets, I think it’s very clear that embedded in this play was that question, “Who? Who?” To every one of those audience members, and, in the larger sense, the nation. “Who are you, really? Who will you become?”

And then, the biggest question, the one that’s meant to startle you out of your sleep at night, not let you sleep, the way it was startling Charlie Cass, “Who, if not you?” All those billions of mourning doves asking that question to you, individually, and to our country, “Who? Who, who, who, who, if not you?”

—Robert Beltran,
excerpted from the conference panel on
“The Big Knife’ and Trumanism,”
Feb. 15, 2004
which is about the founding of The Group Theatre:

This was a fantastic world we were living in, electric with energy, feverish with impulse, gigantic with invention. It was a world full of sharp curiosity, quick assimilation, enormous activity, mountain-high with reward. But it was a meaningless world, just the same; a downright silly world. It was terribly attractive: had the fairest flesh, the most resplendent contours, the most bedizened dress imaginable. But it had no insides; it was empty. Or if it wasn’t empty, its contents were in such a perpetual boil that nothing emerged from it except an eruption of brilliant particles that turned cold and dead when they hit the earth. Nothing tied the fast-moving forces together, no governing principle, no aim, no deep and final simplicity. The gyration and tremor made it all an overwhelming burden that no human spirit could survive. Everything had been rendered both too easy, and too difficult. One was rushed giddily through brightly bursting substance that had no real texture; it ended by making one tired as if one had been struggling with a colossus. The American man was alone, and he made his woman, who clung to his neck as he twisted and whirled, equally lonesome and more hysterical. There was no quiet here. Man couldn’t find himself. He was perpetually on the go to a place he didn’t know for a pleasure he couldn’t enjoy, for a purpose he didn’t seek. Man no longer understood his own nature, his own dreams, even his own appetites. And despite the fact that he was constantly agitated, he was actually passive. He let everything be done to him. His consent was his habit, not his choice. He was dizzy with his own jiteriness. He could not rest, stop, or feel his own motion, for it had become identical with life. If the motion were to cease, it would be as if all were to cease. He was prepared for nothing else. . . .

I’m sick of this dervish dance they’ve got us doing on steel springs and a General Electric motor. When it stops—as it must—there will be disillusion and devastation; everything will become as frightfully blank as today everything is fiercely congested. Perhaps to rush out of line is to invite disaster. If so, let it come. If enough of us try to form another line according to our true nature, ours may become the right line, one which others may follow and walk on more peacefully and gracefully. We

must help one another find our common ground; we must build our house on it, arrange it as a dwelling place for the whole family of decent humanity. For life, though it be individual to the end, cannot be lived except in terms of people together, sure and strong in their togetherness.

I think that shows some prescience also, the discussion in the Twenties, that things are coming to an end.

Now, Clurman said that his idea of theater was to demonstrate “the perfectibility of man, or at least, the inevitability of the struggle against evil.” In 1931, he and two others, Cheryl Crawford and Lee Strasberg, founded The Group Theatre. I won’t discuss The Group Theatre as a whole, because there were some problems with it, but they had an idea: If you’ve got people together who looked at acting and drama as a way of conveying a higher conception of man, and it was integrated with the audience, then perhaps you could change the country.

Note the similarity in the photo between their activity and ours [see illustration]. It looks a little like a cadre school, doesn’t it? At least, on the West Coast. Clurman is the man sitting with a stick, and the person in the lower left-hand corner, all hunched up, that’s the young Clifford Odets.

From the beginning, they had problems with The Group Theatre. The typical problems that Robert can tell you about in chapter and verse today. Problems with money. A concern for the box office: “Will people like it?” And from the beginning, Odets said, “We must not cater to public opinion.”

In 1932, Odets became close friends with Clurman. The year 1932 was the real bottom of the Hoover
Depression. A very cold winter. Many people died on the streets of New York City. And Odets and Clurman walked those streets, trying to soak in something from this, from the Depression. And Odets was developing his philosophy at that time. He said that what he believed in, was that it's a profound and universal human need to be part of something, to believe in something beyond one's fragile, mortal self. He was looking for that in the theater. He had written several plays, one-act plays. Short plays. Clurman, who was not prescient in this case, said of Odets, “Why are you trying to write, you’re terrible. Give it up.” But Odets stuck with it, partly because he was not a very good actor, by his own description.

The Courage of the Young

In 1932, there was a shift: Franklin Roosevelt was elected. There was a change, there was hope. This is typified by a statement Roosevelt made to a college graduating class shortly after he was elected. He said, “We need the courage of the young. Yours is not the task of making your way in the world, but the task of re-making the world.” That was from Franklin Roosevelt. This inspired many of the younger people, and Odets at that time said, he’s going to write, even if people don’t like it. And, he also wrote at that time of his philosophy, “We need convictions, not opinions.” And he quoted Heine, to the effect that, why did they build Gothic cathedrals hundreds of years ago, while today we produce ugly buildings and shacks? He said, “They had convictions, we have opinions.”

Nineteen thirty-five was the crucial year for Odets. At the age of 29—he had been a voracious reader; it’s not clear yet, I haven’t researched it enough to know how much he actually read of Schiller—he wrote an essay, an outline for a story on natural law acting through a crane. Sound familiar? But Odets, at the age of 29, emerged in 1935 as the playwright who was changing history. He had a one-act play called Waiting for Lefty, which has been denigrated by people who haven’t read it as a piece of communist agit-prop. That it seems like it is just something to organize people to go out on strike—which, in fact, is what it was, but that’s not why he did it that way. In fact, here’s Clurman’s description of this play when it first opened. There had been a taxi strike in 1934, and Odets used it as a setting for this play. Clurman writes,

The debut of Waiting for Lefty [became] the birth-cry of the Thirties. Our youth had found its voice. It was a call to join the good fight for a greater measure of life in a world free of economic fear, falsehood, and craven servitude to stupidity and greed. “Strike!” was Lefty’s lyric message, not alone for a few extra pennies of wages, or for shorter hours of work, but strike for the greater dignity, strike for a bolder humanity, strike for the full stature of man.

This play was a phenomenon. But it was a one-act play, so it was paired with a second play he wrote that year, called Till the Day I Die, which—and this was 1935—was an anti-Nazi play. Later on, when he was being investigated for being a communist, Odets said, “I made the mistake of being a premature anti-Nazi.” That is, anyone in the mid-Thirties who was considered anti-Nazi, must have been a communist. In fact, the New York Times was still praising Adolf Hitler in the mid-Thirties!

That same year, Odets also wrote two full-length plays

that were presented by The Group Theatre, one called *Awake and Sing*, and another called *Paradise Lost*. So he had four plays in one year, and at 29 years old, he was the new voice of a new, happier America, looking for something to come out of the Depression, to change the nation, and hopefully, to bring about a new theater which could move the nation.

*Paradise Lost* is an interesting play. It’s about a family, a small shopkeeper, who is losing everything, a family which is losing absolutely everything. And yet they are trying to get by. This play infuriated Bertolt Brecht, who was an enemy of Schiller. Brecht was an opponent of Schiller’s idea of the beautiful. Here is what he said about Odets’ *Paradise Lost*: “Do you wish us to feel sorry for them?”, referring to the people going through the Depression. The hero in that play was trying to keep his workers employed, even as the business was losing money. Brecht, in fact, wrote a letter to a guy named V.J. Jerome, who was the dogmatic cultural “commissar” of the Communist Party of the United States, demanding that the Communist Party take up Odets’ “deviationism,” his “middle-class sentimentality.”

So, you had Brecht, who at that time, by the way, was himself going to Hollywood. Nineteen thirty-five to 1937, when Odets was emerging as a playwright, was the period when Hollywood was invaded by people like Brecht, Aldous Huxley, Christopher Isherwood, and others, who were trying to use Hollywood to create the culture we have today, the brain-dead culture, with no conception of the dignity of man. But they had a lot of money. So, many people from The Group Theatre, including Odets, decided to “check out” what was going on in Hollywood. And Clurman pleaded with the people in The Group Theatre to stay, and here’s what he wrote to them:

> If you feel that you really are represented by what you write for pictures then—forget the theatre. But if you feel there’s something more, something beyond, something essentially different that you want to say . . . if you feel that not enough of your imagination, your invention, thought, or sentiments is being used in the pictures, then you must write for the theatre—carefully and patiently, since today the theatre needs the best you can give. If your need is as strong in you as it has proved to be in us, Hollywood will not tempt you; you will have to return to work ever more actively in the theatres of your own choice. . . . But there is room today only for the determined.

This was a very large battle going on. Odets decided to stay in New York City and continue to write for the theater. In 1938, he had a play, *Golden Boy*, which was another smashing success. And, if you look at the photograph [see illustration], you’ll see something you rarely see these days—an appearance in popular culture of a dramatist: Clifford Odets on the cover of *Time* magazine. Odets had struck a nerve in the country. And among the intellectuals, there was discussion: Can there be an art that will change our nation? Can we come out of the Depression a better nation? And we see this debate continue in Odets’ journal [see illustration]. And you’ll note in the photograph, over his shoulder, the famous portrait of Ludwig van Beethoven.

The post-war hopes, because after this 1938-39 period, we had a war.

**The Big Knife**

When we came out of the war, Odets and Clurman and others were making plans. But those plans were shattered with the death of Franklin Roosevelt. In *The Big Knife*, the very first scene—*The Big Knife* was written in
1947, 1948—in the very first scene, a gossip columnist is trying to get the goods on Charlie Castle, a Hollywood actor, and the gossip columnist says, “The first time we met, all you’d talk about was FDR.” And Charlie responds, “I believed in FDR.” And here you see this question of historic specificity. This was a play about “Trumanism.”

Trumanism was centered around the fear of communism. This is a picture from 1946, Churchill and Harry Truman in Fulton, Missouri [see illustration, page 87]. A little, small, ex-KKK-er, Harry Truman, standing next to Winston Churchill, who, now that Roosevelt was dead, had figured the time was ripe for an extension of the British Empire. In March 1947, Truman enacted something called Executive Order 9835, which established an Ashcroft-style Federal Employees Loyalty and Security program. You had to take a loyalty oath if you were a Federal employee, supposedly for fear of communism. And one of these writers said, “We have the smallest Communist Party in the world, why do we pay so much attention to it?”

There were three million people investigated in 1947 and 1948 by the FBI and HUAC, the House Un-American Activities Committee. In 1947, the investigation spread to Hollywood, and ten writers, who became known as the “Hollywood Ten,” were sent to prison for refusing to answer the question before House hearings, “Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party?” In November 1947, the studio chiefs met, and they acted to ban communists from the motion picture industry. Now, I’d like Robert to read Clurman’s reflection of this period. This was written in 1955; it’s an epilogue to The Fervent Years:

The theater was as much a business in 1925 and 1935 as it is today, and people then were not morally superior or aesthetically more refined than they are today. What is lacking now is a sense of purpose, of an ideal—something to be achieved over and above a smash hit, a fat salary, rave notices, more fulsome billing and more frequent mention in the columns. . . .

The answer to my queries you may think is that with the passing of the Roosevelt regime and the temper it reflected a sharp reaction set in which made everything that smacked of a departure from the \textit{status quo} more than a little suspect. There is considerable truth in this.

The political constriction which began to make itself felt around 1947 and which mounted in frightening tempo to reach a sort of climax in 1953 made almost everybody disinclined to commit themselves to any opinion that suggested anything specific beyond “loyalty.” . . . But what began as a kind of political terror inducing a political hush gradually deteriorated to cessation of all serious discussion of any kind whatsoever and to a large extent even of thinking. There was nothing left, it seemed, but for us to drop dead. . . .
What happened to most of us was that we came to desire nothing more than to be inconspicuous citizens, with no other thought than to “get on,” no other ideal than celebrity or success—and in this area, one kind is as good as another.

Clurman could have been speaking for Odets, because that practically comes out in the pages of *The Big Knife*.

So, this is when *The Big Knife* was written, in the midst of this Trumanism, in the midst of this anti-communist scare. And so, we see the tragedy of Clifford Odets, someone who is talented, someone humane, someone obsessive, someone who is working with Clurman, coming out of the Yiddish theater, out of the Mendelssohn-Schiller tradition, to try to create a new tradition in the United States. And this was the tragedy of Clifford Odets. Someone who saw his life, as we see in *The Big Knife*, as a metaphor for post-World War II America. He was trapped between the lure of the world of his senses—that is, Hollywood—and the hammer of the Synarchists, Trumanism. This destroyed his sensibilities as an artist; his humanism was overwhelmed, and he was unable to live up to his ideal as an artist.

‘Sacrificing for Art’

I want to finish by telling you briefly about this ideal that he had. It was an ideal that he got from his study, his intense, sometimes obsessive, study of Ludwig van Beethoven, whom he loved above all others. When he first met Clurman, and he was interviewing for a position in The Group Theatre, Clurman said, “Well, what is your idea of acting?” And Odets said, “Well, if you listen to much music, my idea of acting is like Beethoven quartets. That kind of polyphonic interweaving.”

Odets had more than a love of music, he communed with the great composers. “Would you believe,” he wrote, “that Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, and Schumann are as alive to me as almost anyone I know?”

He commented on Beethoven in his art, and on this, he said, “I’m too normal”—he had to overcome being “normal.” And he said of Beethoven, “He sacrificed completely to his art.”

*The Big Knife*, which was written mostly in 1947 and came out in ’48, was really the last quality piece by Clifford Odets. Sixteen years later, in 1963, on his death bed, dying from stomach cancer not too far from here, Odets, in a moment of lucidity—and this was one of the last moments he had—sat up in bed and said, “I may fool all of you. You know, I may live. Then, perhaps, Clifford Odets will do something to redeem the last 16 wasted years.”

Now, our battle today, is a battle to create a culture where “normal” will mean to become creative geniuses. “Normal” will mean to aspire to the highest that man can offer, as opposed to “going along to get along,” or even preparing the crappy culture we have for those who want to “go along to get along.” This is why we must have a renaissance in Classical culture and, especially, in Classical drama. This is part of the battle in this 250-year period of history. It’s a battle that we can win, and I think that we are seeing, with the work of the LaRouche Youth Movement, that we have a generation today, which will take up this battle.


**FOR FURTHER READING**


Harold Clurman, *The Fervent Years: The Group Theatre and the ’30s* (N.Y.: Da Capo Press, 1975). Excellent source not just on Odets, for whom Clurman was a mentor, but as a social/intellectual history of the 1930’s.


We call an object **sublime**, with whose conception our nature feels its limits, but our cognitive nature its superiority, its freedom from limits; in the face of which we are therefore physically reduced, but over which we morally elevate ourselves, that is, through ideas.

Only as sensuous beings are we dependent; as cognitive beings we are free.

The sublime object *first* allows us to feel our dependency as natural beings, while it *secondly* makes us conscious of our independence, which we as cognitive beings maintain over nature, not only in us, but also outside us.

We are dependent, insofar as something outside us contains the grounds for something in us becoming possible.

