The Sublime Heroism of Gethsemane

The paintings by Francisco Goya y Lucientes (1746-1828), ‘The Agony in the Garden’ and ‘The Third of May, 1808,’ convey Friedrich Schiller’s concept of the sublime, a concept which is also expressed in the two works by Ludwig van Beethoven presented in this issue, the oratorio Christ on the Mount of Olives, and the opera Fidelio.

As the juxtaposition of the two Goya paintings indicates, Christ’s decision in the Garden of Gethsemane to subject his will to that of God, to be willing to lay down his life for humanity, out of agapic love for truth and justice, is the Promethean mission which each of us is called upon to imitate and adopt. This is reflected in the central figure of the ‘Third of May,’ as also in Beethoven’s Leonore and Florestan of Fidelio.

As Schiller writes in ‘On the Sublime,’ man is not truly free if there is even one exception to his freedom, i.e., death. Only through his capacity to overcome death by freely submitting his will, as Christ did, to Divine Counsel, does man demonstrate that supersensuous capacity for moral freedom, which distinguishes him from the animals. Note well the sleeping dog in the foreground of the ‘Agony in the Garden,’ which symbolically conveys the failure of the three Apostles to rise at that moment to the level of agapic, creative reason—like so many of our fellow citizens today.

‘The Third of May, 1808,’ painted in 1814, depicts the execution by Napoleon’s invading troops of Spanish civilians who had risen up to defend their fatherland, armed only with knives against the entrance of the French army into Madrid. The central figure, dressed in pure white and yellow, arms spread open, evokes Goya’s image of Christ in Gethsemane, accepting the cup, and with it His imminent crucifixion—thus demonstrating that man is indeed free, and need not fear death.

Like his contemporary Beethoven, Goya was initially a supporter of Napoleon, believing him to be the bearer of the revolutionary ideals of liberty and progress. When Napoleon crowned himself emperor, however, both artists saw him for the tyrant he was. Beethoven, whose Eroica Symphony had been written in his honor, expressed anger at Napoleon’s betrayal of the republican cause: ‘Now he, too, will trample on all the rights of man and indulge only his ambition. He will exalt himself above all others, become a tyrant!’

The purpose of these paintings, as of Beethoven’s musical compositions and Schiller’s dramas, is to inspire the capacity for such sublime heroism in the average citizen, so as to achieve true, republican freedom for all humanity in the fight against tyranny. This is the quality of mind needed today, if humanity is to defeat the financier oligarchy and its bureaucratic lackeys once and for all, and thus avoid the otherwise inevitable descent into a New Dark Age.

—William F. Wertz, Jr.
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A Not So Distant Mirror—
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New Dark Age
William F. Wertz, Jr.
Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., delivered this summary address to the closing session of the summer cadre school of the Schiller Institute in Europe, held in Oberwesel, Germany, on July 26.

What is certain today, is that this is a very unusual circumstance. We are approaching the month of August, and, in the coming several months, August, September, October, there will be such changes in the world, as none of you living has ever seen before.

The change in the course of European and world history, which has been ongoing for the last thirty-odd years, is most comparable to the destruction of European civilization which occurred from the death of Frederick II, in the middle of the Thirteenth century, through the collapse of European civilization in the so-called Dark Age of the Fourteenth century.

What is certain among the many uncertainties of this circumstance, is: The present world monetary and financial system, or what some people call the world economic system, will not live out this century. The next months and years will see the end of every financial and monetary institution, as institutionalized forms, on this planet. They will all go. We obviously are therefore at a point in history, which is an unusual turning point. For someone to live in such a time as this, is to live what people have not lived for a thousand years—the time of crisis when everything changes, when nothing is simple any more. This is real history. Not the history that’s talked about in the newspapers, or the textbooks, or the classrooms these days: This is real history—a fundamental change in human destiny, for the better, or for the terrible.

Remember, that in the period from the middle of the Thirteenth to the middle of the Fourteenth century in Europe, half of the level of population vanished. Half of the cities and towns of Europe, vanished. Most of the people who had lived relatively prosperously under early-Fourteenth-century European conditions, went insane, like the Flagellants—like the rock concert people today, the Flagellants of today, the techno people, the Flagellants of today, the madmen, the lunatics, Unmenschen. And we are in such a time.

History does not mean what event occurs, what or who is elected, what governments are elected, what war is won. That is not history. History is ideas. History is the principles, like the discovery of scientific principles, relative to the physical universe, or those principles we call artistic principles. These are the principles which determine how humanity behaves, how it governs itself. And we come to a turning point, where we must choose between two sets of ideas: The set of ideas, on the one hand, which are generally accepted; which are upheld by the press; which are presented by the television; which are the commonly accepted terms of conversation; which are the common terms of discussion among parliamentarians; and so forth and so on. The common, street-corner types of discussion. All of this is nonsense. It’s finished, it’s gone. It’s over.

A new set of ideas will either take over, in the months and years immediately ahead—a fundamental, revolutionary change in the condition of mankind, which, hopefully, will be comparable to what happened in the context of the great ecumenical conference of Florence, in the Golden Renaissance in the middle of the Fifteenth century—, or, if we do not have such a revolutionary change, from evil to good, as the Council of Florence typifies, then we will find that the level of the human population will collapse in a very short period of time, to much less than half of what it is today. If there are over five billion people today, there
may be less than one billion, twenty to forty years from now, maybe much less. Whole civilizations, nations which existed, will disappear. Entire languages and cultures will vanish, doomed, because they lack the ideas, the moral fitness to save themselves.

There’s a good side to this horror show: It is that the universe is the best of all possible universes, as Leibniz said. So, whenever mankind, which is the ruler of this planet, and implicitly the potential ruler of this universe; whenever mankind becomes so filthy, so impure, so degraded, that mankind is unfit to rule the Earth, then history—and ideas—intervenes, and eliminates that culture which represents those ideas, which destroyed the mission given humanity.

What we are going to have to do, will probably, to most, seem impossible, in the next weeks and months ahead—is to make a great revolution, which will erupt, as people realize that everything they believed in up to now, is false. That government is false; the economy is false; institutions are false; that world credit institutions must vanish, globalization must vanish, free trade must vanish, Prince Philip of England must vanish, carried by the Erinyes, who are quite useful for carrying out such garbage.

Or else— We purge ourselves of these things, or we do not survive.

Look at the situation of Japan. The present ruling class of Japan is morally unfit to survive, and will not survive. Either Japan rids itself of this ruling class, or the world will rid itself of Japan. That’s the fate of Japan, in the weeks ahead.

You see in Russia, a similar problem. The existing system cannot continue. It is doomed. It has to change. The existing system in Europe is doomed, it cannot continue to exist, past the weeks and months and years ahead. It’s doomed. The present system in the United States is doomed. In Africa, the doom is already there. Asia, Southeast Asia, is doomed. South America, Central America—doomed. Unless a fundamental change in the choice of ideas to determine human behavior occurs in the weeks and months ahead.

This is real history. When you stand on a mountain-top, and you must choose one of two roads, for all mankind; you cannot wait, you cannot postpone, you must begin to move. You must move in one direction, the old direction, which is to doom, or you must move in a new direction, which is to survival and renaissance.

So, we live not in a period of “important events,” we live not in a period of “crisis,” but rather, we live in a time, when the fate of humanity for five hundred years perhaps to come, will be determined by what we do, in these weeks, months, and years ahead. And, what we do, will not be based on the swinging of swords, or great physical events; what we do, will be determined entirely within the realm of ideas. Ideas. The choice of ideas, and the ability and passion to act for those ideas which ensure the continuation of humanity.

If we fail, humanity will be purged of those of us who have failed, because we are unfit to survive, like Belshazzar, or ancient Babylon. If we become unfit to survive, like the empires in the dust, we shall go in the dust too. A new civilization will come to replace it, perhaps to do better.

But we have now the chance, one chance, a momentary chance; and to live in such a time, when the fate of humanity is in our hands, that is to live in real history.

Thank you.

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Ozymandias

I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert . . . Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed:
And on the pedestal these words appear:
‘My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!’
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

—Percy Bysshe Shelley
If Friedrich Schiller is the poet of freedom, then Ludwig van Beethoven is emphatically its composer. Of all the great artists who follow Schiller, Beethoven is the closest to him in outlook, and potency.

Although his admiration for Schiller is well known, exactly to what extent Beethoven took ideas directly from Schiller, or generated them independently himself, we may never know. It doesn’t really matter, however, for what can be demonstrated is, that Schiller created the intellectual environment; his aesthetical writings, plays, and poetry were all in circulation by the time Beethoven presented his first published works. More importantly, it can be demonstrated that Beethoven and Schiller were thinking the same way.

In his 1789 poem “The Artists,” Schiller wrote:

How beautifully, O man, your palm branch holding
You stand at century’s unfolding,
In proud and noble manhood’s prime . . .

For Beethoven, as for Schiller, freedom is the freedom to develop one’s cognitive powers, in order to carry out that necessary mission, on behalf of humanity as a whole, for which the Creator put us here in the first place. It is only from this Promethean standpoint, that we can locate the true meaning of individual freedom.

Martin Schongauer (c.1430-1491), “Christ on the Mount of Olives,” engraving from the series “The Passion of Jesus Christ.”
Republicans such as Schiller and Beethoven had been inspired by the success of the American Revolution, and its institutionalization of the idea that “all men are created equal.” They believed that the Nineteenth century could truly become an age of reason. But, they were also horrified by the degeneration of the French Revolution into an enraged mob with a guillotine. Schiller’s response to this was, that the great moment had found a “little people,” and the burning concern of his aesthetical writings was how to elevate this “little people” to the level of a self-governing, republican citizenry.

Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man, is a call for a revolution in great Classical art, to accomplish this republican transformation. He considered this a task for a hundred years. Art must not remain satisfied with itself, he said, according to an internal criteria of “art for art’s sake”; rather, it must freely change itself, to meet the necessity of saving Civilization.

How different from today’s degraded, so-called artists, who say they can only reflect the degeneracy and alienation of their times; or worse, think that they must be in the vanguard, leading us ever further along the road to Hell!

In the following essay, we examine Beethoven’s oratorio Christ on the Mount of Olives (Christus am Ölberg), both in relationship to his subsequent opera Fidelio, and as a change in the treatment of the same subject from the earlier “Passion music” of other composers, particularly J.S. Bach. Beethoven’s changes in the treatment of Christ’s Passion, are shown to be a magnificent fulfillment of the type of progress so ardently required of art by the poet of freedom Friedrich Schiller.

The Shared Idea Behind Christ on the Mount of Olives and Fidelio

Before Beethoven attempted string quartets, he wrote three string trios, to develop his composi-
tional skills. Similarly, the oratorio *Christ on the Mount of Olives* was very likely Beethoven’s preparation for his first opera, *Leonore*, later called *Fidelio*. Both works were commissioned by the same individual, Emmanuel Schikaneder, who is best known for having commissioned, and written the libretto for, Mozart’s opera *The Magic Flute*. The opera was commissioned shortly after the premiere of the oratorio, most probably on the basis of its success. Both premiered in the same theater, the Theater an dem Wien (Schikaneder’s theater), *Christ on the Mount of Olives* in 1803, and *Leonore* in 1805.

Oratorio and opera both combine music and drama, but in different ways. In an oratorio, there is no scenery, the characters are not in costume, and they do not act. They stand and sing, letting the music tell the story. The chorus plays a much greater role than in opera. In *Christ on the Mount of Olives*, there are no acts, but six numbered sections featuring three soloists—Jesus, the Seraph, and Peter—as well as the chorus (playing different roles), and orchestra.

The opera *Fidelio* is in two acts, with sixteen numbered sections (and twenty scenes), and with seven soloists who must act, as well as sing. It is the story of the heroic Florestan, unjustly cast into the stinking dungeon of a royal prison by the evil commandant Don Pizarro; and, of the efforts of Florestan’s courageous wife Leonore to free him by finding employment in the prison disguised as the boy “Fidelio.” Leonore acts to save her husband’s life when Pizarro, knowing of the imminent arrival of the Governor, and fearing the discovery of his crime in illegally imprisoning Florestan, is about to murder him. (The story bears a close resemblance to the actual events surrounding the imprisonment of the American Revolutionary War hero the Marquis de Lafayette, and the efforts of his wife Adrienne to enter the prison at Olmütz, Austria, to save him.)

What unifies these two works, is the conception Beethoven shares with Schiller of the Promethean idea of man—the idea that individual man, who is made in the image of God, can intervene into history to change its course. Beethoven was notoriously single-minded about which librettos (texts) he would, and would not set to music. Even the great moral operas of Mozart were not sufficient for his purpose.

In the *Aesthetical Letters*, Schiller calls upon the artist to give man a more powerful and true notion of his own humanity. These two works, and the contemporaneous *Eroica* [Heroic] Symphony, are unified by a single burning preoccupation in the composer’s mind: that the Promethean idea of man must be made comprehensible to the public, as the embodiment of a republican citizenry.

In Aeschylus’ play *Prometheus Bound*, Prometheus, himself an immortal god, has stolen fire from the tyrannical Zeus; and given it as a gift, to the “creatures of a day”—mankind—whom Zeus wishes to destroy. Armed with fire, and other gifts of knowledge from Prometheus (his name means “forethought”), mankind is lifted above its bestial condition, and survives. Zeus, in anger, imposes hideous punishment on Prometheus: to be chained to a rock, where an eagle returns every day to eat his liver; but Prometheus, being immortal, cannot be destroyed, and rejoices in his foreknowledge of how Zeus himself shall be toppled by the folly of his own evil designs. All of Prometheus’ so-called “friends,” able to think only in the here-and-now, urge him to compromise with Zeus, in order to ensure his immediate survival. But Prometheus operates on a higher level, ordering his life in the present, and enduring great suffering, to bring about a future he knows must become.

Although Beethoven is still today often identified with the idea of individual freedom, this is usually interpreted to mean the countercultural vision of an individual, free from all moral and social responsibility—that is, freedom to do “exactly as I please.”

For Beethoven, as for Schiller, freedom is the freedom to develop one’s cognitive powers, in order to carry out that necessary mission, on behalf of humanity as a whole, for which the Creator put us here in the first place. Such a mission can be carried out only by a sovereign individual, acting against self-interested and narrow “mainstream opinion.” It is only from this Promethean standpoint, that we can locate the true meaning of individual freedom.

**Love and Duty: Levels of Hypothesis in Fidelio**

Great art is never concerned with merely telling a story, no matter how noble; it must instead develop according to the principles of Socratic dialogue. In the opera *Fidelio*, these principles can be efficiently identified by examining the arias, or solos, insofar as these are akin to soliloquies in a drama. Here, we see the innermost workings of the minds of the leading characters—their souls speak.

In this opera, the seven principal characters (five of whom have arias) are operating under completely different “hypotheses,” or sets of axiomatic assumptions, which determine how they act, think, and respond to situations. These differences are revealed clearly in their respective arias, which are composed according to different musical
principles. This allows Beethoven to have great fun developing beautiful metaphors around the related concepts of love [Liebe], and duty [Pflicht].

**Hypothesis (1)** Florestan and Leonore are governed by the hypotheses appropriate to a world-historical sense of identity—the idea of living one’s life for a great purpose—to fulfill a mission, where all personal cares and desires are subsumed under it. Their arias are the high points of the opera.

After a long orchestral introduction that opens Act II, marked “Grave,” Florestan’s aria begins with a recitative, in which he has been startled out of sleep, and into awareness of his desperate situation. He sings:

God, what darkness here!  
O gruesome silence  
Around me, all is desolate,  
Nothing alive save myself.  
O heavy trial!

A change occurs in the recitative when Florestan accepts that

God’s will is just!  
I do not complain,  
The measure of suffering is His.

Then, the aria proper begins with a prayer-like Adagio (slow), where Florestan tells us that he

Dared to speak out the truth, boldly,  
and that  
Chains were my reward,  
but that it is a  
Sweet comfort in my heart:  
I have done my duty!

Beethoven has Florestan sing this line, and then repeat it, with only one change: the second time the words “my duty” [meine Pflicht] are sung, the notes rise into the tenor third (high) register on Gb-F [SEE Figure 1].

In Book Two of the Republic, Plato uses the term “agape” in speaking of the love of justice. It is this agapic love of truth and justice, which enables Florestan to face death with a peaceful soul. Like the Good Samaritan of Schiller’s parable, Florestan needs no one to impose his duty on him from the outside: Love creates its own duties.

In a third section of the aria, marked Allegro (fast), Florestan is inspired by a vision of

An angel, so like my wife, Leonore,  
who leads him to freedom in  
the Heavenly Kingdom [himmlische Reich],
as he soars up into the tenor third (high) register, to Bb [SEE Figure 2].

Leonore also operates under the hypotheses appropriate to a world-historical personality, for whom love is agapê. Her great aria is in Act I. In her recitative, where she must subdue “violent inner emotions” (she has just heard Pizarro talk of murdering her husband), a change also occurs, beginning on the words

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**FIGURE 1. “I have done my duty”**

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Adagio

\[ \text{Adagio} \]

\[ \text{süßer Trost in meinem Herzen: meinene Pflicht hab' ich gethan,} \]