As long as the nature outside of us is in conformity with the conditions under which something becomes possible in us, to that extent we cannot feel our dependency. Should we become conscious of our dependency, then nature must be conceived as at variance with that, which is a need for us and yet is only possible through nature’s cooperation, or, which is to say just as much, nature must find itself in opposition to our drives.

Now, let all the drives which are effective in us as sensuous beings, be led back to two fundamental drives. First, we possess a drive, to alter our condition, to express our existence, to be effective, which all amounts to obtaining conceptions for ourselves; thus, it can be called the conceptual drive, the cognitive drive. Secondly, we possess a drive, to preserve our condition, to continue our existence, which is called the drive of self-preservation.

The conceptual drive relates to cognition, the self-preservation drive to feelings, thus to the inner perceptions of existence.

We stand, therefore, in a two-fold dependency upon nature through these two drives. The first becomes perceptible to us, when nature is lacking the conditions under which we attain cognitions; the second becomes perceptible to us, when nature contradicts the conditions under which it is possible for us to continue our existence.

In the same way, we assert a twofold independence from nature through our reason: first, in that we (in the theoretical) go beyond the conditions of nature and we are able to think more than we realize; second, in that we (in the practical) disregard the conditions of nature and can contradict our desires through our will. An object, with whose perception we experience the first, is theoretically great, a sublime of cognition. An object, which allows us to feel the independence of our will, is practically great, a sublime of disposition.

With the theoretical-sublime nature stands as *an object of cognition* in opposition to the conceptual drive. With the practical-sublime, it stands as an *object of feeling*. 

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**TRANSLATION**

Of the Sublime
Towards the Further Realization
Of Some Kantian Ideas
(1793)

Friedrich Schiller

*This essay appeared in the third volume of Schiller’s periodical “Neue Thalia” in 1793. It was Schiller’s first treatment of the concept of the sublime. In it, Schiller developed his own idea of the sublime through a critical treatment of the concept as expressed by Immanuel Kant in his “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.” Schiller wrote a second essay, entitled “On the Sublime,” that was first published in 1801; a translation of that essay appears in the Institute’s “Friedrich Schiller, Poet of Freedom,” Vol. III.*
opposition to the preservation drive. There it was considered merely as an object, which should extend our cognition; here it is conceived as a power, which can determine our own condition. For this reason Kant called the practical-sublime, the sublime of power or the dynamic-sublime, contrary to the mathematical-sublime. But, because nothing can become clear from the concepts dynamic and mathematical, whether or not the sphere of the sublime is exhausted by this division, I have therefore preferred the division into the theoretical- and practical-sublime.

In what way we are dependent in cognitions on the conditions of nature and we become aware of this dependency, will be sufficiently elaborated with the development of the theoretical-sublime. That our existence as sensuous beings is made dependent on conditions of nature outside of us, will indeed scarcely require its own proof. As soon as nature outside of us changes the determinate relationship to us, upon which our physical well-being is grounded, then also our existence in the sensuous world, which rests on this physical well-being, is immediately challenged and placed in danger. Nature therefore has the conditions in its power, under which we exist; and thereby we should take care of this natural relation so indispensable to our existence, our physical life has been given a vigilant guardian by way of the self-preservation drive, but this drive has been given a warner by way of pain. As soon therefore as our physical condition suffers an alteration, which threatens to determine our condition to the contrary, then pain draws attention to the danger, and the drive of self-preservation is called upon by pain to resistance.

If the danger is of the kind that our resistance would be in vain, then fear must arise. An object, therefore, whose existence conflicts with the conditions of our existence, is, if we do not feel ourselves equal to it in power, an object of fear: fearful.

But, it is fearful for us only as sensuous beings, for only as such are we dependent upon nature. That inside us, which is not nature, which is not subject to the law of nature, has nothing to fear from the nature outside us, considered as power. Nature, conceived as a power, which can indeed determine our physical condition, but has no power over our will, is dynamically or practically sublime.

The practical-sublime distinguishes itself therefore from the theoretical-sublime in that, it clashes with the conditions of our existence, the latter only with the conditions of our cognition. An object is theoretically sublime, insofar as it bears within itself the conception of infinity, to which representation the imaginative power does not feel itself equal. An object is practically sublime, insofar as it bears within itself the conception of a danger, which our physical power does not feel itself capable of conquering. We are overcome by the attempt to make for ourselves a conception of the first. We are overcome by the attempt to oppose the violence of the second. An example of the first is the ocean at peace; the ocean in a storm is an example of the second. An immensely high tower or mountain can provide a sublime of cognition. If it bends down to us, then it is transformed into a sublime of feeling. However, both again have in common with one another, that through their contradiction with the conditions of our existence and activity they reveal that power in us, which feels itself bound to none of these conditions—a power therefore, which, on the one hand, can conceive more than the senses grasp, and, on the other hand, fears nothing in regard to its independence and suffers no violence in its manifestations, even if its sensuous companion should succumb to the fearful power of nature.

But, even if both kinds of the sublime have an identical relation to our cognitive power, they nonetheless stand in a completely different relation to our sensuousness, which establishes an important difference between them, both of strength and of interest.

The theoretical-sublime contradicts the conceptual drive, the practical-sublime contradicts the preservation drive. With the first, only a single expression of the sensuous conceptual power is challenged, but with the second, the ultimate basis of all possible expressions of the same, namely its existence, is called into question.

Now, indeed, every unsuccessful striving for cognition is connected to aversion, because an active drive is contradicted thereby. But this aversion cannot rise to the level of pain, as long as we know our existence independently of the success or lack of success of such a cognition, and our self-respect does not suffer thereby.

An object, however, which clashes with the conditions of our existence, which would arouse pain in the immediate feeling, arouses terror in the conception; for nature had to make completely other arrangements for the preservation of the power itself, than she found necessary.
for the maintenance of the activity. Our sensuousness is therefore interested in the fearful object completely otherwise than with the infinite; for the drive of self-preservation raises a much louder voice than the conceptual drive. It is entirely something different, if we have to fear for the possession of a single conception, or if we have to fear for the basis of all possible conceptions, our existence in the sensuous world; if we have to fear for existence itself, or for a single expression of the same.

But just for this reason, because the fearful object assails our sensuous nature more powerfully than the infinite, the gap between the sensuous and the supersensuous capability is also felt all the more vividly, the superiority of reason and the inner freedom of the state of mind is felt all the more prominently. Now, since the whole essence of the sublime rests on the consciousness of this our cognitive freedom, and all pleasure in the sublime is based only in this consciousness, it follows automatically (which experience also teaches), that the fearful must make an impression on the aesthetical conception more vividly and more pleasantly than the infinite, and that therefore the practical-sublime, according to the strength of the feeling, has a very great advantage over the theoretical.

The theoretical actually only expands our sphere; the practical-greatness, the dynamic-sublime expands our power.—We actually only experience our true and perfect independence from nature through the latter; for it is something entirely different, to feel oneself independent of natural conditions in the mere act of conception and in one’s whole inner existence, than to feel that one has overridden fate, all contingencies, the entire necessity of nature, and to feel sublime. Nothing lies closer to man as a sensuous being than the concern for his existence, and no dependency is more pressing to him than this, to consider nature as that power, which has to rule over his existence. And one feels oneself free from this dependency with contemplation of the practical-sublime. “The irresistible power of nature,” Kant says, “allows us, considered as sensuous beings, to recognize our powerlessness indeed, but at the same time reveals in us a capability, to judge ourselves as independent of nature, and a superiority over nature, upon which a self-preservation of a completely different kind is grounded, than is that, which can be challenged by the nature outside us and can be brought into danger—thereby mankind remains degraded in our person, although man must succumb to that power. In such a manner,” he continues, “the fearful power of nature is judged aesthetically by us as sublime, because it calls up in us our power, which is not nature, in order to look at all that, for which we as sensuous beings are concerned—goods, health, and life—as small, and for that reason also to consider that power of nature—to which in considering these goods we are certainly subjugated—nevertheless as no power for us and our personality, under which we would have to bow, if it were a matter of our highest principles and their affirmation or abandonment. Therefore,” he concludes, “nature is here named sublime, because it elevates the imaginative power to the representation of those cases, in which the state of mind itself can make the characteristic sublimity of its determination perceptible.”

This sublimity of our cognitive determination—this our practical independence from nature, must indeed be distinguished from that superiority, which we know how to assert over nature as a power in individual cases either through our corporeal powers or through our rationality, and which indeed also has something great, but nothing at all sublime in itself. A man, for example, who fights with a wild animal and overcomes it through the strength of his arms, or also through cunning; a torrent like the Nile, whose power is broken by means of dams, and which the human understanding transforms from a destructive object even into a useful one, in that it collects its overflow into canals and irrigates arid fields with it; a ship on the ocean, which through man-made equipment is able to defy all the turbulence of the wild elements; briefly, all those cases, where man through his inventive understanding has compelled nature to obey him and to serve his purposes, even where nature is superior to him as power and is armed for his destruction—all these cases, I say, awaken no feeling of the sublime, although they have something analogous to it, and for this reason also are pleasing in the aesthetical judgment. But why are they not sublime, since they nevertheless make known the superiority of man over nature?

Here we have to go back to the idea of the sublime, wherein the cause will be easily revealed. In consequence of this idea, only that object is sublime, in the face of which we as natural beings are overpowered, but from which we as cognitive beings, as beings not belonging to nature, feel absolutely independent. Therefore, all natural means, which man applies, in order to resist the power of nature, are excluded through this idea of the sublime; for this idea demands absolutely, that we should not be equal to the object as natural beings, but that we should feel ourselves as independent from it through that, which is not nature in us (and this is nothing other than pure reason). Now, however, all those cited means, through which man becomes superior to nature (skill, cunning, and physical strength), are taken from nature, befit him therefore as a natural being; he resists therefore these objects not as an intelligent being, but rather as a sensuous being, not morally through his inner freedom, but rather physically through the application of natural powers. He is also for this reason not overcome by these
objects, but rather he is already superior to them as a sensual being. However, where he suffices with his physical powers, there is nothing there, which could compel him to resort to his intelligent self, to the inner self-reliance of his cognitive power.

For the feeling of the sublime it is therefore absolutely required, that we see ourselves completely deserted by every physical means of resistance, and seek help on the contrary in our not-physical Self. Fearful must such an object therefore be for our sensuousness, and it is no longer fearful, as soon as we feel ourselves equal to it through natural powers.

This is also confirmed by experience. The most powerful natural power is to just that degree less sublime, as it appears subdued by man, and it rapidly becomes sublime again, as soon as it brings disgrace upon the art of man. A horse, which yet runs around in the woods free and unsubdued, is fearful to us as a natural power superior to us, and can serve as an object for a sublime description. Just this horse, tamed, harnessed to the yoke or to the wagon, loses its fearfulness, and with it also everything sublime. But, if this subdued horse breaks from its bridle, if it rears full of indignity under its rider, if it gains its freedom once again by force, then its fearfulness is there once again and it becomes sublime afresh.

The physical superiority of man over the powers of nature is therefore so little the basis of the sublime, that almost everywhere it is encountered, it weakens or completely destroys the sublimity of the object. Indeed, we can dwell with evident pleasure on the contemplation of human skill, which has been known to overcome the wildest powers of nature, but the source of this pleasure is logical and not aesthetical; it is an effect of reflection and not imparted through the immediate conception. Nature is therefore nowhere practically sublime, except where it is fearful. But now the question arises: Is the opposite also the case? Is nature everywhere where it is fearful, also practically sublime?

Here we have to go back once again to the idea of the sublime. Thus it is an essential requirement thereto, that we feel ourselves as sensual beings dependent upon the object; thus, on the other side, it essentially requires that we feel ourselves as cognitive beings independent of the same. Where the first does not exist, where the object has nothing at all fearful for our sensuousness, there no sublimity is possible. Where the second is missing, where the object is merely fearful, where we do not feel ourselves superior to it as cognitive beings, there sublimity is just as little possible.

Inner mental freedom is absolutely required in order to find the fearful sublime and to have pleasure in it; for it can indeed only be sublime, in that it allows us to feel our independence, our mental freedom. But now the real and earnest fear removes all mental freedom.

The sublime object must therefore be indeed fearful, but it may not arouse actual fear. Fear is a condition of suffering and of violence; the sublime can alone please in the free contemplation and through the feeling of inner activity. Either, therefore, the fearful object may not direct its power at us at all, or if this occurs, then our mind must remain free, while our sensuousness is overwhelmed. This latter case is, however, most rare, and requires an elevation of human nature, which can hardly be thought possible in a subject. For where we find ourselves actually in danger, where we ourselves are the object of a hostile natural power, there the aesthetical judgment is done for. As sublime as an ocean storm, seen from the shore, may be, so little may those who find themselves on the ship which is smashed to pieces by the same, be disposed to pass this aesthetical judgment over it.

We are therefore only dealing with the first case, where the fearful object lets us indeed see its power, but does not direct it at us, where we know we are secure before the same. We place ourselves then merely in the imagination, in the case where this power could strike us and all resistance would be in vain. The terrible is therefore merely in the conception; but also already the mere conception of danger, if it is to some extent lively, brings the preservation drive into motion, and something takes place analogous to what the actual feeling would produce. A shudder seizes us, a feeling of anxiety moves us, our sensuousness is aroused. And without this commencement of actual suffering, without this serious attack on our existence, we would merely play with the object; and it must be serious, at least in the feeling, if reason should have recourse to the idea of its freedom. Also, the consciousness of our inner freedom can only have value and count for something, insofar as it is serious about it; it can not, however, be serious about it, if we merely play with the conception of the danger.

I have said, that we must consider ourselves secure, if the fearful is to please us. But, now, there are mishaps and perils, in the face of which man can never know himself to be secure and which can nevertheless be sublime in the conception, and also really are sublime. The idea of security can therefore not be limited to the fact that one knows that he has physically escaped danger, as, for example, when one looks down from a high and well-secured railing into a great abyss, or from a high ground onto the storming sea. Here, of course, the fearlessness bases itself upon the conviction of the impossibility, that one can be struck. However, upon what would one want to base his security before fate, before the omnipresent power of the Divinity, before painful illnesses, before
heavy losses, before death? Here no physical basis for calm exists at all; even if at the same time we say to ourselves, that we are anything but removed from the same.

There is therefore a twofold basis of security. Before such evils, from which to escape stands in our physical capacity, we can have external physical security; before such evils, however, which in a natural way we are able neither to resist nor elude, we can merely have inner or moral security. This difference is important, especially in relationship to the sublime.

Physical security is an immediate cause of calm for our sensuousness, without any relationship to our inner or moral condition. Thence, also, nothing at all is required, to contemplate an object without fear, before which one finds oneself in this physical security. Thence one also observes among men a far greater unanimity of judgment about the sublime of such objects, whose view is connected to this physical security, than of those, before which one has only moral security. The cause is apparent. Physical security is to the benefit of every one in the same way; moral security on the contrary assumes a mental state, which is not found in all subjects. But because this physical security is valid merely for sensuousness, it has nothing in itself, which could please reason, and its influence is merely negative, in that it merely prevents the self-preservation drive from being startled and one’s mental freedom from being cancelled.

It is entirely different with the inner or moral security. This is indeed also a cause of calm for sensuousness (otherwise it were itself sublime), but it is so only indirectly through ideas of reason. We look at the fearful without fear, because we feel ourselves removed from the power of the same over us, as natural beings, either through the consciousness of our innocence, or through ideas of the indestructibility of our being. This moral security postulates therefore, as we see, religious ideas; for only religion, but not morality, puts forward the grounds of calm for our sensuousness. Morality follows the direction of reason inexorably and without any regard for the interest of our sensuousness; it is religion, however, which seeks to establish a reconciliation, an agreement between the demands of reason and the desires of sensuousness. Therefore, it does not at all suffice for moral security, that we possess a moral disposition, but rather it is still required, that we think of nature in agreement with the moral law, or what is here the same, that we think of nature under the influence of a pure cognitive Being. Death, for example, is such an object, before which we have only moral security. The vivid conception of all the horrors of death, combined with the certainty of not being able to escape it, would make it completely impossible for most men, because most are surely far more sensuous beings than cognitive beings, to combine as much calm with this conception, as is required for an aesthetical judgment—if the cognitive belief in immortality, even for sensuousness itself, did not provide a tolerable departure.

But one must not understand this as though the conception of death, if it is combined with sublimity, obtained this sublimity through the idea of immortality.—Nothing is less true!—The idea of immortality, as I understand it here, is a cause of calm for our drive towards continuance, hence for our sensuousness, and I must observe once and for all, that with respect to everything which should make a sublime impression, sensuousness with its requirements has been absolutely set aside, and every cause of calm has to be sought only in reason. That idea of immortality therefore, in connection with which sensuousness is still to a certain extent taken into account (as it is laid down in all positive religions), can contribute nothing at all to making the conception of death into a sublime object. On the contrary, this idea must as it were only stand in the background, in order merely to come to the aid of sensuousness, if this felt itself exposed hopelessly and defenselessly to all the horrors of destruction and was in danger of succumbing to this violent attack. But if this idea of immortality becomes pre-
dominant in the mind, then death loses its fearfulness, and the sublime vanishes.

Divinity, conceived in its omniscience, which shines through all the twists of the human heart, in its holiness, which suffers no impure emotion, and in its power, which has our physical fate in its control, is a fearful conception, and for this reason can turn into a sublime conception. Before the effects of this power we can have no physical security, because it is equally impossible to avoid the same and offer resistance. Therefore, only moral security is left to us, which we base upon the justice of this Being and upon our innocence. We view the frightened appearances, through which its power is revealed, without fear, because the consciousness of our innocence places us securely before it. This moral security makes it possible for us, not to entirely lose our mental freedom with the conception of this boundless, irresistible and omnipresent power; for, where this is gone, the mind is disposed to no aesthetical judgment. But it cannot be the cause of the sublime, because this feeling of security, although it rests on moral grounds, nevertheless ultimately only supplies a cause of calm for sensuousness and satisfies the drive of self-preservation, but the sublime is never grounded on the satisfaction of our drives. If the conception of Divinity should become practically (dynamically) sublime, then we may refer the feeling of dynamism only in misfortune.

The object of the practical-sublime must be fearful for sensuousness; an evil must threaten our physical condition, and the conception of danger must set the self-preservation drive into motion.

Our intelligible self, that in us which is not nature, must distinguish itself with each impulse of the preservation drive from the sensuous part of our being, and must become conscious of its self-reliance, its independence from everything which can befall our physical nature; briefly stated, it must become conscious of its freedom.

This freedom is, however, absolutely only moral, not physical. We may feel ourselves superior to the fearful object not through our natural powers, not through our understanding, not as sensuous beings; for then our security would always be determined alone through physical causes, therefore empirically, and therefore would always still remain a dependency upon nature. Rather, it must be completely indifferent to us, how we fare with it as sensuous beings, and our freedom must consist merely in the fact that we in no way consider our physical condition, which can be determined through nature, as our self, but rather look upon it as something foreign and strange, which has no influence upon our moral person.

Great is he who overcomes the fearful. Sublime is he who does not fear it, even when he himself is overcome.

Hannibal was theoretically great, since he created a passage for himself to Italy over the impassable Alps; he was only practically great, or sublime, in misfortune.

Hercules was great, since he undertook and completed his Twelve Labors.

Prometheus was sublime, since, put in chains in the Caucasus, he did not regret his deed and did not confess that he was wrong.

One can show oneself to be great in good fortune, sublime only in misfortune.

Therefore, every object is practically sublime, which indeed allows us to observe our impotence as natural beings, but at the same time reveals a capacity for resistance...
in us of a completely different kind, which does not indeed remove the danger from our physical existence, but (which is infinitely more) separates our physical existence itself from our personality. It is therefore not a security which is material and merely pertaining to a single case, but rather a security which is ideal and extending to all possible cases, of which we become conscious with the conception of the sublime. This grounds itself therefore in no way upon the overcoming or the removal of danger threatening us, but rather upon the clearing away of the final condition under which there can alone be danger for us, while it teaches us to regard the sensuous part of our being, which alone submits to the danger, as a foreign thing of nature, which does not concern our true person, our moral self at all.

* * *

After establishing the idea of the practical-sublime, we are able to classify it according to the diversity of objects through which it is produced, and according to the diversity of relations in which we stand to these objects.

In the conception of the sublime, we make three distinctions. First: an object of nature as power. Second: a relation of this power to our physical capacity for resistance. Third: a relation of the same to our moral person. The sublime is therefore the action of three successive conceptions: (1) of an objective physical power, (2) of our subjective physical impotence, (3) of our subjective moral superior strength. But even though with every conception of the sublime these three components must essentially and necessarily be combined, it is nevertheless contingent, how we attain the conception of the same, and upon this is now founded a twofold principal difference of the sublime of power.

1.

Either an object as power, the objective cause of suffering, but not the suffering itself, is merely given in contemplation, and it is the judging subject, which produces the conception of the suffering in itself and transforms the given object into an object of fear through connection to the preservation drive and into a sublime object through connection to a moral person.

2.

Or, aside from the object as power, its fearfulness for man, the suffering itself is at the same time objectively conceived, and nothing remains to the judging subject, except to make the application of it to his moral condition and produce the sublime from the fearful.

An object of the first class is contemplatively sublime, an object of the second, practically sublime.

I.

The Contemplative-Sublime of Power

Objects are merely contemplatively sublime, which show us nothing further than a power of nature, which is far superior to ours, but otherwise leave it to us ourselves, whether we want to make an application of it to our physical condition, or to our moral person. I name it thus, because it does not seize the mind so powerfully, that it could not persist in a condition of calm contemplation. With the contemplative-sublime most arrive at the self-activity of the mind, because a condition is given only from the outside, but the two others must be fulfilled by the subject itself. On this basis the contemplative-sublime is neither of so intensively strong nor of so extensive an action as the pathetical-sublime. Not of so extensive an action: because all men do not have enough imaginative power, in order to produce a vivid conception of the danger in themselves; not all have enough self-reliant moral power, in order not to prefer to avoid such a conception. Not of so strong an action: because the conception of danger, even if it is still so vividly awakened, in this case is nevertheless always voluntary, and the mind easily remains master of a conception which it generated spontaneously. The contemplative-sublime therefore provides a smaller, but also less mixed pleasure.

Nature gives up nothing to the contemplative-sublime except an object as power, out of which to make something fearful for mankind is left to the imaginative power. Accordingly as the part is large or small, which fantasy has in the production of this fearful object, accordingly as it conducts its business openly or covertly, the sublime must also turn out differently.

An abyss, which opens up to our feet, a thunderstorm, a burning volcano, a mass of rocks, which is suspended over us, as if it were about to tumble down just this moment, a storm on the ocean, a bitter winter in the Arctic circle, a summer in the torrid zone, rapacious or poisonous animals, a flood and the like, are such powers of nature, against which our capacity for resisting is to be considered nil, and which contradict our physical existence. Even certain ideal objects, such as, for example, time, regarded as a power, which acts silently, but inexorably; necessity, whose stringent laws no natural being can evade; even the moral idea of duty, which not seldomly acts against our physical existence as a hostile power, are fearful objects, as soon as the imaginative power refers them to the preservation drive; and they become sublime, as soon as reason applies them to its highest laws. But because in all these cases fantasy first adds the fearful, and it is completely up to us, to suppress an idea, which is our own work, these objects belong in
the class of the contemplative-sublime.

But, the conception of danger nevertheless has a real basis here, and it merely requires the simple operation, to combine the existence of these things with our physical existence in a conception, and thus is the fearful present. Fantasy needs to insert nothing from its own means, but rather it holds itself only to that, which is given it.

But not rarely are objects of nature, indifferent in themselves, transformed subjectively through the intervention of fantasy into fearful powers, and it is fantasy itself which reveals the fearful not merely through comparison, but rather creates it on its own authority without having an adequate objective ground for it. This is the case with the extraordinary, and with the indeterminate.

To man in the condition of childhood, where the imaginative power works most freely, everything is frightful, which is unusual. In every unexpected phenomenon of nature, he believes he sees an enemy which is armed against his existence, and the preservation drive is immediately busy countering the attack. The preservation drive is in this period his unconditional master, and because this drive is anxious and cowardly, the rule of the same is a realm of terror and fear. The superstition which arises in this epoch is therefore black and frightful, and even the morals bear this hostilely dark character. One finds man sooner armed than clothed, and his first grasp is for the sword, if he encounters a stranger. The custom of the ancient inhabitants of Tauris, to sacrifice to Diana every recent arrival whom misfortune led to their coast, had scarcely another source than fear, for only the badly educated, not the uneducated man, is so wild that he would rage against that which cannot harm him.

This fear before everything that is extraordinary is indeed now lost in the state of culture; but not so completely that a trace of it should not remain in the aesthetical contemplation of nature, where man voluntarily surrenders himself to the play of fantasy. The poets know this quite well and therefore do not neglect to employ the extraordinary at least as an ingredient of the fearful. A profound stillness, a great emptiness, a sudden illumination of the darkness, are in themselves very indifferent things, which distinguish themselves by nothing other than the extraordinary and the unusual. Nevertheless, they arouse a feeling of terror or at least strengthen the impression of the same and are therefore of use for the sublime.

If Virgil wants to fill us with horror about the infernal realm, he makes us especially attentive to the emptiness and stillness of the same. He calls it _loca nocte late tacentia_, vast silent fields of the night, _domos vacuas Ditis et inania regna_, empty dwellings and hollow kingdoms of Pluto.

In the initiations into the mysteries of the ancients, a fearful solemn impression was especially seen to, and for that purpose they especially also made use of silence. A profound silence gives the imaginative power a free sphere of play, and excites the expectation of something fearful, which shall come. In the saying of prayers, the silence of a fully assembled community is a very effective means to give fantasy an impetus and to place the mind in a solemn disposition. Even popular superstition makes use of it in its reveries; for, as is well known, a profound silence must be observed if one has to unearth a treasure. In the enchanted palaces that are found in fairy tales, a dead silence rules, which awakens dread, and it belongs to the natural history of the enchanted forests, that nothing living stirs therein. Also solitude is something fearful, as soon as it is prolonged and involuntary, as, for example, exile to an uninhabited island. A vastly extended desert, a lonely, many-mile-long forest, wandering around on the boundless sea, are clear conceptions, which arouse dread, and are employed in poetry for the sublime. But here (with solitude) there is nevertheless already an objective basis of fear, because the idea of a great solitude also bears within itself the idea of helplessness.

Fantasy shows itself still far more active making an object of terror out of the mysterious, the indeterminate, the impenetrable. Here it is actually in its
element, for since reality places no limit on it, and its operations are limited to no particular case, the vast realm of possibilities stands open to it. But that it inclines directly to the frightful, and fears more than it hopes from the unknown, lies in the nature of the preservation drive, which guides it. Abhorrence works incomparably faster and more powerfully than desire, and for this reason it is the case, that we suspect something bad behind the unknown more than we expect something good.

Darkness is frightful, and just for this reason suitable for the sublime. But, it is not in itself frightful, but rather because it conceals the objects from us and therefore hands over to us the full sway of the imaginative power. As soon as the danger is clear, a great part of the fear disappears. The organ of sight, the first guardian of our existence, fails to work for us in the darkness, and we feel ourselves defenselessly exposed to the hidden danger. For this reason superstition places all ghostly phenomena in the midnight hour, and the realm of the dead is conceived as a realm of eternal night. In the poetic works of Homer, where mankind still speaks its most natural language, darkness is represented as one of the greatest evils.

There lies the land and the city of the Cimmerian people. These grope about constantly in night and fog, and never does The god of the shining sun look radiantly upon them, But rather frightful night envelopes these wretched men. 

Thereupon Ajax, the brave Ajax calls out in the dark of the battle, “free the Greeks from the darkness. Let it become day, let these eyes see, and then, if you will, let me fall in the light.”

The indeterminate is also an ingredient of the frightful, and on no other basis than because it gives freedom to the imaginative power, to paint the image according to its own discretion. The determinate, on the contrary, leads to distinct cognition, and removes the object from the arbitrary play of fantasy, while it subjects it to the understanding.

Homer’s representation of the underworld becomes all the more fearful just because it swims, as it were, in a mist, and the ghostly forms in Óssian are nothing except the vaporous cloud formations, to which fantasy arbitrarily gives the contour.

Everything which is veiled, everything mysterious, contributes to the frightful, and is for this reason capable of the sublime. Of this kind is the inscription which one read at Sais in Egypt over the temple of Isis: “I am everything which is, which has been, and which will be. No mortal man has lifted my veil.” Just this uncertainty and mystery gives something dreadful to the men’s conception of the future after death; these feelings are expressed very successfully in Hamlet’s well-known soliloquy.

All religions have their mysteries, which maintain a holy horror, and just as the majesty of Divinity resides behind the curtain in the Holy of Holies, the majesty of kings also is wont to surround itself with mystery, in order to keep the respect of its subjects in continuous tension through this artificial invisibility.

These are the most excellent subspecies of the contemplative-sublime of power, and since they are grounded in the moral determination of man, which is common to all men, one is justified in presupposing a susceptibility for it in all human subjects, and the lack of the same cannot be excused as with merely sensuous emotions through a play of nature, but rather may be attributed to the subject as an imperfection. Sometimes one finds the sublime of cognition combined with the sublime of power, and the effect is all the greater, if not merely the sensuous capacity for resistance, but also even the capacity for representation, finds its limits in an object, and sensuousness with its twofold demand is dismissed.

II. The Pathetic-Sublime

If an object is objectively given to us not merely as power in general, but rather at the same time as a power destructive to man, if it therefore does not merely show its power, but rather really expresses it hostilely, then the imaginative power is no longer free to refer it to the preservation drive, but rather it must, it is compelled objectively thereto. But actual suffering permits no aesthetic judgment, it cancels the freedom of the mind. Therefore, it may not be the judging subject, on whom the fearful object demonstrates its destructive power, i.e., we may not suffer ourselves, but rather merely sympathetically. But even sympathetic suffering is already too aggressive for sensuousness, if the suffering has existence outside of us. Sympathetic suffering outweighs all aesthetic pleasure. Only when suffering is either mere illusion and fiction, or (in the case that it had occurred in reality) when it is not directly presented to the senses, but rather to the imaginative power, can it become aesthetic and produce a feeling of the sublime. The conception of
another’s suffering, combined with an emotional state and with consciousness of our inner moral freedom, is pathetically sublime.