\[ \text{meine Pflicht, ja, meine Pflicht hab' ich gethan.} \]
```

To graphically represent the vocal registers: Notes which are to be sung in the first register are enclosed by a solid-shaded box (with the exception of the male voices, where an unshaded, outline box is used instead). Notes to be sung in the second register are left unmarked. Third-register notes are enclosed by an open box with a shaded outline.

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**FIGURE 2. “Leonore ... who leads me to freedom in the Heavenly Kingdom”**

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Poco allegro

\[ \text{Poco allegro} \]

\[ \text{ein Engel, Leonore, Leonore, der Gattin so gleich,} \]

\[ \text{der, der führt mich zur Freiheit, zur Freiheit in's himmlische Reich,} \]
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Yet though like ocean breakers
Hatred and rage storm in your soul,
In me there shines a rainbow,
That brightly rests on dark clouds.

Like Florestan’s, her aria also begins in a prayerful mode, and at an adagio tempo:

Come, Hope, let the last star
Not forsake the weary!
Brighten my goal,
Be it ever so far,
Love will arrive at it. [See Figure 3]

In a third section of the aria, she strengthens her resolve, and sings, allegro, of a duty born of love:

I follow an inner drive.
I will not waver,
Strengthened by the duty [Pflicht]
Of faithful married love [Gattenliebe]!

The original French play was entitled Leonore, ou l’amour conjugal (Leonore, or Married Love). Even great art is too often concerned with youthful “falling in love.” Fidelio is unique in the way it treats the strength of married love. But, in Beethoven’s mind, married love is not viewed in its “personal,” everyday dimension. Leonore is not merely concerned with getting back her husband: she knows that Florestan’s freedom is important for mankind. Both are married, not only to one another, but to their shared mission. When man and wife love each other for their world-historical identity, married love can soar to otherwise unobtainable heights, as Leonore does, rising up to a soprano third register B, on the final word “Gattenliebe” [see Figure 4]. Like Florestan, she sings with great strength through all three registers. When Beethoven wishes to make a point, he is always very bold.

Hypothesis (2) The concept of love is completely different for someone whose identity is that of a “little person.” All the hypotheses, or sets of axiomatic assumptions, are changed. Gone is the sense of mission, or any responsibility to historical humanity: instead, the little person seeks to adapt to whatever evil is in power, in order to get along with his or her personal life, and love becomes eros—the erotic fixation on possessing objects.

The opera’s first arias are those of Marzelline and her father Rocco, the chief jailer. Both are “little people,” and a comparison of their arias with those of Leonore and Florestan is most revealing.

Marzelline has become infatuated with the boy Fidelio (who is actually a grown woman, Leonore, in disguise), and has capriciously cast off her boyfriend, Jaquino. She is literally “falling” in love! She knows little of her own mind, and sees love as an escape from a hostile world. She sings of Fidelio:

O were I now united with you
And might call you husband!
What it would mean, a maiden can
Only half admit.
But when I do not have to blush
At a warm and heartfelt kiss,
When nothing on earth can disturb us—

In the peace of quiet domesticity [Hauslichkeit]
I shall awake each morning,
We shall greet one another tenderly,
Toil will banish care. [See Figure 5]

Her father Rocco also expresses the notion of love as eros, or object possession—in his case, however, it is possession of money. In his “buffo” (humorous) aria, he sings

Now children, you love each other well and truly, do you not? But that is not all that goes to make a happy household

If you don’t have money [das Gold] too
You cannot be really happy;
Life drags sadly by,
Many an anxiety sets in.
But when it clinks and rolls in your pocket
Fate is then your prisoner, and money
Will bring you power and love
And satisfy your wildest dreams.
It’s a lovely thing, is money,
It’s a precious thing, is money [ein goldnes Ding, das Gold]
... It’s a mighty thing, is money. [SEE Figure 6]

In contrast to this littleness, agapē is the emotion of creativity, of scientific discovery, and Beethoven awakens this emotion in his listeners through the music, which has the ability to fully realize the potential potetic content of the text. He is constantly making discoveries, and improving his compositional powers. His music instills in us a love of, and excitement about, our own and others’ creative powers of mind. This helps solve a problem: Most citizens think of themselves as little people, and would more easily identify with a Rocco than a Florestan, but the music makes that impossible. The beauty of Flor- estan’s, and Leonore’s, music, is sublime, and makes us want to be like them. No one could conceivably prefer listening to, or singing, any of the other arias in the opera. Contrary to those who claim that as a composer, Beethoven did not write well for the voice, Beethoven, the scientist, would discover new capabilities for voices, strings, and keyboard, and then demand that the performers develop the appropriate technique! For the great composer, chorus, orchestra, and so forth, are his “machine shop,” where new ideas can be tested. Leonore and Florestan take the dramatic soprano and heroic tenor to new heights. For the characters to function on a higher level of hypothesis, every aspect of the musical composition itself must be on such a higher level.

Both Rocco’s and Marzelline’s arias are strophic, or repeating, whereas Florestan’s and Leonore’s are thorough-composed, that is, constantly developing and changing. Strophic settings can be among the most beautiful, but here Beethoven means to contrast the fixed emotional quality of eros, with the growing passion of agapē. As we have seen, both Florestan’s and Leonore’s arias have three sections, each of which is governed by different, and advancing hypotheses. The emotional shift to a higher level and type of passion in each of the three sections, is in accordance with the advances in hypothesis, and makes such advances sensuous for the listener. Scientific discovery is the source of agapic passion, and the words in the arias are merely appropriate for what Beethoven accomplishes through musical discoveries.

Both Florestan’s and Leonore’s arias begin with a recitative in which they must conquer eros, in the form of fear, rage, and despair; followed by a prayerful Adagio, in which they find great strength in agapē—a sacred love, and sense of duty; ending with an inspiring Allegro—an impulse towards action, which looks towards the freedom that shall be obtained.

Marzelline’s aria is of an entirely different character than Leonore’s. It is simpler, far easier to sing, and within a much smaller vocal range. It is also at a far lower level of musical hypothesis, not just in the vocal line, but the entire polyphony (multiple voices). However, both her and Rocco’s arias are meant by Beethoven to appeal to us. It is only in times of crisis that the immorality of otherwise affable “little people” becomes clear (as in the French Revolution), and that we, the audience, become embarrassed at our previous sympathy with their outlook; and it is when we contrast these two arias, with those of the two heroes, that we see what is lacking in the former.

Marzelline’s strophic aria is divided into A and B sections, which repeat A-B-A-B. Rocco’s goes A-B-C-A-B-C. In both cases, the B section is a little faster, and captures a sort of manic elation at the contemplation of actually possessing the desired object. For Rocco, this occurs when he stops complaining about the lack of money, and dreams of what he might do if he had some. Compare Marzelline’s A section [Figure 5], with her B section [SEE...
Figure 7], where she reaches up to a soprano third register G, and sings of hope [Hoffnung] filling her breast, that she might have Fidelio as her husband. Then see how Leonore sings of hope [Figure 3].

Two Views of the Same Object

The audience should recognize that Rocco is not an evil man. Indeed, he has potential for good. He tells us that he hates all cruelty, and agrees to allow Fidelio to free the prisoners for a short walk in the garden; but, he is very fearful, and sees himself as a victim of the system—just a guy trying to avoid trouble. When forced to choose between good and evil, he hides behind a false notion of duty.

Whereas Florestan sings of a duty which is not dictated by any external authority, and for which he would give his life, Rocco, when asked by Pizaro to murder Florestan, protests

that is not my duty [Pflicht],

but quickly agrees that it is his duty to dig Florestan’s grave!

In the Finale of Act I, Rocco sings to Fidelio,

No, my good lad, do not tremble!
Rocco is not hired for murder, no no no no no!
The governor himself will come down;
We two will only dig the grave.

When Florestan, who is starving, requests a drink of water, and asks to have his questions answered, Rocco replies:

What would you have me do? I carry out the orders that are given me; that is my office—my duty.

Beethoven develops this through a beautiful use of metaphor. One word—“duty” [Pflicht]—is seen from two completely different hypotheses. Both Rocco and Florestan think their definition is self-evident. There is a paradox here. To someone on Rocco’s level, Florestan’s notion of duty is unfathomable. After all, who told Florestan that it was his duty to “tell the truth, boldly”? Isn’t duty something externally imposed? The paradox can only be resolved, if one discovers that a “world-historical” identity is the natural state of man, even if only a few ever rise to that level; and that the little person’s prejudices are false, even if immensely popular. Only Florestan and Leonore are right in their concept of duty, and only they know why they are right.

Beethoven has great fun with this. In this same Finale to Act I, Leonore and Rocco seem to be singing in parallel, about the same thing:

O let us delay no longer,
We follow our stern duty [wir folgen unser strengen Pflicht],
but Rocco is talking about digging Florestan’s grave, and Leonore/Fidelio, about freeing him!

Hypothesis (3) On the lowest level of hypothesis is Pizarro, a tyrant, who hates humanity. (Plato’s Republic identifies the tyrant as the lowest level of man, himself enslaved to the tyrant eros.) Pizarro’s aria follows those of Marzelline and Rocco, but comes before Leonore and Florestan. Eros no longer appears as a seemingly innocent flaw, but is now the very soul of evil. Pizarro is incapable of singing about duty, or love, and instead chooses vengeance [Rache], and the bliss [Wonne] he looks forward to from plunging a dagger into Florestan’s heart! The man is so enraged, that his aria really has no melody (it is never performed outside the opera), and keeps repeating a few notes:

Ha! what a moment!
My vengeance [Rache] shall be cooled!
You go to meet your fate! [SEE Figure 8]

Beethoven’s morality would not be satisfied merely to show the existence of these different levels of hypothe-
ses—more important to him is the higher hypothesis, of how change from an inadequate hypothesis to a better one can take place. Here, we see that it is the activity of the world-historical individuals which alone uplifts and transforms the others around them. Positive change always comes from the highest levels of moral character, and never the lower.

In the great and joyous Finale, all the newly freed political prisoners, and townspeople, join in a chorus to sing

Hail the day, hail the hour,
Long yearned for but unforeseen,
Justice in league with mercy
Appears at the threshold of our grave.

All are uplifted by the heroism of Leonore, and the strength of the married love of Florestan and Leonore; especially Rocco, who angrily denounces Pizarro to the governor, and pleads for justice for Florestan and Leonore. He is so moved, that he has lost his fear. When he angrily denounces Pizarro for attempted murder, the latter points to Rocco as an accomplice. Earlier, Rocco would have claimed that he was only following orders; now, he accepts responsibility for his actions:

ROCCO
This very hour that villain would have
Wreaked murder on Florestan.

PIZARRO
Wreaked it, with him.

ROCCO
We two in league
(to Don Fernando)
Only your arrival called him away.

Marzelline is also uplifted, through the beautiful quintet “O God! what a moment!” (“O Gott, welch’ ein Augenblick!”), sung at the moment Leonore unlocks her husband’s shackles:

You [God] test us, but don’t forsake us.

Here, Marzelline’s voice often rises above Leonore’s, and she follows Leonore in canon up to a third register B♭ for the first time in the opera. Under Leonore’s influence, Marzelline grows into full womanhood [SEE Figure 9].

Most important to Beethoven, the artist, is the change he knows he is creating in us, the audience of real live human beings (even though born centuries after his death), as we witness all these transformations! We leave the opera house better people than we arrived, as we begin to perceive that the story was only a vehicle for something more profound.

Or, as Lyndon LaRouche develops the idea in the case of tragedy,

In a valid performance, the mind of the audience is shifted from the literal drama as such, to the eerie sense of some principle of the mind which intervenes to change the character of the literal events on stage. The drama is thus shifted from the literal drama on stage, to the drama within the mind of the audience. . . .

In Schiller’s composition of the drama, the truth lies not in the selection of the literal events on stage; the truth lies in the artful juxtaposition of those conflicts of principle—those metaphors which account for the tragic, actual history of referenced, real-life events. 

Christ on the Mount of Olives

The oratorio Christ on the Mount of Olives is unique in that, unlike earlier Passion music—such as that of Heinrich Schütz and J.S. Bach—it omits the trial and Crucifixion of Christ, and presents only the events around the garden of Gethsemane: and, also unlike the earlier works, it sets Christ in the primary singing role. Beethoven’s Christ is not a tragic figure, but a Promethean one—as is Florestan, who is man acting in the image of Christ.

This work is not often performed, and is usually considered inferior. One can scarcely encounter a dust jacket which doesn’t repeat how it was “a youthful work,” “written in two weeks,” and that “Beethoven later criticized the poet,” and so forth.

There is something suspiciously telling about this “mainstream” commentary, however. For example, press
reviews of its premiere in 1803 were almost unanimously critical of the work, and claimed that the performance was poorly received; but an unknown critic for the Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung, wrote that it was received with "extraordinary approval," and added,

It confirms my long-held opinion that in time Beethoven can effect a revolution in music like Mozart's. He is hastening towards this goal with great strides.5

A full three months later, another correspondent countered:

I am obliged to contradict a report in the Musikalische Zeitung: Beethoven's cantata did not please.6

To this, Beethoven's associate, and first biographer Anton Schindler, remarked:

Even the composer agreed with this to the following extent—that in later years he unhesitatingly declared that it had been a mistake to treat the part of Christ in the modern vocal style. The abandonment of the work after the first performance, as well as its tardy appearance in print (1811), permit us to conclude that the author was not particularly satisfied with the manner in which he had solved the problem.7

Schindler is notoriously unreliable, and Beethoven's later biographer Alexander Thayer contradicts him, by identifying that after its premiere in 1803, the work was performed four times in 1804, and repeated every year, always drawing full houses, until it was banned in 1825 by the Hofmusikgraf.8

Beethoven himself wrote in 1804 that

[t]he oratorio has not been published because I have added a whole new chorus to it and have changed some things; for I wrote the whole oratorio in a few weeks, and several things since then have not entirely suited me.

It is important to note here that Beethoven was critical of himself in a way completely different from his scurrilous critics. He often was critical of earlier masterworks because he had gone so much further, just as Fidelio surpassed Christus am Ólberg.

At the heart of the matter, is Schindler's remark about setting the person of Christ in the modern vocal style. That is an innovation essential to Beethoven's purpose, and probably a large part of the controversy over this work. Bach's Passions set Christ as a bass voice. He sings only in the recitatives, and has no arias.9 Beethoven sets Christ as a passionate tenor, in fact a Heldentenor (heroic tenor), and gives the first, and most important aria to Him. A Heldentenor is a baritone voice with a tenor register shift. He can sing with the power and depth of a baritone in the lower registers, while carrying that power high up into the tenor third register. Although this is the first great Heldentenor role written—and Florestan the next—Beethoven developed this idea from the operas of Luigi Cherubini.10

Even Brahms' friend Eduard Hanslick accepted the idea that it was a mistake to set Christ in this manner. In an 1862 review of Handel's Messiah, he wrote:

... the person of Christ is not introduced as singing, a dangerous rock where even Beethoven was shipwrecked.11

The Sublime Heroism of Gethsemane

Christ's experience in the garden of Gethsemane, where he accepts his coming Crucifixion and death, is one of the most important moments in Christianity, but it is also among the least understood. How many Christians see the acceptance of their own, personal "cup of Gethsemane" as a central point of their religion? Do they not prefer, rather, to focus upon a covenant with God, whereby they might obtain entrance into a future heaven, and ignore their responsibility to carry out God's work here on earth? In times of great crisis, such as war, this quality of Gethsemane may arise in the majority of the people; but in other times, such as ours, it is sadly lacking.

The account of Gethsemane in all four Gospels is very short. Christ's decision to accept the cup is very quick. He prays three times:

O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt. (Matthew 26:39)

Notice that the transition from asking to have the cup removed, to accepting God's will over His own, is instantaneous. While it is always better to follow God's will, and to choose one's mission in life over personal well-being, it cannot be done as mere Kantian duty, or as passive resignation to a fate outside one's own control. Schiller believed that beauty is nothing but an inclination toward duty. He would demand that even the sacrificing of one's life must be done freely, of one's own will! It must be actively willed, out of love of humanity, so that we could face death with joy, knowing that future generations will look back at us with love: knowing that we had lost our life, in order to gain it.12

But, in order for us to love the sublime heroism of Christ, his suffering must be real. The Biblical account of Christ's suffering is powerful, but again, very short:

And his sweat were as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground. (Luke 22:44)

My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death.
Christ's suffering was denied by the Gnostics, who rejected the dual nature of Christ as both man and God. In fact, some commentators believe that the Apostle John wrote his Gospel in refutation of a Gnostic named Cerinthus, who maintained that Christ's soul was made by God, but his body by the Demiurge; and that therefore, the true Christ, being pure spirit, died without suffering, and his soul returned to the Plethora of multiple deities. To this, John replied that

The word was with God, and the Word was God. (John 1:1)

and

All things were made by Him; and without Him was not anything made that was made. (John 1:3)

And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us. (John 1:14)

All the Christian heresies stumbled over precisely this point, denying the consubstantiality of a Christ who was both fully God and fully man. Ironically, today's Christian fundamentalists, who can barely speak a sentence without praising "Jesus," seem not to identify at all with him as a heroic human being, but as something inimical, completely separated from themselves, as a "supernatural" presence waiting to bail them out from whatever jam they get into. Beethoven and Schiller, on the other hand, would see Christ as a passionate figure, whose suffering must be adequately represented, in a way that would make both fundamentalists and the oligarchy very uncomfortable.

Schiller begins the first of his two essays on the sublime, "On the Pathetic," thus:

Representation of suffering—as mere suffering—is never the end of art, but, as means to its end, it is extremely important to the same. The ultimate aim of art is the representation of the supersensuous, and the tragic art in particular effects this thereby, that it makes sensuous our moral independence of the laws of nature in a state of emotion. Only the resistance, which it expresses to the power of the emotions, makes the free principle in us recognizable; the resistance, however, can be estimated only according to the strength of the attack. Therefore, shall the intelligence in man reveal itself as a force independent of nature, so must nature have first demonstrated its entire might before our eyes. The sensuous being must profoundly and violently suffer; there must be pathos, therewith the being of reason may be able to give notice of his independence and be actively represented.

One can never know, whether self-composure is an effect of one's moral force, if one has not become convinced, that it is not the effect of insensitivity. It is not art, to become master of feelings, which only lightly and fleetingly sweep the surface of the soul; but to retain one's mental freedom in a storm, which awakens all of sensuous nature, thereto belongs a capacity of resisting that is, above all natural power, infinitely sublime. Therefore, one attains to moral freedom only through the most lively representation of suffering nature, and the tragic hero must have first legitimized himself to us as a feeling being, before we pay homage to him as a being of reason, and believe in the strength of his soul.

Pathos is therefore the first and unrelenting demand upon the tragic artist, and it is permitted him, to carry the representation of suffering so far as it can be done, without disadvantage to his ultimate end, without oppression of moral freedom. He must, so to speak, give his hero or his reader the full load of suffering, because it remains always otherwise problematic, whether his resistance to the same is an act of the soul, something positive, and not rather merely something negative and a lack.

Beethoven succeeds beautifully in fulfilling Schiller's requirements. The oratorio begins with an orchestral introduction, followed by a recitative and aria by Christ. The introduction (marked Grave), recitative, and aria, cannot but remind us of the opening of the second act of Fidelio, which also begins with a Grave introduction, followed by the recitative and aria of Florestan, who is facing his own personal Gethsemane. (Compare the openings of both recitatives, as shown in Box I.)

The introduction, recitative, and aria in the oratorio are quite long, and expand on the Biblical texts:

**Recitative**

O God my father! send me comfort, power, and strength.

The hour of my suffering approaches, which I chose long before the world was called from chaos at thy behest . . .

I would be the saviour and sole atoner for human guilt.

How could this race, fashioned from dust, stand a sentence which crushes even me, thy Son, to the ground? See how dread and fear of death take their grip on me . . .

**Aria**

My soul is afflicted with torments which threaten me; terror seizes me, and my whole frame trembles. I shudder convulsively with fear of imminent death, not sweat but blood drips from my brow.

Father, your Son implores you, deeply bowed and wretched. All things are possible to your omnipotence; take this cup of sorrow from me!

Beethoven has set out not to alter the New Testament, but to fulfill it.

The first time Christ sings "Take this cup of sorrow
Box 1. Compare the recitative entrance of (a) Christ in “Christ on the Mount of Olives,” with that of (b) Florestan in “Fidelio.” In both cases, the orchestra reduces to a descending arpeggio that ends very quietly, so that the tenor may enter, unaccompanied, addressing God. Both use the G of the tenor third (high) register. Conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler’s recorded performances of “Fidelio” show that this note must not be shouted: Florestan and Christ are addressing God out of reverence, not anger.

(a) Recitative entrance of Christ in *Christ on the Mount of Olives*

(b) Recitative entrance of Florestan in *Fidelio*

from me” [*nimm den Leidenskelch von mir*], he seems hopeful: by the last time, it has become so moving, that we find ourselves in the paradoxical situation of wishing that the bitter cup could be removed from Him, even though we know that the survival of Civilization, and thus our own existence, depends on His having accepted it.

Later, the Seraph informs Christ that mankind can only find atonement with God, and eternal life, through His sacrifice. They join in a beautiful duet:

Great the torment, fear and terror
Which the hand of God pours upon me/Him;
Yet greater still is my/His love
With which my/His heart embraces the world.

This is the moment of decision—the turning point. In
Box I, we compared the opening recitatives of Jesus and Florestan. Now, let us compare this duet [see Figure 10] with the first part of Florestan's aria shown in Figure 1, which opens as a prayer on the words "In des Lebens Frühlingsstagen." Both pieces are in the same key, Ab Major. Earlier, we saw the repetition of the words "meine Pflicht" [my duty] first on Eb-D♭, then in the tenor third register G♭-F.

Here, Christ rises to exactly the same tones, G♭-F on the words "meine Liebe" [my love], while the Seraph sings the same words slightly later on Eb-D♭ [Figure 10]. Again, we see the idea of agapic love, and the sense of duty born from it, as a unity in Beethoven's mind.

But before Jesus can leave the world, this love must be put into action, as law. Section Six opens with Judas and the soldiers coming to arrest Christ. The disciple Peter flies into a rage, and sings

\begin{quote}
In my veins gather Righteous anger and rage,
Let my vengeance be cooled
In the blood of these audacious ones.
\end{quote}

Peter is not an evil man like Pizarro, but a good man overcome by rage; his aria lacks beautiful melodic development, although it has more of a melodic line than Pizarro's [see Figure 11]. Both men sing of "cooling their vengeance in blood." Then, Jesus intervenes, singing

\begin{quote}
You must not seek revenge
I have taught you one simple thing,
To love all mankind
And forgive your enemies.
\end{quote}

A trio begins, with Jesus and the Seraph singing

\begin{quote}
O children of man,
Grasp this holy law:
Love him who hates you,
Only thus can you please God.
\end{quote}

Peter, however, still hanging on to his rage, continues to sing about cooling his vengeance, as an ironic counterpoint to the other two voices [see Figure 12].

Later, after another, more powerful intervention by
Christ (there are three in all), Peter is finally recruited, and all three sing

O children of man, 
Grasp this holy law:  
Love him who hates you,  
Only thus can you please God. [SEE Figure 13]

Only now can Jesus die happy. His success in changing Peter, and thus guaranteeing a line of succession, confirms that he has outflanked the enemy by unleashing a weapon that they cannot and will not understand: the idea of loving your enemy—not joining him at his level, but recruiting him to yours—because, in actuality, there is no stupid mass of humanity foredoomed to brutishness and ignorance: there are only confused, individual human beings, who are all made in the image and likeness of God, and thus can be changed for the better. This willingness to forgive one’s real and supposed enemies, is necessary to realize the essential political message of Christianity: that all men and women are created equal, and equally perfectible, by God.

This brings us to the greatest part of the oratorio—the Finale. Let Schiller speak again, from his “On the Sublime”:

“No man must must” . . . The will is the species character of man, and reason itself is only the eternal rule of the same . . . All other things must; man is the being, who wills.

Precisely for this reason is nothing so unworthy of man, as to suffer violence, for violence annuls him . . . .

For everything, the proverb says, there is a remedy, but not for death. But this single exception, if it actually is one in the strictest sense, would annul the whole notion of Man. By no means can he be the being which wills, if there is but even a single case, where he absolutely must, what he does not will. This single terrible one, which he merely must and does not will, will accompany him as a ghost and, as actually the case among the majority of men, deliver him as a prey to the blind terrors of the phantasy; his boasted freedom is absolutely nothing, if he is bound even in a single point . . .

The feeling of the sublime is a mixed feeling. It is a combination of woefulness, which expresses itself in its highest degree as a shudder, and of joyfulness, which can rise up to enrapure, and, although it is not properly pleasure, is yet widely preferred to every pleasure by fine souls. This union of two contradictory sentiments in a single feeling proves our moral independence . . . . [A]s it is impossible that the same object stand in two opposite relations to us . . . we ourselves stand in two different relations to the object, so that consequently two opposite natures must be united in us . . . . We therefore experience through the feeling of the sublime, that the state of our mind does not necessarily conform to the state of our senses . . . . that we have in us an independent principle, which is independent of all sensuous emotions.”
A chorus of soldiers comes to arrest Christ. Suddenly, while the soldiers are singing

- Up, up, seize the traitor:
- Tarry here no longer.
- Away with the miscreant:
- Hurry him to justice,

and the chorus of disciples sings

- On his account we shall also
- Be hated and persecuted.
- We shall be bound, martyred, and condemned to die.

Christ breaks into a triumphant and joyous song that soars up into the third register, the same range as the third part of Florestan's aria shown in Figure 2:

- My agony will soon be over,
- The task of redemption accomplished;
- Soon the might of Hell will be
- Totally overcome and conquered. [See Figure 14]

Here, Beethoven has done something completely new and different. In the Passions of J.S. Bach, the passage where Christ is arrested and led away is always very sorrowful. In Beethoven's, it is victorious. Prometheus has given the gift of fire to man. The half-steps where Jesus sings of defeating Hell's might, are a transformation of the most sorrowful repetition of "Take this cup of sorrow from me," from Christ's first aria [See Box II]. What seemed a personal defeat, has been turned into a victory for all mankind.

Jesus' singing completely transcends the rage of the soldiers, and the fear of the disciples, whose choruses continue throughout [Figure 14]. Again, as in the later Fidelio, all three are operating according to different levels of hypothesis, which are combined ironically in musical polyphony. The soldiers are filled with rage, and denounce Jesus as a traitor. The disciples, like the friends of Prometheus, can only think of the consequences in the immediate here and now. Jesus is thinking about the future of humanity; He knows that His suffering will be short, and is able to locate His identity, and thus His emotions, fully in His mission. Only this supreme sacrifice, made out of love of humanity, will outflank and defeat the enemy. Killing Christ was the biggest mistake the Romans could have made: they thus assured the spread of Christianity throughout the Empire.

Some might say that the reason Christ faces death without fear, is because He has foreknowledge of His coming Resurrection; but, that would turn the Passion into a facile game. The Son of Man has feared, and overcome fear, by replacing concern about His personal wellbeing, with true joy in knowing how the gift He has given mankind, will shape everything to come after Him.

His aria leads directly into, and is itself transcended, by a chorus of angels, who sing

- Worlds sing thanks and honor
- To the sublime [erhab'nen] Son of God.

This chorus is introduced by a maestoso (majestic) orchestral introduction. This slow and stately march,
very powerfully turns this moment into a moment in the simultaneity of eternity. Christ's decision has instantly transformed past, present, and future; in that sense, he is the Alpha, and the Omega: suddenly, entire worlds are transformed past, present, and future; in that sense, he is a saint, and angels, in a solemn procession.

A great fugue begins on

Praise Him, you angel choruses
Aloud in holy tones of exultation!

This fugue develops with the kind of exhilarating and accelerating joy that we hear later, in a more developed way, in the Finale of Fidelio, and the choral movement of the Ninth Symphony. One is exalted by the effect on humanity's future, which a single life brought into atonement with God can have.

In the Ninth of his Aesthetical Letters, Schiller talks of how the poet must be in his time, but not of it. He must be nurtured

under distant Grecian skies, to full age. If he is then become a man, he thus returns, a strange form, to his century; but not, in order to please it with his appearance, but rather, frightful as Agamemnon's son, in order to purify it.¹⁹

Beethoven the composer, is a great poet of the sort desired by Schiller; and perhaps, he deserves also to be admitted into the company of humanity's handful of truly great dramatists.
At least three completely different productions of Beethoven’s *Great Opera Fidelio* (1814) were presented on German stages in 1997 alone. Can it be, that Beethoven’s musical personification of a great figure as wife, Leonore—who, in her singing celebrates not only “true married love,” but, by risking her life, achieves the rescue of Florestan in the dramatic development of the “Great Opera”—might have a completely unheard-of effect at the present historical turning point? For sure, it is certain that the number of *Fidelio* performances demonstrates, that, completely contrary to the spirit of the times, people today are more than ever seeking the impact of Beethovenesque “Great Opera.”

If one examines the performances in detail, it is completely apparent from them, that there are still directors living in the old era of ’68-generation “director’s theater” (*Regietheater*).* According to one review, one of the

* A recent decades’ fad, according to which theatrical “freedom” is expressed by discarding—or, in fact, critiquing—the ideas and intentions of even the greatest Classical authors, in favor of the titillating preoccupations of the “liberated” director.—Ed.

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The musical changes from *Leonore* to *Fidelio*—the dimly conscious metaphor of ‘liberation of creative power through freedom’—can be recognized as the ‘loose cords’ through which the work of art is tightened and shaped.

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In the springtime of my life
Fortune fled from me!