The sympathy or the sympathetic (imparted) emotional state is not a free expression of our state of mind, which we first had to bring forth automatically in ourselves, but rather an involuntary affection of the capacity for feeling determined by natural law. It does not depend at all upon our wills, whether we want to sympathize with the suffering of a creature. As soon as we have a conception of it, we have to sympathize with it. Nature, not our freedom, acts, and the motion of the mind rushes forward to make the decision.

Therefore, as soon as we objectively receive the conception of suffering, a sympathetic feeling for this suffering must ensue within us by virtue of the immutable natural law of sympathy. By this means we make the suffering, as it were, into our own. We co-suffer. Compassion is not only sympathetic grief, being moved by another’s misfortune, but rather every sad emotional state without distinction, in which we have a feeling for another; thus, there are as many kinds of compassion, as there are different kinds of the original suffering: compassionate fear, compassionate terror, compassionate anxiety, compassionate indignation, compassionate despair.

But, if the exciting emotional state (or the pathetic) should provide a basis for the sublime, then it may not be driven to the point of actual self-suffering. Even in the middle of the most violent emotional state we must differentiate ourselves from the self-suffering subject, for freedom of the mind is done for, as soon as the conception is transformed into complete truth.

If compassion is heightened to such a liveliness, that we seriously exchange ourselves with the one suffering, then we no longer rule our emotional state, but rather it rules us. If, on the contrary, sympathy remains within its aesthetical boundaries, then it unites two principal conditions of the sublime: sensuously lively conception of suffering, combined with the feeling of one’s own security.

But this feeling of security when faced with the conception of another’s suffering, is by no means the basis of the sublime and, in general, not the source of the pleasure that we derive from this conception. The pathetic becomes sublime only through consciousness of our moral, not our physical freedom. It elevates our state of mind and becomes pathetically sublime, not because we see ourselves shielded from this suffering through our good fate (for then we would still always have a very bad guarantor for our security), but rather because we feel our moral self shielded from the causality of this suffering, namely, its influence on the determination of our will.

It is not absolutely necessary, that one feel equanimity effective in oneself, to assert one’s moral freedom in the face of a seriously arising danger. The discussion here is not about that which occurs, but rather about that which should and can occur, about our destiny, not about our actual activities; about our power, not about the application of the same. While we see a heavily laden cargo-ship sink in the storm, we can feel ourselves very unfortunate indeed in the position of the merchant, whose entire fortune has been swallowed up here by the water. But at the same time we nevertheless also feel that this loss affects only contingent things, and that it is a duty to elevate oneself above it. But nothing can be a duty, which cannot be fulfilled, and what should occur, must necessarily be able to occur. But that we can disregard a loss, which is just so heavy to us as sensuous beings, demonstrates a capacity in us which proceeds according to completely different laws than the sensuous and has nothing in common with the drive of nature. But everything is sublime which brings this capacity in us to consciousness.

One can therefore say to oneself quite well, that one would bear the loss of these goods nothing less than calmly—this does not hinder the feeling of the sublime at all—if only one feels, that one should disregard it, and that it is a duty to allow it no influence on the self-determination of reason. Of course, all aesthetical power of the great and sublime is lost on him who not even once has a sense for it.

Therefore, it requires at least a capacity of the mind to become conscious of its cognitive determination, and a receptivity for the idea of duty, even if one recognizes the limits, which weak mankind may place on its execution. In general, it would be difficult for delight in the good as well as in the sublime, if one could have sense only for that which one has attained oneself, or believes oneself able to attain. But it is an estimable character trait of mankind, that it acknowledges a good thing, at least in aesthetical judgment, even though it must speak against itself, and that it pays homage, at least in feeling, to the pure idea of reason, even though it does not always have enough strength to actually act accordingly.

For the pathetic-sublime two principal conditions are therefore required. First, a vivid conception of suffering, in order to arouse the compassionate emotional state in suitable strength. Second, a conception of the resistance against suffering, in order to call into consciousness inner mental freedom. Only through the first does the object become pathetic, only through the second does the pathetic at the same time become sublime.

From this principle flow the two fundamental laws of all tragic art. These are, first: representation of suffering nature; second: representation of moral independence in suffering.

—translated by William F. Wertz, Jr.
The article in Phil. Mag. II, Vol. 1, p. 88, gives the arguments, why the well-known eleventh axiom* of Euclid does not possess the evidence, that an axiom should have: because it contains the concept of an infinity: a space that, in regard to its bounding, would be indefinitely extended, and which the senses and imagination could not represent.

Speaking precisely, it does not seem to me that this concept is contained in Euclid’s axiom. . . . [When Euclid speaks of] extension of lines into the infinite, this means nothing other than: extending as far as necessary. Euclid says only, that [if two lines intersect a third one in such a way, that the inner angles formed add up to less than two right angles, then] one can extend the lines so far, that they intersect. The visual concept of a such pair of lines is thus as follows: When the sum of the two angles comes closer and closer to two right angles, then the lines will stay apart for a longer distance, before they intersect; and the axiom only says: The lines can always be extended far enough [i.e., to the point where they intersect—JT].

In the magazine mentioned above, we read, “they intersect, when they are extended to infinity.”

This is a correct translation of the [Greek] words, but the Greeks did not attach the same thought to the word, which we call the infinite, as what we think—or believe we think—in connection with the German expression.

For, if it were necessary to extend the two lines to infinity (in the newer sense of that word), in order for them to intersect, then they do not intersect at all, but are parallel. . . .

One says: Parallels intersect at infinity; in what sense this is said, I have show in my Foundations of Geom-

ABRAHAM GOTTHELF KÄSTNER was one of the most important figures in the history of science. Born in 1719 in Leipzig, Kästner spent his entire life as a passionate defender of Kepler and Leibniz. In 1756, he was appointed professor of mathematics at Göttingen University, where his students included Carl F. Gauss. In 1766, he hosted Dr. Benjamin Franklin’s visit to the University, as part of his continuing support for the efforts of Leibniz’s networks to create a republic in North America.

Kästner’s contributions to science are numerous, but perhaps his most important was his seminal work on developing what his student Gauss would later call “anti-Euclidean” geometry. As the following excerpts demonstrate, Kästner, like Leibniz and Kepler, rejected Aristotle’s insistence that all knowledge must rest on a set of a priori axioms, postulates, and definitions, as is the case in Euclidean geometry. As Kästner indicates, all Euclidean geometry depends on the truthfulness of the so-called “parallel postulate,” which must be accepted without proof. Gauss, and his student Bernhard Riemann, adopted Kästner’s view, demanding that all such axiomatic systems be discarded, and that physical science be based on demonstrable universal physical principles alone.
entry 12, p. 12. If this manner of speaking is to be defended, then it must certainly signify as much, as to say: the lines never intersect.

29. If the two lines (as in 26) intersect each other, then they form together with the third line, where the two angles mentioned above are formed, a triangle, and thereby a figure which constitutes a bounded space. In Euclid’s expression, “they intersect, when they are continued to infinity,” the word infinity signifies nothing other than what we explained in point 26 above.

30. The reason why one does not find the same degree of evidence in this axiom, as in the others, does not lie in the concept of infinite space in the newer meaning of the word, but rather: that we have merely a clear concept of straight line, and not a definite concept, as I pointed out in my article: what it means in Euclid’s geometry to be possible.

If two straight lines, in the same plane, are perpendicular to a third line, then they never intersect. This conclusion flows from the clear concept of straight line: for, on one side of the third line everything is identical to the other side, and so the two lines would have to intersect on the other side also, if they intersect on this side. But they cannot intersect twice . . .

31. However, when only one of the two lines is perpendicular to the third, and the other does not form a right angle, then do they intersect? And on which side of the third line?

This is a part of the non-evident eleventh axiom; and if one could establish the correctness of this part, then the whole would follow.

32. The lack of evidence does not flow from the fact, that we have no visual concept of an infinite space . . .

33. The question is this: Let one extend the oblique straight line (31) as far as one wants: do we ever get to the perpendicular line?

The difficulty to give an affirmative answer to this question, comes from the following:

One could imagine, instead of the oblique straight line, a curved line, whose asymptote would be the perpendicular straight line—for example, a branch of a hyperbola.

With such a curved line, one could go out as far as one wanted, without ever touching the perpendicular line.

Why should something necessarily occur with an oblique straight line, which does not have to occur, when one replaces it with a curved line?

34. Thus, the difficulty concerns the distinction between curved and straight lines. A curved line means, a line in which no part is straight. This concept of a curved line is distinct, because the concept of straight line is clear; but it is also incomplete, because the concept of straight line is merely clear.

35. So we see, that the difficulty of the axiom does not concern infinite space, but rather the indistinctness and incompleteness of the concepts.

36. A curved line never intersects its asymptote; the strange thing about this is, that it always approaches toward the asymptote. A bit of thought shows: never intersecting, but always approaching, could only occur at the same time, if the amount of approach becomes smaller and smaller. So, the oblique line (31) surely must approach [the other line] at a constant rate, although not an increasing one. Since this proposition is sufficient, one need only prove it, in order to establish that an intersection occurs. This has also been attempted, but without success, because the required result cannot be derived from concepts that are no more than clear.

37. Besides, in geometry, “asymptote” means nothing more than a straight line that comes ever closer to a curved line, without ever touching it. The more modern authors say: the curved line is intersected by the asymptote at infinity; and even regard the pair of such touching-points, located far across each other on the infinite line, as constituting a single point; and other such paradoxes, which all arise from a poetic interpretation of the simple, clear prose of the ancients. Even the concept of asymptotes requires nothing more, than a space, in which extension can be continued further and further.

38. In Joseph Raphson, Analysis aequationum universalis, 2nd edition (London: 1694), one can find his article on “Spatio reali, seu ente infinito, conamen mathematico metaphysicum.” In Chapter 3, he calls the infinity of the mathematicians, as this occurs with series, asymptotes, etc., the potential infinite . . .

Raphson says exactly what I have said. Since I have restricted myself to space, as the geometers conceive it, the rest of his propositions don’t belong to my present intentions; besides which, I still think the way Leibniz and Wolf taught me to think.

—translated from the German by Jonathan Tennenbaum
Lyndon LaRouche began his keynote address to the annual ICLC/Schiller Institute Presidents' Day Conference February 14-15, by posing the paradox that must be resolved in the current world crisis: "This is a truly momentous occasion," characterized by the greatest threat to civilization in known history; but, at the same time, if we seize the opportunity presented by the crisis to create a cultural and economic Renaissance, there is reason for optimism. The key to ensuring that civilization is rescued, is the international LaRouche Youth Movement, which is already shaking the rafters of the political establishment.

As signalled in his speech's title, "I Stand at the Bedside of a Doomed Empire," LaRouche identified both the gravity of the present crisis, and the extremely limited time remaining to avert a new Dark Age. He pointed to the historical struggle between the forces of the Anglo-Dutch Liberal empire, consolidated in the Eighteenth century, and those republican forces rallied around the impulse of the American Revolution and its Constitution of 1789, as defining the central conflict of the past quarter-millennium. This conflict has reached its endpoint: The empire is doomed, and the only issue to be resolved is, who will reorganize the financial system now disintegrating? Will it be the political forces gathering around LaRouche's conception of a New Bretton Woods monetary system, and a Eurasian Land-Bridge, to shift the world from its trajectory toward doom? Or the Synarchist bankers, who acknowledge the onrushing collapse, but insist on putting things back together to their advantage?

Science, Music, and Truth

The conference's first panel, on Saturday evening, was conducted by the LaRouche Youth Movement on the theme, "The Scientific Revolution and the Fight for American Independence." Each speaker developed aspects of the scientific and cultural breakthroughs, notably those of Benjamin Franklin and his networks, which were integral to the success of that revolution.

On Sunday morning, a second youth panel, "Music as a Science Driver," answered the question: How can we communicate profound ideas to an increasingly bes­tialized population? LaRouche advised the LYM to master the Bach motet, "Jesu, meine Freude," in parallel to their study of Carl Gauss's Fundamental Theorem of Algebra. Panel members presented a powerful and beautiful pedagog-

Please turn to page 108
Democratic Presidential pre-candidate Lyndon LaRouche was the lead-off speaker at the "Science and Our Future: Ideas To Change the World" conference, which took place April 14-16 in Moscow. The event, held at the Vernadsky State Geological Museum (S.G.M.) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was co-sponsored by the Museum, the Schiller Institute, and several companies.

Some 70 scientists, students, and members of the press were welcomed to the conference by the director of the Museum. The organizing committee had received 115 papers from 177 scientists, ranging in age from 13 to 85 years. The emphasis was on novel ideas, which underwent competitive evaluation during the conference. An article appeared beforehand in the Nauka ("Science") supplement to Izvestia newspaper, and Itar-TASS put out a newswire; both news reports mentioned the participation of LaRouche and his colleague Jonathan Tennenbaum.

In his presentation, entitled "Entering the Economy of the Noosphere," LaRouche took up what has been the central theme of his discussions with members of the Russian intelligentsia over the past decade and a half: Russia's mission as "Eurasia's keystone economy," in directing mankind's way out of a looming Dark Age. It is concretized in the project for the Eurasian Land-Bridge, with corridors of dense physical-economic development. The identity of Russia which makes it suited for such a historic mission is defined, not merely by geography, but by a national tradition of scientific genius, best exemplified by the chemist and economist Dmitri Mendeleev in the Nineteenth century, and the Ukrainian and Russian biogeochemist Vladimir Vernadsky in the Twentieth. It is in Vernadsky's "Noosphere," the realm of human creative mental action, that the potential to develop new types of resources, and eventually manage the Solar System, is found.

Please turn to page 106.
On January 10, Democratic Presidential pre-candidate Lyndon LaRouche told an international audience at a live Internet webcast, that the time has come for the “forgotten men and women” of this nation to demand the urgently needed changes in policy that will avert the impending global calamity.

“The American people, in particular, have to look inside themselves,” LaRouche advised. “It was their negligence, which created the monster which I shall describe to you today. And, unless the American people are willing to change the way they think, the United States is not going to survive.”

More than 150 people, including over 100 college-age youth, attended the Washington, D.C. event. Many more listened and watched over the Internet, from numerous locations around the world: Groups of supporters gathered to listen, from Melbourne, Australia, to St. Petersburg, Russia; from Los Angeles, Calif., to New Delhi, India; from Berlin, Germany, to Mexico City.

The ‘Erinyes’
To make his point more sensuous, LaRouche turned to Friedrich Schiller, who, in his famous poem, “The Cranes of Ibykus,” identifies the principle of divine justice. Ibykus, a beloved poet of ancient Greece, is travelling to a poetry festival in Corinth, when he is set upon by robbers and murdered. His murderers go on to the festival. As Ibykus lies dying, he sees a flock of cranes overhead, and entreats them to be a witness to his murder. The cranes fly to the festival, and, aided by the Erinyes (Furies), they create such a commotion, that the murderers, realizing they have been judged, confess their crime.