I dared to boldly tell the truth,
And chains are my reward.

Florestan’s Aria, *Fidelio*, Act II

Come, Hope! Let not the last star
Of the weary be dimmed!
Light my goal, be it ever so far,
Love will attain it.
I follow my inner impulse;
I waver not,
The duty of true married love
Strengthens me!

Leonore’s Aria, *Fidelio*, Act I

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The Granger Collection, NY
unfortunate directors must be a total “hard case” proponent of ’68-era “director’s theater,” and Adorno’s rage against the “affirmative character of Beethoven’s music” appears to have supplied a special arsenal for his Fidelio-spectacle. The critic loudly acclaims this performance in Bremen, produced by Johann Kresnick, as “political farce.” One reads: “Florestan . . . is a beatnik, a ladies’ man, a drunk, and a hardline, ideological communist.” Kresnick has also, without hesitation, shifted the central prison scene, in which Beethoven’s Florestan sings the above-cited lines, to “the meadows of Munich, at Oktoberfest”!

The conflict, the clash, of two worldviews, could not be greater. There, in Beethoven’s composition, in idea and in expression, truth, married love, and courage are celebrated; here, be it in Bremen or elsewhere, lack of character, and the misery of today’s egotist associated with it.

The concert performance in Bonn during the 35th Beethoven Festival, of Leonore, the early version of Fidelio from 1806, marked an important exception. Because, for the first time in 191 years, a performance could be modelled on a score which had been reconstructed “authentically” from notes, libretto, and also stage directions, according to scientific criteria. Thanks to the tireless work of Dr. Helga Lühning of the Bonn Beethoven-Archiv, this reconstruction of the 1806 Leonore will soon be published in the new Beethoven Complete Works.

The publication of the libretto from 1806, and individual studies of “Leonore 1806” for the Beethoven Festival, are exciting to read even today. For they create the possibility of studying, in each particular, the intricate process of creating this work of art over a decade—from 1803/4 until 1814. The successful performance of the orchestra of the Bonn Beethovenhalle, gave the accompanying three-day distinguished scientific symposium on the topic “Leonore 1806,” artistic confirmation of the thesis, that the juxtaposition of the Leonore of 1806 and Fidelio of 1814 with the various famous artistic figures of Beethoven’s circles, is the best way to trace the dramatic, conceptual, and declamatory-musical sharpening of Beethoven’s artistic idea. (In order to distinguish the different versions, the term “Leonore”—which is how Beethoven also named his first three Overtures—signifies the early versions of 1805 and 1806; the 1814 opera presented in performance is customarily called Fidelio.)

This lays the foundation to understand this great work of art—to term it “opera,” today, after the unspeakable theatrical spectacles of the most recent period, is difficult)—more precisely than before, as the continuation of Friedrich Schiller’s thoughts on “aesthetical education,” of his “Art of Tragedy.” Particularly, because Beethoven, in the process of the changes and development of Leonore, ever more intelligibly elaborated the profound ideas of the sacrifice of “personal life” for the establishment of right, justice, and freedom. However, not only this: How, in the aria of Leonore, and, above all, in the “keystone” aria of Florestan in 1814, Beethoven brought something to expression as metaphor, which far surpasses the transitory background plot of this dramatic work, of hope for rescue. Beethoven discovers a musical metaphor which reveals the inner domain of the individual, of his terror, not only in the face of his lonely death in a dungeon, but of his close presentiment-of-death fear of the dissolution of his creative “I,” which is overcome in the exultant duet, “O namenlose Freude” [“O Nameless Joy”] and in the final chorus. The musical changes which Beethoven carried out on the path from Leonore in 1805, up to the performance of Fidelio in 1814, the dimly conscious metaphor of “liberation of creative power through freedom,” can be recognized in Beethoven’s work as the “loose cords” through which the work of art is tightened and shaped.

Schiller formulates this in a general way in a letter to Caroline von Wolzogen:

There is something mysterious in the effect of music, that it moves our inner self, so that it becomes a means of connection between two worlds. We feel ourselves enlarged, uplifted, rapt—what is that called other than in the domain
of Nature, drawn to God? Music is a higher, finer language than words. In the moments, where every utterance of the uplifted soul seems too weak, where it despairs of conceiving more elegant words, there the musical art begins. From the outset, all song has this basis.

Beethoven’s intense preoccupation with Schiller’s view of aesthetical education, of the art of tragedy, of the sublime, can also be recognized in the shaping of the Leonore material, not only in the original form in 1805, the year of Friedrich Schiller’s death, but also in the treatment of the Leonore version of 1806. Beethoven’s intellectual agreement with Schiller’s artistic aims is particularly clear in the final Fidelio version of 1814. Clearly confronted with the eight-year experience of social developments in Europe, in Austria—“the land of the Pha- ricarians,”* as Beethoven was later wont to rail—he sharpened the principal psychological truths of Leonore, of a truly womanly character, and, of the unjustly imprisoned Florestan: a challenge to the approaching obliteration of intellectual life, and censorship of political life—an intellectual current which was at that time, after the oligarchi- cal Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, embodied in the Carlsbad Decrees of 1818.

Not only Beethoven’s references to Schiller’s The Virgin of Orleans support this, but also his contact with Friedrich Rochlitz, a composer in Leipzig, with whom Schiller wished to establish a Journal for German Women [Journal für deutsche Frauen] just a few weeks prior to his death.

Leonore 1805/6

On June 22, 1806, Stephan von Breuning, a friend of Beethoven’s from his days in Bonn, wrote to his sister, Eleonore, and her husband, Dr. Wegeler:

As far as I remember, I promised to write you, in my last letter, about Beethoven’s opera. Since I am sure it does

* Odyssey, Books 5-7. An island north of Ithaca, where the stranded Odysseus encounters a people who lead lives of bucolic ease, surrounded by opulence and the bounties of nature.–Ed.

interest you, I want to keep this promise. The music is of the most beautiful and most perfect that one can hear; the subject is interesting, since it presents the freeing of a prisoner through the faithfulness and the courage of his wife; however, despite all that, nothing has caused Beethoven so much vexation as this work, whose value people will only fully appreciate for the first time in the future. First, it was staged seven days after the invasion of the French troops; therefore, at a completely unfavorable point in time. Naturally, the theaters were empty, and Beethoven, who at the same time noticed several defects in the treatment of the text, withdrew the opera after the third performance. After the return of order, he and I put it on again. I revised the entire script for him, by which the action became faster and more lively; he shortened many pieces, and it would be performed three times after this to the greatest applause. Now, however, his enemies at the theater have revolted, and several there, a few especially insulted at the second performance, have arranged that it has not been performed since then.[cited in Stephan Ley, p. 70ff]

If you read a review of the first performance, you could come to the conclusion that (as we say today) the opera “flopped.” For example, you can read in a commentary by Kotzebues in Der Freimütige:

A new Beethoven opera, Fidelio, or Married Love, doesn’t appeal. It was only performed a few times, and remained empty after the first performance. Both the melodies, as well as the characterization, lack (as much therein is far-fetched) that felicitous, excellent, overwhelming expression of passion which grips us so irresistibly in Mozart’s and Cherubini’s works. . . . The text, translated by Sonnleithner, comes from a story of liberation, of the kind come into fashion since Cherubini’s Deux Journées.

Whereas, we saw in Stephan von Breuning’s judgment of the work, especially in light of the improvements, a confirmed, sensitive judgment of the story. This is not accidental. Breuning enclosed in his letter copies of two poems which he composed “as publicity” for the performances of 1805/6; the second ends with the verse, “In your music, may the power of true Beauty
always appear!"

This thought had been discussed in many ways by Schiller, so that Breuning’s wish for Beethoven is completely coherent with the discussions of art, concerning Truth and Beauty, among Beethoven’s circle of friends. Schiller often plays with this fundamental idea, whether it be the poem “The Power of Song” [“Die Macht des Gesanges”] (“Who can undo the magic of the singer; who may resist his music?”), as motivic thorough-composed metaphor in his “Ode to Joy,” or as resonating motif in “The Encounter” [“Die Begegnung”]:

On what I felt in that moment
And what I sang, I muse in vain;
I discovered a new organ in myself,
That spoke of my heart’s sacred stirring;
It was the soul, which for long years bound,
Broke at once now through all chains,
And found notes in its deepest depths,
That slept in it—divine and undreamt of.

Schiller devoted the following lines to music in the “Homage to the Arts” [“Huldigung der Künste”]:

The power of tones, which from the strings is welling,
Thou playest mightily, it well thou ken’st,
What is the bosom with foreboding swelling,
Is in my tones alone in full expressed;
Upon thy senses plays a lovely magic,
As forth my stream of harmonies doth flow,
The heart would break apart in sweetness tragic,
And from the lips the soul desires to go,
And if I start my scale of tones, I bear thee
Upon it upward to the highest beauty.

Thus, in his letter, Breuning presented a concise sketch of the story of Leonore 1805/6 from his own experience.

The Fate of the Republican Lafayette

Obviously, people saw some fuel in the version by Beethoven. One can sense it in Joseph Sonnleithner’s petition to the Vienna censorship authorities against the ban on performance, which plays down all contemporary political references. Sonnleithner had done the German rendering of the Leonore material from the French production of Jean Nicholas Bouilly. He petitioned the “k.k. Police Station” in writing on October 2, 1805, with “Five Reasons” to retract the published performance ban; among them: “the fourth, the story itself, which I forgot to note in the title, occurs in the Sixteenth century; therefore, no reference whatsoever can underlie it; and, fifth, there is such a great shortage of good librettos, and the

one in question presents the most stirring picture of wife-ly virtue, and the evil-minded governor only a private revenge, as Pedrarias exercises in Balboa.” On October 5, the k.k. Police Station permitted the performance, under the condition that the “most insulting” scenes be changed.

What really infuriated the censorship authorities? It is said, at least, that Bouilly, who was prosecutor for the French Revolution in Tours, had drawn on his own experiences. Were the Austrian public authorities so sensitive, because the Leonore material contained too many accusations about the vile imprisonment of the republican fighter for the American Revolution, the Marquis de Lafayette? As Donald Phau wrote in a 1978 essay, Lafayette, who had organized European support for the American Revolution, came to France to promote a republican evolution in France with Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine. He was opposed, however, by Marat’s mob, arrested after his flight from France, and thrown in prison in Austria, where he was detained between 1792 and 1797. His wife Adrienne was arrested, and only narrowly escaped the guillotine. Thanks to the help of the American government, she was able to obtain her freedom again. Disguised, Adrienne journeyed to Olmütz, where, according to the secret agreements between London, Paris, and Vienna, Lafayette remained in detention.

In 1795, Adrienne had discovered that British Prime Minister William Pitt was responsible for the imprisonment of Lafayette. Bouilly depicted him later as “Pizarro,” the villain in Leonore. Thanks only to an international press campaign about the fate of this republican folk-hero, the Marquis de Lafayette; to the courage of his wife; and to effective aid (passports); could Lafayette be freed on Sept. 19, 1797.

On Feb. 19, 1798, the play Leonore, or Married Love [Leonora, ou l’amour conjugal] by Jean Nicolas Bouilly, set to music by Pierre Gaveaux, was performed for the first time in the Paris Theater Feydeau.

The visit in 1795 by Adrienne and her children to the prison, using forged passports (which, among other things, Andr é Maurois describes in his biography of Lafayette), is amazingly similar to the description of the scene at the beginning of the second act of Fidelio:

They were led down a succession of long passages until they reached two padlocked doors which gave access to Lafayette’s quarters. He had not been warned of their coming. He was still kept in solitary confinement. Not only were there no letters delivered to him, but he was not even told whether the members of his family were alive or dead. The only news that reached him in this terrible solitude was conveyed in a code song hummed to him by Felix Pon-
tonnier, his young secretary, who was put on a diet of bread and water whenever he was caught in the act by the jailers. After a great grinding of bolts, the door suddenly opened and Lafayette saw before him his wife and his daughters. What a shock and what happiness!

. . . He was little more than skin and bone. She had not set eyes on him for four years. Although he was only thirty-eight, he had aged beyond all belief. . . . He had difficulty in recognizing Adrienne in this gray-haired woman with seamed face. [André Maurois, cited in Phau, p. 44]

In his biography of Schiller, Benno von Wiese poses the question:

Wasn’t a figure like the thirty-two-year-old Lafayette, who, following the model of the American Declaration of Independence, put forward to the National Assembly on June 11, 1789, the blueprint for the rights of man, an exact embodiment of the Schillerian Posa? [von Wiese, p. 450]

In his answer, von Wiese alludes to Schiller’s disassociation from the later developments of the French Revolution, without, however, emphasizing Schiller’s clear preference for the Leibnizian ideas in the origins of the American Revolution.

In any case, however, Lafayette’s fate was more on the mind of Europe’s humanists—Beethoven among them—than people today suppose. Did this irritate the sensibilities of the Vienna authorities?

On Nov. 20, 1805, the original performance occurred under the title (not wanted by Beethoven, incidentally) Fidelio, or Married Love, concerning which Breuning wrote his sister, Eleonore, a friend of Beethoven in her youth, the above-cited letter. On Nov. 13, Vienna had been occupied by Napoleon’s troops. On Dec. 2, 1805, the great battle of the three Kaisers was fought at Austerlitz, at which Napoleon was victorious over Austria and Russia.

As Breuning correctly reports, at that time Beethoven wanted to make Leonore a success through revisions of the imperfections in musical declamation and dramatic development. He retained Breuning to help in adapting the text.

Schiller’s Writings and Beethoven’s Leonore

In his youth, Beethoven had become quite familiar with, and very engaged in, the intellectual life of the time, through his cordial reception by the Breuning family. Schiller’s works, generally everything related to his writings and poetry, were quite esteemed in this family [see Schiedermair]. Upon Beethoven’s departure for Vienna in 1792, his friends inscribed quotations from Schiller in his album; his friend Klemmer wrote thus from Don Carlos:

They say to him, that he should bear respect for the dreams of his youth when he becomes a man; [He] should not open the heart of the tender flower of God, to the deadening insect, of more honored common sense—that he will not err, if inspiration, the daughter of heaven, blasphemes dusty wisdom. [cited in Schiedermair]

These were the years of Schiller’s inspiration in Rhineland Bonn. Direct connections to Schiller were established through the jurist and university professor Fischenish, with whom Schiller and his wife exchanged letters, in which Beethoven’s efforts to set Schiller’s “Ode to Joy” [“Ode an die Freude”] are also reported.

By this time, slightly altered lines of verse from Schiller’s “Ode to Joy” are again found in the finale of the original performance:

Who has attained a noble wife
Join us in our jubilee!

(Schiller’s verse, “Mingle in his jubile!" [“Mische seinen Jubel ein!"], was later set to music by Beethoven in the Ninth Symphony.)

Thus, it appeared nothing but appropriate to Beethoven’s inner development, to find in Stephan von Breuning the person to collaborate in the improvement of the Leonore material of 1805. (Remember, also, that Beethoven would have gladly assigned this work to a not-so-outstanding poet like Breuning. For, composing music for great poetical works is more difficult, as Beethoven commented while wrestling to set to music the Ninth Symphony, or the Fiesco and Wilhelm Tell pro-
jects. He formulated it as follows, in his well-known comment before his pupil Czerny: “Schiller’s poetical works are extremely difficult to set to music. The composer must know how to raise himself far above the poet. Who can do this with Schiller? In this respect, Goethe is much easier.”)

Schiller’s Death

In May 1805, at the time of the completion of the first version of Leonore, Friedrich Schiller died. There is probably no direct evidence of how Beethoven reacted to Schiller’s death. Did Beethoven have his eye on the Schillerian tragedies, particularly The Virgin of Orleans [Die Jungfrau von Orleans], in the later years of his work on the Leonore material? Beethoven was obliged to employ precisely the image of woman which Schiller portrays in Joan of Arc.

In the Fidelio 1814, for example, Beethoven had textually rewritten through the librettist Treitschke (or perhaps, in fact, even himself) Leonore’s key recitative, and inserted, among other things, the metaphor of hope: “Thus a rainbow shines for me . . . .”

In Act V of The Virgin of Orleans, Joan dies with the words:

Do you behold the rainbow in the air?
The Heaven opens up its golden gates:
I’th’ choir of angels stands she gleaming there,
She holds th’ eternal Son upon her breast,
Her arms she smiling stretches out to me.
What comes o’er me—Light clouds are lifting me—
The heavy armor does to winged garments turn.
Upward—upward—The earth does backward flee—
Brief is the pain, the joy shall be eterne!

In November 1813, Beethoven composed a canon on this final verse, “Brief is the pain . . . .” [“Kurz ist der Schmerz . . . .”] (WoO 163)—that is, at the same time as his revision of Fidelio.

Was not the ongoing revision of Leonore into Fidelio, therefore, a dramatic realization of Schillerian ideas in a sung work of art, which, admittedly, was conceived by Beethoven as an opera (whose dramatic requirements he was well equipped to handle), but which went beyond the framework of all previous musical works for the stage?

After all, hadn’t Schiller called The Virgin of Orleans a “romantic tragedy,” and in a letter to Göschken characterized the work thusly: “This work flowed from the heart, and was meant to speak to the heart as well” (Feb. 10, 1802). Beethoven inscribed this thought above his Missa Solemnis.

During the period of the preparation of this work, Schiller wrote:

Our tragedy, if we would have such, has to wrestle with impotence, flabbiness, the lack of character of the spirit of the time, and with a base way of thinking; it must, therefore, demonstrate strength and character; it must shake the soul to elevate it, but not try to shatter it. [Letter to Suevern]

This could have applied as an artistic guide to Beethoven’s revision.

Schiller, Rochlitz, and the Journal for German Women

Beethoven’s first mention of the fact that he was working on Leonore occurred in a letter of Jan. 4, 1804, to Friedrich Rochlitz in Leipzig.

Among other things, Beethoven sent him back an opera libretto (“Would that this material were not sorcery”), and then Beethoven wrote: “I have had an old French script adapted for me quickly, and am beginning now to work on it.” The latter was Bouilly’s Leonore libretto, translated into German by Sonnleithner.

In June 1801, Schiller wrote in a letter to Goethe, that “Rochlitz from Leipzig” was with him: “As he tells it, you [Goethe] have encouraged him to thus compete for the play prizes. He certainly has good intentions, but lacks the abilities.” Later on, Schiller came to a still critical, but favorable, view of Rochlitz’s talent.

In addition, two more letters to Goethe mention Rochlitz.

In November 1804, the publisher Göschken was on a visit to Schiller and received from him the promise, that he would participate in the new Journal for German Women, written by German Women (Journal für deutsche Frauen, geschrieben von deutschen Frauen) as a kind of patron—“managed by Wieland, Schiller, Rochlitz and Seume.” Even on April 24, 1805, two weeks before his death, Schiller had wished him luck on the “new launching of the Journal for Women.”

That was only a few months before the premiere of Leonore.

Therefore, at the moment when Schiller, as well as Rochlitz and Seume, all of whom were esteemed by Beethoven, wanted to participate in this Journal for Women project—was not perhaps the question of the image of women in history, from Joan of Arc up to Leonore-Fidelio, the substance of a dialogue amongst them?
‘In the springtime of life, Fortune has flown from me!’ —
The Shaping of Florestan’s Aria, from 1806 to 1814

By shifting a few notes through the new harmonic phrasing, and through slight rhythmic touches, the declamation and expression grow in intensity (extension of the high note at “kühn” [boldly]; the highest note at “Ketten” [chains]; the opening in C, instead of a return to E♭ major).

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On the Path to the ‘High Musical Work of Art’

In 1827, a reviewer for the Munich Allgemeine Musik-Zeitung called Beethoven’s opera “a high musical work of art of the German school.” [cited in Riehmüller, inter alia, p. 548]

“A high musical work of art”—isn’t this description more accurate than today’s “rescue opera,” “opera of horrors,” “opera in the tradition of opera semiseria,” etc.?

Beethoven’s labors on the path from Leonore to Fidelio made possible the tightening of the dramatic tension, sharpening of outline, differentiation of notes, of instrumentation, and of expression. Schiller’s essay, “On the Reason We Take Delight in Tragic Objects” (“Über den Grund des Vergnügens an tragischen Gegenständen”) formulates many principles which were obviously followed by Beethoven in the artistic shaping. As a warning, Schiller writes at the beginning: “The well-intentioned aim, to pursue the Moral everywhere as the highest end, which already generated and took under protection so many mediocrities in art, has also caused damage in theory.”

And he continues, after a commentary on Morals:

The means through which art achieves its aim are as manifold as, in general, there are springs of free delight. However, I call “free,” that delight whereby the intellectual powers, reason and imagination, are active, and where feeling is generated through an idea; [it is] the opposite of physical or sensuous delight, whereby the soul is subject to a blind necessity of nature, and feeling occurs directly through its physical cause.

Schiller, then, would distinguish those arts, which are concerned chiefly with the understanding and the power of imagination (arts of taste), and those, which concern chiefly reason and the power of imagination, therefore having the Good, the Sublime, and the Pathetic as the highest object (arts of the heart). Schiller then discusses the phenomenon, that normally the Sublime strongly contradicts sensuous thinking; indeed, causes listlessness and annoyance: “A Sublime object, precisely because it clashes with sensuousness, is appropriate for Reason, and delights through the higher capacity, while it pains through the base capacity.”

For the 1814 performance, Beethoven deleted a Leonore-Marzelline duet: “In order to live happily in marriage, above all else, one must be true to himself,” and a trio of Rocco-Marzelline-Jacquino: “A husband is found in a short time; a man easily takes a wife; but after the passing of time, regret can come quickly.” Many see in that, Beethoven’s surgical dramatic editing—of course, one should not criticize it—to the detriment of “the idyllic,” or of the “personal life” of Marzelline, who, seeking personal happiness, believes she perceives a beau, Fidelio, in the disguised form of the young Leonore. It would be very difficult today to emphasize the fully executed
“heroic-utopian” aspects of the *Fidelio* of 1814, say some writers of music reviews. If one recalls Schiller’s reflections: could it be, that the reason why, today, more than ever, people want to see *Fidelio*, is precisely that people—suffering under a privatist, “personal life” ethos that has been driven to the extreme (but which, ironically, does not fear to display the most intimate things on television!)—seek the opposite in Beethoven’s drama? And that Beethoven intensified, by tightening up the action of the play, the artistic effect he was seeking to produce? That mankind today seeks something, which can restore a relation of reason to the important things in life, in order to reestablish a splintered existence, the cruelly and egotistically isolated soul, in fact, in respect to, as Schiller formulates it, “the purpose of mankind—progress.”

As can be recognized from the chronology of the origin of particular segments from *Leonore*, Beethoven changed the keystone arias of Leonore and Florestan most of all, in the course of the revisions. For the Florestan aria alone, at least eighteen outlines and rough drafts have been located. A great deal of effort flowed into the conclusions of Acts I and II. (Of course, the meaning and leading musical ideas of the four Overtures in connection with the central developmental parts, the motif arias of Florestan and Leonore, Pizarro’s aria, as well as the development of the trumpet signal as the turning of the tide in the drama, the righteous freeing of the prisoners, are worth special examination.)

It is surprising that the famous canon, “It is so wonderful for me” [“Mir ist so wunderbar”], the dramatic exposition of the four contracting parties, was composed complete and unchanged from the very beginning:

**Marzelline**
It is so wonderful for me;  
It quickens my heart;  
He loves me, it’s clear,

---

**Beethoven, Mozart**

On Married Love

*Right:* Beethoven jotted down excerpts from Mozart’s opera “The Magic Flute,” at the time he was working on “Leonore.” *Below:* The Mozart score, whose text reads, “For through it [the love of man and wife] the happiness and contentment of mankind is increased.”

(Reproduced by permission of the Beethoven-Haus, Bonn, Sammlung H.C. Bodmer, authorized by Dr. Helga Lühning.)
I will be so happy.

**LEONORE**

How great is the danger,
How weak the light of hope;
She loves me, it’s clear,
O unspeakable torment!

**ROCCO**

She loves him, it’s clear,
Yes, maiden, he will be yours,
A good young couple,
They will be happy.

**JАQUINO**

My hair now stands on end,
Her father consents;
It’s getting so wonderful for me,
I can think of no way out.

The latter is noteworthy, since, on the one hand, the “fixed canon” “forces together” the four bargaining characters; on the other hand, the dissimilar character-sketches are presented “contemplatively” to the audience as the point of departure at the beginning of the piece.

‘To Hope’

Beethoven’s numerous developments, changes, enlargements, and condensations of both principal arias of “hope,” the aria of Leonore in Act I, and the Florestan aria in Act II, are particularly revealing in musical, as well as textual-dramatic, hindsight. Dr. Helga Lühning rightly emphasizes [see Riethmüller, I and II], that Beethoven, in both creative periods of the early Leonore version of 1804/5 and the later Fidelio version of 1814, had worked at the same time on composing music for Tiedge’s “To Hope” (“Das Lied an der Hoffnung”), from Tiedge’s Urania poems. Tiedge called this a “lyrical didactic poem in six songs.” Beethoven completed his first composition, Op. 32, in 1804/5, and his second composition, Op. 94, in spring 1815.

The sketches for Op. 32 are in the middle of the Leonore Sketch-Book; the oldest records for Op. 94 have been handed down in three pages which also contain a brief notice for the Fidelio Overture, and underneath that, the motif of the horns from the Allegro of the Leonore aria. Near it are printed Leonore’s lines, “Come, Hope! Let not the last star of the weary be dimmed,” perhaps an imprint in speech of the common musical metaphor which Beethoven had in mind in the 1804/5 and 1814/15 psychological shaping of this aria of Leonore and his work on Tiedge’s verses. The textual changes appeared as follows.

In the libretto of 1806, which Beethoven had improved together with Stephan von Breuning, the following is found in Leonore’s key aria, following the beginning, as recitative:

O! Break not yet you weak heart!
Days of horror you have endured,
With each hour new sorrow
And alarming fear.

And then the aria opens up:

Come, Hope! Let not the last star
Of the weary be dimmed!
Light their goal! Be it ever so far,
Love will reach it!
O you, for whom I endured all,
Would I could force my way to the place
Where wickedness cast you in chains,
And bring you sweet comfort
I follow my inner impulse,
I waver not,
The duty of true married love
Strengthens me!

As Lühning relates, Beethoven had requested that the first librettist, Sonnleithner, supply an additional stanza for the aria part; obviously, the musical idea through the work by Beethoven with Tiedge’s poem was the right metaphor for this strophic part, which was inserted at this stage. A similar thing recurs in 1813/14.

In the revisions in 1813/14, Beethoven, together with his third librettist, Treitschke, gives the following expression to this passage:

**No. 9**

**Recitative**

Horrible! Where do you hurry?
What do you intend in your wild rage?
The call of compassion, the voice of humanity,
(passionately) No longer touches your tiger instinct;
However fury and anger also rage
In your soul like ocean waves,
So a rainbow shines for me,
Which rests bright in the dark clouds,
That looks down so silently and peacefully;
That reflects former times again,
And my blood flows newly calm.

**Aria**

Come, Hope! Let not the last star
Of the weary be dimmed!
Light my goal, be it ever so far,
Love will reach it.

etc.

In the preliminary stage of Leonore—as Dr. Helga Lühning points out—Beethoven had worked on the song setting of Tiedge’s “To Hope” (Op. 32), in which is found the verse line: “O Hope! Let the sufferer, having been lifted up by you, divine that there above, an angel counts
his tears.” Shortly after completing the composition of *Fidelio* in 1814, Beethoven wrote a second version of this song, which he introduces with the verse lines:

"May a God exist?  
May he fulfill in the future,  
What longing tearfully hopes for?  
May, before a Last Judgment occurs,  
This enigmatic Being reveal His nature?  
Man is made to hope!  
He questions not!  
What you celebrate on holy nights so gladly etc.

"May He fulfill in the future, what longing tearfully hopes for?"

Beethoven, after the personal crisis of 1802 ("Heiligenstadt Testament"), then worked on the Third Symphony, and the “Appassionata” and “Waldstein” sonatas; but, also on the setting of the Gellert songs. In the “Bußlied” [“Song of Atonement”], Gellert No. 6, the resemblance to the “Recordare” (measure 47ff) from Mozart’s *Requiem* can be noticeably detected. (It existed as a printed score for the first time during this period in Vienna.)

The text inserted in the recitative, “So a rainbow shines for me,” shows echoes of the last verse lines of Joan in Schiller’s *The Virgin of Orleans*. Florestan’s “An angel, so like my wife Leonore, who leads me to freedom in the heavenly realm,” is stamped from the same coin.

As well, an impartial hearing of the 1803 projected “dramatic Oratorio” *Christ on the Mount of Olives* [*Christus am Ölberg*] (Op. 85), demonstrates new aspects of Beethoven’s understanding of “the God-like nature of man,” exactly in agreement with the later shaping of the Florestan aria [see “Beethoven’s *Christ on the Mount of Olives*,” this issue, p. 4].

**The Prison Scene**

In 1806, Beethoven composed the following scene. In the stage directions, it is described: *Florestan (alone). He sits on a stone. Around his waist he has a long chain, whose end is fastened to the wall.*

**Recitative**

God! What darkness here! O dreadful silence!  
Desolation surrounds me! I am the only living being here!  
O onerous test!—But God’s will is just!  
I will not complain! For the measure of my suffering is in your power!

**Aria**

In the springtime of life  
Fortune has flown from me!  
I dared to tell the truth boldly,  
And chains are my reward.

I willingly bear all the sufferings,  
And would end my journey in ignominy:  
Sweet consolation in my heart:  
I have done my duty.  
*(He pulls out a portrait from his bosom.)*  
Alas! Those were beautiful days,  
When my gaze hung on yours,  
When I embraced you  
With a joyful beat of my heart!  
May love soften your complaint,  
Let you travel your way in peace;  
Let it speak to your heart, and say:  
Florestan has done what is right.  
*(He sinks onto the stone, his hands covering his face.)*

In the revision of this prison scene, Treitschke redrafted, at Beethoven’s urging (or was it Beethoven himself who did the redrafting?), the second stanza (“Alas, those were beautiful days . . . ”):

*(In a rapture bordering on madness, yet peaceful)*

Don’t I feel gentle, soft, rustling air?  
Doesn’t my grave appear to me?  
I see, what looks like an angel in a rosy glow,  
Standing at my side taking comfort.  
An angel, so like my wife, Leonore,  
Who leads me to freedom in the Heavenly realm.  
*(He sinks down, exhausted from the extreme emotion, to the stone seat, his hands covering his face.)*

Doesn’t this remind us of Joan’s “vision?” —

Do you behold the rainbow in the air?  
The Heaven opens up its golden gates:  
I’th’ choir of angels stands she gleaming there,  
She holds th’eternal Son upon her breast,  
Her arms she smiling stretches out to me.  
What comes o’er me—Light clouds are lifting me—

Now, after countless drafts—in the course of which the introduction had already long been completed—Beethoven wrote the immense oboe solo in counterpoint for this “surpassingly” beautiful tenor aria.

As the foreword to *The Bride of Messina (The Bride of Messina, or the Enemy Brothers. A Tragedy with Choruses)* [*Die Braut von Messina oder Die feindlichen Brüder. Ein Trauerspiel mit Chören*], Schiller wrote, “On the Use of the Chorus in Tragedy” [“Über den Gebrauch des Chores in der Trägedie”]. On this occasion, he discussed some aspects of art which Beethoven certainly advocated in many statements as his very own conception, as Beethoven often used to quote to his circle of friends from this work:

True art, however, did not aim merely at a passing performance; it is serious about not merely transporting man to a
momentary dream of freedom, but making him actually and in fact free; in this way, it awakens, exercises, and develops in him a power to remove the sensuous world—which otherwise only weighs upon us as a coarse substance; presses upon us as a blind power—to an objective distance, to transform it into a free work of our spirit, and to master the material world through ideas.

For exactly that reason, because true art demands something honest and objective, it cannot thus be satisfied with merely the semblance of truth; [it seeks] truth itself; in the solid and deep foundation of Nature, it establishes its ideal structure.

Thus understood, art has the power to move mankind, since it isn’t satisfied “with the semblance of truth,” but establishes its “ideal structure” in “the truth” alone. The changes in the Leonore and Florestan arias demonstrate Beethoven’s efforts to shape more intelligibly the inner processes of tension between hopelessness, rage, resoluteness based on love, and freedom (“By loving, I succeeded in freeing you from chains” [“Liebend ist es mir gelungen, dich aus Ketten zu befreien”]—Finale, 1814).

The revisions were by no means easy for Beethoven. Thus, he wrote in a letter to the librettist Treitschke in March 1814:

I assure you, dear T., the opera would earn me the martyr’s crown, had you not put forth so much effort into it, and adapted everything so well, for which I will forever be grateful to you; I would scarcely have been able to bring myself to do it—you have thereby salvaged a few remnants that are still good from a ship run aground.

Leonore and Fidelio, described here according to Beethoven’s manner as “remnants from a ship run aground,” are indeed more capable today than ever before, of confronting people with the great questions which stir and preserve mankind. In particular, the comparison of the authentic versions of 1806 and 1814, and the individual studies of multiple revisions of the key dramatic passages in Beethoven’s own hand, make possible an invaluable insight into Beethoven’s creative process of composition—whose creative principle, more than ever today, in this world of “Information Age linear thinking,” will surely grow in importance.

—translated by Anita Gallagher

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This is an essay about jokes, about “time-reversal” in jokes, in particular.

The issue can be posed from the outset in the following terms: The fact of the matter is, as many people have noted, man is the only animal who laughs. Some people might argue that other species are also capable of laughter. In the cases of some relatively humanized animals, it is perhaps arguable that they are capable of some sort of laughter. But I don’t think anyone would disagree that man is the only animal who is capable of actually making a joke, that is, to say something which induces laughter in others.

This is not the same as laughing at something. We often laugh at animals: you can have puppies that act in a very cute way, or you can laugh at the stupidity of some animals, or things of that sort. But to laugh with is different; to laugh over something that is said or done. The fact of the matter is, that only man is such an animal.

One of my points is, that it is precisely this which makes man imago viva Dei. It is another way of saying the same thing. It is this, that makes man as in the living image of God, as distinct, for example from computers. Now, a computer can never make a joke; you might have discovered this. Why? What is it in the difference in the make-up of the human mind versus the make-up of a computer, on this specific point of humor? What is at issue here?

I will address what the actual issue is in jokes, and in particular, in puns, from the standpoint of “time-reversal.” There is a fundamental quality involved in joking, and especially in the delivery of the “punch line” in a joke, the point at which the joke itself is enunciated—which is not anything specifically said, but rather an insinuation of something unsaid—which is what is actually humorous. In other words, the joke is not what is named or said directly; it is what is left unsaid. It is that which lies beyond the realm of names, and language as such.

For example:

I am sure you are all familiar with the case of the guys who went hunting, the three professionals: one was a doctor, the other was a lawyer, and the third was a mathematician, specifically a mathematical probability theorist. They went hunting for geese.

So the doctor gets out there, and he’s the first man up. Now he’s a doctor; he may be a skilled surgeon, but he really doesn’t know a whole lot about shooting. So he picks up the shotgun: Blam! It’s about ten yards to the right of the target. “Damn. Missed.”

Then the lawyer comes up and says: “No problem, I can do this.” He pulls the shotgun up and: Blam! Ten yards to the left. “Damn. Missed.”

Finally the mathematical probability theorist stands up. And he shouts: “Got ’em!”

I’m assuming you had a delayed reaction here; and that’s what’s interesting, because that’s how the mind.
works (as we’ll come to later). This is proof of how humor actually functions: It is mental activity, not anything specific that is said. After all, who could imagine that the two words “Got ’em,” could be funny? What is funny in saying the words “Got ’em?” Is there anything funny about the words “Got ’em?” Not particularly.

What is it that makes it funny?

To actually get at the underlying, epistemological issues behind this, the fundamental philosophical questions, we are going to need to briefly review a few salient points about the concept of time-reversal. Because, as you may have noticed, what was actually humorous here, was the totality of the joke as viewed retrospectively from the punch line. There was nothing particularly funny about the course of the joke itself. The humorous thing comes in, as your mind recapitulates everything that it has just walked through, after the conclusion. The conclusion isn’t funny. None of the points along the way are funny. The whole thing strung together isn’t funny. What is funny, the humor, is what is unsaid, which is the mental activity of recapitulating what you have just walked through, from the standpoint of the unexpected conclusion. Which is why the delay factor is of some interest in this, in how it works. Because it is your mind retracing its own steps: that is “time-reversal.”

‘Time-Reversal’

Let me tell you what I don’t mean by time-reversal, and what I do mean by it.

If you look at Lyndon LaRouche’s writings on the issue of time-reversal, you will note that the phrase he actually uses is “time-reversed causality.” You may have noticed also that, over the last several years, LaRouche has stopped using the word “negentropy,” and instead has insisted on using the expression “not-entropy,” or “not-entropic,” or “anti-entropic.” He has explained that the reason for this, is that the word “negentropy” triggers an association in the mind of people who have read Norbert Wiener and so forth, of a concept of entropy going backwards: in other words, simple entropy in reversed time. And that is not what LaRouche means by “not-
entropic”—he is not talking simply about taking entropy, and standing it on its head, or taking a video clip of something that is entropic, and playing the reel backwards, that kind of time-reversal.

What he is talking about with “not-entropy” is something completely different. He is talking about a different process of development, which is completely contrary to the concept of the physical universe as described in “entropy.” And he has deliberately chosen to use the phrase “not-entropy,” or “anti-entropy,” to force the individual, each of us, to create in our own minds a positive concept, which cannot be reached by simply trying to explain it negatively in relationship to entropy.

Now the question of “time-reversal” is similar. Time reversal is not the arrow of time which marches along chronologically, like a metronome (1, 2, 3, 4, . . . ), going in the opposite direction. It is not a linear concept of time, put in reverse. That is not what we are talking about; we are talking about something completely different.

We are talking about a concept of time that actually functions at two levels simultaneously—two different types of time. We are talking about the time of that which is created, of the phenomena which occur, as in a chronological time; simultaneously considered with the time of that which creates them, that is, of the hypothesis relative to the theorem-lattice which it has created. The time of the hypothesis is everywhere present in every moment of the development of the theorem-lattice which it has created. The time of the hypothesis is everywhere present in every moment of the development of the theorem-lattice. As the causal factor, it is equally present at points A, B, C, D, E, or F, in what is otherwise chronological time.

So, the time of the hypothesis is in that sense eternal, relative to the entirety of the time of that which it has created.

Let us look at the matter this way. Leibniz says the following, on the subject of time and space:

Space is an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions.

“Space is an order of coexistences.” In other words, Leibniz is saying that the physical universe is not composed of physical objects banging around in space. Rather, space is actually relative; there is no distinction, there is no way of cleanly separating out space and the material objects “in” it. There is no three-dimensional, empty spatial Cartesian coordinate system, within which material bodies are banging around. Rather, Leibniz says, space is an order of coexistences—it is the way that coexistence is ordered. It is an ordering of physical space-time. And he says similarly, “time is an order of successions.”

In his 1714 Letter to Remond, Leibniz says:

Space, time, extension, and motion are not things, but well-founded modes of our consideration. . . . The source of our difficulties with the composition of the continuum, comes from the fact that we think of matter and space as substances. Whereas, in themselves, material things are merely well-regulated phenomena. And space is exactly the same as the order of coexistence, as time is the order of existence which is not simultaneous.

So time is not the clicking off of the clock or the metronome. The only thing that time is, says Leibniz, is the order of existence which is not simultaneous. So already, in Leibniz, we have a completely relativistic concept of time and space. But to more thoroughly grasp the concept of time-reversed causality, we have to go back to Plato’s solution to the paradox, or the apparent paradox, of the One and the Many.

The One and the Many

Do not think of a One as the aggregation or assembling of a Many, to get a picture of the totality. That is not the idea. Rather, think of a One as the causal singular concept which uniquely explains, or causes, all of the specific things, or Many, which are created. You want to think of the One as the hypothesis, which is at a different level of existence, a higher level of existence, than all of the particularities of the phenomena which it is explaining. So, you have a multiplicity of phenomena, either of experiences or of material objects, if you care to view it that way, which produce these experiences. And the concept of a One, is that hypothesis which, through mental action, you create and which is the causal explanation of the Many. The One functions or exists at a totally different level than the Many. You cannot get to the One through any aggregation of the Many.

Similarly, you cannot have a concept of time as it relates to the One, within the same general bounded universe of the Many. You are talking about two completely different levels of existence.

This is what LaRouche frequently refers to in terms of the idea of a theorem-lattice, and then the hypothesis which creates a succession of such theorem-lattices. Within the realm of the specific theorem-lattice, or that which is created, you have what could be called chronological time, time which is clicked off like a metronome. This time seems to march fairly regularly forward—from past through present into the future—through that time as it exists within the world of the created.

However, if you look at that exact same process from the standpoint of the hypothesis which created the theorem-lattice, then you are looking at a concept of time...
which applies to the totality of that which has been created (the Many). And the time of the hypothesis is, on the one hand, *eternal*, or everywhere present within the time of the many, but it is also *simultaneous*. It is neither before nor after; it is neither later nor earlier; it is simultaneous and eternal at the same time. It affects all parts of that which is changing, but it is that which does not change through all change.

One of the most useful examples of this conceptual issue, is the famous Heraclitus question: Can you step in the same river twice? If you view “the river” as your sensory experience of whatever the river is made up of—the water, the pebbles, the bank, and so forth—it is clearly the case that you cannot possibly step in the same river twice. If you define “the river” as what you are experiencing, what you experience one minute when you stick your toe in, and then you come back a minute later or even a half second later, and you stick your toe in again, it’s a completely different river. Nothing is the same; everything has changed. The water has gone by; the pebbles have moved a little bit; the wind is blowing differently. Everything is pure change. So what is it, then, that allows us to say “this is a river.” What is it that makes it a One, a Unity?

We are clearly forming a mental concept, a construct, a hypothesis, which is a One, relative to the Many which we are perceiving. That One is somehow unchangeable through all change.

The same thing applies to human identity. You say the word “I.” But what do you mean by “I”? Do you mean the “I” that you perceived at the moment that you began to utter that one-syllable word; or the “I” when you finished enunciating that one-syllable word? Because everything has changed inbetween. You’ve moved a little bit; all of your atoms and molecules have moved; everything around you has moved; your internal, somatic experience of yourself has changed; you are probably a little hungrier than you were the instant before; you may be more thirsty; hotter or colder. Everything has changed; nothing is the same. So what, then, gives you the right to say “I”?

It’s an interesting question. What is identity? What is that One which is the same throughout all change? This is the concept of the One and the Many, and it starkly poses the issue of two distinct levels of time which exist simultaneously.

To quote directly from LaRouche on this subject:

Given: a series of events, each and all consistent with a specific theorem-lattice. These events are located in time and place. The relevant theorems are determined by an underlying hypothesis. In what part of that span of time and place, does that hypothesis exist? The hypothesis never changes during any part of that span of space-time; it exists, “simultaneously,” in all the places and times defined by that theorem-lattice, but is confined to none of them. Meanwhile, that hypothesis is the necessary and sufficient cause for the selection of all of the theorems adopted as propositions for the occurrence of the events. In this respect, as sufficient and necessary cause, the hypothesis has the form of the Good. . . .

Thus, rather than the “Dr. Dolittle Push-me/Pull-me,” fairy-tale myth of mechanistic causality, commonly taught in schools today, we must have the sense of efficient relationship among past, present and future, as implicit in the Platonic notions of hypothesis and Good. If one says, from this latter standpoint, that the future shapes the present, or that the present shapes the past and future, it is only in the Platonic sense of hypothesis and Good, that such an efficient role of time is to be premised. It is through the relatively timeless hypothesis which shapes past, present, and future, that these three aspects of a continuing process behave as if they might be efficiently interactive at all times. They do not interact directly, of course?

So, this is no simplistic, reductionist idea of time, such as: “Oh, yes, the future acts on the present and the past.” That is not what is happening. LaRouche emphasizes that it acts “as if” that were the case, and the reason that is so, is because what is *actually* acting efficiently in the past, the present, and the future of the chronological time of the created theorem-lattice, is a different order of time, that of the hypothesis, which is eternal or timeless relative to the past, present, and future of that which is created.

This brings us of necessity to Plato’s presentation of knowledge and the Good, in his famous discussion of the “Divided Line.” It is necessary to briefly review this, in order to address our next topic: Nicolaus of Cusa on the issue of how you know what you know, on time-reversal, and on the relationship of all of this to the all-important issue of jokes.

Plato presents his discussion of the “Divided Line” in Book VI of the *Republic* dialogue. The basic point that Plato makes is, that knowledge works by a process of successive development of new, overall concepts, or Ones, which explain the Many which are the objects of mental experience. The way that the mind works is, that it takes as its raw material, first, the simple perceptions that come from the visible world, the images produced by sensible objects. And from those perceptions, those images, the mind constructs a hypothesis, an explanation, a single, unique One, of what it is that is producing all of those sense perceptions. And this is what Plato describes as the process of hypothesis formation.

Plato goes on to explain that the mind works to see, in the world of the intelligible, much as the eye sees in the
world of the visible. The visible world is illuminated by the sun; the intelligible world, the world of ideas or of thought, is illuminated by the Good. He says: Think of the Good as akin to the sun, which illuminates everything around it, but is not that which it illuminates.

Plato then explains that we form an initial hypothesis about the nature of even an object—because hypothesis formation is involved even in the humble task of conceiving of an object as such, and calling it an object. For example, a river: that is a hypothesis; you are saying that there is some Unity there. Or, when you say “I,” the implicit assumption of using that word is that there is such a thing as a Unity, there is such a thing as an “I.” There is a One, which doesn’t change throughout all of its specific manifestations.

Plato elaborates, saying that, in the world of the intelligible, the first objects of the understanding, or the first class of intelligible things, are those concepts that come from the physical world. But the mind then constructs an actual universal object, distinct from the specific things which it is observing. This is what he calls a thought-object, or a Form, or Idea. And the mind forms such a hypothesis, or Idea, in the world of the intelligible, regarding that which it is observing, that which it is taking as its object of thought.

Plato then describes the way the mind, in addition to constructing specific hypotheses to explain specific things, clearly demonstrates a capability of developing an ongoing series of such hypotheses, and that capability, which itself produces hypotheses, is a higher hypothesis. So, you have a whole nest of hypotheses, which is produced by a higher hypothesis. And then, too, the ordered set of these higher hypotheses, is in turn produced by a mental faculty, which is hypothesizing the higher hypotheses. So, you are talking about a level of causality existing at a higher level than the simple objects which are perceived.

Plato is getting at the idea that, if you simply describe the world in terms of the space and the time of that which is created and apparently exists around us, you are missing the essential point. What you have to do is to look behind this, to the causal hypothesis which has created that array, and which leads you to a different concept of space and to a different concept of time.

Curvature and Metric

This raises the crucial question of metric or measurement. How do you measure these distinctions, or these differences in space or in time?

LaRouche argues that, if the chronological time of the created, that is to say, the time of the theorem-lattice as such, is not the same as the time of the hypothesis which created it, and other theorem-lattices, then that difference has to be measurable:

Time is not an absolute, but only the name conveniently assigned to the experience of change.6

This is very similar to Leibniz’s formulation. The time of the hypothesis, the way you measure time in the domain of the hypothesis, of the One, is different from the measurement of time in the lattice itself. The time of the hypothesis enfolds within it, includes within it, that which then becomes unfolded as the time of the lattice.

This issue of enfolding and unfolding appears in many theological writings, including those of Nicolaus of Cusa. For example, Cusa explains that God enfolds within himself the totality of the created physical universe which He unfolds. But that unfolding, simply observed as an unfolding, is not in fact the enfolded totality which is within God. In other words, God and the physical universe He creates are not the same thing. You cannot say “God equals the entire universe”—which is the pantheist view. You are talking about two completely different levels of existence, of Creator and the created.

What LaRouche stresses, and this gets to the heart of the matter, is that, if you are talking about two different ways of measuring time, of two different ways of conceiving of it; if it does not function as a single, strictly chronological, metronomic time; then you have to be able to measure the difference, in some sort of an experiment, between what the perceived results would be based on the linear or the chronological time of the created lattice, and the measurement of time from the standpoint of the hypothesis.

This is the same issue posed by C.F. Gauss, Bernhard Riemann, and others in their study of curvature. Take the case of a plane surface. The metric, or the unit of measurement, on a Euclidean plane surface is, as we have all been taught, that “the shortest distance between two points is a straight line.” A related, axiomatic feature of this metric applied to a plane surface, is that the sum of the internal angles of all triangles adds up to 180 degrees.

That is fine and good, so long as you are on a flat surface. But what if we are not on a flat surface, but, say, on a spherical surface, which of course has curvature?

If that were the case, how would the distinction manifest itself? Well, it would show up in the fact that the shortest distance between two points on a sphere, for instance, is not a Euclidean straight line, but is actually measured by an arc of the great circle cutting the sphere at those two points. Thus, in the case of a spherical triangle, the sum of the internal angles does not add up to 180 degrees. And the shortest distance is the one which connects two points by the geodesic, that is, the shortest distance on a curved surface, which in this case corresponds to an arc of the great circle which goes through the center of the sphere.
So even in this very simple example of different curvatures, there is a difference of metric: your unit of measurement in one geometry (a flat Euclidean surface), is different than your unit of measurement in a spherical geometry. You don’t measure with the same units, because your unit of measurement in one case is itself already curved. The same principle holds in the more complex case of surfaces of changing (i.e., non-constant) curvature—which more closely reflect the nature of the real physical universe.

The same issue of metric applies to time. And, LaRouche argues that, if this is in fact the case, the difference between the two metrics is of necessity measurable. We can’t simply assert that there is the simple chronological time of the Many, and that there is also the time of the causal One which produces the Many; this distinction must be measurable:

The measurable impact of “time-reversal” must necessarily lie within the conceptual bounds of the crucial discovery at the center of Riemann’s habilitation dissertation. In other words, applying those methods of C.F. Gauss’s general principles of curved surfaces (which Riemann incorporated in the method of his own discovery), there must be a measurable difference in the implied curvature of physical space-time, reflecting the action of time-reversal upon the function as otherwise determined. [“Time-Reversal,” p. 39]

In other words, the distinction has to show up in the realm of that which you can empirically measure. This is not empiricism; but, the distinction must manifest itself empirically. When you measure, you are never directly determining what you think you are measuring; the only thing that you are actually measuring, is the difference in two possible curvatures, which you have under consideration. And the difference between the two, is what you actually measure.

LaRouche applies this concept of time-reversal to Classical music compositions: if causal time-reversal actually exists, he notes, then there is a difference in the performance of a piece of music, as performed from the standpoint of causal time reversal, compared to a straight galloping through.

Now let’s look at the issue of jokes from this standpoint, and perform some measurements of time-reversed
Mind Is the Metric of the Universe

Let’s develop our science of measurement a bit further. For this, we have to turn to Nicolaus of Cusa, and in particular a dialogue of his, which in Latin is called "Idiota, de mente," and which in English has been translated as "The Layman: About Mind." It is a relatively short dialogue. It was written in 1450, and is part of a trilogy of three dialogues. (By the way, Cusa’s "De docta ignorantia" was written in 1440, a decade before this dialogue. So, this is after the fundamental breakthroughs he made in science and theology presented there.)

All three of Cusa’s “Layman” writings are in the form of dialogues, in which a layman, a common man, turns out to be far more intelligent than the philosophers with whom he speaks. The layman is, in fact, the voice of Cusa, the voice of the actually insightful person.

The first of these is "The Layman: About Wisdom;" the second, "The Layman: About Mind;" and the third, "The Layman: About Experiments with Weight." Let’s look at the second one, on the question of Mind.

Cusa begins by saying that the word in Latin for Mind, mens, actually comes from the word for measurement, mensurare. That is lawful, he explains, because the nature and characteristic of Mind is that it measures. Mind is that which embraces, or enfolds, all “Exemplars.” By “Exemplars,” Cusa is expressing a concept similar to Plato’s use of Forms or Ideas. He is talking about a One, a mental construct which is a One, which explains the causality of the Many which are merely experienced:

"Well, back where I come from, I got a spread, and you know, my farm, why, you can get in your pick-up truck, and you get in that truck, and you drive, and you drive, and you drive. You drive all day, and you’re still not at the end of the farm. And you go in the other direction, and you get in that truck, and you drive, and you drive—you spend the night—and then you drive another day, and you’re still not at the end.”

And the Israeli guy looks at him, sympathetically, and says: “Oy. Yeah, I once had a truck like that.”

So, you see, it’s measurable.

This is of some interest; for, in Cusa’s treatment, Mind and the human Soul are equivalent. This recalls LaRouche’s frequent insistence that Reason is not something to which you have to add agapē, to get the right recipe for Man in the living image of God. Reason, if conceived of as logic, certainly is inadequate; but the actual, Christian-Platonic concept of Reason, is of necessity one with agapē. Properly conceived, there is no distinction between the Mind and the Soul. Cusa elaborates:

"The power I call “mind”—the power in us which embraces conceptually the exemplars of all things.

"What is this idea of the “exemplars of all things?” Cusa says that the important point about measuring and embracing is, that that which is finite can only be embraced, or understood, or measured, by that which is infinite. You cannot measure something that is infinite, with something that is finite; you can only measure the finite as a component or a part of the infinite. The infinite does the measuring. And that's what Mind is. Mind is the image of God, in the sense that it carries out measurement of that which is relatively finite with respect to itself; but man’s Mind itself is measured, in turn, only by God, by that which is infinite relative to it.

Cusa proposes that we think of the world in terms of Exemplars, and those things which are Images of those Exemplars. When I say Exemplars, you can, for these purposes, replace it with Plato’s concept of Form, the Platonist concept of Idea. Cusa develops the following approach in "About Mind," to locate the relationships among, on the one hand, the Exemplar, or the Original, of something; and, on the other hand, its Image (see Table I).

First we have God’s Mind (1), or simply God, as the Original of all originals; and we have its Image or reflection (in first approximation, just think of this the way you would normally think of the word “image”), which is Man’s Mind (2). Then, Cusa says, if God’s Mind is the Original, what God’s Mind has created, the total created world (3), is an image of its Creator. And finally we have the “conceptual world” (4), by which Cusa means something akin to perception, which, in turn, is an image of the actual physical created world.

This gives you a sense of the totality of the universe
TABLE I. Relationships of Exemplar and Image in “About Mind.”

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exemplar/Original</th>
<th>Image</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original</td>
<td>(1) God’s Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) created world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Image</td>
<td>(2) Man’s Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4) conceptual world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(perception)</td>
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which Cusa is examining, for the purposes of determining the meaning of “knowledge” and “measurement.” In it, all Originals or Exemplars measure their Images; they are the standard against which you measure the image, which tells you to what degree the image does, or does not correspond to the original. Cusa says, for example, that clearly God’s Mind measures Man’s Mind, and also measures the created world, because the original, that is to say, the creating hypothesis, is the standard against which its creation is to be measured.

So God’s Mind (1) measures both Man’s Mind (2), which is made in His image (it is the image of God, and therefore God measures that), and also the created world, the physical universe (3). Man’s Mind (2) in turn measures the conceptual world of his perception (4). In other words, your mind allows you to measure which you are perceiving, the images which you have. And, similarly, the created world, the physical universe itself (3), is the original with respect to its image (4). So (3) measures (4); in other words, physics measures mathematics, for example. The physical universe is the only way to measure the accuracy of mere images or representations of that universe, such as mathematics.

However, the really interesting point, Cusa emphasizes, is that (2) is also the measure of (3): Man’s Mind measures the created world. Man’s Mind is part of the created world, of God’s created universe; yet it is also the measure of that created world. That is to say, Man’s Mind is relatively infinite compared to the created world. It is the highest expression of God’s created universe, says Cusa: it is part of the created universe, but it is its highest expression. And therefore, for that reason, since it is the Exemplar, or the Original, or the measurement of the created world, Cusa says, Mind is the metric of the universe. The only way to measure the universe, is with the human mind. It is the relative infinite compared to all the rest of creation around it.

In other words, knowledge is totally subjective. There is nothing that is known, other than man’s own mental activity in hypothesizing a mental object, which is a causal explanation of perceived events.

So, for Cusa, Mind is the metric of the universe, and it is this which makes Mind imago Dei.

Why? Because Mind elaborates concepts that are not in the sensible, not in the world of sensation. Mind alone does this. Cusa in fact attacks Aristotle for proclaiming falsely that, “to understand is an accident.” Cusa says it is not an accident, but it is rather exactly that quality of elaboration of concepts that distinguishes Mind from everything around it:

Something is present to mental intuition which was not present to sense nor to reason, namely, the exemplary and incommunicable truth of the forms which are reflected in sensible things.

Cusa further argues that it is this quality of mind, which gives life to the individual person, and gives him a soul. The body, for Cusa, is a necessary vehicle for the soul: he is by no means a Manichean, viewing the world as divided between good and evil, where the good is the immaterial, mental side, and everything that is physical or material or body is bad. Whereas the Manicheans believed like the Gnostics that the material created universe was “bad,” or evil, Cusa says exactly the opposite: that it is good, and that the body, the physical material body, is the necessary vehicle for this unique quality of mind, which is man’s soul:

PHILOSOPHER: Aristoteleans say that the intellect, which you seem to call mind, is a power of the soul, and that to understand is an accident. But you say otherwise.

LAYMAN: Mind is a living substance which we experience as our interior speaking and judging. Mind is more like infinite substance and absolute form than all the other spiritual powers in our inner experience. Its function in this body is to give it life and because of this it is called soul. Mind is a substantial form or power. [About Mind, p. 53]

How does this mind, or soul, give life to man?

Our mind is the image of that infinite being which enfolds all images, just as the first portrait of an unknown king is the model of all the other copies which can be painted from it. Knowledge of God, his “face,” is accessible only in mental reality whose object is truth. It is not further accessible except through mind so that mind may be the image of God and of all God’s images following upon the exemplar itself. [About Mind, p. 51]

Cusa doesn’t leave it at that. He goes on to explain what he means by this mental capability of understanding that which is beyond the sensible. He says the mind is capable of making, from the Many, a One, in the same way that a musician or a sculptor makes a One out of a Many:
For the eternal mind acts as does a musician who wants to make his concept perceptible. He gets a plurality of sounds and puts them in a fitting harmony. . . . Plurality of things proceeds from our mind. Mind alone counts. . . . We say something is one from the fact that mind understands a single thing once and individually. [About Mind, p. 59]

And again:

Unity precedes all plurality, and this is the unity which unites, the uncreated mind in which all is one. After the one comes plurality, the unfolding of the power of that unity. [About Mind, p. 61]