LaRouche at webcast: “The American people have to look inside themselves.”

LaRouche warned, pointing to a large screen on which was projected an image of Terry McAuliffe, the corrupt Chairman of the Democratic National Committee responsible for excluding LaRouche from full participation in the Democratic Party primaries: “He sees them coming! They’re about to get him. He’s about to confess!”

A Sense of Mission

After outlining the past 40 years’ decline in the conditions of life, accompanied by a turning away from the Classical culture which formed the foundations of the American Republic, LaRouche pointed to the space program, as initiated by President Kennedy, as a model for the type of science-driver approach to scientific and economic development needed today to revive the optimistic outlook of the Kennedy years.

In concluding, LaRouche urged his audience to consider the true meaning of their lives, their own mortality, and to stop “going along to get along”: “What will save this planet, what gives you the courage to face whatever you have to face, for humanity, is a sense of mission.”

“My job is to give the people of the United States, in particular, a sense of mission,” he continued, “our mission, as a nation in the world. What we have to do, among nations, to lead other nations—by leadership, not by rule; not by domination; not by giving orders. But by being a factor of leadership on this planet, which gets this planet out of this horrible danger before us now.”
Zepp LaRouche’s BüSo Picks Slate for European Parliament

Two hundred people gathered in Berlin January 25 for the party conference of Germany’s BüSo Party, gathered to select a slate for the June 13 European Parliament elections. The conference elected a slate of 86 candidates to run for 99 seats—the number allotted to the German delegation to the European Parliament. Helga Zepp LaRouche, founder of the Schiller Institute and the BüSo—the German acronym for “Civil Rights—Solidarity,” will head the slate.

Zepp LaRouche keynoted the conference, explaining that this election for the European Parliament is important because the fate of Europe—indeed, of the whole world—is at stake, in the sense that the great German poet Friedrich Schiller meant, when talking about great moments of history, the moments when questions of war and peace are decided. The BüSo want to be elected to the European Parliament, she said, because civil rights are in danger, in Europe and the U.S., and it is essential to defend these rights—through the spirit of solidarity, as opposed to a kind of Darwinist individualism.

The enemy, she said, is Synarchism: “oligarchical control,” to preserve a world in which human beings are treated like cattle, as the helots in Sparta were treated. The solution is—as it was in the Fifteenth century—to make a renaissance; to create, as the Italian Renaissance did, sovereign nation-states, governed by the principle of the common good.

Bach Chorales

The afternoon session opened with three chorales from Bach’s motet, “Jesu, meine Freude,” sung by members of the LaRouche Youth Movement (LYM) and the European Schiller Institute chorus, followed by a panel of presentations by LYM members from France, Germany, and Sweden.

In the course of the afternoon, the BüSo members discussed and voted up “Ten Theses for the European Elections.”

The theses emphasized that all bestialization of the economy must be opposed—such as deregulation and excessive privatization of public enterprises. The future European Constitution, now being worked on, must be based on Natural Law: not lists of positive-law items, but the integration of Leibniz’s concept of the pursuit of happiness into the European Constitution, as it is incorporated into the American Declaration of Independence and, by reference, the American Constitution.

Youth must be schooled in the spirit of Humboldt. Character education, and the original discoveries made by our civilization’s great thinkers and scientists, musicians, and poets, must be the guideline of education.
At prestigious Moscow State University, LaRouche told students that youth around the world are asking their parents’ generation: What world have you left us?

Russia

Continued from page 103

After LaRouche’s keynote, a representative of the European Union discussed the importance of programs to support young scientists, including in Russia. Academician Dmitri V. Rundkvist, the senior scientist at the S.G.M., spoke about the importance of fostering new ideas and intellectual creativity, and studying “the laws of development of the Biosphere and the Noosphere,” the realm of the infinite mental resources of man.

On his trip, LaRouche also visited the Moscow Academy of Finance and Law April 15, where he addressed an audience on the post-1971 phases of collapse in the interrelated spheres of global finance and the physical economy, and on the New Bretton Woods alternative.

Student Evening

On April 14, LaRouche was the guest of the “Student Evenings” program at the prestigious Moscow State University (M.G.U.). LaRouche held a dialogue with close to 100 students, many from other universities, in a hall in the main University building.

LaRouche was introduced by Professor Andrei Kobyakov, who teaches economics at the University, as well as being a published writer on the financial bubble process in the world economy, an editor of Russkiy Predprinimatel (Russian Entrepreneur) magazine, and author of a recent, devastating critique of the neo-cons in the U.S. government. He has described LaRouche as, “probably the only American expert who has forecast, over a long period of time, the inevitable collapse of the now-reigning liberal monetary and financial system.” Kobyakov said that this first visit by LaRouche to M.G.U. was an historic event, bringing to the University a unique historical person, a universal thinker like Leonardo da Vinci.

The “Science and Our Future” conference concluded on April 16 with a round-table discussion. Here, LaRouche propounded the concept of education that is the central principle of the LaRouche Youth Movement. It is a principle of truthfulness, he said, which discerns the difference between knowledge and mere opinion. Youth who come to LaRouche looking for the real education they have not found in the universities, master Carl Friedrich Gauss’s 1799 work on the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra, which mastery can serve them as a criterion of truthfulness both in their study of history, and their engagement shaping “current history” by political action.

Launch Mexico

Opening a powerful strategic flank against the Synarchist financiers who are out to impose global fascism, Lyndon LaRouche took his U.S. Presidential campaign to Mexico March 18-20.

“If you want to change the Americas, Mexico is very important, and the enemy knows it. It’s a powerful nation, with great potential... The United States’ relationship with Mexico, is the test of the existence of the United States,” LaRouche stated in a press conference during his visit to Monterrey, Nuevo Leon.

LaRouche exposed the fascist networks run by the Synarchist financiers as the authors of the March 11 terror bombing in Madrid. These same networks are preparing to unleash a new “Hispanic” war—this time against Mexico and the United States’ other Hispanic neighbors—a war they seek to extend against Hispanics living in the U.S. itself.

Know Your Enemy

Over 20 years ago, in 1981, LaRouche set off a national storm in Mexico when, in an address before Monterrey’s prestigious Technological Institute, he proposed a sweeping oil-for-technology accord between Mexico and the United States. This time, too, it was “the Tech” which invited LaRouche to Monterrey. The trip opened March 18 with an interview with Architect Hector Benavides, whose television program is the most widely watched news show in Monterrey, and is broadcast throughout northern Mexico and southern Texas.

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Flank Against Synarchists

In each of his public events—which included a meeting with some 25 local dignitaries; a press conference attended by 11 national and regional media; a meeting with 110 youth from around the country organized by the LaRouche Youth Movement of Mexico; and the final address at the Tech, attended by over 300 people, almost all students—LaRouche presented the hard facts of the strategic situation: The entire world today faces a situation comparable to that of Germany in 1923, when the system imposed on that country by the Versailles Treaty collapsed in a hyperinflationary blowout. The attitude of the bankers, as Mexicans know from experience, is “to squeeze out the last drop of blood.” And to do so, as they did in that earlier period, they are unleashing the Synarchists to once again create fascist movements, as they did in the 1920’s and ’30’s.

The March 11 bombing in Madrid, and the attempt to pull off a coup d’état in its wake, typify the terror which the modern descendants of the Nazi SS “security” apparatus are prepared to unleash, to maintain control. LaRouche named the names of the fascists saved after World War II by the financiers’ Dulles brothers, fascists now being called back into action: the Spanish fascist Blas Piñar, his Italian cohorts Licio Gelli and Stefano Delle Chiaie, and France’s Jean-Marie Le Pen. The networks of these SS-murder types extend into Central and South America, and are ready to act.

Inspiring the Next Generation

The LaRouche Youth Movement in Mexico, which began forming in a systematic way only a year ago, organized youth from various parts of the country to participate in an intense three-hour discussion with LaRouche.

What is our mission? one LYM member asked LaRouche during the discussion. “To change the planet!” he answered. “Our job is to use the downfall of this system, use this opportunity, to set into motion a next step up for humanity. To use the severity of the crisis, in order to mobilize much of humanity to come out of the bankruptcy of this financial system with an idea of a community of perfectly sovereign nation-states. . . . We must strengthen our ties in order to do this job. And if Mexico and the United States move in that direction, with the aid of the phenomenon which you represent here, that’s the mission!”
Continued from page 102

ical exercise, which allowed the audience to peer into J.S. Bach’s mind, and see how he constructed this masterpiece.

At the Crossroads

“Lyn yesterday shocked us,” began Helga Zepp LaRouche, in opening a presentation entitled, “Let’s Have a Second American Revolution!” We are at a crossroads, she said, proceeding to develop the historical conflict between the forces of reaction in Europe, characterized by the 1815 “sexual” Congress of Vienna, which are today deployed to contain, and if possible, crush the “spirit of 1789,” and “the ideas of 1789, of the American Revolution,” which were presented in the dramas of Friedrich Schiller.

She stressed that the leading Synarchist ideologue of the reaction in Europe was Joseph de Maistre, who defended the Spanish Inquisition’s violence as “good, gentle and maintaining.” She also cited Dostoievsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, in which the Grand Inquisitor denounces Jesus for promising freedom. In his Don Carlos, Friedrich Schiller’s Grand Inquisitor similarly tells King Philip: “Far better putrefaction than freedom.” This, she concluded, is the Synarchist mentality that must be defeated.

The final panel, led by Harley Schlanger, featured a look back at the post-World War II phenomenon LaRouche has named “Trumanism”—the transformation of Americans following the death of President Franklin Roosevelt, into “little people,” fearful of doing or saying anything that “might get them into trouble.” Schlanger was joined by Hollywood actor Robert Beltran, whose recent stage production of Clifford Odets’ The Big Knife inspired the panel [see “Symposium: Classical Drama and Historical Specificity,” page 65, this issue].

Baltimore Students Hear Amelia Robinson

Civil Rights heroine Amelia Boynton Robinson had the honor of addressing two high schools in Baltimore, Maryland in February, at the invitation of the LaRouche Youth Movement. During the two-day tour, Amelia guided approximately 400 eager, bright, curious, playful, but mostly hungry high-school students through the journey from Montgomery to Selma, Alabama and Bloody Sunday, 1965.

The youth were awestruck by the presence of a cognitive Black woman who is almost 100 years old. A woman who, along with Lyndon LaRouche, has the weapon to fight senility: namely, to “fight the political fight on the highest level,” the realm of ideas. This is the real “fountain of youth,” Amelia often says. The students, under a veil of quiet composure, were elated at the thought of having “real, live” history before them.

During the course of each section, both students and teachers barraged Boynton Robinson with a myriad of questions: “What was Dr. King like personally?” “Did you ever run into the KKK?” And, “How did Martin become known back then?”

At the second school, the teachers were just as elated to see Amelia as the students were. One teacher asked, “What President do you think did the most for Black people?” When she answered, “Roosevelt,” the teacher’s smile reached her ears, as she professed that her 80-year-old mother says the same thing.

After Amelia spoke, students had the opportunity to see if she was real, by talking with her and shaking her hand. On this day, Amelia Boynton Robinson generated a spark in the minds and hearts of both students and teachers at these schools. She made it clear that it was the “Forgotten Men and Women” who gave their all—cashing in insurance policies, etc.—to finance and staff the Civil Rights movement, emphasizing that young people were the first fighters in the movement, and that only afterwards did the adults follow.
Knowing the True Geometry, 
A Dialogue in Two Parts

Question: I read last week’s pedagogical discussion, and I believe there is an error, or at least a contradiction, in it.

Answer: That is certainly possible, but it is also likely that the error, or contradiction, arises from a lack of comprehension of these matters. Thinking about these matters teases the most profound concepts from our spirit. Let’s have at it, and find out whence this error comes, or at least provoke enough thought to get us stirred up about it.

Q: Well, first of all, I don’t quite understand the question of the parallel postulate. Is the question whether parallel lines exist?

A: Not really. As a matter of historical literacy, you should be familiar with the definitions and postulates of Euclid’s Elements. The Elements begins with 23 definitions, 5 postulates, and 8 common notions, which lay the foundation from which the subsequent geometrical theorems and constructions are demonstrated. The definitions describe the objects of Euclidean geometry, such as points, lines, circles, straight lines, right angles, and parallel lines. The postulates describe assumptions about the nature of space which, for Euclid, were self-evident and not necessary to demonstrate, nor susceptible of demonstration.

The postulates are:

1. To draw a straight line from any point to any point.
2. To produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line.
3. To describe a circle with any center and diameter.
4. All right angles are equal to one another.

5. If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which lie the angles less than two right angles [see Figure 1].

The first three postulates are constructions that describe the assumption that space is infinite and continuous. The fourth postulate describes the assumption that figures in space don’t change their shape with changes in position. It is the fifth, convoluted, negatively stated postulate that drew the attention of Kästner, Gauss, and Riemann, as it had that of so many others over the preceding 2,000 years. The troubling question is, is it self-evident that the two straight lines will converge when extended indefinitely? Or, stated inversely, if the two straight lines make two interior right angles with the third line, that they will never converge—that is, they will be what Euclid defines as parallel.

Q: It certainly seems that two straight lines, so constructed, would converge, no matter how far they were extended, until the interior angles formed two right angles. If I make a drawing of two straight lines that converge, then I cut those lines with another straight line, it will form a triangle [see Figure 2]. It is clear from the drawing, that the two interior angles are less than two right angles. If I now make these interior angles larger, the two straight lines still converge, except at a point further from the third line. If I had a big enough piece of paper, I could make the interior angles as close to right angles as I wanted, and the drawing would show that these lines still converged. From this it seems self-evident, that when these two interior angles both become right angles, the two lines will not converge, but will become parallel instead.

A: That is exactly the argument Gauss had with H.C. Schumacher back in 1831. You are assuming as self-evidently true, that the infinite is merely the simple extension of the finite. Embedded in the idea that underlies your drawing, are the assumptions about space described in the first four of Euclid’s postulates, that is, that space is continuous, infinite, and homogeneous. In his letter to Schumacher, Gauss proposed that he consider what the same drawing would look like, if space were anti-Euclidean. In such a case, the triangles...
in your drawing would look quite different. Gauss depicted these triangles as formed by negatively curved arcs, similar to hypocycloids [see Figure 3]. As these negatively curved triangles grew, the arcs would curve more and more inwardly towards the center of the triangle. But, an infinite triangle depicted in this way, would no longer appear as a triangle; instead, it would appear as three divergent lines intersecting in one point. This is a completely different figure from the finite one. If space is anti-Euclidean, then the infinite can not be depicted as a simple extension of the finite.

From the standpoint of Euclidean geometry, this discontinuity between the finite and the infinite would seem contradictory. In his 1831 correspondence, Gauss used this pedagogical example to criticize Schumacher for thinking of the infinite as a completed simple extension of the finite. Instead, Gauss says the infinite should be thought of as a boundary.