Thus, for Cusa, the act of creation by Mind—the creation of a concept of a One, out of a Many—is an act of imposing boundaries, that is to say, of measurement. Out of the totality of an undistinguished Many, the Mind forms a One: that is imposing a boundary, that is measuring, that is telling you where something begins and ends. The Mind says: it’s this, and not that. Cusa draws a further parallel with sculpture: Mind’s creativity is like the work of a sculptor, who takes a block of marble and delimits it, imposes boundaries, where the actual beautiful shape is to be formed. That is the act of mind.

Cusa’s Epistemology

This brings us to the core of Cusa’s About Mind dialogue, where he presents his elaborated theory of knowledge, of epistemology. In many ways reminiscent of Plato’s famous “Divided Line” exposition, Cusa’s argument takes us further. In Cusa’s conception, Mind takes itself as its own object; in other words, it makes its own subjective construction of thought-objects, the object of knowledge itself.

The way Cusa develops this, is as follows. He posits that there are three steps, or levels, of human knowledge, which he describes in terms of four parameters (SEE Table II).

First, we must look at what the object is that the Mind is studying (A). Second, what is the nature of this object that mind has before it (B). Third, we want to consider the power employed, the mental power or faculty employed: what is it that is being wielded by Mind in its study (C)? And, finally, what is the result of this activity, in terms of what we know and what we don’t know (D)?

Cusa begins with the first level of knowledge (1). Here, the objects that Mind is looking at, are sensible things, the objects of the senses, things which are tangible. The nature of these objects is that they are material, and that they are changeable—in fact, they do nothing but change, like Heraclitus’s river. The power employed in this first level, is that of Mind. And the result, in terms of our resulting knowledge, Cusa describes as conjecture. Here, he explains, we know only the changes which occur; we don’t know things in themselves. And under these circumstances, measurement is in fact very imprecise. If we can only measure things that are only changing, there is not much precision that we can get out of our measurements.

Here are Cusa’s own words about this first level of knowledge:

Since mind gets only the notions of sensible things through these assimilations, in which the forms of things are not the true forms, but clouded by the changeableness of matter, therefore all such notions are conjectures rather than truths. This is why I say the notions which are obtained by rational assimilation are not certain—they are in accord with images of forms rather than with truths. [About Mind, p. 65]

In his ascending quest for knowledge and truth, in typical Platonic fashion, Cusa poses the second object of Mind (2). From the first level, we are able to generate a concept of the Exemplars, or the Forms, which we in turn take as an object of Mind: for example, the idea of a

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circle. This is not a specific circle, not a specific sensible object, but the concept of the Exemplar of which the specific circle is the image. So, the objects of our mental activity, in this second level, are the Exemplars, or Plato’s Forms.

The nature of these objects is that they are immaterial—they are thought-objects, not material things—and they are unchangeable. Here we have a concept of a relative One: it doesn’t change; it is not the changing specific objects, or the perceptions we have of them; it is an unchangeable, immaterial Form, and that is what Mind is looking at.

What is the power employed here? Cusa says it is Mind looking at its own immutability. This poses the challenging question: what is the power of Mind, which Man clearly possesses, that does not change through all change?

The result of this exercise, at this second level, is that Mind generates concepts, or names, and it gives names to things. When we name something, we are pronouncing a relative universal concept, a One, about that object, which is beyond change. For example, we say: “this is a piano.” We are not saying: “this is 7 trillion, 459 billion molecules organized in the following form, and when someone plays a key, there are the following 936 quajillion interactions.” No. We just say: “this is a piano.” So, to name something, is to refer to precisely that immaterial unchangeable aspect of it, which derives from the Exemplars, not the sense object. Cusa explains that this level is a lot like mathematics, and he emphasizes that this is not the same thing as the truth: we are not yet there.

In reference to this second level, he says that measurement here is more precise, since it gets us closer to the truth, it gets us to the Exemplars. But we are not at truth yet. What Mind is examining is not matter, it is different from matter itself, but it is roused by the images of matter. Cusa puts it thus:

Beyond this, our mind, taken not as immersed in the body it animates but as mind in itself (though joinable to a body), looking now to its own immutability, makes assimilations of forms taken not as immersed in matter but as they exist in and of themselves. Mind now conceives the unchangeable quiddities of things using itself as instrument without any bodily spirit. For instance, it conceptualizes the circle as a figure from whose center all lines drawn to its circumference are equal. No circle existing outside the mind in matter, it assimilates itself to the abstracted forms. In accord with this power it constructs mathematical sciences with their certainty and discovers that it has power to assimilate itself to things insofar as they exist in the necessity of connection and to construct concepts. The mind is roused to these abstractive assimilations by phantasms or images of the forms. It acquires these images through the assimilations made in the sense organs, in the same way as a person is moved by the beauty of an image to ask about the beauty of its original. [About Mind, p. 65]

But, I emphasize, this is not yet truth, although it is a higher level and closer to the truth. Before, we only had conjecture; now we can actually name something. We’ve generated a One; we have a concept, a universal. But that’s not enough.

Cusa says that in the third level, Mind takes as the object of its study “unity beyond all variety” (3). The nature of the object which is being studied, is Mind’s own power as the assimilation of the One—in other words, Mind’s relation to God. The power of Mind being employed to examine this idea of unity beyond all variety, which is employed here and only here—not earlier—is Mind as imago Dei. Cusa otherwise calls this Intellect; it is what Plato calls Reason. Mind is not in the image of God, unless and until it is examining the world and itself from this standpoint. And the result of this exercise is what Cusa calls “intuited Absolute Truth.”

Cusa’s argument is that all of levels one and two only participate in the truth: we are getting closer, but it is not yet the truth. It is only when Mind studies its own unity as imago Dei, that it is capable of actually constructing concepts of the Original One, that is, of God. And this, and only this, is actual intellect, and therefore actual truth.

Let’s study Cusa’s formulation:

Up to this point the mind is not sated by this way of knowing for it has no intuitive grasp of the exact truth of everything. Rather it intuits the truth in a certain necessity determined for each thing—insofar as one thing is this way, another thing that way, and any one of them composed of its parts. Mind sees that this way of being is not truth itself but a participation in truth—so that one thing is truly this way, another truly that way. This otherness cannot be compatible in any way with truth in itself, taken in its infinite and absolute exactness.

Mind looks to its own simplicity: not only as separate from matter but as unable to be communicated to matter or united to it after the fashion of form. Then it employs this simplicity as an instrument so that it may assimilate itself to everything not just as separate from matter but in a simplicity that cannot be communicated to matter. In
this fashion mind grasps everything intuitively in its own simplicity. There the mind grasps everything intuitively without any composition of parts—every magnitude in the mathematical point and the circle in its center—not as one thing is this and a second that, but as all things are one and one all.

This is the intuitive grasp of absolute truth; when someone in the manner just mentioned sees how entity is shared differently among all beings and then in the way we are discussing grasps intuitively and directly absolute entity itself beyond all participation and variety. Such a person would certainly see everything beyond the determined necessity of connection which he saw in variety. And without it, in an utterly simple way he would see everything in absolute necessity, without number or magnitude or any otherness.

Mind uses itself in this most exalted way insofar as it is the very image of God. God who is everything is reflected in mind when it, as a living image of God, turns toward its exemplar by assimilating itself with all its effort. In this fashion, it grasps intuitively everything as one and itself as the assimilation of that one, through which it constructs conceptions of that one which is all. [About Mind, pp. 65-67]

That is Nicolaus of Cusa’s concept of imago Dei; and that is what he means by measurement. That is what he means when he says, Mind is the metric of the universe:

So every mind, even ours, though created below all others, has from God that, in the way it can, it is a perfect and living image of the infinite art. Therefore it exists as three and one; it has power, wisdom, and the connection of both in such a way that, as a perfect image of that art, once stimulated it can make itself even more and more like its exemplar... Once stimulated [it] can always make itself more conformed to the divine reality without limit, even though the exactness of the infinite art stays always unreachable. [About Mind, p. 87]

This now allows us to consider the concept of time. For Cusa, Mind as the image of the infinite, has a concept of time which is eternal. This eternal time unfolds in the time of creation, perfecting itself in that process:

Mind is the image of eternity, but time is its unfolding, though an unfolding always less than the image of the eternal enfolding... So our mind remains unmeasurable, indefinable, and unlimitable by every reason. Only uncreated mind measures, limits, and defines our mind. [About Mind, p. 93]

So Man’s Mind is the metric, as the relative infinite of the entire created universe. And the metric of man, that
by which man must measure himself, is God, and con-
cretely, Cusa argues, Jesus Christ. Only the infinite mea-
sures the finite, and it is that which determines time as
well.

Jokes As Metaphor

Armed with these tools, let us proceed to the task at
hand.

Since we’ve been speaking of theological matters, I
presume you are familiar with the story about the
incident between God and Satan’s hordes, his bunch
of little devils. What happened is that the devils, on
Satan’s instructions, one day grabbed a bunch of
broomsticks and punched holes up into heaven. God
was riding around on his horse, as he often did and,
presumably, still does, and he of course came across
this hole punched in the floor of heaven. He got really
angry and he told his minions: “Fill this thing up
right away. It’s unacceptable; this pot-hole has got to
be fixed up.”

So they scrambled around and they did it. And the
devils down below were pleased by what they had
done, but also a bit nervous, because God was starting
to get angry. So they went running back to Satan, and
Satan told them: “Don’t worry. I want you to go out
there tomorrow and make a bigger hole.”

So these little devils with their broomsticks—bang,
bang, bang—made another hole and ran off again.

God came riding by on his horse—a white horse,
of course—and saw this big hole, got quite angry, and
said: “This is completely outrageous! I’m not going to
tolerate this. I’m boss here. This stuff stops. This gets
filled up. And that’s that.”

The little devils got quite frightened this time, and
went running back to Satan: “What are we going to
do now? He’s really getting angry. This can’t contin-
ue.” Satan said: “Don’t worry about it. It’s all bluff.
Nothing’s going to happen. You go out there and
make a huge crater, that’s what I want you guys to
do.”

So they obediently went back, and punched a
gigantic crater in the floor of heaven.

The next morning, God of course ran across this
thing—he almost fell into the damned hole. And he
yelled: “That’s it! That’s the last straw. You’ve had it.
Your day of judgment has come, and that’s that.”

The devils rushed back to Satan in a panic: “Boss,
we’re finished! It’s all over; we’re in real trouble. He
says that our day of judgment has come, and that he’s
going to sue the pants off us.”

Satan replied: “Him? He doesn’t even have any
lawyers up there.”

Let’s return to the issue of the measurable effect of
time-reversed causality. LaRouche has explained this
concept using the case of music. But it also applies, rigor-
ously, to the question of jokes. In music, LaRouche has
noted, a polyphonic idea is presented. You have a series
of such concepts. Your mind, at the conclusion of the piece
of music, replays for itself—in memory only—the entire-
ty of the piece. It simultaneously hears the totality of the
piece, both in succession, and not in succession.

Obviously, you can only do this in your mind. You
can’t hear the totality of a piece in actual audible perfor-
manece, because if all of the notes were played simultane-
ously, it wouldn’t exactly be a piece of music. So in Mind
one relives, and works through, the relationship between
the whole, the totality, the One, and everything that is
enfolded in that One, which is then unfolded in the
process of the performance of the composition.

Furthermore, each of the concepts that are developed
in music, are themselves metaphors: they are in-between-
ness, they are not specific things, they don’t have names.
They exist, they can be identified, but they are not name-
able: they are ambiguities. LaRouche explains:

How are singularities, such as metaphors, afforded discrete
distinctness within the mind? The answer from any literate
person should be: by the juxtaposition which we term
irony: a “double meaning,” the which can not be resolved
deductively. [“Time-Reversal,” p. 40.]

This double meaning, or double entendre, which is
something that means two things at the same time,
makes your mind think of both simultaneously. This is
precisely what happens as well in good humor, in jokes,
in puns especially.

The Layman: About Jokes

Recently, I made a remarkable find: It turns out that
Nicolaus of Cusa wrote a fourth dialogue, called, The
Cusa Layman: About Jokes. Even more remarkably, this one
wasn’t written in Latin (conveniently), but in English. In
this heretofore unknown manuscript, Cusa posits that
there are four, distinct qualities of a good joke.

The first is ambiguity. This is most clearly evidenced
in puns. What is a pun? A pun is a word, or an audible
sound which your mind simultaneously interprets in two
ways. It is two things at the same time, and the humor
lies precisely in the ambiguity of the relationship of those
two things. The joke is the punch-line, which hits you at
the end, forcing you to recapitulate what you’ve heard, but listening to it simultaneously from two different standpoints. It’s just like a piece of music: You hear the totality simultaneously in memory.

There are good puns, there are bad puns, and there are mediocre puns. Here are a few mediocre ones, to exemplify the point:

**This is the case of the guy who goes to his psychiatrist, and says:**

“Doc, I’m really having a lot of problems. I can’t figure out who I am. One moment, I think that I’m a wigwam; the next moment, I think that I’m a teepee. I don’t know what’s going on.”

And the doctor says: “Well, it’s obvious. You’re two tents.”

I think we can agree that that was mediocre.

I have another one, which I would also call mediocre. It’s actually in the form of a riddle:

**Question:** What lies on the ground, 100 feet in the air?

**Answer:** A dead centipede.

Decidedly mediocre.

But, what’s going on, even with these mediocre jokes? Do you follow what’s happening in your own mind, for example, with the silly riddle about the centipede? Your mind reviews and reexamines what it itself went through up until the punch-line. And you find that you were led down the primrose path. You were led along, by the way the sounds evoked a certain concept in your mind, which turned out be a complete dead end. Because you had started to think: “Okay, it’s lying on the ground, but it is 100 feet in the air.” And then when someone says, “well, it’s a dead centipede,” it’s as if you just hit a cement wall. And you say mentally, “Oh, come on!” Obviously, you had been tricked into thinking about the matter wrongly. Intentionally tricked to think wrongly. And the humor is when you look at your own process of mental activity, and say: “Aha! Boy, that was pretty dumb.”

That’s what actually goes on in a good joke: ambiguity. It is something that is two things at the same time; otherwise it is not humorous. That’s what a good pun is all about.

This already takes us beyond Cusa’s second level, the level of names, computers, and so on, where things are only what they are. When you give something a name, as in a computer, it either is or it isn’t. It’s A, or it’s B; but it can’t be two things at once. So you have immediately ruled out, at this level, that which is distinctly humorous, that is to say, distinctly human. This is why computers can’t crack jokes, nor translate. Jokes, at least many good jokes, cannot be translated, for the same reason that a computer can’t crack a joke: it’s not *imago Dei*. Nor can a computer translate, for exactly that reason: it cannot get the ambiguity of language. A computer will be literal; it will transliterate, but it will not translate.

There is a second quality required of good humor, which Cusa wrote about in his long-lost *The Layman: About Jokes*—the quality of surprise. A good joke has to be not only ambiguous, it also has to have a “punch-line,” a surprise, at the end. It’s called a punch-line, because you feel like you’ve just been hit: you were going in one direction, mentally, and all of a sudden you realize you are somewhere else completely different.

What this does, is it forces your mind to go through an instant re-run, in memory, of what it had gone through until that point. And when mind takes its own motion and action as the subject of contemplation, then you’ve really got a good joke. Because, what you are actually laughing at, is yourself. You are laughing at the two different ways your own mind works, simultaneously. Thus the punch-line is, on the one hand, “eternal” relative to the time within the telling of the joke, but it is also “simultaneous.” In other words, it functions like a hypothesis, or like a good piece of music.

The element of surprise forces your mind to complete the sentence with the unsaid word. It fills in the blank. And when it fills it in in one way, or fills it in in another way, that’s the humor of the matter. For example:

There’s the case of the two guys, one a slightly older gentlemen, the other a younger man, who just turned forty. And the older guy says: “Don’t worry about it. After forty, you almost make love every day.”

And the younger fellow, his eyes turn big, and he says: “Really? No kidding? What a relief!”

And the older guy answers: “Sure! On Monday, almost. Tuesday, almost. Wednesday, ....”

So, what’s going on in that joke? Well, you were thinking certain thoughts, weren’t you? But then the punch-line came along.

There’s another one, which I like because it exemplifies the element of surprise:

There are two couples, older folks. They’ve been friends for a long, long time, and they play cards a lot. One of the guys had gone through a very difficult period; he’d become very forgetful; but this evening he’d just played an incredibly good game of bridge. So during the break, the wives get up, go into the
kitchen to make coffee, and so on. And the one fellow says to his friend:

“Boy, you are really in great shape. You didn’t miss a move tonight; you remembered everything. What’s going on with you? What’s happened?”

His friend answers proudly: “I took a memory course. It was terrific: I learned a lot about my problem, and I’ve mastered it completely.”

His friend responds: “Really? What was it called, what was the name of the course?”

The first guy says: “Ummm, umm, what do you call those plants? You know, with thorns, and those fluffy flowers?”

His friend says: “Rose?”

The first guy gets excited: “Yeah, yeah, that’s it! Hey, Rose, what was the name of that class?”

Now, the good thing about that joke, is that it has a double punch-line. You think that the joke occurs when he first says, “Umm, umm,” and can’t remember the name. Up to there, that’s sort of silly, and not a very good joke. You might laugh politely. But it turns out that that wasn’t the joke, was it? So it has a kind of double-punch line, a double element of surprise, in that one.

Now Cusa, being a man of great philosophical insight, realized that it was not adequate to simply have the elements of ambiguity, and of surprise, in jokes. There is a third, crucial quality to a good joke: it has to lead the listener to some insight into the human condition, or his own mind, or other people’s minds. It has to ennoble the person; it can’t just be vulgar. There are some jokes which are, admittedly, slightly ribald, and that’s okay, if it actually leads to your mind’s ennoblement. Similarly, jokes that make fun of certain attitudes or mental abilities and so on, are okay if they force you to reflect on yourself, or other people, or your foibles. But it is not good humor to just make fun of a whole class of people, or nationalities, or things like that.

To put it in Platonic terms, a good joke has to generate motion toward the Good. It really does have this function: it must force you to reflect on the human condition. It has to be like Classical tragedy in that sense, that it presents something which leads you to think in a different way about yourself and the world—and not just at someone else’s expense.

I’ll give you an example of a bad such joke, which does not lead you to insight. Every nationality and ethnic group has jokes of this sort: In the United States, there are “Polack” jokes. Others have “Newfie” jokes. Well, in Colombia, there are “Pastuso” jokes: Pastusos come from Pasto, in the south of Colombia. Every culture has these jokes, where you goof on somebody else in order to feel superior and snicker—“heh, heh, heh.” For example:

There was a bank robbery in Pasto, and they brought in the country’s greatest detective, a Colombian Sherlock Holmes. He studied everything: footprints, fingerprints, etc. And he emerged after weeks and weeks of study to report authoritatively: “There is one thing that I can state with certainty about this crime: this heist was carried out by Pastusos.”

“Ohhhhh,” the media intoned, “how do you know that?”

“It’s simple: there are two tunnels, one to go in and one to come out.”

Now that joke is really not fair, because:

Everybody knows that if it had been Pastusos who committed the crime, there would have been only one tunnel: they would have walked in, and tunneled out.

Let’s look further at this question of insight into the question of ideology, into how people think:

You’ve heard the story of the young Jewish man, who’s about to get married. He has studied up, but he still has a couple of religious questions for the rabbi, before he gets married, because he needs to know the do’s and the don’ts, the rules, and how you do things, and so on. So he goes to the rabbi, and says:

“Rabbi, at my wedding, do you think, could we have dancing?”

Rabbi: “Absolutely not! Dancing is prohibited, just read the Talmud. It says—absolutely no dancing. What kind of question is this?”

Young man: “I’m sorry, I’m sorry. I’ve got one more, though.”

Rabbi: “Okay, what’s the question?”

Young man: “Well, when we get married—I know, not before, but after we get married—rabbi, my new wife and I, can we have sexual intercourse?”

Rabbi: “But, of course. Of course. This is one of the purposes of marriage.”

The rabbi goes on to give the young man a whole lecture, explaining that the Talmud says this, it says that, procreating and having a family is good, and so on. “Of course you can have sexual intercourse, no problem.”

Young man: “One other question. When my wife and I are married—not before, I know, but after the wedding—when we make love, can we do it face to face, you know, looking?”

And the rabbi says: “Hmm. This I don’t know. I’ll check; come back tomorrow.”
The rabbi goes home, he reads, he studies the Talmud, his sacred books. And he’s going crazy, looking; he stays up all night, looking all over, in his books. And when he returns the next day, he’s a total wreck. He’s a rabbi, so he’s been through a lot; he’s getting older, so he’s a wreck from staying up all night reading through the Talmud to try to find out what it says, yes or no, on the question the young man asked.

So when the young man returns, the rabbi says: “I looked everywhere, read everything, and it doesn’t say. So, if it doesn’t say you can’t, okay, you can do it.”

Young man: “Terrific, this is great. But I still have one last question. When we get married—after, not before, I know—I know we can make love, I know it’s okay, we can look a little. But besides that, can we do it, you know, standing up?”

And the rabbi answers, angrily: “Absolutely not! It could lead to dancing!”

So, you see the problem with fundamentalism. That joke went over very big when I told it in a recent cadre school in Mexico—everyone got a good belly laugh out of it. But this next one, curiously, produced a somewhat different response:

This is the story of a tour of heaven. A bunch of new people have just arrived, and St. Peter is going to give them a tour, show them around, give them some orientation. On the left, they came across a group in deep, religious prayer. Holy, holy people, and St. Peter said: “Here we have the Muslims who made it up here; they are a deeply religious people.”

In the next area, on the right, they see a group of people reading, studying, very erudite. St. Peter explains what was already pretty obvious: “These are the Jews.”

Then they come up to a third area with a closed door, and St. Peter says: “Shhh! Quiet!”

One of the new arrivals asks innocently: “Why? What’s the problem?”

St. Peter: “It’s the Roman Catholics, and they think they’re alone.”

This, of course, poses some very deep theological issues, which we won’t attempt to address here. But, you do see, it’s often easier to laugh at others, than at yourself.

The fourth quality of good jokes, as explained by Cusa in *The Layman: About Jokes*, is the question of delivery, or execution of a joke. Everything is in the delivery and timing: there are some people who are capable of taking a bad joke, and making it worse; of they can take an actually credible, decent joke, and completely destroy it, through delivery. It’s murder. That’s a different kind of execution.

Delivery and execution are very important. Why?

Because what you are doing, by delivery, as with a good raconteur, is, you are inducing the listener to get involved in the level of time of the chronological sequence within the story. You are deliberately inducing the listener to think wrongly. That’s what you are trying to do. You get them involved in the time within the joke, and then you bring to bear, at the right moment, with the right timing, the time from outside the joke. You bring in the hypothesis, and from that standpoint you force the listener to look at the time within the joke, that he has been taken into.

So you have to pull your listener into the story: it is extremely important to deliberately lead them towards a false conclusion. You can’t laugh in the middle of your joke; you can’t giggle along the way; you don’t want to break the spell. If you’ve ever heard a really good raconteur, this is what they do: they spellbind you. Why? They deliberately pull you in; they are deliberately pulling a trick on you, which you will eventually laugh about, if you have any sense of humor about yourself.

In this sense, good jokes really are like Classical tragedy, which gets you emotionally involved from the standpoint, simultaneously, of the errors of thinking of the characters of the play, and also from a higher standpoint of a potential solution to the events unfolding. So you are both emotionally involved from the inside, and looking at it from a higher level from the outside, and you are examining the mental processes of the players on the stage, to see what the flaw is that is going to lead them to the ineluctable tragedy. So it works on two levels of time: a great tragedy employs this concept of time-reversed causality, about the audience’s own way of thinking. You look at your own errors of thought from the conclusion of where that is leading you, in order to learn how to change them.

Since we are on the theme of religious jokes and delivery:

Did you know that, as you get up to the pearly gates, there are actually two lines up there for the men? One of them has a big sign: “Henpecked men.” The other sign says: “Non-henpecked men.”

So, recently, a journalist went up to do an interview, and found, of course, that the “henpecked” line was really long, while there were only two guys standing in the “non-henpecked” line. So the journalist, being a bright, bushy-tailed go-getter, goes up to one of the two guys in the short line, and asks enthusiastically: “Excuse me, sir. And why are you here?”

The fellow answers: “I don’t know. My wife told me to stand here.”

The other relevant point is that any attempt to explain a joke, kills it: all of a sudden, it’s not funny. When you dissect it, it’s not funny any more. If you have to tell
someone, explain to them, what the punch-line is, when you have to explain it out, you kill it. It’s like taking a living body and turning it into a corpse. You dissect it: that may be useful, but you will never understand what it is that makes it live by dissecting it. The same principle applies to jokes.

Only man laughs. Only man creates jokes. Because only man is capable of that unique activity of creative mind, which creates an ambiguity of the unsaid, the unspoken, and the unsayable—which is humorous. It is the motion of mind, that is the metric which is used to measure the components. And therefore, it is the same thing to say that man is the only animal who laughs or makes jokes, as it is to say *imago viva Dei*. It is that, that capability of mind, which creates humor, and enjoys humor, which makes man in the living image of God.

You can understand this abstractly or theoretically, but you can also understand it by observing it in children. One of the most fascinating and enjoyable points in the development of a young child, is when they are learning what a pun is, or a joke. It is really quite humorous to watch the mind of the child discover this. What happens is, that it begins to dawn on the child that there is a whole reality behind language, which is unseeable, unnameable, untouchable, and unperceivable—but it is real, and it is really funny. And the child goes crazy—he or she usually gets very repetitive, and silly, and you have to listen to the same joke seven hundred times, over and over again. But it is an amazing discovery nonetheless, because the child really sees what’s going on: he is observing his own mind at work. That is, the object of thought is his own mental creative activity.

What is the function of teasing? Teasing is very useful with children. I don’t mean nasty, or mean teasing, but teasing that induces a child to do two things. First, he learns to not take himself too seriously. To be able to be loose. And second, he learns to not take things literally. This is most important.

What is teasing? Teasing is when you say something that is not true, when you say an untruth on purpose, *not* for the purpose of torturing the child or making him feel terrible, or confusing him, but to get him to understand that what you mean, is not literal. For example, if the child says something, you answer with something completely preposterous about the child, or about the other parent, or about anything at all, and you say it
with a totally straight face. And then you watch the little wheels turning, until the child gets it: "Oh, that's a joke!" If they can laugh at you and at themselves that way, and use their mind for judging things—that not everything they see or hear is literally true—this is tremendously important.

It is also the best antidote to paranoia. Paranoia is when you take things literally, when you think that people mean literally what they say, and you interpret the world from this nominalist standpoint. Things become only what their names, or labels, are. The best way to deal with this problem in a child, of paranoia and insecurity, is to get them to be able to be loose enough so that their thinking is such, that they are always looking for ambiguities. “Now, wait a minute, wait a minute. Are you teasing, or aren’t you teasing? Does it work that way, or doesn’t it work that way?” You don’t want to confuse the child, you don’t want to pretend that the world works magically, when of course it works scientifically, but you want the child to be loose enough so that they are always thinking and evaluating: “Wait a second, now. Let me think this through, and figure out what’s actually going on behind the mere words.”

It is the action of mind in considering options—not learned things—that is truly human.

And this, of course, is why a computer can’t think, and it can’t make jokes, and it also can’t translate, in point of fact.

So, what, then, does this discussion of jokes tell us about what we are here for, what human identity is, and in whose image we are made? A frequent form of the question is: Do we live for the future, do we live for now, or do we live for past generations? In fact, you have to live your life in such a way that you are simultaneously living for the past, the present, and the future, by living at the level of the higher hypothesis. Live such that everything that you do is maximizing the Good in all chronologically past time, the Good in all chronologically present time, and the Good in all chronologically future time. You are living simultaneously on all of these levels.

LaRouche, in his essay on time-reversal, says the following:

When is the future? At what point in time? Similarly, what is the beginning-point in time from which to define the cumulative past with which the future is to collide? The answer to this seeming paradox, was already known to Plato, by Augustine of Hippo, and therefore, also, Thomas Aquinas: All time is subsumed under a general regime of simultaneity! The highest expression of change, is that lattice of higher hypotheses which expresses the transfinite notion of hypothesizing the higher hypothesis. What underlies that lattice? That lattice is underlain by what Plato distinguishes as the Good. In the analysis situus of hypothesis, that Good is “simultaneously” efficient in all times and places which might exist. Thus, in those terms of reference, the past and future, as hypothesis, are existent as efficient agency in each present moment. [“Time-Reversal,” p. 42]

With that scientific view in mind, we have the basis and the tools for understanding what is, of necessity, the most important question for all of us: What is human identity, what is the meaning of life? One must live in such a way as to give meaning to all past, all present, and all future existence, simultaneously. And, in this regard, I think the proper conclusion is the beautiful statement of Leibniz: “One is obligated, in conscience, to act in such a way that one can give an accounting to God of the time and power He has lent us.”

If such an outlook permeates our lives, we are on the pathway of searching for Truth, and will have a laughing good time in the process. Not so the formalists, the fundamentalists of all stripes, who are uniformly hostile to humor—and Truth. Which brings me to my concluding comment on precisely this point:

There was recently one helluva dispute among a group of ten rabbis. All distinguished scholars, they could not reach unanimity on a particular theological point. The majority of eight could not convince the two hold-outs: they argued, they explained, they pulled out the Talmud to prove their point. All to no avail.

Then, as the leader of the eight was making his most incisive and convincing argument, citing from the well-worn Talmud in his hands, one of the two minority rabbis prayed to God: “Please, God, give me a sign to confirm that I am right.” Out of the blue, a bolt of lightning struck a nearby tree stump, reducing it to smoldering rubble.

“All right, all right,” the leader of the majority faction sputtered. “Eight to three.”

NOTES
4. Ibid., p. 656.
5. LaRouche, “U.S. Law,” op. cit., p. 27.
We are today in the midst of a global civilizational crisis, comparable only to the catastrophic New Dark Age of the Fourteenth century. As Lyndon LaRouche has emphasized, the last thirty years have seen our civilization begin a descent into such a Dark Age, brought about by the same Black Guelph political faction—centered today in the British monarchy—which gave the world the calamitous collapse of a half-millennium ago. Building on the accomplishments of such creators of the Fifteenth-century Golden Renaissance as Dante Alighieri (1265-1321), the Brothers of the Common Life, and Nicolaus of Cusa (1401-1464), LaRouche today leads the worldwide opposition to this on-rushing calamity.

The financial crisis facing us today is, in fact, far worse than the collapse of the Venetian-controlled Peruzzi and Bardi family banks in 1343-44. At that time, the sovereign debt default of one nation, England, was sufficient to pierce the speculative financial bubble, bringing in its wake the breakdown of civilization in Europe. Today, owing to globalization and the buildup of an unprecedented speculative bubble, several nations, including South Korea, Indonesia, Russia, and Brazil, are simulta-
neously on the verge of sovereign debt defaults, any one of which could trigger a global financial vaporization.

For the last more than three decades, since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and the launching of the mid-1960’s, neo-Malthusian youth counterculture, the world’s population has been subjected to a concerted effort to eradicate the advances of the Golden Renaissance, which include the creation of the sovereign nation-state, quality public education, and a commitment to scientific and technological progress. The British-centered, Venetian-feudalist financial oligarchy has attempted, with significant success, to return the modern world to the same “Diocletian” universe, defined by the same Malthusian false-axiomatic assumptions, which prevailed in the Fourteenth century: usury, ecologism, free trade, and privatization.

This feudal, philosophically Aristotelian faction, associated with Prince Philip’s Worldwide Fund for Nature, the Club of Rome, and neo-conservative organizations like the Mont Pelerin Society, has also attempted to undermine the Christian religion, by attempting to maneuver leading Christian institutions into rejecting the Renaissance in favor of policies of free trade, post-industrialism, and globalization—all of which are opposed to the economic policies associated with nation-building. This same faction is also operating to pit nations against each other, based on religious conflicts—Christian against Muslim, Hindu against Muslim, etc.—reviving the outlook of the Crusades and the Inquisition, through the fostering of what Harvard’s Samuel Huntington termed a “clash of civilizations.”

As part of this, one can recognize in such contemporary movements as the Promise Keepers and the followers of neo-conservative televangelists Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell, a proliferation of irrational cults reminiscent of the Fourteenth-century Flagellants. We see a deliberate effort to brainwash desperate layers of the population into irrational belief in such so-called “Biblical prophecies” as Armageddon and the “End Times,” with the explicit purpose of convincing people that positive human intervention, as occurred during the Renaissance, is impossible.

Culturally, through the destruction of public education, we are witnessing an attempt to dumb down the vast majority of the population, and to educate only a five percent elite to be the new ruling oligarchy in the so-called Information Age, as advocated by British Lord Rees-Mogg. Through the popular culture promoted by Hollywood on television, in the movies, and on the Internet, a culture of death and violence is being spawned. Entire nations, like Colombia, are being overrun by private, mercenary narco-terrorist armies. In Africa, vast regions have been devastated by the spread of epidemic diseases such as AIDS, and by genocidal wars launched by satraps of the British Empire. In Asia, populations of entire nations, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea, have seen their living standards, built up over decades, decimated overnight by pirate currency speculators like George Soros, and their national sovereignty destroyed by the International Monetary Fund.

But, if we look carefully at the Fourteenth century, we can also see the means by which to save humanity. By violating natural law, the financial oligarchy is today—as it was then—weakening itself, and thus creating the opportunity for us to finally free mankind from oligarchical oppression. As Barbara Tuchman writes in her 1978 book, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century: “Once people envisioned the possibility of change in a fixed order, the end of an age of submission came in sight; the turn to individual conscience lay ahead. To that extent, the Black Death may have been the unrecognized beginning of modern man.”

When Tuchman wrote her book twenty years ago, she suggested that our own century bore a striking resemblance to that last Dark Age. Developments over the last thirty years especially bear out her thesis, but in ways that she did not fully anticipate. For that reason, a review of her book now provides a unique opportunity to examine the current world crisis from the vantage point of universal history.

The purpose of this review is to analyze the false-axiomatic assumptions of the culture of the Fourteenth century, as empirically described by Tuchman; while at the same time to identify her errors of omission. In this way, such a review will serve the purpose of identifying both the cause of that Dark Age, and of the one we face today, while showing how mankind created a Renaissance in the mid-Fifteenth century, and what such a Renaissance must necessarily entail today.

**The Origin of the New Dark Age**

The primary weakness of Tuchman’s book is, that it fails to locate the historical origin of the Fourteenth-century Dark Age in a key turning point in the previous century. The origin of the mid-Fourteenth-century Dark Age lay in the success of the reactionary Guelph League in turning back the clock of history, following the death of Hohenstaufen Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II, on December 19, 1250.
In 1239, a Venetian-controlled faction, known as the Guelph League, centered around the powerful Este family of Ferrara, launched a series of wars throughout Europe, against the then-existing trends toward the establishment of European nation-states, in order to consolidate an ultra-feudalist, usurious world order. This was part of a sweeping change in the correlation of forces in Europe, following financier-oligarchical Venice’s successful exploitation of its control over the Fourth Crusade (1202-04).

After the killing of both Manfred and Conradin Hohenstaufen in 1266, the Black Guelph unleashed chaos, economic ruin, and the rising power of a group of Venice-sponsored “Lombard bankers,” typified by the House of Bardi, throughout Europe. Through feudal wars, and “free trade”-linked financial speculation, Europe’s culture and economy collapsed, and death rates skyrocketed. The collapse of the resulting debt bubble and ensuing bankruptcy of the House of Bardi, unleashed the final stage of that decay.

The primary political consequence of Tuchman’s failure to identify the seeds of the Fourteenth-century Dark Age in the political ascendency of the Guelph in the mid-Thirteenth century, is to potentially blind us today to their descendants’ role in fostering the subsequent collapse. The Este, one of the leading families of the Guelph party, are represented today by their distant cousins, the royal family of Britain (the Hanover branch of the Bavarian Welf [Guelf] family), _primum inter pares_ of the modern oligarchical faction; and, by such right-wing pro-feudalist families as the Pallavicini and the Colonna, who are today arrayed against Pope John Paul II and the tradition of Pope Leo XIII within the Catholic Church, as well as against the forces associated with Lyndon LaRouche globally. In other words, because of the continued “species existence” of Europe’s oligarchical families, today’s potential new Dark Age is being engineered by the descendants of the architects of the last one.

The second, related weakness of the Tuchman book is, that she fails to make intelligible the emergence of the Golden Renaissance in the mid-1400’s. To give her credit, she describes the self-weakening of the fixed system which produced the Dark Age, the necessary emergence of the nation-state, and the significance of the intellectual contributions of the poets Dante Alighieri, Geoffrey Chaucer (1340-1400), Francesco Petrarca (Petrarch) (1304-74), and of the teaching order known as the Brothers of the Common Life, who created the cultural basis for the Golden Renaissance of the Fifteenth century.

However, she fails to mention at all, either the decisive role of the 1439-40 Council of Florence, or the work of Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa. Instead, she writes: “Times were to grow worse over the next fifty-odd years, until at some imperceptible moment, by some mysterious chemistry, energies were refreshed, ideas broke out of the mold of the Middle Ages into new realms, and humanity found itself redirected.”

Contrary to Tuchman, who thus renders the emergence of the Renaissance entirely obscure—“some mysterious chemistry”—, the Renaissance occurred as a result of the Florentine Council’s ecumenical re-affirmation of the “filioque” clause of the Nicene Creed. “Filioque” literally means “and the son.” By stating that the “Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son,” the Nicene Creed affirms the principle that, since the Son, Christ, is not only God, but also man, all men and women, who are created in the image of God, _imago Dei_, are capable of agapic reason. (In the Christian trinity, the Holy Spirit is love, and the Son is the _Logos_, or Reason.) Thus, the “filioque” principle uniquely emphasizes the cognitive capacity of each man and woman made in the image of the Creator—in opposition to the Roman Empire’s Code of Diocletian, which created the political structure of European feudalism based on the anti-human condition of peasant serfdom.

The significance of Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa, who himself was a product of the Brothers of the Common Life and the key organizer of the Council, was that he contributed directly both to the development of the sovereign nation-state, through his work _On Catholic Concordance_ (1433), and to the founding of modern science, through his _On Learned Ignorance_ (1440). Both contributions flowed directly from Cusanus’ belief in the primacy of man’s cognitive capacity, reflected in the _filioque_ doctrine.

With these two weaknesses identified and corrected, we now turn to Tuchman’s treatment of the “calamitous Fourteenth century.” Our purpose is not only to give the reader a mirror image of the degeneration of our own culture over the last thirty years. Our purpose is also to identify the feudalistic, false-axiomatic assumptions of the last Dark Age, in order to arm today’s reader against similar assumptions prevalent today. Moreover, just as the destruction of the last Dark Age resulted in a self-weakening of the enemies of humanity, thus creating the opportunity for a Renaissance, so today, by ridding ourselves of false-axiomatic assumptions and by becoming more self-consciously in the living image of God ourselves, we can and must seize the opportunity which the current global crisis affords us, to reverse mankind’s descent into a new Dark Age, and to launch a new Renaissance.
Our primary advantage today is that the Golden Renaissance, which saved mankind from the last Dark Age, gave rise to that institution—the sovereign nation-state—which the financial oligarchy has been attempting to obliterate in the name of supra-national globalism over the last thirty years. On the one hand, it is this very attempt that is propelling the world once again into a new Dark Age. On the other hand, it is the very existence of the nation-state inherited from the Fifteenth-century Renaissance, however currently weakened, that is the key to humanity's future. By defending the sovereign nation-state, and by forging a family of nation-states committed to scientific and technological progress, we can complete the unfinished task of our forefathers, and eliminate the parasitical financial oligarchy once and for all.

Return to Anti-Scientific Feudalism

The prevailing, false-axiomatic assumption today, is the Malthusian view that there are “natural” limits to both economic and population growth, along with the related view that mankind has reached these limits and entered a post-industrial Information Age, in which productive industry is no longer either necessary or desired. In fostering this view, the financial oligarchy has sought to return to a period—such as the Fourteenth century—before the Industrial Age and universal education, when almost the entire population were essentially ignorant slaves.

The feudal world was a fixed, primarily agrarian order, whose political structure derived from the decrees of the Roman Emperor Diocletian (A.D. 284-305). In the year 301, Diocletian issued an edict which fixed the maximum prices of commodities and wages throughout the Empire. His accompanying rapacious system of tax collection, making civil officials responsible for payment of fixed sums, laid the basis for serfdom, by tying peasants to the land to meet their tax burden. Diocletian’s “reforms” were followed by those of the Emperor Theodosius (346-395), which legally bound the Roman citizen to his occupation for life.

Related to these false assumptions of post-industrialism, is the idea that industrial development has caused global warming and similar ecologist concoctions, which can only be prevented by deindustrialization. This completely false idea is so pervasive, that it has been accepted by many prominent scientists and governments, despite the fact that the evidence suggests just the opposite to be the case, i.e., that the world is, in fact, entering the next Ice Age cycle.

The consequences of such an anti-industrial bias can be clearly seen in the Fourteenth century. Unrecognized at the time, the Fourteenth century was ushered in with the onset of what has since been recognized as the Little Ice Age, which lasted until about 1700. At the inception of the Little Ice Age, the Baltic Sea froze over twice, in 1303 and 1306-07. Years of cold, storms, and heavy rains followed, and the level of the Caspian Sea rose. Owing to this Ice Age, communication with Greenland was gradually lost, Norse settlements there were extinguished, and cultivation of grain disappeared from Iceland and was severely reduced in Scandinavia. Overall, a shorter growing season resulted.

Lacking an emphasis on scientific and technological progress necessary to increase agricultural production and improve transportation and preservation of food stuffs, the capacity of the population to sustain itself, including its immunological resistance to disease, was
significantly reduced. In 1315, unusually heavy rains came, crops failed all over Europe, and famine ensued. People were undernourished and consequently more vulnerable to hunger and disease. A contagion of dysentery prevailed in these years, and famines recurred intermittently after 1315-16, in 1328-29 and 1338-39.

Such natural disasters can indeed be overcome, but only to the extent that one rejects the limits-to-growth ideology reflected in the Diocletian decrees, and fosters instead the intellectual capacities of the entire population, for the purpose of improving economic productivity through scientific and technological revolutions. But, in the Fourteenth century, a demographic and financial-economic implosion ensued, similar to that which the world faces today, if today’s financial oligarchy succeeds in turning back the clock.

The Church Disintegrates

Just as we are today witnessing the disintegration of institutions such as the family, as well as political and religious institutions, under conditions of economic disintegration, so, too, in the first twenty years of the Fourteenth century, the Church, the mainstay of feudal society, itself began to disintegrate. The immediate issue was temporal (i.e., secular) versus papal authority. In response to the attempt of France’s King Philip IV (the Fair) to levy taxes on the clergy without the consent of the Pope, Pope Boniface VIII issued a Bull in 1296 forbidding the clergy to pay any form of tax to any lay ruler. In 1302, Boniface issued a second Bull asserting papal authority in the most absolute terms: “It is necessary to salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman pontiff.”

Philip responded with a council to judge the Pope on charges including heresy, blasphemy, murder, sodomy, simony, and sorcery. When Boniface then drew up a Bull to excommunicate the King, on September 7, 1303, agents of the King seized the 86-year-old Pope in his summer retreat near Rome to bring him before a council. After three days, Boniface was freed, but died within a month. A French Pope was elected as Clement V, who settled in Avignon, France, rather than going to Rome, thus beginning what became known as the “Babylonian Exile.” He would be followed by six French popes in succession from 1305-78.

The false-axiomatic assumption which led to the Church’s disintegration, was its concept of itself as a theocratic, supra-national government, having supreme authority over the state, including the fraudulent papal claim to exercise the right to crown the Emperor. (The document upon which this claim was made, the so-called “Donation of Constantine,” was later proved to be a forgery.)

The Church’s maintenance of its Papal Estates in Italy, over which it held feudal suzerainty, also led the Church to engage in balance-of-power politics and feudal warfare in its own name, in opposition to the emergence of an Italian nation-state. Moreover, so enmeshed was the Church with the feudal system, that the Vatican bureaucracy, the Curia, and the Vatican’s finances, were dominated by the most powerful feudal families.

As long as the Church insisted on this temporal power, it undermined its own proper universal moral authority.

With the papacy reduced to a tool of the French crown, the order among nations also rapidly deteriorated into a prolonged state of warfare. When Philip IV died in 1314, he was succeeded by his three sons, Louis X, Philip V, and Charles IV, each of whom reigned less than six years and died aged 27, 28, and 33, respectively, each without leaving a male successor. Philip of Valois, the son of a brother of Philip IV, became king. Edward III of England, son of Philip IV’s daughter, Isabel, had also made a claim to the French throne, which was rejected. In 1337, Philip confiscated Aquitaine, a French province which the English claimed as their own, whereupon Edward III announced himself the rightful king of France. At the time, the population of France was 21 million, five times England’s slightly more than 4 million. Nevertheless, England invaded France in 1339, thus beginning the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), in which both sides were manipulated by the Venetian-controlled Black Guelph Florentine banking families.

The Chivalric Delusion

As Tuchman documents, the culture of the Fourteenth century was dominated by chivalry, an anti-Christian, pagan code, which was developed at the time of the Twelfth-century Crusades by Benedictines. The chivalric belief structure originated with feudalism, and was adopted by the caste of mounted warriors or knights, who made up the private armies bound to the feudal nobility.

In the Fourteenth century, the nobility in France amounted to 200,000 people in 40-50,000 families, out of a total population of 21 million. Thus, in France, the warrior class of chivalric knights derived from approximately one percent of the population.

The Church repeatedly intervened to temper the anarchy of feudal warfare (although it would later foster its existence). The Church condemned the judicial duel and
the tournament. Through two initiatives, called the Peace of God and the Truce of God, the Church tried to check the excesses of private warfare, by urging knights to pledge themselves not to attack the weak and the defenseless, such as widows, orphans, merchants, and unarmed clergy, and to refrain from use of arms on holy days.

However, with the Crusades, the Church embraced and gave a religious significance to a class of society and to an activity, which it had previously attempted to temper. An initiation ceremony was created by the Church, including a vigil of arms, the ritual bath, and blessing of the sword. Knighthood was received in the name of the Trinity after a ceremony of purification, confession, and communion. The feudal warrior was supposedly thus transformed into a Christian knight, whose task was to champion orthodoxy against heresy and schism, and to defend Christendom against the “infidels.”

The net result of this was not that the knights were transformed, but that the Church became complicit, under the guise of “just warfare,” in crimes of feudal barbarity.

The fulcrum of the chivalric principle was not passion for truth and justice, but rather loyalty to the feudal overlord. The relationship of citizen to the State did not yet exist, and the knight’s concept of loyalty derived from the time when a pledge between lord and vassal was the only form of government. A knight who broke his oath of fealty was charged with treason for betraying the order of knighthood. The concept of loyalty did not preclude treachery, however. As Tuchman writes: “When a party of armed knights gained entrance to a walled town by declaring themselves allies and then proceeded to slaughter the defenders, chivalry was evidently not violated, no oath having been made to the burghers.” Thus, rather than being a champion of justice, the knight increasingly became a predator and aggressor, on behalf of the narrowly defined self-interest and arbitrary whims of his lord, with whom he had a private covenant, and on behalf of his own vainglory, all under the guise of the Benedictine-supplied chivalric code.

In the warfare of the Fourteenth century, chivalry was a constant obstacle to victory, especially for the French, who were most imbued with the chivalric conceptions of personal honor and glory.

The French knight conceived of combat as necessarily personal and corporal. He therefore despised the “artillery” of the day, archery, which was engaged in at a distance, and could be undertaken by commoners, who lacked the expensive trappings of knighthood—horse, armor, and page to assist one in combat—available only to members of the feudal military caste.

As a result, from the very beginning of the Hundred Years War, the English repeatedly won crucial battles by virtue of a military innovation, the long-bow. In 1337, the English King Edward III fostered prowess in archery by prohibiting, on pain of death, all sport except archery, and cancelling the debts of all workmen who manufactured the bows of yew and their arrows.

Throughout the century-long warfare, including in such battles as Crécy (1346), Poitiers (1356), and Agincourt (1415), French tactics refused archery an essential place, and French chivalry refused to concede a role in war to the non-noble combatant. Initially, this reflected both contempt for the common man and fear for the loss of chivalry’s primacy in battle. Later in the century, it reflected fear of insurrection. In 1393, the French government passed an ordinance prohibiting games, in order to encourage archery, but the nobles insisted it be revoked, fearing common people would gain too effective a weapon against the noble estate.

Thus, although most of the wars were fought on French soil and the French vastly outnumbered the English, the code of chivalry, which was based upon a rejection of the truly Christian view that all men and women
are created in the image of God, precluded an in-depth mobilization of the French citizenry, and thus, repeatedly resulted in French defeat.

The knights lacked innovation, held to tradition, and gave little thought or professional study to tactics. Scorning both archers and the use of commoners as infantry, the knights employed tactics relying upon their own cavalry charge, followed by hand-to-hand fighting on foot. Clad in weighty armor, which led one poet to describe a knight as "a terrible worm in an iron cocoon," knights had limited mobility. Thus, battle was a more or less fixed, set-piece engagement. If a knight fell down, the weight of his armor prevented him from regaining his footing. Many knights actually died of heart attacks, rather than of fatal wounds.

In the Battle of Crécy in 1346, for example, the French knights opened battle by racing uphill against the English, without giving their crossbowmen a chance to soften the English line. When the English knights advanced on foot, they were preceded by archers and supported by pikemen and Welshmen with long knives, who went among the fallen and slew them on the ground. As Tuchman observes: "England's advantage lay in combining the use of those excluded from chivalry—the Welsh knife-men, the pikemen, and, above all, the trained yeomen who pulled the long-bow—with the action of the armored knight."

In her Epilogue, Tuchman describes how the same chivalric mentality on the part of the French resulted in the French loss at the battle of Agincourt. In this battle, described by Shakespeare in his Henry V, the French army outnumbered the English invaders by three or four to one. Repeating the mistakes of the past, the French Constable rejected an offer of 6,000 crossbowmen from the citizen militia of Paris. No change in tactics was introduced, and the only technological development was even heavier plate armor, which only further reduced mobility.

As rain fell during the night prior to battle, the French pages walked the horses, churning the ground into a soft mud. The French had not attempted to select a battleground where their superiority in numbers could be effectively deployed. With no commander-in-chief able to impose a tactical plan, the nobles vied for the glory of a place in the front line. The archers and crossbowmen were placed behind, where they were in fact useless.

In their overcrowding, the dismounted knights of the French front line could barely wield their weapons and, hampered by the mud, fell into disarray. The English archers, who, wearing no armor, were fully mobile, threw down their bows and rushed in with axes and other weapons. Many of the French, impeded by their heavy armor, could not defend themselves.

As Tuchman also points out, William Tell's legendary defiance of the Austrian Hapsburg tyrant Gessler, at the start of the Fourteenth century, personified the struggle against feudal tyranny and chivalry. William Tell, as immortalized in Friedrich Schiller's drama, reflected the importance of the long-bow in warfare against the mounted knight. On two additional occasions, at Morgarten and Laupen in 1315 and 1339, the Swiss made military history by defeating the Hapsburg cavalry, by taking advantage of the mountainous terrain.

What contributed to the century-long blood-letting, was the fact that, on both sides, most knights went to war principally to advance themselves. Under feudalism, with the primary loyalty of a knight to his lord, neither a national army nor a unified command was possible, and without centralized national finance, an effective military defense of the nation could not be financed. A national strategic aim was not in their minds, because the sovereign nation-state would not come into being until its emergence in the year 1461 under Louis XI. Therefore, they had no republican concept of victory, which is based upon the defense and development of both one's own and the enemy's population.

Banking Collapse, Famine, Plague

Edward III had financed the war against France through usurious loans underwritten by the Venetian-controlled Florentine banking firms of the Bardi and the Peruzzi, which were secured on the expected revenue from a tax on wool. When the tax brought in too little (production of wool in England had begun to decline from about 1310) and Edward could not repay, the Peruzzi failed in 1343, the Bardi suspended a year later, and their crash brought down a third firm, the Acciovoli. England's sovereign state debt default initiated a full-scale depression. Capital vanished, stores and workshops closed, wages and purchases stopped.

But the banking collapse of the 1340's was not merely an immediate result of England's default. The collapse was the result of a huge international "bubble" of currency speculation created by the Venetians from 1275 through 1350. The Bardi, Peruzzi, and Acciovoli family banks were all founded in the years around 1250. These were "Black Guelph" noble families allied to Venice. Even before the crash, the Venetian-controlled Floren-
tine banks, which operated free of any national regulation, as is the case today with globalization, progressively depressed the real physical economy in order to feed the speculative debt bubble. Through its monopolistic control over finances, and the imposition of I.M.F.-style “free trade” and conditionality policies, Venice stopped the emergence of embryonic nation-states in France, England, and Spain.

Economic devastation in Florence and Siena resulting from the banking collapse, was followed, first by the renewal of war between England and France in 1346, then, by famine in 1347, and, finally, by the first outbreak of plague—the “Black Death”—in Messina in 1347.*

Tuchman describes the symptoms of the victims of the Black Death as follows: “The diseased sailors showed strange black swelling about the size of an egg or an apple in the armpits and groin. The swellings oozed blood and pus and were followed by spreading boils and black blotches on the skin from internal bleeding. The sick suffered severe pain and died quickly within five days of the first symptoms. As the disease spread, other symptoms of continuous fever and spitting of blood appeared instead of swellings or buboes. These victims coughed and sweated heavily and died even more quickly, within three days or less, sometimes in twenty-four hours.”

The disease was present in two forms: bubonic plague, which infected the bloodstream, causing buboes and internal bleeding, and was spread by contact; and pneumonic plague, a more virulent type that infected the lungs and was spread by respiratory infection. The presence of both at once caused the high mortality and speed of contagion.

In Avignon, it was said, 400 died daily; 7,000 houses emptied by death were shut up; a single graveyard received 11,000 corpses in six weeks; half the city’s inhabitants reportedly died, including nine cardinals, or one-third of the total. When graveyards filled up, bodies at Avignon were thrown into the Rhône River until mass burial pits were dug. Everywhere reports spoke of the sick dying too fast for the living to bury. Families dumped their own relatives into pits or buried them so hastily and thinly “that dogs dragged them forth and devoured their bodies.”

Perhaps even more devastating than the horrible loss of human life, was the breakdown of the moral social order. The response to the plague was not an increase in solidarity, but just the opposite. Out of concern for their own survival, parents abandoned their children, women left their husbands, and priests refused to take confessions. As Boccaccio wrote, “The Black Death froze the hearts of the people.”

By January 1348, the plague had penetrated France via Marseilles. In a given area, the plague lasted four to six months and then faded, except in the larger cities, where it abated during the winter, only to reappear in spring to rage for another six months. In 1349, it resumed in Paris, spread to Picardy, Flanders, and the Low Countries, and from England to Scotland and Ireland, as well as to Norway. From there, the plague passed into Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Iceland, and as far as Greenland. Although the mortality rate varied, the estimate of modern demographers is that for the area extending from India to Iceland, about one-third

* Even transmission of the plague into Europe was not accidental, but resulted from the ecological devastation caused by Venice’s “geopolitical” sponsorship of the Mongol Horde’s rampage across Central Asia. See Paul Gallagher.—Ed.
of the world's population died. A third of Europe would have meant about 20 million deaths. By the year 1380, the population of Europe was reduced by about 40 percent, and by nearly 50 percent by the end of the century.

Religious Irrationalism

In the Fourteenth century, the idea of animal- or insect-borne contagion did not exist. There was no suspicion of the real carriers, rats and fleas (in fact, the actual plague bacillus, *Pasturella pestis*, remained undiscovered for another five hundred years). Owing to the lack of a scientific outlook in the culture, and the collapse of the social order, there was widespread abandonment of public health measures which would have slowed the spread of the epidemic.

Increasingly, people resorted to astrological explanations, which doubled the irrationality, since the position of planets could not explain the ongoing contagion. In October 1348, Philip VI asked the medical faculty of the University of Paris for a report. The doctors ascribed it to a triple conjunction of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars in the 40th degree of Aquarius, said to have occurred on March 20, 1345.

The devastation affecting humanity gave rise to irrational religious fundamentalism, which is increasingly characteristic of our own times, and for the same reason—rejection of real science. It was widely thought that the end of the world had arrived. The plague was viewed as the wrath of God to punish mankind for its sins.

By the spring of 1348, demagogues arose, who manipulated popular hysteria, blaming the Jews for the plague. Irrational religious movements, like the Flagellants, appeared. Although they originally only flagellated themselves, they soon found an easier victim: in every town they entered, the Flagellants slaughtered the Jewish population.

Pope Clement attempted to check the hysteria in a Bull of September 1348, in which he said that Christians who imputed the pestilence to the Jews, had been “seduced by that liar, the Devil.” He pointed out that, “by a mysterious decree of God,” the plague was afflicting all peoples, including Jews; that it raged in places where no Jews lived, and that elsewhere they were victims like everyone else; therefore the charge that they caused it was “without plausibility.”