(Incidentally, Georg Cantor later criticized Gauss for rejecting the notion of a completed infinite; but, although Gauss did not have Cantor’s concept of the transfinite, Cantor must not have taken into consideration Gauss’s complete thoughts on this question.)

Gauss wrote Schumacher, “In this sense, anti-Euclidean geometry contains in it nothing contradictory, although those many results that at first must seem paradoxical, would be a contradiction owing only to a self-deception, brought forth by a prior habit of taking Euclidean geometry as rigorously true.” And he ends his letter: “There is nothing contradictory in this, as long as finite man doesn’t presume to want to regard something infinite, as given and capable of being comprehended by his habitual way of viewing things.”

Q: That brings me to the point that I originally thought was an error, or contradiction, last week. If Gauss says that paradoxes such as these arise from the habit of taking Euclidean geometry as rigorously true, how can we determine what the true geometry is? On the one hand, Kästner says, “[T]he basis of truth and certainty is not in the metaphor of the subject, but in the intelligibility, the conceptions of reason in which those metaphors lie. That, I would think, would be obvious from those geometrical theorems that are capable of being proven. One never concludes from the form, but from it, one thinks of the reason of the form.” From this standpoint, it seems that one could determine the true geometry purely from the conceptions of reason that underlie it. Yet, the pedagogical went on to say, using the examples of Kepler, Gauss, and Riemann, that the only way to determine truth is in the domain of physics. Isn’t this contradictory?

A: Now we’re at the problem. Look again at Kepler’s revolution over Ptolemy, Brahe, and Copernicus. Kepler rejected those three models, not merely because their results deviated from physical observation, but because they were merely models, and could not, and did not intend to, distinguish the truth underlying the physical observations [see Figure 4(a)-(c)]. All three derived the physically observed non-uniform motion of the planets, from mathematics constructed from constant circular action; whereas Kepler constructed a mathematics of non-constant curvature, from the physically observed non-uniform motion [see Figure 5]. The validity of Kepler’s hypothesis was then demonstrated, by the unique experiment of the physical measurement of the planetary orbits, especially with Gauss’s later determination of the orbit of the asteroid Ceres.

So too is the case, as Gauss points out, with Euclidean geometry. As Gauss shows, you cannot attribute to physical space the characteristics of Euclidean geometry, just because we are habituated to viewing things that way. But, how then are we to determine the characteristics of geometry? It could not be simply a matter of replacing the parallel postulate with some other postulate, because that would lead us into the same predicament as that of Ptolemy, Brahe, and Copernicus. We would still be unable to determine which geometry is the true one, unless we constructed that geometry out of the paradoxes of physical measurement, as Kepler did. For the same reasons that Kepler rejected the models of Ptolemy, Brahe, and Copernicus, Gauss became convinced when he was 15 years old, that Euclidean geometry was not the true one. It was not the true one, because it could not be proven true, no matter how accustomed we were to its results. To determine the characteristics of the true geometry, Gauss followed
the method of Kepler: He constructed physical measurements in the domain of geodesy, electrodynamics, geomagnetism and astronomy, which were continued by Riemann, Weber, Fresnel, Ampere, and others.

And this takes us into another higher domain, the domain of physical economy as developed by Lyndon LaRouche, a domain one can come to know best by studying LaRouche’s works directly.

**Question:** I've been reading the last pedagogical discussions on anti-Euclidean geometry, and I still get confused when I try to think of different geometries. The only thing that comes to mind is the difference between a sphere and plane, which difference I think of in terms of the difference between the characteristics of triangles on a plane and on a sphere. Is this what is meant by anti-Euclidean geometry?

**Answer:** No. The problem isn’t with the images you describe, but with the way in which you think of those images. You have to direct your mind toward the concepts underlying the way you think of geometry. While one may proceed, at first, to the concepts through images, the concepts are not found in the images.

Think of how Abraham Gotthelf Kästner concludes his essay, “On the Mathematical Concept of Space”:

“The basis of truth and knowledge does not lie in the sense notion [or image-BD] of the subject, but in the

**Figure 4(b).** Copernican system: sun-centered, constant circular action.

**Figure 4(c).** Brahe’s system: mixed Earth-and sun-centered, constant circular action.

**Figure 5.** Keplerian system: Non-constant motion on an elliptical orbit. The ratios of elapsed times are proportional to the ratios of swept-out areas. In equal time intervals, therefore, the areas of the curvilinear sectors swept out by the planet, will be equal—even though the curvilinear distances traversed on the orbit are constantly changing. In the region about perihelion, nearest the sun, the planet moves fastest, covering the greatest orbital distance; whereas, at aphelion, farthest from the sun, it moves most slowly, covering the least distance.
always 180 degrees. While Schumacher’s proof was formally valid, Gauss pointed out a devastating error in his friend’s thinking. Underlying Schumacher’s demonstration was the assumption that space was infinitely extended and had zero curvature. In such a space, straight lines would behave as Schumacher indicated. But, if space were bounded and curved, straight lines would behave differently. According to Gauss, Schumacher’s assumption arose “from an early habituation to thinking of Euclidean geometry as rigorously true.”

Q: That is why I thought of the image of comparing triangles on a sphere with triangles on a plane, since the sphere is bounded and curved, while the plane is infinitely extended and flat. Thus, the triangles on the sphere have curved sides, while the triangles on the plane have straight sides [SEE Figure 6].

A: You are falling into the trap Kästner warns about. You are looking for certainty and truth in the images, not in the concepts. Why do you say the triangles on the sphere have curved sides?

Do you remember a pedagogical discussion written by Jonathan Tennenbaum back in 1998, in which he posed the experiment of drawing an equator on a sphere and two great circles that intersect that equator? When you look at those great circles from the center of the sphere, they appear to be straight lines. In fact, the image you see appears to be two parallel straight lines, intersecting another straight line at 90 degrees [SEE Figure 7].

Q: I do remember that experiment, and I remember being startled by the result.

A: Then you surely remember that when you looked straight ahead to the equator, the lines looked parallel, but when you turned your eye toward the pole, the lines began to converge.

Q: That is what I recall being so surprising.

A: Well, Gauss posed a similar paradox to Schumacher. If space had a negative curvature, then the sum of the angles of a triangle would be less than 180 degrees. The sides of such triangles depicted on a flat piece of paper would look like hypocycloids, although, as discussed last week, this is just a depiction. But, if space were negatively curved, the sides of the triangles, whose angles added up to less than 180 degrees, would nevertheless be “straight” lines.

Q: I’m having trouble visualizing such a concept.

A: For exactly the reason stated by Gauss above. Visualizing this idea seems to contradict your assumptions, because when you think of triangles whose angles add up to less than 180 degrees, you think of their depiction in Euclidean space. As such, you can only think of such triangles as having curved sides. But, if space were not Euclidean, this would not be a contradiction. As Gauss told Schumacher: “Anti-Euclidean geometry contains nothing contradictory, although some people at first will consider many of its results paradoxical—the which, however, to consider as contradictory, would be a self-deception, arising from an early habituation to thinking of Euclidean geometry as rigorously true.”

Q: This will take some thinking.

A: That’s the idea. Now, refresh your recollection of Euclid’s parallel postulate by drawing two straight lines on a piece of paper and label them A and B [Figure 1]. Then draw a third line C, that cuts the other two. The parallel postulate says that lines A and B will intersect if the angles they make with C are less than 180 degrees [SEE Figure 6].

versely, if the angles are greater than 180 degrees they will diverge. If the angles are equal to 180 degrees they will never meet.

Q: That I remember.

A: Now think of how the two images we just constructed pose a contradiction with what you just imagined. In the one by Tennenbaum, the straight lines A and B would be the great circles that intersect the equator C at 180 degrees. According to the parallel postulate, they should never meet, yet, in fact, they con-
verge at the pole. In the image posed by Gauss, the straight lines A and B intersect C at less than 180 degrees [Figure 3]. According to the parallel postulate, they should intersect, but if space were negatively curved, these lines would converge but never intersect.

Q: How can it be that we have three sets of three lines, all configured in the same way, and yet get three entirely different results?

A: Now you're beginning to see the paradox that Gauss and Kästner posed, to get people to recognize the underlying assumptions they had made about the nature of space. In a certain sense, this is an inversion of the problem Kepler posed with respect to the geometries of Ptolemy, Brahe, and Copernicus. In that case, three entirely different configurations yielded the equivalent result. In the paradox posed here, three equivalent configurations yield entirely different results. Nevertheless the same principle is demonstrated: the primary role of cognition.

Now go back and think about why you thought the parallel postulate of Euclid was true in the first place.

Q: Because when I drew the picture, the two lines always intersected, as long as I extended them far enough.

A: In other words, you thought it was true, because it always worked.

Q: Yes, and there was nothing to indicate it would be otherwise.

A: And you assumed that if it worked in a small region of space, it would continue to work in a large, or even infinite region of space.

Q: Well, why not? There is nothing to indicate it shouldn't. I even tried it with a very large piece of paper, and the lines still intersected.

A: That's exactly the type of thinking that's leading the world to disaster. Think of the poor Baby Boomer who thinks his mutual funds will reach a certain amount so he can retire at a certain age, before his mortal body deteriorates to the point where he can no longer experience sensual pleasure. He assumes the two lines (his mutual funds and his age), will intersect at some point (his retirement), simply because they appear to converge prior to another point (his physically decay). But this image is based on an assumption about the nature of the space in which these points and lines lie. If the nature of space is like the one Gauss proposes, the two lines will never meet, and the Baby Boomer will never have the retirement he so earnestly desires. And to make things even more complicated, what if the nature of space changes, as the lines are extended? Such an image, as Riemann showed, is closer to reality. But for now, let's stick to the simpler case, which is sufficient to demonstrate the point.

Q: How, then, can I know the underlying nature of space, if no matter what the curvature, the straight lines will appear "straight"? How can I know if these lines will converge, diverge, or be parallel?

A: You must reverse your thinking entirely. Previously, you deluded yourself into thinking that the infinite would be the same as the finite, only more of it. You assumed the parallel postulate to be true, because it appears to work in finite regions of space, and you assumed it would continue to work for the infinite. Now, reverse your thinking. Let the infinite determine the finite. If the infinite is bounded, in the sense of Cantor's transfinite, or, Gauss's anti-Euclidean geometry, then the finite relations are different from what they would be, if you assume the infinite was a simple extension of the finite. In fact, your assumptions about finite space are derived from your conception of the infinite; anything else is self-deception.

As Gauss told Schumacher in 1831 with respect to this very paradox, "There is nothing contradictory in this, as long as finite man doesn't mistake something infinite, as something given, and thus capable of being comprehended by his habitual way of viewing things."

In future issues we will investigate this further.

—Bruce Director

A translation of excerpts from Abraham Kästner's "On the Conceptions that Underlie Space" appears on page 100 of this issue.
Rembrandt: The Painter’s Drama

‘Classical artistic composition must express a valid idea which is not explicitly stated in the composition itself, which is transmitted to the audience, not as an explicit statement, but rather, as a prescience of a well-defined quality and significance.’
—Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Rembrandt van Rijn (1606-1669) lived through a period of intense upheaval in Europe, including the genocidal Thirty Years’ War and its resolution in the watershed Treaty of Westphalia. Throughout all of it, Rembrandt spoke through his art for the highest qualities of mankind. For Rembrandt saw in the crisis of his time, the opportunity to create a new renaissance, in the arts, in the sciences, and in human relations.

We know that Rembrandt, like his younger contemporary Leibniz, believed in the goodness of mankind, and was optimistic about the future. How do we know this? Rembrandt left no treatises or written evidence of his philosophical views. But he gave us his many paintings, prints, and drawings, which speak to us with such power and clarity, as to leave no doubt.

The Boston Museum of Fine Arts exhibition, “Rembrandt’s Journey,” provided a rare opportunity to discover, or re-discover, the exceptional power of Rembrandt’s work to engage, challenge, and inspire; an opportunity to walk through a significant portion of the artist’s life work, and to witness his development unfold through the various media he employed—drawing, etching, engraving, and painting—in more than 200 works.

Rembrandt is the painter who most passionately expresses the ideas of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended more than a century of bloody religious warfare. From 1566 to 1648, Rembrandt’s own Netherlands fought a continuous struggle for its independence from Hapsburg Spain. It has been estimated that, in just the final 30 years of European warfare, between 7 and 8 million people died—approximately one-third the total population living within the Hapsburg Empire.

The Treaty of Westphalia called on all parties to put the nightmare of war behind them, to look to the future by forgiving their enemies and putting the “advantage of the other” before the desire for revenge. Rembrandt’s close friend, the Czech (Moravian) humanist John Amos Comenius (1592-1670), who had taken refuge in Amsterdam, was one of the figures whose philosophical and political writings provided the basis for the Westphalia Peace.

It is precisely this spirit of agape that emanates from Rembrandt’s work, ever more powerfully as he matures.
Rembrandt's Amsterdam

Rembrandt's Amsterdam was a city of great wealth, and a center of science, culture, and learning, which saw its population quadruple, from 50,000 to 200,000, in the 50 years between 1600 and 1650. Among the world-transforming developments which took place during Rembrandt's lifetime, was the establishment of European settlements in the New World, including the voyage of the Mayflower in 1620, which included citizens of the Dutch Republic.

During the same period, when Rembrandt was growing to maturity, the revolutionary works of Shakespeare (d. 1616) began to reach the continent in translation. By 1604, Romeo and Juliet appeared in German; in 1621, The Tragedy of Titus Andronicus was translated into Dutch; a few years later, Julius Caesar, King Lear, and Hamlet were printed in German; in 1654, the Taming of the Shrew appeared in Dutch. And, while it is well known that Rembrandt, unlike many of his fellow artists, never travelled to Italy, there is evidence that he was in Shakespeare's London: he drew the gates of the city in the early 1640's, and may have accompanied his close friend, the rabbi and teacher of Spinoza, Menasseh ben Israel, on a trip to England to convince Oliver Cromwell to open the country to Jewish immigration.

Then, there were the visits to Rembrandt's Netherlands in the 1630's by Shakespeare's "student" John Milton (1608-1668), in which he met and befriended Dutch republicans such as Hugo Grotius, discussing their writings and those of Shakespeare. Milton's first idea for Paradise Lost is thought to have come from the young Grotius's polemical republican drama, Der Stadtholder.

Was Rembrandt familiar with Shakespeare's dramas and poetry? Although we do not know, even a brief survey of his works reveals the striking fact that Rembrandt conceived of his compositions as staged dramas—from the selection of subjects, to the placement of the figures ("actors"), the lighting, and so forth—organized as though he were directing a great Classical drama.