Clement also issued a Bull calling for the Flagellants’ dispersal and arrest; the University of Paris denied their claim of divine inspiration; and Philip VI forbade public flagellation on pain of death. But, without a scientific approach to the epidemic causing their hysteria, the hysteria continued.

The Seeds of Social Upheaval

With the vast loss of life brought about by the plague, production slowed, goods became scarce, and prices soared. In France, the price of wheat increased four-fold by 1350. At the same time, the shortage of labor brought a concerted demand for higher wages. In many guilds, workers struck for higher pay and shorter hours.

The response of the ruling feudal oligarchies was repression. In 1349, the English issued an ordinance freezing wages at 1347, pre-plague levels. Penalties were established for refusal to work, for leaving a place of employment to seek higher pay, and for the offer of higher pay by employers. In 1351, this ordinance was issued by the Parliament as the Statute of Laborers. It was essentially a recodification of the Diocletian Code. Every able-bodied person under sixty years of age, without means of subsistence, was forced to work for anyone who required him. (This statute, down to our own century, has been the basis for “conspiracy” laws against labor’s efforts to organize.) Stocks were set up in every town for punishment of offenders. In 1360, imprisonment replaced fines as the penalty, and fugitive laborers were declared outlaws. If caught, they were to be branded on the forehead with an “F” for “fugitive.”

Clearly, what was lacking, was any concept of human labor power, that is, the cognitive capacity of man created in the image of God (*imago Dei*), as the source of all wealth generation, through the productive transformation of nature as mediated through science and technology. The failure to so develop the cognitive powers of labor and to raise the standard of the living of the population, something later pioneered by the Brothers of the Common Life, only led to further economic and social devolution during the course of the century.

The Rise of the Free Companies in France

In 1351, the first year of Jean II’s reign in France, the currency suffered eighteen alterations, and seventy in the course of the next decade. In 1353, Europe was under external attack, the Turks having entered Europe by seizing Gallipoli. The King’s idea for dealing with the crisis, was to form his own chivalric order, called the Order of the Star, which was intended to rival King Edward’s Order of the Garter. Thus, rather than breaking from the code of chivalry, Jean resorted instead to the very tradition which was at the center of France’s devastation.
In 1355, King Edward invaded France once again, and in 1356, at the battle of Poitiers, France suffered a military debacle. Marshal Clermont had advised blockading the English, rather than attacking them in their protected position; but the dictates of chivalry forbade such a course of action. In the battle, the French king himself was captured by the English. In May 1357, King Jean, with his son and other noble prisoners, were taken back to London. France had thus been decapitated.

Under these conditions, the Third Estate of Paris, consisting of merchants, lawyers, and doctors, skilled craftsmen, day laborers, and peasants, attempted to impose limits on the monarchy. However, outside Paris, the breakdown of authority was catastrophic. This vacuum was filled by the Free Companies, composed of English, Welsh, and other mercenaries. Gathered at first in groups of twenty to fifty around a captain, they merged, organized, and spread. They exacted tribute from travellers, raided the countryside, imposed ransoms on prosperous villages, and burnt poor ones. Companies of this kind had existed since the Twelfth century and proliferated especially in Italy. Led by professional captains, the companies, sometimes numbering as many as 2,000 to 3,000 men, were composed largely of exiles, outlaws, and landless or bankrupt adventurers. In the absence of organized national armies, they filled a need and became accepted. The companies in France, though primarily English, also attracted French knights. In the anarchy after Poitiers, knights and brigands became interchangeable.

The French provinces, believing the royal power to be their only defense against the Free Companies, backed King Jean’s son, the Dauphin. In 1358, the Dauphin ordered the nobles to provision their castles. A peasant uprising ensued on May 28, in response to the seizure of their goods by the nobles. In theory, the tiller of the soil, and his livestock, were immune from pillage and the sword. However, chivalry did not apply outside the knights’ own class. By June 24, 1358, 20,000 French peasants had been killed, and the countryside converted to a wasteland. Like every insurrection of the century, this one, too, was smashed, and with it, the Third Estate in Paris.

Although King Jean initially agreed to surrender virtually all of western France and a huge ransom in the Treaty of London, on May 8, 1360, the Treaty of Bretigny was signed, in which the terms were scaled back, but were still draconian. Newly discharged soldiers swelled the ranks of the mercenary private armies. In order to pay his ransom, King Jean himself sold his eleven-year-old daughter Isabelle in marriage to the nine-year-old son of the Visconti family of Milan, for 600,000 gold florins.

In the spring of 1361, twelve years after the onset of the first plague, the dreaded pest reappeared in France and England. With the return of the plague, people lived in constant fear of recurrence of the epidemic, just as they lived in fear of the return of the Free Companies.

When he was unable to fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Bretigny, King Jean, incredibly, voluntarily returned to captivity in England in January 1364. He died in April.

In a pastoral letter of 1360, Pope Innocent VI denounced the Free Companies: “Insensible to the fear of God, the sons of iniquity invade and wreck churches . . . .” His successor, Urban V, issued two Bulls of Excommunication in 1364, which were supposed to have the effect of prohibiting any cooperation with or provisioning of the companies, and which offered plenary indulgence to all who died in combatting them.

In Italy, the companies were used as official mercenary armies in public wars. In France, they were out of control. But instead of creating a permanent national army to demobilize them, in 1365, an attempt was made by the Pope, the Emperor, and the King of France to free France from the menace, by paying them to go elsewhere—a crusade was declared against the Turks in Hungary. This, however, did not materialize until the end of the century.

The Papal Schism

In 1367, Pope Urban V, a former Benedictine monk, decided to return to Rome from France, in order to restore the authority of the papacy and secure the papal estates. During the absence of the papacy, the population of Rome had fallen from 50,000 before the Black Death, to 20,000. In 1369, the goal of reunification with the Eastern Church seemed at hand, when the Byzantine Emperor, John V Paleologus, came to Rome to meet Urban. He hoped to obtain Western help against the Turks, in return for rejoining the Roman Church, but this possibility fell apart when the churches could not agree on ritual. (It was only in the year 1440, at the Council of Florence, that such a reunion was temporarily achieved, based upon the notion of unity in diversity with regard to ritual.) In 1370, harassed by renewed revolt in the Papal States, Urban returned to Avignon, where he died two months later.

Religious unrest was widespread throughout Europe,
owing primarily to the corruption in the Church. Petrarch, who remained loyal to the Church at Rome, described the papacy at Avignon as “the impious Babylon, the hell on earth, the sink of vice, the sewer of the world. There is in it neither faith, nor charity, nor religion, nor the fear of God. . . . All the filth and wickedness of the world have run together here. . . . Fornication, incest, rape, adultery are the lascivious delights of the pontifical games.”

Moreover, religious opposition to the Church’s corruption cohered with political opposition to the Church on the part of national interests. In England, John Wyclif proposed the disendowment of the temporal property of the Church, and the exclusion of the clergy from temporal government. These proposals obtained significant support from the national institutions of England, since the Church was allied to France under conditions of war. The extent to which the French controlled the papacy at this time, is indicated by the fact that, while at Avignon, the Popes named 113 Frenchmen to the College of Cardinals, out of a total of 134 nominations.

The Church was further discredited by its resort to the Inquisition in France. In 1372, a group called the Brethren of the Free Spirit was condemned by the Inquisition, its books burned in Paris, and a woman leader of the French group, Jeanne Dabenton, burned at the stake. The resort to such cruel methods merely fuelled the disintegration of the Church. Like the State’s use of the death penalty today (which the Roman Catholic Church supported until only recently, when Pope John Paul II announced his opposition to it), the institutional use of violence had the effect of undermining the moral authority of the administering institution.

In 1373-74, the Black Death recurred in Italy and southern France. In the Rhineland, a new hysteria appeared in the form of a dancing mania. The participants were convinced they were possessed by demons. Forming circles in streets and churches, they danced for hours, calling on demons by name to cease tormenting them. As the mania spread to Holland and Flanders, the dancers moved in groups from place to place, like the Flagellants. Sexual revels often followed the dancing.

In 1375, the war for control of the Papal States had resumed in Italy. Guelph-controlled Florence organized a revolt of the Papal States, and formed a league against the papacy. To reconquer the Papal States, Cardinal Robert of Geneva persuaded Gregory XI to hire the Bretons, one of the worst mercenary Free Companies. When the Bretons failed to take Bologna and suffered several defeats at the hands of the Florentines, Cardinal Robert determined to set an example through the commission of an atrocity. In the city of Cesena, swearing clemency by a solemn oath on his cardinal’s hat, he persuaded the men of the city to lay down their arms, then summoned his mercenaries and ordered a general massacre. The toll of the dead was between 2,500 and 5,000.

In 1376, Gregory XI returned to Rome, which he entered in January 1377. Fifteen months later, in March 1378, he died. Seeing a chance to end the reign of French popes, the citizens of Rome urged the election of an Italian. On April 9, a compromise Italian candidate, Urban VI, was elected, whom the French cardinals believed they could control.

According to Tuchman, papal power went to Urban’s head. He publicly chastised the cardinals and refused to return to Avignon. By July 1378, the French cardinals began to circulate the claim that the election had been invalid. On August 9, they pronounced his election void on the grounds that it had been conducted in “fear of their lives.” In a further manifesto, they anathematized Urban as “Anti-Christ,
devil, apostate, tyrant, deceiver, elected-by-force.”

In a conclave of September 20, the French cardinals elected an Anti-Pope from among their own ranks. Incredibly, the person they elected and crowned as Clement VII, with the support of France, was none other than Robert of Geneva, the “Butcher of Cesena,” who took up his residence at Avignon.

The papal schism was thus an attempt by France to retain the support of the papacy in her war with England. France was followed by Naples, Spain, and Scotland in supporting Clement VII. But England, Flanders, Germany, Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, and Portugal accepted Urban.

The moral damage done by the schism was incalculable. Half the Christian world regarded the other half as heretical and excommunicate. Each side claimed the sacraments administered by the other were invalid. Each side claimed that the other pope was the Anti-Christ. (In later centuries, Venice would use this same “divide-and-conquer” technique to manipulate the Protestant/Roman Catholic, Reformation/Counter-Reformation conflict.)

Moreover, since papal revenue was cut in half, the financial effect of the schism was catastrophic. To keep each papacy afloat, simony (the selling of church offices and favors) increased, benefices and promotions were sold, charges for spiritual dispensations (“indulgences”) were increased. Instead of reform, abuses multiplied, further undermining the faith. The rift in Christendom was to last for forty years.

Working Class and Peasant Revolts

As Tuchman points out, what had happened in the last thirty years of the century, as a result of the depression, plague, and war, was a weakening of acceptance of the system, an awakening sense that authority could be challenged and that change was possible.

Beginning in 1378, the accumulated miseries of the working class gave rise to workers’ insurrections in Florence, and one year later in Ghent. Over five years, insurrections succeeded each other in Florence, Flanders, Languedoc, Paris, England, and then back to Flanders and northern France.

Membership in the guilds was shut off to the ordinary journeyman. In many trades, work was farmed out to workers in their homes, and often at lower wages, to their wives and children, whose employment was forbidden in the guilds. The imposition of 120-150 obligatory religious holidays a year kept earnings down. Workers were forbidden to strike, but they formed associations to press for higher wages.

In Florence, for example, employees worked at fixed wages, often below subsistence level, for sixteen to eighteen hours a day. Their wages might be withheld to cover waste or damage to raw materials. Workers could be flogged, or imprisoned, blacklisted, or have a hand cut off for resistance to employers. Agitators for the right to organize could be hung. In 1345, ten wool-carders were put to death on this charge.

The Church, because of its alliance with the feudal system, effectively supported the oppression of labor. A pastoral letter issued by a Bishop in Florence at the time declared that spinners could be excommunicated for wasting their wool.

In England in 1381, a peasant revolt erupted, precipitated by the third poll tax in four years. The peasants wanted abolition of the old bonds, the right to commute services to rent, and riddance of all the restrictions heaped up by the Statute of Laborers.

However, none of the insurrections were successful. The leaders were hanged and the uprisings suppressed. They were unsuccessful, because they were merely rebelling against the symptoms of the crisis without any concept of its cause or of an alternative organization of society.

Today, the labor movement is similarly faced with an effort on the part of the financial oligarchy to lower its standard of living and deny it the right to organize and to strike. In the United States, despite its history of trade union organizations and labor legislation dating from the 1930’s, workers are being fired and blacklisted for organizing unions, and striking workers can now be permanently replaced by strikebreakers. In the last three decades, the percentage of American workers organized into unions has declined from over one-third to only 17 percent, which decline has only recently begun to be reversed, under the new leadership of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.

Unfortunately, thus far, today’s labor movement has failed to learn the lessons of universal history. Like the incipient labor movement of the Fourteenth century, it lacks a program for reorganization of the bankrupt financial system, and for global and national economic reconstruction.

Beginning with Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, the Roman Catholic Church formally broke with feudalism’s anti-labor outlook and policy, and through its social teaching undertook to defend the interests of labor as primary. However, even today, that policy is compromised by the Church’s failure to break decisively with the neo-liberal policies of the International Monetary Fund, whose Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, is a nominal Catholic, and with the anti-labor policies of such Catholic neo-conservatives as Michael Novak and Rev. Richard Neuhaus.
The End of the Century

The century ended in warfare, continued schism, madness, and regicide, the necessary consequences of the false, chivalric-feudal axiomatic assumptions which dominated the century as a whole. In the 1380’s, the French engaged in three military adventures, all of which ended in failure. First, in 1382, the Duc d’Anjou crossed the Alps to make claim to the Kingdom of Naples; a secondary aim, not pursued, was to use force against Pope Urban. Then, in 1386, the French resolved to invade England to finish off the war and assure the supremacy of the French Pope. And finally, after a three-year truce was concluded with England in 1389, the French carried out an abortive crusade in 1390 against the Berber Kingdom of Tunis in North Africa.

In this same year, Pope Urban died and was replaced by Boniface IX. All of its adventures having failed, France then planned to march on Rome to oust Pope Boniface and install Pope Clement. This was called the Way of the Deed, conceived in opposition to the Way of Cession, or voluntary mutual abdication of both Popes, as advocated by the University of Paris. The latter course was fought for by Jean Gerson, the Chancellor of the University of Paris, who later distinguished himself by defending both the Brothers of the Common Life and Joan of Arc.

In 1388-90, the Black Death returned for the fourth time. The population of Europe was reduced to 40-50 percent of what it had been in the year 1300, and would fall even lower by 1450, before it would begin an exponential rate of increase in Europe and globally, as a consequence of the Renaissance sparked by the Council of Florence.

In 1392, the King of France, Charles VI, went insane. For the rest of his life, which was not to end until thirty years later in 1422, Charles was intermittently mad. Ultimately, the Way of the Deed was not pursued, owing both to the King’s madness, and to an offer of peace from the English at the request of Pope Boniface.

On September 16, 1392, the French Pope, Clement, died. His successor was elected six days later, taking the name of Benedict XIII. However, the fact that he was Spanish and not French, diminished the French enthusiasm for the Way of the Deed. Nonetheless, for thirty years, Benedict resisted every pressure to step down. Retreating to a Spanish fortress, he died in 1422 at the age of 94.

The century closed with a final abortive chivalric adventure, a crusade to Nicopolis in 1396 against the Ottoman Turks, who were led by the Sultan Bajazet. The Turks were not immediately able to follow up their devastating victory, because Bajazet had to turn eastward to defend against the Mongols led by Tamberlane (1336-1405), whose forces met and defeated the Ottoman army at Ankara in 1402, capturing Bajazet alive. The latter events were to be portrayed in playwright Christopher Marlowe’s two-part strategic study, Tamberlane The Great, which was first performed in 1588.

In 1398, the Emperor Wenceslas and the King of France met at Rheims, in a renewed effort to end the schism. However, as Tuchman writes: “Owing to the disabilities of the two major sovereigns, one incapacitated by alcohol and the other by insanity, the result was not what it might have been.”

Finally, in 1399, Richard II, who was King of England from 1367 to 1399, was deposed by his cousin Henry of Bolingbroke. Compelled to resign the crown, Richard was imprisoned and, within a year, murdered. Bolingbroke, now Henry IV, would devote the remainder of his life to defending his usurped crown against Welsh revolt, baronial antagonists, and a son (Henry V) impatient to succeed him. In 1413, he died, and in 1415 his son invaded France to claim the French crown.

Thus, the calamitous Fourteenth century ended with usurpation and regicide, and consequently, the Fifteenth century commenced with perpetual warfare. It was a period much like the ending of the Eighteenth and the beginning of the Nineteenth centuries, which Friedrich Schiller characterized in his poem “The Commencement of the New Century”:

Noble friend! Where is to peace imparted,
Where to liberty a refuge place?
In a storm the century is departed,
And the new with murder shows its face.

Cultural Paradigm-Shift

What occurred following the death of Frederick II in 1250 and the ascendency of the Black Guelph in Europe, and what has occurred in our own century, since approximately 1962 with the onset of the neo-Malthusian youth counterculture, is a cultural paradigm-shift of an entropic type. The earlier, anti-entropic cultural values in both cases were shifted politically under conditions of traumatic shock. Under Frederick II, there had been a tendency toward the development of sovereign nation-states. So too, after World War II, the potential existed to
eliminate British-style colonialism and to implement American-style methods of economic development on a global scale. In both cases, the anti-entropic type of political-economic potential was deliberately reversed by the same oligarchical financial faction.

If we review the developments over the Fourteenth century, what we see is something analogous to a fixed Euclidean geometry. The cultural paradigm of the century is determined by a static, entropic hypothesis, i.e., feudalism, from which is derived a set of interacting definitions, axioms, and postulates. Insofar as qualitative change is precluded from such a deductive geometry, the events which occur in such a geometry lead necessarily to devolution. A society which operates on this basis is a doomed culture, lacking the moral fitness to survive. It is like the society destroyed by the despot, whose ruined statue stands in the desert, which the English poet Percy Bysshe Shelley characterizes in his poem “Ozymandias”:

Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

However, the very fact that a society is organized on the basis of an entropic hypothesis, which clearly violates the natural-law ordering of both human nature and the physical universe, dictates that such a society must necessarily devolve. This devolution, in turn, inexorably results not only in a self-weakening and discrediting of that society, but also in the potential for a reverse cultural-paradigm shift, back to an anti-entropic universe, in restored harmony with natural law. Again, as in Shelley’s poem “Ozymandias,” this potential for an alternative, anti-entropic course, is expressed “between the lines,” through the principle of metaphor.

The devolution itself poses an ontological paradox, which can only be resolved through cognition, that is, through the generation of a new, higher-order, anti-entropic hypothesis, a discovery of principle which leads us from a relatively inferior \( n \)-fold manifold, to a relatively superior \( n+1 \)-fold manifold, as LaRouche has described it. Thus, the revolution or devolution of a physical-economic manifold, determined by scientific and technological progress or the lack thereof, is mediated through what Lyndon LaRouche has characterized as a moral, or \( m \)-fold, manifold of discoveries of Classical-artistic principles, including principles of history in the large.

At the point that the false-axiomatic assumptions of the Dark Age have shown themselves to be a deadly fantasy leading civilization to a tragic conclusion, a desire to abandon that failed ideology on the part of a population can be utilized by those world-historical individuals, who, owing to their passionate love (\( \text{agapé} \)) for truth and justice, have developed the required truthful ideas, through which justice can be secured, to effect the change necessary to continued human survival. To the extent that the cognitive capacity of a world-historical individual generates a validatable discovery of principle, the universe itself is so designed, that it is self-obliged to submit to mankind’s will on that account.

The Principles of Tragedy and Comedy in History

It is no accident, that such great dramatists as William Shakespeare and Friedrich Schiller turned to the Fourteenth and early Fifteenth centuries for the subject matter of many of their most important plays. Each, in his own way, attempted in his history plays, to give Classical
artistic expression to the quality of mind required to win the world-historical fight on behalf of the creation and defense of the sovereign nation-state, as the vehicle necessary to realize the divine qualities of man.

At the center of all great Classical art, both tragedy and comedy, is the paradoxical conflict between agape and eros, anti-entropy and entropy. Tragedy conveys the necessity of agape and anti-entropy negatively, through the entropic consequences of succumbing to eros. Comedy, as in Dante’s Divine Comedy or in Schiller’s play William Tell, conveys the positive resolution of this conflict, and the avoidance of an infernal Dark Age, through the agapic overcoming of entropy.

For example, in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, a paradox is posed: “To be, or not to be.” For the Danish state to continue to exist, Hamlet must resolve to act on the basis of love of justice and truth. Hamlet knows that the state of Denmark depends upon his overcoming his personal erotic fixations, to bring to justice his uncle Claudius, who has usurped the throne by murdering Hamlet’s father. However, the solution to the crisis with which Hamlet is confronted, the leap from the n-fold manifold to the n+1-fold manifold, appears to him as a frightening, “undiscovered country, from whose bourne no traveller returns,” the which Hamlet wishes to avoid at all costs.

One should compare Hamlet’s comment, to that of Young Mortimer in Christopher Marlowe’s Edward the Second. Mortimer, who has deposed Edward II and is about to be beheaded for his crime by his son, King Edward III, says: “Weep not for Mortimer, that scorns the world, and, as a traveller, goes to discover countries yet unknown.”

Hamlet, however, as opposed to the Young Mortimer in Marlowe’s play, is the legitimate heir and not a usurper. In Hamlet’s speech, Shakespeare transforms Mortimer’s words embracing imminent death, to reflect Hamlet’s fear of relinquishing his false-axiomatic assumption, despite the fact that his fear guarantees his own death and the destruction of the state. Hamlet recoils from the cognitive breakthrough and action required for him to be a legitimate agent of change. Consequently, he chooses “not to be,” through a chivalric flight forward, resulting in a bloody denouement.

However, even in such tragic consequences, the audience sees in Hamlet their own capacity to act differently, to determine “to be,” and not to shrink from the cognitive leap necessary to lead society from the n-fold manifold to the n+1-fold manifold. Hamlet himself identifies that capacity, which distinguishes man from a mere beast, as “godlike reason.” But instead of acting upon his own capax Dei, he chooses to leave that capacity unused:

. . . What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more,
Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To fust in us unused.

(Act I, sc. iv, l. 33-39)

In Shakespeare’s Richard II, we see a king, who, although he describes himself as “the deputy elected by the Lord,” by virtue of the divine right of kings, not only fails to act on the basis of man’s true nature as imago Dei, but having surrounded himself with flatterers, so oppresses his own people in violation of natural law, that he contributes to his own ouster. He procures the murder of the Duke of Gloucester, banishes and then deprives Henry Bolingbroke of his rightful inheritance, and converts England into a “tenement or pelting farm” and himself into a mere “landlord,” rather than the king of the realm.

In contrast to Hamlet, Bolingbroke, who is the future Henry IV, does take action against a king unfit to rule. Hamlet, however, is the legitimate heir to his father’s throne and his uncle, Claudius, the usurper; whereas Bolingbroke is the usurper and Richard II, the legitimate king. Thus, Richard II’s ouster by Bolingbroke does not result in peace, but rather, as the Bishop of Carlisle prophesies, it leads eventually to the War of the Roses (1455-85) between the Houses of York and Lancaster:

In his fall from power, Richard II repeatedly compares his dethronement to the betrayal of Christ:

Disorder, horror, fear, and mutiny
Shall here inhabit, and this land be call’d
The field of Golgotha and dead men’s skulls,
O, if you raise this house against this house,
It will the woefullest division prove
That ever fell upon this cursed earth.

(Act IV, sc. i, l. 142-47)

In his fall from power, Richard II repeatedly compares his dethronement to the betrayal of Christ:

So Judas did to Christ; but he, in twelve,
Found truth in all but one; I, in twelve thousand none.

(Act IV, sc. i, l. 170-72)

Though some of you, with Pilate, wash your hands,
Showing an outward pity, yet you Pilates
Have here deliver’d me to my sour cross,
And water cannot wash away your sin.

(Act IV, sc. i, l. 239-42)

However, in light of his arrogance of power, this false
self-comparison merely serves to underscore his failure as king to act in the living image of God.

In contrast to Hamlet, Richard II, and Bolingbroke (Henry IV), the characters of William Tell and Joan of Arc (1412-1431) in Friedrich Schiller’s dramas, demonstrate the revolutionary quality of mind, which led to the liberation of humanity from the Dark Age of feudalism, by the creation of the nation-state.

William Tell is a comedy, in the Classical sense of Dante’s Commedia (Divine Comedy). As Schiller writes in On Naive and Sentimental Poetry, the task of comedy is to bring forth to nourish in us the freedom of mind, which derives from agapē, whereas the purpose of tragedy is to help reestablish mental freedom, when it has been violently annulled by erotic passion.

Like Joan of Arc, William Tell is not a member of the nobility. From the very opening scene of the drama, Tell is portrayed as an individual who acts agapically in the spirit of the Good Samaritan. When asked to help a fellow-countryman escape certain death at the hands of pursuing Hapsburg troops, Tell responds unselfishly:

The valiant man thinks of himself the last,  
Put trust in God and rescue the distressed.  
(Act I, sc. i)

In William Tell, which Schiller wrote in 1805, the Swiss nationalist forces are nearly defeated as a result of their failure to act in a timely fashion, but they are saved by Tell, who, at the punctum saliens, acts out of self-defense against the tyrant Gessler. Tell acts not for selfish, personal reasons, but rather as an instrument of the Creator above, on behalf of the inalienable rights of all mankind, the principles of which had only recently been expressed in the American Declaration of Independence of 1776. In contrast to Hamlet, William Tell does not shrink from the “undiscovered country,” and, in contrast to Bolingbroke, he does not usurp power. As a result, the play ends not with the murder of the tyrant Gessler sowing entropy, but rather, anti-entropically, with the character Rudenz proclaiming the liberation of all his serfs.

Schiller’s play The Virgin of Orleans is described by Schiller as a “Romantic Tragedy,” which distinguishes it both from a comedy such as William Tell, and also from tragedies such as Hamlet or Schiller’s own Don Carlos. In this play, Joan of Arc acts to save the French nation. As in William Tell, her ability to do so is based upon her agapic capacity. This is seen most clearly in her ability to heal the division in France between Charles VII and the Duke of Burgundy, who had fought with the British against his king. Not only does she effect a reconciliation between them, but she moves Burgundy to reconcile with Du Chatel, the man who murdered Burgundy’s own father. Thus, Joan of Arc says to Burgundy:

... A reconciliation
There’s not, which doth not free the heart in full.
One drop of hate, which in the cup of joy
Remaineth, turns the blessed drink to poison.
—No crime so bloody be, that Burgundy
Upon this day of joy it won’t forgive.
(Act III, sc. iv)

Joan of Arc differs from William Tell, in that in saving her nation, she must make the supreme sacrifice of her life in the course of completing her mission. Joan freely accepts the end of her own mortal existence in the furtherance of a higher, divine purpose. She thus demonstrates man’s absolute moral freedom in the simultaneity of eternity. The play ends with her words, which Beethoven later set to music in a beautiful canon: “Brief is the pain, the joy shall be eternel!”

In writing this drama, Schiller was not only polemicizing against the moral degeneracy of the Fourteenth-century Dark Age, but he was doing so, in order to address the failure of the French people to realize the potential of the 1789 French Revolution, owing to their own erotic self-centeredness. As Schiller wrote at the time in an epigram entitled “The Moment”:

A momentous epoch hath the cent’ry engender’d,  
Yet the moment so great findeth a people so small.

In contrast to such erotic small-mindedness, the quality of mind that Tell and Joan of Arc share, is the quality of agapic reason, expressed by Plato, the Apostle Paul, and the “filioque” principle of the Nicene Creed. This is a quality, which is directly opposite to that which characterized chivalry and the Flagellants in the Fourteenth century, or which characterizes neo-conservatism and the youth counterculture today. This is the anti-entropic quality of mind, which led to the Golden Renaissance of the Fifteenth century; it is the quality of mind self-consciously in the living image of God (imago vivi Dei), which Shakespeare and Schiller attempted to nurture in their times, and which must be evoked today, if we are to prevent humanity from descending into a new Dark Age.

Making the Renaissance Intelligible

Contrary to Tuchman, the Renaissance that occurred in the mid-1400’s did not take place “at some imperceptible moment, by some mysterious chemistry.” In this characterization, Tuchman so obscures causality, as to have a
destructive political effect, serving to stifle actual change and the emergence of necessary historical agents of change. The ideas that “broke out of the mold of the Middle Ages into new realms” were indeed revolutionary “ideas,” in the Platonic sense of the term, advanced by individuals at the crucial moment of self-weakening of the Black Guelph forces. Without such concrete, historic men and women of ideas, as we saw during the Fourteenth century, mere rebellion leads inevitably to suppression and further devolution within the equivalent of a fixed theorem-lattice.

In a time of civilizational crisis, such as occurred in the Fourteenth century and is occurring today, irrationalism is deliberately induced by oligarchical forces. Under conditions of traumatic shock, particularly with regard to an uneducated population, subject to superstitious beliefs and characterized by erotic infantile emotions, the creation of institutions which can foster intellectual growth is of utmost importance.

The war of ideas over a two-hundred-year period from 1250 to 1450, which led to the creation of the first sovereign nation-state in 1461 in France under Louis XI, was spearheaded by a series of individuals and institutions who are in fact identified by Tuchman in her book, including Dante Alighieri, the Brothers of the Common Life, founded by Gerard Groote (1340-84), and Joan of Arc (1412-31). However, as already noted, Tuchman fails to explicitly identify their contributions, and omits altogether the even greater contributions of the Council of Florence and Nicolaus of Cusa.