'Christ Preaching'

Rembrandt's dramatic skills are in full play in his masterpiece "Christ Preaching" (1648) (also known as the "Hundred Guilder Print"), etched the year of the Treaty of Westphalia, where the composition appears as an enormous proscenium stage setting. Christ is placed slightly off-center; the suggested imbalance conveys the idea of change, motion—of something about to happen. He is illuminated by a strong light from the left, coming from outside the space of the picture; but light also emanates from within the figure of Christ himself. It is by this light that we can read the expressions (and hence thoughts) portrayed on the faces of those immediately surrounding him, and in the motions of the "supporting cast" gathered to listen to his sermon. To make the action come alive, Rembrandt not only uses chiaroscuro—the contrast of light and dark to create depth and drama—but also adopts Leonardo da Vinci's sfumato, the softening of edges to reflect atmospheric effects, especially around the face of Christ, whose image is rendered without definite contours. This creates both a sense of mobility, and of ambiguity—manifesting the movement of the mind—wherein we can discover for ourselves the nature of Christ.

The figure of Jesus is set against a stark background; a large, dark form rises above him, protectively, and emphasizes his central role; the other actors are riveted to his words, his presence, so that he becomes the organizing principle of the drama. The scene, chosen for its dramatic potential, is from the Gospel of Matthew: "And great multitudes followed him; and he healed them there." At the right, a crowd enters through the city gate: they are the sick, the crippled, the aged, who seek his help. To the left are the Pharisees—the religious fundamentalists, who demand to know Christ's "position" on "single issues," like divorce (Matthew 19:3-12). In front of the Pharisees, two mothers approach him, offering their children for his blessing; as Peter, at Jesus's right hand, tries to hold them back, Christ reproaches him, for "of such is the kingdom of Heaven" (Matt. 19:13-15).

Between the two mothers, a youth is seated deep in thought; he seems to be pondering his very existence. This must be the rich young man, who came to Christ seeking eternal life, but rejected the advice to sell his earthly possessions and help the poor. This identification is reinforced by the entry of a barely visible camel through the gate, reminding us of Christ's admonition that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter heaven (Matt. 19:16-24).

Overall, this staging of Matthew's
19th verse reflects its conclusion, that “many that are first shall be last; and the last shall be first.” Rembrandt brilliantly depicts this idea metaphorically, by presenting the poor and disadvantaged with more precise definition, and greater substance, than the rich and powerful.

Is this not the idea of the Treaty of Westphalia, which was signed the very year Rembrandt made his print?

‘Adam and Eve’:
Real People

In Rembrandt’s etching “Adam and Eve” (1638), the stage curtain (in the form of a large tree trunk at the right of the picture) is drawn back, and our attention is drawn to the two figures lit dramatically from the back and left; so that, at first, we don’t notice the huge winged serpent clinging to the the tree trunk. Rembrandt has made the familiar story entirely his own. Rembrandt’s couple are often compared to Albrecht Dürer’s famous engraving “The Fall of Man (Adam and Eve)” (1504), which Rembrandt undoubtedly knew well (he was an avid collector, and owned many of Dürer’s prints). But, whereas Dürer followed tradition by depicting Adam and Eve as paragons of physical beauty, Rembrandt’s pair is anything but. They are earthy, almost primitive—indeed, barely human, in the higher, spiritual sense. This quality is reinforced by the moment of the story Rembrandt has selected to illustrate. The pair are caught at the instant of temptation, just before committing the sin which brings about the Fall of man and the expulsion from the Garden of Eden. Eve peers at Adam with a wily expression, as he reaches for the apple she is holding. Adam is clearly the weaker figure, and this is borne out by the stance of each—he is slightly off-balance, one foot resting insecurely on a rock, as the other seems to slide forward toward Eve, while she rests firmly on two feet at the center of the composition. Four hands dance around the guilty apple; Adam’s hand, in shadow, hovers above, about to grasp it. Suddenly, we notice the serpent hanging from the tree above them, dangling another apple from his mouth.

On the lower right-hand side, Rembrandt includes another animal of the Garden, a scarcely visible elephant, a symbol of piety and temperance—qualities which are being violated by the leading players in the drama, but also, by the forces who have turned all Europe into a field of carnage.

Self-Portraits

Rembrandt’s sense of drama is present in his celebrated self-portraits as well. No other artist reproduced his own image so many times—50-60 paintings, dozens of drawings, engravings, and etchings—over such an extended period of time. These critical self-examinations can be thought of as Rembrandt’s autobiography.

The MFA exhibit offers an abundance of these studies, in every media, beginning with some of the earliest drawings and etchings, dating from 1628-30, when Rembrandt was a struggling young artist in Leyden. These show us a youthful and awkward Rembrandt, using his own face to experiment in portraying various expressions and moods, at a time when he could not afford to pay a model to sit for him. Later, Rembrandt would return again and again to his own visage, as if to document for posterity his development as a human being and an artist.

A self-portrait from 1629 [see inside back cover, this issue], when he was about 23 years old, already reveals the genius Rembrandt was becoming. In this youthful work, he has already begun to employ the dramatic use of light and shadow, which gives his expression a sense of ambiguity, the
sense that an idea is forming in the mind that lies behind his eyes.

Constantijn Huyghens, the powerful secretary to the Prince of Orange, himself a poet, musician, and art dealer, "discovered" Rembrandt in Leyden, and became his early patron, securing fat commissions at court for the young artist. In an unpublished autobiography written 1629-31, Huyghens (whose son Christian, a scientist and pioneer in optics and the science of light, was a teacher and collaborator of the great Leibniz) wrote about Rembrandt's 1629 painting "Judas Returning the Thirty Pieces of Silver":

"All [the expressiveness of Rembrandt's 'despairing Judas'] I compare with all the beauty that has been produced throughout the ages. This is what I would have those naive beings know, who claim (and I have rebuked them for it before) that nothing created or expressed in words today has not been expressed or created in the past. I maintain that it did not occur to Protogenes, Apelles, or Parrhasios [ancient Greek painters-BJ], nor could it occur to them, were they to return to earth, that a youth, a Dutchman, a beardless miller, could put so much into one human figure and depict it all."

Looking at this early self-portrait, it is easy to see why Huyghens was so affected. Here we see the young artist, already displaying those paradoxical qualities of self-confidence and self-doubt: it's there in the eyes—one in shadow, one half in light; the wispy lightness of the feather in his cap, contrasted with the oversized, substantial torso, giving the youthful face weight and solidity; the serious expression, against the fanciful costume. These paradoxical juxtapositions, reinforced by the chiaroscuro and blurring of outlines (sfumato), create an ambiguous quality of action caught in mid-motion, the hallmark of a Classical composition. No wonder, then, that Huyghens compared Rembrandt to the greatest of the Classical Greek painters!

A decade later, Rembrandt, at age 33, gave us an etching of himself costumed as a Renaissance courtier, the "Self-Portrait Leaning on a Stone Sill" (1639). He had just moved to Amsterdam and tasted his first real success, having sold several paintings to the Stadholder (Governor) Frederik Hendrik. This self-portrait is an expression of supreme self-confidence, in which the young artist has drawn himself with reference to the most celebrated Renaissance painters; for, in the year this work was executed, two famous Italian portraits were on display in Amsterdam: Raphael's "Baldassare Castiglione" (c. 1514), and Titian's "Ariosto" (c. 1510). Rembrandt cedes nothing to these two icons of the Renaissance. In fact, he lampoons the corrupt Titian, by borrowing his window-ledge stage, but flipping the image; and, where Titian hides half his subject's face in a menacing shadow, Rembrandt—like Raphael's Castiglione—looks directly out at the viewer. Rembrandt was present at the purchase of this Raphael portrait, and made a copy of it, noting the price (an astonishing 3,500 guilders). He may not have been aware that the Portuguese agent who purchased the painting was acting on behalf of Cardinal Richelieu for Louis XIII, King of France.

In 1659, Rembrandt, now aged 53, painted what may well be his greatest self-portrait [see inside back cover, this issue]. What is only suggested in the earlier works, is now fully realized. Having mastered all technical issues, he is free to focus his full concentration on revealing the inner qualities of the personality. Compare the three self-portraits. In 1629, the artist is just begin-
ning to discover himself; his face is divided between light and dark, signifying something unfinished, just emerging. In 1639, he confronts us fearlessly, but he is still impressed with his own success, and costumes himself accordingly. By 1659, however, Rembrandt gazes out at us from eyes which are truly windows to the soul. This is a painting which must be seen “in person” (it was loaned from the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., where it is usually on display), in order to appreciate its astonishing truthfulness. There is no “pretifying” here. Rembrandt piles on the paint, to catch every line, every wrinkle, every physical imperfection that life has stamped on his face. What is left is the mind itself, seen through the eyes. A harsh light illuminates the visage, which is set against a dark background. There is nowhere to hide from the penetrating glance.

Clearly, Rembrandt has given us, through the medium of his self-portraits—if viewed only briefly through these three—the longest-running play in history!

**Between Canvas and Sculpture**

No review would be complete without mentioning two of his other portraits, those of “Flora” (1654) [see inside back cover, this issue] and “Titus” (1655). As with the National Gallery “Self-Portrait,” reproductions can not convey the reality of these paintings. By the mid-1650’s, Rembrandt was a fully mature master. His paintings had become something between canvas and sculpture. It was noted during his lifetime that Rembrandt used an impasto so thick, that it took on sculptural qualities; the texture and modeling of the paint became a means of reflecting light and casting shadows, in the same way relief does in sculpture.

The allusion to Classical sculpture is reinforced in the painting of Flora, who, although a Roman goddess, is wearing a white chemise, which, with its simple vertical folds, suggest a Classical Greek statue. Her body faces front, while her head and arms are turned, creating precisely the kind of tension between stillness and mobility that marks great Classical sculpture. A quintessentially Rembrandt touch is found in the goddess’s hands, which are those of a simple working woman. And her poignant expression, conveyed through her eyes and the set of her mouth, reveals that this is not a goddess at all, but a real woman, who has been given a costume to wear for her part in Rembrandt’s drama.

In “Titus,” we see the great artist addressing his posterity. The portrait shows Rembrandt’s son at age 14, on the verge of manhood, and perhaps contemplating his future. We cannot tell whether the sheaf of papers, which extends into our space, is for writing or drawing, but Titus’s pensive expression suggests a depth of character we associate with his father. Up close, we are once again struck by the painting’s tactile qualities. Rembrandt has used a buildup of paint to sculpt the sheaf of paper, so it both catches the strong light, and reflects it back onto Titus’s face. As Titus looks into the future, we can share both his fears, and hopes for what is to come.

---Bonnie James

**1. In an unpublished manuscript, “Rembrandt and Comenius Against Rubens: The Light of Agape” (June 2001), Karel Vereycken notes that Constantijn Huyghens (who was also an avid admirer of the Hapsburg-owned Counter-Reformation painter Peter Paul Rubens) became a thorn in Rembrandt’s side: “Rembrandt, at one point, got so irritated with Huyghens’ shortsightedness, that he offered him a large painting, called ‘Samson Blinded by the Philistines,’ painted ‘à la Rubens,’ [i.e., in Rubens’ violent style—BJ], which shows Roman soldiers gouging out Samson’s eyes with a stick. Did Rembrandt suggest,” asks Vereycken, “that his Republic (the strong giant) and its representatives, were blinded by their own philistinism?”**
Routing the ‘Beast-Men’

In April 2003, the LaRouche in 2004 campaign released a blockbuster pamphlet titled *Children of Satan: The Ignoble Liars Behind Bush’s No-Exit War*. Approximately one million copies of the pamphlet, in three separate editions, were circulated throughout the United States. One consequence of the mass circulation of the document was that Vice President Dick Cheney, the mastermind of the Bush Administration’s new national security doctrine of preventive nuclear war, and the architect of the Iraq invasion, became a target of public expose, ridicule, and, eventually, grand jury investigation.

By the early winter of 2003-2004, the Iraq war had turned into precisely the quagmire that candidate LaRouche had warned of. The failure of American search teams to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, after months of work, raised new, and even more serious questions about the Bush Administration’s new ideological roots of “Beast-man” Dick Cheney.

**The Beast-Men: Cheney, Delay**

The investigation began with Leo Strauss, the University of Chicago fascist philosopher, who trained several generations of American and European “intellectuals,” steeped in the tradition of Nazi ideologues Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger. Strauss had been identified in the original *Children of Satan* report, as the intellectual godfather of the entire neo-conservative cabal in and around the Bush 43 Administration, that practiced the art of strategic deception to promote perpetual wars in aid of their fantasies about an American Imperium.

By January 2004, the LaRouche in 2004 team was prepared to release a follow-up report, *Children of Satan II: The Beast-Men*. Now in its second printing, and with over 400,000 copies already in circulation, this entirely new document picks up where *Children of Satan* left off, identifying the major players—in both political parties—behind the perpetual war drive of Cheney and company.

In addition to an expanded profile of the role of Vice President Cheney in the Bush Administration “war party,” including his own Straussian roots dating back to his tenure at the Gerald Ford White House, the report also provides a devastating expose of Republican House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, the Texas Republican known equally for his crude and often abusive treatment of his House Republican colleagues, and his penchant for corruption and dubious campaign financing schemes.

*Children of Satan II* revealed, for the first time, that DeLay is, in fact, a pathetic figure, a victim of an abusive, alcoholic father, who was chosen to run for the U.S. Congress because, as a Texas state legislator, he was considered to be an intellectual lightweight, with a penchant for hot-tub parties. Once he arrived in Washington, DeLay was brought into a bizarre non-denominational religious cult, known alternatively as “the Fellowship,” and “the Family.”

The eight-page segment of the report on DeLay helped break the climate of terror surrounding the House Majority Leader, whose inner office is adorned with a replica of the Ten Commandment tablets, and a pair of bull whips. With the myth of DeLay’s übermensch persona cracked, suddenly the dirt began to spill out about DeLay’s campaign finance schemes, and the suspect “lobbying” activities of several of his longtime aides. DeLay and these other men are now all under criminal investigation for a series of schemes, including illegal financing of the campaigns of many Texas state Republican candidates.

**Soros and the Dope Democrats**

In the original *Children of Satan* dossier, the authors exposed the Democratic Leadership Council as an outpost of neo-conservative penetration and subversion of the Democratic Party. *Children of Satan II* identified another Trojan Horse operation on the Democratic side of the aisle, this one centered around mega-speculator and would-be dope legalizer, George Soros. Soros has poured millions of dollars into the Democratic Party in the current electoral cycle, claiming to anyone who will listen that he is devoted to removing George W. Bush from office.

Soros’s actual complaint against Bush is simply that the perpetual wars and destabilizations coming from the neocon cabal inside the Administration make it tough on offshore speculators to make an illegitimate living. Soros is the furthest thing on the planet from the ideals behind the Franklin Roosevelt tradition of the Democratic Party.

In fact, as *COS II* reveals, Soros’s closest ally in the drive to legalize all drugs in the United States and around the
globe, to ensure the free flow of narco-dollars, is George Shultz, the Godfather of the Bush 43 Administration.

These are but several of the highlights of the LaRouche in 2004 study that make it a must-read. Adding historical and philosophical depth to the exposés that punctuate its early chapters, is a vital essay by candidate LaRouche, “Religion and National Security: The Threat from Terrorist Cults,” subtitled “What Ashcroft Would Prefer You Not Know.” The essay situates the current misdeeds of Cheney, DeLay, Soros, et al., in the long wave of Jacobin history, and poses some profound and fundamental questions about the nature of man as a creature in the living image of God.

—Jeffrey Steinberg

Lyndon LaRouche’s “Religion and National Security: The Threat from Terrorist Cults” appears on page 4 of this issue.

What Religion Was Jesus?

If you answered Christian, or Catholic, you would be in the majority, and maybe very popular with your friends, but you would be wrong. You, along with anyone else seeking some understanding of just what is at stake in such seemingly well-intentioned phenomena as Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ, would do well to read this book. For it is with disarming polemics such as this, that James Carroll begins a detailed inspection of the origins of anti-Semitism within the Roman Catholic Church. An old and trying theme, you might say, but, as anti-Semitism is a marker for what Lyndon LaRouche has identified as the “ultramontane” or Synarchist faction within the Church, Carroll intentionally or not has provided the thoughtful with a history of this virus.

Unlike many authors who simply seek to “dis” the Catholic Church, or the Pope, author Carroll takes us on a journey for the discovery of Truth. Carroll was ordained a Catholic priest, and at some point had a crisis of faith around questions such as these. But, as one with love for his “mother”—Carroll also often refers to his biological mother, whose faith, blind as it was, led him to fall in love with the Church as a boy—he seeks, not revenge, but an understanding of just what is at stake in this matter, or fall into some academic stupor, which has grown so, that at one time the entire area of Auschwitz was ringed with crosses. The question (from the Christian side) was, “Why would anyone object to this simple construct of two pieces of wood?” While it was written before Gibson’s faith-baiting movie, the story Carroll tells serves to answer that question.

The Cross as a Weapon

For Carroll, the issue can, in part, be understood by remembering the Jewishness of Jesus. He takes us back to the time just after the Crucifixion, a time before there were Christians, and when there were simply Jews who either believed that the Messiah had come, or not. This was fertile ground, Carroll observes, not for the believers, so much as for their rulers, the Romans. The Romans, like any empire worth its salt, would look for just such “local issue” conflicts such as these, and encourage them as much as possible, thus using the local issue to mask the heavy hand of the Empire. Why does he understand this so well? “I’m Irish,” he says, “and the British have been doing this to us for hundreds of years!” So, while Carroll might fail to carry the issue of imperialism’s manipulation of religion through to the present day—although he thoughtfully probes into the social motives for anti-Semitism—he has no problem understanding that it was the Romans who killed Christ, as it is their like-minded sympathizers today who are again raising the cross as a weapon to put fear into the flock.

The naked cross is indeed the link that carries Carroll’s historical narrative up to the present. Theologically, it puts the emphasis on the human death of Jesus over His divine Resurrection. Of course, the Romans, empiricists that they were, had to drag a physical cross into the picture. The story is told by Eusebius, the first historian of the Church, of Constantine’s vision before the Battle of the Melvian Bridge, as he...
was vying for control of Rome. On the eve of battle, high above the hills over Rome, the emperor saw a cross in the sky, with the words In Hoc Signo Vinces—"In This Sign, Conquer." As the story goes, with the psychological terror inspired by the crosses painted on their shields, Constantine's forces were indeed victorious. Filled with the power of this new god, Constantine converted on the spot, made Sunday a day of rest, forbade the death-torture of crucifixion, hired Christians into his government, and generally became known as the man through whom Christianity had subdued the Empire.

Or was he? Eusebius' story was written 10 years after the battle, in his laudatory Life of Constantine, and is essentially legend, not history. More tellingly, in Eusebius' tale, the cross is not one of wood, but rather, one more fitting the Empire it would serve: the image is that of the hilt of a sword. The implications are mammoth. As Carroll writes, "When the death of Jesus—rendered literally, in all its violence, as opposed to metaphorically or theologically—replaced the life of Jesus and the new life of Resurrection at the heart of the Christian imagination, the balance shifted decisively against the Jews." From here, Carroll expands the story, concentrating on how the image of the cross would again and again be raised against the Jews. So the question remains: Had the Church conquered Rome, or had the Empire, in fact, subdued the Church?

Empire and Church
The official history of the Catholic Church begins with this "corporate merger" of Church and State. It is from here that the first Pope is officially traced, now that the Empire had adopted this new religion. But again, this story comes to us by way of Eusebius, who, it turns out, although a Bishop in his own right, was a victim of the Arian heresy which denied the Divine nature of Christ—a version of Christianity much more compatible with the other pagan religions in the pantheon of the Empire. The story goes on and on, but, like the so-called "Donation of Constantine" written by fraudsters some 400 years after the Emperor's death, the message keeps coming back: Not only did the Romans kill Christ, but, at a certain point, they (as did later and current, like-minded imperialists) moved to take over His Church as well.

The point is further made if we consider that the same story could be told with Muslims in the role of antagonists.

For example, the first sequel (as told by Carroll) to the Constantine story takes place in Palestine, where, on the first pilgrimage of a Christian to the (now) "Holy Land," Constantine's mother, Helena (revered as a saint in the Orthodox Catholic Church) is led (by a Jew, of course) to discover the original "true cross" that had somehow been preserved for three centuries. Untold by Carroll is that this very same cross, this very "weapon of mass destruction," would somehow (it is now over 1,000 years old!), be dragged back to Palestine during the Crusades, when the declared foes of the Church/Empire were now Muslim, and not merely Jewish.

With today's financial collapse fuelling the drive to merge religion and empire into some newfangled fascist form of government, it is no surprise to see some fool like a Mel Gibson again raising the cross in this image of bloody fury. To his credit, Carroll resurrects some of the best Christian thinkers of previous eras—Augustine, Abelard, and Cusa—to deal with these issues, for example citing as his source for Cusa's ecumenical approach to religious conflicts, the Schiller Institute volume, Toward a New Council of Florence: 'On the Peace of Faith' and Other Works by Nicolaus of Cusa.

—Mark Bender

**Courage and Seduction**

In assessing playwright Arthur Miller, one must take into consideration both the insightful artist with flashes of genius, and the critical shortcomings of his work, and then set them against the backdrop of Great Depression of the 1920's and '30's, the uplifting of the nation by Franklin Roosevelt, and the horrible downfall initiated by Harry S Truman and his successors. In this new—and only—biography of Miller, author Martin Gottfried attempts to deal with the contradictions and accomplishments of a playwright who, while never able to achieve consistent artistic greatness, did for a time wage a gritty fight against the prevailing moral degeneration and cultural collapse that gripped the nation.

The author of such widely celebrated works as Death of a Salesman (1949), All My Sons (1947), The Crucible (1953), and The Misfits (1957), Miller came out of the same milieu as Depression artists Clifford Odets, Lee Strasberg, Eugene O'Neill, and Tennessee Williams. All were struggling to create an American school of drama, and each achieved a modicum of success, although they all ultimately succumbed to the increasingly decadent culture launched by post-war "Trumanism."

Miller succeeded better than most (although he never fully appreciated the concept of historical specificity, as presented by Lyndon LaRouche—the
metaphor of The Crucible, for example, is symbolically compelling, but historically untruthful.) Unlike Odets and others, he withstood the witchhunt of the McCarthy show trials of the 1950’s and refused to capitulate to the Senate committee, even with the threat of imprisonment. Nevertheless, Miller did capitulate to the lago-like manipulations of F.B.I. stooge Elia Kazan, and sold some of his soul to the devil. Eventually, he, like the others, fell prey to the existentialism of his environment and the seductive lure of Hollywood.

Willie Loman: Trumanism’s ‘Common Man’

Three crucial events played defining roles in Miller’s development, both as a writer and a political figure: the stock-market crash of 1929, in which, Miller’s family went overnight from a life of affluence to a world of poverty and conflict, leading to his questioning the idea of economic justice; his refusal to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC); and his ill-fated marriage to actress Marilyn Monroe.

Throughout his plays, Miller continually addressed his characters’ selling out, especially by selling themselves. This is particularly true for his most memorable character, Salesman’s Willie Loman. Miller has Willie eulogized at his funeral: “Willy was a salesman . . . he didn’t put a bolt to a nut . . . he don’t tell you the law or give you medicine. He’s a man way out there in the blue, riding on a smile and a shoeshine. And when they start not smiling back—that’s an earthquake. And then you get yourself a couple of spots on your hat, and you’re finished. Nobody dast blame this man. A salesman has got to dream, boy. It comes with the territory.”

In this emphasis on “selling,” Miller was consciously addressing the consumer society of the 1940’s and ’50’s, and the shift from the era of optimism and production during Roosevelt, to the service economy of the post-war era. Gottfried quotes Miller, first from a sketch for A View from the Bridge: “A man who doesn’t build anything must be liked. He must be cheerful on bad days. Even calamities mustn’t break through ’cause one thing, he has to be liked.” And later, from an interview, speaking of Willie Loman: “What happens when a man does not have a grip on the forces of his life and has no sense of values which will lead him to that kind of grip?”

There is little question that Miller’s intention was to change society for the better. As one of his characters says in The Great Disobedience: “‘The world has got to be changed, so we can live, and if you’ve gotta die, then die changing it.’ And, in the last scene of Salesman, Miller provocatively opens up the question of immortality. Willie Loman is planting seeds in his garden by flashlight—just before he kills himself—and says to his absent brother, “A man can’t go out the way he came in, Ben, a man has got to add up to something.” I.e., man must produce, he must create—he cannot just consume.

Stuck in the Fishbowl

As a result of his refusal to name names before HUAC, Miller was convicted of contempt of Congress in 1957 (later overturned by the Supreme Court, in 1958). This was at the high-point of his literary and political life.

But on the day Miller’s stand made him a hero, he announced he was going to marry Marilyn Monroe. During his eight-year involvement with Monroe, Miller never wrote anything significant for the Broadway stage—his next play, After the Fall, was written after Monroe’s suicide. (She, like the fictional Charlie Castle in Odets’ The Big Knife, was destroyed by the Hollywood system. She said she was “tired of being Marilyn Monroe . . . it’s a burden. What do you call it? An albatross.”)

Miller had written The Crucible, set during the Salem witch trials of the 1600’s, at the height of the McCarthy hearings in 1953. This period comes together in Miller’s words: “’what was in the air’ provided the actual locus of the tale. It was the fact that a political, objective, knowledgeable campaign from the far Right was capable of creating not only a terror, but a new subjective reality, a veritable mystique which was gradually assuming even a holy resonance. . . . It was as though the whole country had been born anew, without a memory even of certain elemental decencies which a year or two earlier no one would have imagined could be altered, let alone forgotten. Astounded, I watched men pass me by without a nod whom I had known rather well for years; and again, the astonishment was produced by knowledge, which I could not give up, that the terror in these people was being knowingly planned and consciously engineered . . . ” (Introduction to Collected Works).

Miller often asserted that the duty of a true artist was to take on the prevailing axioms of society. In the same Introduction, he wrote: “An idea if it is really new, is a genuine humiliation for the majority of the people; it is an affront not only to their sensibilities, but to their deepest convictions. It offends against the things they worship, whether God, or science or money.” But he made a certain, uneasy peace with the fishbowl of modern culture, insightfully criticizing it while never fully breaking with its underlying axiomatics. Even so, as in Salesman, there were flashes of brilliance.

—Angela Vullo
Do you know that this nation was founded by a youth movement? You had an old fogey like me, Ben Franklin, one of the leading scientists of the 18th century. He led a bunch of people.

Do you know how old the Marquis de Lafayette was when he became a general of the Revolutionary Army? How old our first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, was? How old Jefferson was, when he began working under Franklin? They were no older than you!

—LYNDON H. LAROUCHE, JR.
March 11, 2004

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Rembrandt van Rijn lived through a period of intense upheaval in Europe, including the genocidal Thirty Years’ War and its resolution in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Throughout all, Rembrandt spoke through his art for the highest qualities of mankind. For Rembrandt saw in the crisis of his time, the opportunity to create a new Renaissance, in the arts, in the sciences, and in human relations.

The exhibition ‘Rembrandt’s Journey,’ which opened in Boston and is now in Chicago, provides a rare opportunity to witness his development unfold through the various media he employed—drawing, etching, engraving, and painting. And even a brief survey reveals the striking fact that Rembrandt conceived of his compositions as staged dramas—from the selection of subjects, to the placement of the figures (‘actors’), the lighting, and so forth.

This sense of drama presents itself in Rembrandt’s celebrated self-portraits. No other artist reproduced his own image so many times, over such an extended period of time, and these searching self-examinations can be seen as Rembrandt’s autobiography.

A self-portrait from 1629, when he was about 23 years old, reveals the genius Rembrandt was becoming. By 1659, Rembrandt, now aged 53, painted what may well be his greatest self-portrait, focussing his full concentration on the inner qualities of the personality.

Compare these self-portraits. In 1629, the artist is just beginning to discover himself; his face is divided between light and dark, signifying something unfinished, just emerging. By 1659, however, the artist gazes out at us from eyes which are truly windows to the soul. There is no ‘prettifying’ here. Rembrandt piles on the paint to catch every line, every wrinkle, every physical imperfection life has stamped onto his face.

What is left is the mind itself, seen through the eyes. A harsh light illuminates the visage, which is set against a dark background. There is nowhere to hide from the penetrating glance.

* * *

The Roman goddess Flora wears a white chemise whose simple vertical folds suggest a Greek statue. Her body faces front, while her head and arms are turned, creating precisely the kind of tension that marks a Classical sculpture. A quintessentially Rembrandt touch is found in the goddess’s hands, which are those of a simple working woman. And her poignant expression reveals that this is not a goddess at all, but a real-life woman, who has been given a costume to wear for her role in Rembrandt’s drama.

—Bonnie James

[see ‘Rembrandt: The Painter’s Drama’]
Religion and National Security: The Threat from Terrorist Cults

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. identifies the banker-spawned Synarchist ideology behind both left- and right-wing cults—from the Spanish Inquisition, to the French Revolution’s Jacobins, fascist Napoleon Bonaparte, the Congress of Vienna, down to the Nazis, their allies, and the neo-conservative cabal led by Dick Cheney that launched the Iraq war. The antidote lies in locating religious belief in “man’s ability to reach, through powers unique to the human mind, beyond the range of sense-perception, to discover, and master processes lying only in the real physical universe beyond the reach of an animal’s senses.”

Spain’s Carlos III and the American System

Authors William F. Wertz, Jr. and Cruz del Carmen Moreno de Cota report on the extraordinary history of Spain’s King Carlos III, whose 1759-1788 reign was a reflection of the same Leibnizian influences that gave birth to the United States. Contrary to the Synarchists, the positive cultural identity of Ibero-America is not Hispanidad—a concoction based on an anti-Semitic, ultramontane, feudalist version of Catholicism—but the legacy of Carlos, a community of principle with the General Welfare principles enshrined in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution.

Clifford Odets’ The Big Knife and ‘Trumanism’

In this ‘Symposium on Classical Drama and Historical Specificity,’ authors Harley Schlanger and Robert Beltran trace the descent of Hollywood-manipulated American culture from the optimism that blossomed under Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, to the tragic ‘littleness’ that followed Harry Truman’s elevation to the Presidency.