Dante, an opponent of the Black Guelph, who was exiled from his native Florence, wrote in De Monarchia (1310-13), that “the proper work of mankind taken as a whole is to exercise continually its entire capacity for intellectual growth.” In De Vulgari Eloquentia, he argued that the creation of a literate form of vernacular language, common to an entire nation, is a necessary precondition for the intellectual growth of a people, and for the development of its capacity to exercise self-government. Dante was not able to implement this perspective during his own lifetime, but he laid the seeds for its implementation at the point of self-weakening of the Black Guelph.

The significance of the Brothers of the Common Life is that at the very end of the Fourteenth century, it began an educational movement which realized Dante’s program. As Tuchman indicates, the Brothers earned their living by teaching poor children, primarily orphans, and by two occupations not controlled by the guilds, copying manuscripts and cooking. Through this effort, the Brothers contributed significantly to educating the majority of the population, who were otherwise oppressed as mere feudal serfs.

What Gerard Groote and Thomas à Kempis (1380-1471) emphasized in their educational work, was the use of primary sources, which the boys copied—the only means of reproduction in that period,—and the replication thereby by the student in his own mind of the mental experience of great scientific discoveries. This approach was in opposition to the Aristotelean method prevalent in the universities of the time, which was based entirely upon formal knowledge and rote learning. This project laid the basis for the later development of the nation-state and the principle of self-government, as developed by Cusanus.

The significance of Joan of Arc is, that a woman of the commoners’ class engaged in political-military action to lead the French people in rescuing her nation, as a nation, from foreign tyrants. As the British knight, Lionel, laments in Schiller’s play, after Joan of Arc led the French to victory at Orleans:

Who will believe it in the coming times?
The victors at Poitiers, Crécy
And Agincourt o’ertaken by a woman!
(Act II, sc. i)

Her courage and inspiration, even in martyrdom, led ineluctably to the creation of the French nation-state in 1461 by Louis XI.

What Nicolaus of Cusa contributed in his On Catholic Concordance, was the revolutionary concept of govern-
ment by the consent of the governed, which he derived from the self-evident fact that all men are created equal and have equal natural rights, insofar as they are created in the image of God and are thus endowed with the capacity for creative reason (*capax Dei*).

Moreover, it was this latter emphasis on human cognition, which led Cusanus to become the founder of modern science. In total opposition to the dominant Aristotelian view of the universe as essentially fixed, Cusanus argued in such locations as *On Learned Ignorance*, that man as a microcosm has the capacity to act on the basis of his creative intellect to further develop the potential of the macrocosm. In *The Game of Spheres*, he wrote that “the power of the soul is to reason and therefore the power to reason is the soul... For this reason, the soul is the inventive power of the arts and of new sciences.” For Cusanus, insofar as man imitates Christ, who as Maximal Reason is the creator of the world, he is capable of being the instrument of the further unfolding of all things enfolded in God.

It is this concept of man as a second creator, which leads to the intelligible transformation of the world with the Renaissance of the Fifteenth century. And it is this concept of man, as further developed by Lyndon LaRouche, which is the basis for mankind completing the unfinished task of the earlier Renaissance today. That task is to rid the world once and for all of the anti-Christian concept of man as at best a “rational animal,” and to rid the world of the financial oligarchy, which is reducing man to such a bestial condition today, just as it did during the Fourteenth century.

As creators, our task today is to complete the American Revolution, thus far the highest expression of the Fifteenth-century Golden Renaissance, on a global scale, through the creation of a “family of sovereign nation-state republics,” as LaRouche has proposed, which recognize only one supranational authority—natural law. We must free the world of such global oligarchical financial institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, just as Joan of Arc fought to free her fatherland of the British invader. We must create a true universal concord (*concordantia catholica*), through the creation of a New Bretton Woods financial system, in which every nation can cooperate with other nations, to the mutual benefit of the human species as a whole, in great infrastructure projects such as the Eurasian Land-Bridge. We must create a universe in which all societies, in emulation of the Brothers of the Common Life, promote the development and fruitful self-expression of that *divine spark*, which is the sovereign individual’s power of creative reason.

Like Joan of Arc in the last scene of Schiller’s play, who asks for her banner before dying on the battlefield, we must also be able to say:

> Without my banner dare I not to come:  
> It was entrusted to me by my Maker,  
> Before His throne I must needs lay it down—  
> I may display it, for I bore it true.

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* Starred items available from Ben Franklin Booksellers. See ad p. 87.

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Cartoons by Hans Holbein, from “The Dance of Death,” woodcut series, 1530’s.
Philosophy of Physiology
(1779)
Friedrich Schiller

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSIOLOGY was written as a dissertation by Friedrich Schiller when he was a young medical student. It was originally entitled "The Idea of Physiology," and was written in German. In the fall of 1779, Schiller submitted an altered version in Latin, under the title "Philosophia Physiologica." It was rejected by his teachers, owing to its attack on the medical authorities of the day. The only version which has survived, is a German text with the present title. Since both the original German version, and the later Latin text, have been lost, it is not clear whether this extant text is an incomplete copy of the German original, or of a later, revised text of the Latin.

Although some authorities claim, falsely, that the "wise man" referred to by Schiller in Section 1 is the British Empiricist Adam Ferguson, as Anita Gallagher makes absolutely clear, the sage referred to by Schiller can be none other than G.W. Leibniz. One need only compare the concept of happiness expressed by Schiller in Section 1, with that of Leibniz in such locations as his essay "On Wisdom."

Also of interest is Schiller's concept of "Mittelkraft," or mediating power, in Section 2. This concept of a third power which mediates between matter and spirit, anticipates the concept of "Spieltrieb," or play instinct, which Schiller later developed in his "Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man." There, Schiller defines the play instinct as a third power, in which the sensuous drive and the formal drive act in combination.

Four of the eleven sections of Chapter I of Schiller's work are presented here. These eleven sections are the only ones still extant, and even the eleventh breaks off in mid-sentence. A translation of the full extant text will appear in a forthcoming new volume of Schiller translations. The translation has been prepared by Anita Gallagher, who, along with her husband Paul Gallagher and two other associates of Lyndon LaRouche, Michael Billington and Laurence Hecht, remains a political prisoner in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

Plan
First Chapter. THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT.
Second Chapter. THE NURTURING LIFE.
Third Chapter. PROCREATION.
Fourth Chapter. THE COHERENCE OF THESE THREE SYSTEMS.
Fifth Chapter. SLEEP AND NATURAL DEATH.

I. THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

1. Destiny of Man

This much will, I think, have been proven firmly enough one day: that the universe were the work of an Infinite Understanding, and were designed according to an excellent plan.

Just as it now flows from the design into reality through the almighty influence of divine power, and all powers are active and act on each other, like strings of a thousand-voiced instrument sounding together in one melody; so, in this way, the spirit of man, ennobled with divine powers, should discover from the single effects, cause and design; from the connection of causes and designs, the great plan of the Whole; from the plan, recognize the Creator, love Him, glorify Him; —or, more briefly, more sublime-sounding in our ear: Man is here, so that he may strive toward the greatness of his Creator; that he may grasp the whole world with just a glance, as the Creator grasps it. Likeness-to-God [Gottgleichheit] is the destiny of man. Infinite, indeed, is this his Ideal; however, the spirit is eternal. Eternity is the measure of infinity; that is to say, man will grow eternally, but will never reach it.

A soul, says a wise man of this century, which is enlightened to the degree that it has the plan of divine providence completely in its view, is the happiest soul. An
eternal, great, and beautiful law of nature has bound perfection to pleasure, and displeasure to imperfection. What brings this characteristic closer to man, be it direct or indirect, will delight him. What distances him from it, will pain him. What pains him, he will avoid; what delights him, he will strive for. He will seek perfection, because imperfection pains him; he will seek it, because it alone delights him. The sum of the greatest perfections with the fewest imperfections, is the sum of the highest pleasures with the fewest sorrows. This is supreme happiness. Therefore, it is the same if I say: Man exists to be happy; or—he exists to be perfect. Only then is he happy, when he is perfect. Only then is he perfect, when he is happy. Only then is he happy, when he is perfect.

However, an equally beautiful, wise law, a corollary of the first, has bound the perfection of the Whole with the supreme happiness of the individual; human beings with fellow human beings; indeed, men and animals, through the bond of universal love. Thus love, the most beautiful, noblest impulse in the human soul, the great chain of feeling nature, is nothing other than the confusion of my own self with the being [Wesen] of fellow creatures. And this intermingling is pleasure. Love thus makes the fellow creature’s delight my delight; his sorrow, my sorrow.

**G.W. Leibniz:**

**from ‘On Wisdom’**

Such joy, which man can at all times create for himself, when his mind is well-constituted, consists in the mental perception of a pleasure in himself, and in his mental powers, when one feels in himself a strong inclination and readiness for Goodness and Truth; especially by means of thorough intelligence, which a more illumined Mind presents to us, so that we experience the main source, the course, and final purpose of all things, and the unbelievable excellence of the highest Nature which comprises all things in itself, and thereby are elevated above the unknowing, just as if we could see terrestrial objects here under our feet from the stars. Then at last we learn entirely from this, that we have cause to take the highest joy, concerning all that has already happened and is yet to happen, but that we seek, nevertheless, to direct as much as is in our power what has not yet happened for the best. For that is one of the eternal laws of nature, that we shall enjoy the perfection of things and the pleasure which arises from it according to the measure of our knowledge, good will, and intended contribution.

However, even this suffering is perfection, and therefore must not be without pleasure. Thus, what were otherwise pity as an emotion, is blended from pleasure and pain. Pain, because the fellow creature would suffer. Pleasure, because I share his pain with him, since I love him. Sorrows and pleasure, that I turn his pain from him.

And why universal love; why all the pleasure of universal love? —Only out of this ultimate, fundamental design: to further the perfection of the fellow creature. And this perfection is the overseeing [Überschauung], investigation, and admiration of the great design of Nature. Indeed, all pleasures of the senses, ultimately, of which we shall speak in its place, incline through twists and turns and apparent contradictions, for all that, finally back to the same thing. Immutable, this truth itself remains always the same, forever and ever: Man is destined for the overseeing, investigation, and admiration of the great design of Nature.

**2. Action of Matter on the Spirit**

Having laid this as foundation, I proceed further. When man is supposed to discover the Whole from the particular, he must perceive each individual action in this way. The world must act on him. This is now, in part, outside him; in part, in him. What takes precedence within the inner labyrinths of my own being, is more the subject of a psychology than of a universal physiology. We will assume it [a knowledge of psychology] in the reader, and only where the chain of the whole requires it, venture an intervention into it.

The actions that have priority outside my own self, are movements of matter. All movement of matter is based on impenetrability; a quality of matter, which would uniquely distinguish it from spirit, so far as we understand it. Yet, if spirit is not impenetrable, how is matter supposed to act on it, which, in any case, would only act on the impenetrable? Indeed, the beautiful, animated objects of creation would have to be dead to it; its active power would slumber dead in a boundless, fertile sphere of activity; however, it does not slumber dead in a boundless, fertile sphere of activity. The animated, beautiful objects of creation are indeed not dead to it. Spirit is happy. It is active. Either spirit must be able to be impenetrable without being matter; yet, who could separate the concept of matter from the impenetrability of matter? —Or must the Spirit itself be matter? Thinking would therefore be movement. Immortality were an illusion. Spirit would have to pass away. This opinion, promulgated by force to crush the sublimity of spirit and to allay the fear of the coming eternity, can delude only fools and villains; the wise man derides it. —Or, is our entire representation of a world, a single fabric spun out of our own self? We deceive ourselves; we dream; in this way, we believe we receive our ideas and feelings [Empfindungen] from outside. We are
independent of the world; it is independent of us. We interpret, by virtue of an harmony established from eternity, as two clocks wound identically to the second. In this way, the world is thus without design. Freedom and moral approval are phantoms. My supreme happiness is a dream. This view is nothing but a flash of wit of a distinguished thinker, which he himself by no means believed. 3

Or, it is the direct influence of the divine omnipotence, which gives matter the power to act on me. Each of my representations is therefore a miracle, and contradicts the first law of nature. Had one wished thereby to present the Creator as more powerful, one would have been amazingly deranged. Miracles betray a defect in the design of the world. Weak like a human artist, the Creator has to help in all areas. He would still be great, but I can imagine Him yet greater; His work still more excellent. He is excellent, but not perfect. He is great, but He is not the Infinite.

Or, otherwise a power must exist, which mediates between spirit and matter, and connects the two. A power which can be changed by matter, and which can change spirit. This were therefore a power which is one part spirit, another part material; a being, that were one part penetrable, another part, impenetrable—and can one imagine such a thing?—Certainly not!

Be that as it may, there is actually a power existing between matter (this same thing, whose actions are supposed to be represented), and spirit. This power is completely distinct from the world and the spirit. I remove it; all action of the world is lost to the spirit. And yet, the spirit is still there. And yet, the object is still there. Its loss has created a rupture between the world and the spirit. Its existence clarifies, awakens, and animates everything around it. I call it mediating power [Mittelkraft].

* * *

10. The Action of the Soul on the Thinking Organ

Material association is the foundation on which thinking rests. The guide of the creative intellect. Through it [material association] alone can the understanding combine and separate, compare, reach conclusions, and direct the will to volition or rejection. Perhaps this assertion might appear dangerous to freedom. For, when the sequence of the material ideas is determined by the mechanism of the thinking organ, but the understanding is determined by the material ideas, and the will is determined by the understanding, it would thus follow that, ultimately, the will were determined mechanically. But one should listen to what follows.

The soul has an active influence on the thinking organ. It can make material ideas stronger, and, in an arbitrary manner, can be fixed on them, and, consequently, it also makes the intellectual [geistige] ideas more powerful. This is the work of attentiveness [Aufmerksamkeit]. It also holds sway over the strength of motives, it alone advances motives. And it would now be quite definite, what freedom is. It is only the confusion of the first and second wills [Wills] which has caused the controversy over it. The first will, which directs my attentiveness, is the free one; the latter, which directs the action, is a slave of the understanding; therefore, freedom does not lie in the fact that I would choose that which my understanding has recognized as the best (since this is an eternal law); but rather, that I would choose what can direct [bestimmen] my understanding toward the best. All mankind's morality has its foundation in the faculty of attentiveness; that is, in the active influence of the soul on the material ideas in the thinking organ.

Now, the more frequently a material idea is brought
to vivid life [in stark Lebhaftigkeit gesetzt] by virtue of this active influence, it will thus ultimately retain a certain strength even after that, and, as it were, stand out an aftereffect before all others. It will stir the soul in a more striking way. It will force itself on the understanding more potently in all associations; direct it more powerfully; it will become the tyrant of the second will, where the first will was not exerted in the least. So there can be people who, ultimately, do good or evil mechanically. In the beginning, they did it freely and morally; that is to say, while their attentiveness was still undetermined. But now, even without attentiveness, the idea is still the most lively one; it fastens the soul to itself; it dominates the understanding and the will. Here lies the reason for all passions and dominant ideas; and, at the same time, the finger that points to how to enervate both.

If the soul fixes its attentiveness on several ideas, and brings such ideas into different associations, one says thus: It imagines. If it allows its attentiveness to rest on isolated particulars [einzeln Bestimmungen] of diverse ideas, and draws such particulars out of their associations, one says thus: It abstracts. The former, having gone into new associations deeply through imagination; the latter, having tried to understand ideas from their associations through abstraction, it [the soul] binds ideas again, especially in the thinking organ; indeed, even the consciousness of its own self in these actions appears to bind them into material forms, because it restores this consciousness at the same time with the old ideas. In this case, we say: It remembers. If the soul, by virtue of its attentiveness, unsettles a material idea more forcefully, it will thus also unsettle the adjoining one more forcefully. The association will thus become quicker and more lively. We do this if we recall something or let our imagination play. Therefore, attentiveness is that through which we imagine; through which we reflect; through which we separate and seal; through which we will. It is the active influence of the soul on the thinking organ which accomplishes all this.

And, therefore, the thinking organ is the true tribunal of the understanding, having been subjected to the latter, just as the latter [the understanding] was subjected to it. It [the understanding] is, moreover, completely dependent on attentiveness. For that reason, confusion of spirits is possible in sickness, if and when it is transmitted as far as this organ [the thinking organ], (and how easy it becomes) to turn the wisest into the most ridiculous fools; the thinker into a simpleton; the most gentle person into a fury. It [the thinking organ] is completely dependent upon the understanding, with the exception of the influence of sensation. Therefore, an accurate understanding can produce the most faithful memory. For that reason, a continually busy understanding can destroy it [the thinking organ] by overstraining. The examples of great thinkers demonstrate both: of Garve, Mendelssohn, Swift, who have put the instrument of their understanding out of tune such that there is no longer a correct tone from them. And, since it is connected so exactly with the reasoning power [Denkkraft], I have thus designated it the thinking organ, and not because I considered thinking as a consequence of the mechanism.

11. Feelings of the Life of the Spirit

My soul is not only a thinking being; it is also a feeling being. The latter alone makes it happy. The former alone makes it capable of the latter. We will see exactly how the Creator of mankind has bound thinking to feeling. Feeling is that condition of my soul where it is itself conscious of betterment or a change for the worse. Therefore, to make a distinction between it and representation, in representation it [the soul] would feel only the condition of an external being; but in feelings, its own condition.

I see the sunny sky, the starry heaven; I see a confused heap of stones; I hear a spring murmur; the playing of strings echoes. I hear the shrieking of a raven. In all these shifting scenes of my state, there is something common; the representation of an external object. On the other side, however, how very different is not my state, at each of these representations. I see the sunny sky with pleasure, I see the starry heaven with even more pleasure. I turn my eye away from the heap of stones. In this way, I also hear the spring murmuring with pleasure; with even more pleasure, the sound of strings playing. I likewise wish to plug my ear to the shrieking of the raven. What delights me, I call melodious and beautiful; what displeases me, ugly and unmelodious.

However, by virtue of the first law of nature, which stands at the pinnacle of this dissertation on mankind, nothing should delight me, other than what makes me more perfect; nothing should displease me, other than what makes me less perfect. Now, did the melodious, the beautiful, make me more perfect than the ugly and unmelodious? Or, in other words, is it my own state, which is bettered or worsened, . . .

—translated by Anita Gallagher

1. The German noun “Geist” carries both the meaning of the English “spirit,” as well as “mind.” It has been translated here as “spirit,” for the most part. It signifies mankind’s non-material power of creative thinking.

2. Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716). For this view, see his “On Wisdom,” translated by Anita Gallagher, Fidelio, Summer 1994, pp. 78-80. In this essay, Leibniz argues that the happiest soul is the one which has the plan of divine providence most completely in view. [See excerpt, Box, page 66]

3. Leibniz’s monads are immaterial substances created by God independent of the world and other monads, which act in a harmony pre-established by the Creator. The pre-established harmony assures that the perceptions of different monads are in agreement, and thus, that they can interact. See G.W. Leibniz, Monadology.
When will the leading nations, including the United States, admit that the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) is a complete failure, and implement Lyndon LaRouche’s New Bretton Woods system? This was the question posed at a June 18 Executive Intelligence Review (EIR) seminar, held blocks from the Capitol Building just three months after Lyndon LaRouche’s historic March 18 forecast, in which he warned that the so-called “Asian crisis” would soon spread to Russia, Brazil, Europe, and the United States. As Nancy Spannaus, Editor-in-Chief of The New Federalist and the event’s moderator, pointed out, “Since that time, once again, LaRouche has been proven right. The world’s leading financial powers have declined to face the reality of the world crisis over this period, and have only taken crisis management measures—every one of which has failed miserably.”

Spannaus cited recent statements by leading figures, including remarks by Jean-Michel Severino of the World Bank, and Thailand’s Deputy Prime Minister Supachai, uttering the awesome “D”—“Depression”—word and similar apocalyptic pronouncements, to show how close we have come to global financial Armageddon, just as LaRouche warned.

Approximately 100 invited guests attended the event, including, from Eastern Europe, representatives of Russia, Ukraine, and Poland; from Asia, representatives of Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, and India; Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela from Ibero-America; and from Nigeria, in Africa. These nations in themselves represent a majority of the world’s people. Also attending were representatives from the U.S government, the World Bank, the labor movement, and political activists, educators, and others.

Spannaus presented to the conference greetings from several distinguished collaborators of the international LaRouche movement, leading with a short message from Lyndon LaRouche himself, followed by greetings from Dr. Natalya Vitrenko and Volodymyr Marchenko, members of the Ukrainian Parliament. Dr. Vitrenko, the co-initiator, with Helga Zepp LaRouche, of the Call for a New Bretton Woods Conference, reported that “there is now recognition of the economic collapse, which is the lawful result of implementing the policies of the I.M.F.,” and announced that on July 3 and 4, an emergency economic conference would be held in Kiev. Dr. Eneas Carneiro, the Presidential candidate of Brazil’s Prona Party, pledged his commitment to breaking with the international financial system. Roberto Formigoni, president of Italy’s industrial Lombardy region, and president of the Christian Democratic Union, sent a videotaped greeting to the seminar.

The Non-Aligned Movement

Spannaus called attention to a June 19 EIR feature, “What China Can Expect from Clinton’s Visit,” in which Helga Zepp LaRouche revived the 1970’s call...
On August 5, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly rejected, by a vote of 345-82, all attempts to remove the language of the McDade-Murtha Citizens Protection Act from the Commerce, State, Justice, and Judiciary appropriations bill. The vote represented a stunning victory for justice.

The McDade-Murtha legislation, which had first been introduced as H.R. 3396 on March 5, was designed to ensure that the rules of ethics and standards of conduct applied to all other attorneys, be also applied to the Department of Justice (D.O.J.). It also defines punishable conduct and penalties, and creates an independent review board to monitor compliance.

From the beginning, the bill drew strong opposition from the permanent prosecutorial bureaucracy inside the D.O.J., which has operated with impunity as an out-of-control “political hit-squad” against elected officials, Civil Rights leaders, and political activists deemed threatening to the financial establishment. Indeed, the D.O.J. has functioned as a state-bureaucratic lackey of the financial oligarchy to eliminate any potential resistance to the latter’s slave-labor economic policies.

Efforts to “keep a lid” on McDade-Murtha grew increasingly difficult as the LaRouche movement led a broad and powerful coalition of forces to build support for the bill and ensure that hearings not only take place, but feature the most dramatic cases of prosecutorial abuse, including the judicial railroad of Lyndon LaRouche and his associates, the frameup of John Demjanjuk, and the political targeting of African-American elected officials, known as “Operation Frühmenschen.” LaRouche movement activists launched an intense drive to mobilize elected officials, civic and political
A Stunning Victory for Justice

activists, and thousands of ordinary citizens across the nation, to contact their Congressional representatives and demand they co-sponsor the legislation.

Efforts to kill the bill were spearheaded by House Speaker Newt Gingrich and an array of D.O.J.-related front groups; by members of Congress with long-standing ties to the D.O.J. permanent bureaucracy; and, finally, by Attorney General Janet Reno herself. But, by the first week of August, the number of co-sponsors of the bill had climbed to more than 200 members of Congress from both parties.

Immediately following the House reading of the McDade-Murtha provisions, which were incorporated as an amendment to Title VIII of the Commerce, State, Justice, and the Judiciary appropriations bill, three Republicans, Asa Hutchinson (R-Ark.), Bob Barr (R-Ga.), and Ed Bryant (R-Tenn.), all former U.S. Attorneys, moved to amend the bill by removing the McDade-Murtha language, thus triggering a floor debate.

Broad Bipartisan Support

What made it so difficult to defeat the McDade-Murtha bill, however, was the fact that it enjoyed broad bipartisan support. So, even when John Conyers (Mich.), the ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, rose to offer a surprise “perfecting amendment,” broadening the McDade-Murtha provision to apply to independent counsels such as Kenneth Starr—a clear effort to split the bill’s supporters along party lines—other Democrats rose to offer passionate support of the Conyers amendment with appeals based more on the universal principles of justice expressed in the U.S. Constitution, than on rancor between the parties. Members on both sides of the aisle responded. When the vote on the Conyers amendment was called, in a sharp rebuke to Gingrich—and to Starr—it passed 249-182. Forty-eight Republicans voted to support the measure, confirming that many Republicans simply feel that Starr has gone too far.

As the debate continued, one member after another rose to express their outrage, and the outrage of the American people, at the systemic abuse of the judicial process by the permanent prosecutorial bureaucracy inside the D.O.J. Many of the statements were among the most articulate presentations in Congressional history. Later, the House of Representatives passed the Commerce, State, Justice, and the Judiciary appropriations bill in its entirety.

However, the fight is far from over. The overwhelming support for McDade-Murtha seems to guarantee that the public hearings will inevitably occur, when the House returns in September. To ensure this occurs, the Schiller Institute has begun to expand its mobilization against D.O.J. tyranny through a series of broad-based town meetings throughout the nation, to expose the D.O.J. as the financial oligarchy’s enforcer of such slave-labor policies as NAFTA “free trade” and prison privatization.

Civil Rights Movement-Solidarity
Schiller’s Ideas Key To Solving Today’s Education Crisis

The crisis in German education, and how to deal with it, were the subjects of a day-long conference sponsored by the Civil Rights Movement-Solidarity (BüSo) in Germany’s industrial heartland on June 6. The keynote was given by BüSo chairwoman Helga Zepp LaRouche, who is also running for Parliament in the state of North Rhine Westphalia, where the conference occurred.

Many teachers, some of them candidates on the BüSo slate in this fall’s national elections, were among the more than 100 participants who heard a number of speakers on subjects ranging from de-schooling and the post-1968 school reforms, to the Humboldt education program of Germany’s Weimar Classic period almost two centuries ago. BüSo leaders were joined by Prof. Georg Christaller from Berlin in discussing these topics.

North Rhine Westphalia, where the conference was held, has been in the vanguard of the movement to destroy education in Germany, a movement which has involved leading business representatives. In his opening statement, BüSo state chairman Michael Vitt spoke of the recent prominently reported downturn in German educational test results, and reminded the audience of the state’s constitutional responsibility for education, which says that “Respect of God, respect of the dignity of man, and awakening readiness to act socially, are the most prominent aims of education. The youth is to be educated in the spirit of humanity, of democracy, and freedom.”

Schiller’s Concept
Zepp LaRouche spoke on “The Importance of Friedrich Schiller’s Aesthetical Education for Today’s Students.”

Schiller’s concept was outlined in a series of letters he wrote to oppose the Kantian concept of “logic-vs.-emotion,” and to promote the concept that it is through art that one proceeds to freedom. As Zepp LaRouche described it, education must aim to develop character, and beautiful souls. The characteristic of the beautiful soul is that it does with joy, what reason demands—a characteristic unique to genius.

But Zepp LaRouche began by addressing the context for the discussion of education—namely, that the current crisis is a crisis of global civilization, not just of the schools. The whole cultural degeneration of the past 30 years, which was systematically induced through the use of the Frankfurt School’s education “reforms,” has created this disaster, she said.

Humboldt Education Program
The problem with education today, Zepp LaRouche said, is that it denies the nature of man, which is based upon man’s cognitive powers—and it is the development of those cognitive powers which has permitted the development of civilization. Next, she turned to the ideas put forward by Wilhelm von Humboldt, who outlined a Classical education program in the Nineteenth century. A Classical education, said Humboldt, develops the beauty of the character. This requires the study of one’s own language, of a second, more elaborate language (such as Classical Greek or Sanskrit), universal history, Classical music, geography, and the natural sciences. Through this entire process, the student becomes conscious of how to make discoveries, and of how mankind’s knowledge has developed.

This entire process is not academic, Zepp LaRouche stressed, but requires metaphor and a passion for truth and beauty, agapē, which one finds most poignantly described in St. Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians. But there must be a political movement organized around the demand to implement such an educational program now, if we are to make the necessary recovery after the financial crisis hits with full force.
We are the conscience of mankind,” the only organized, uncompromised force for the good of mankind; an institution unique in that it does not wait, like all other institutions, for the catastrophe to happen, before thinking of action. With this concept, Helga Zepp LaRouche, chairwoman of the German Schiller Institute and founder of the movement internationally, keynoted the June 27 biannual convention of the Institute in Germany.

While the Schiller Institute was not founded until 1984, the impetus for its existence, she said, began with Lyndon LaRouche’s first forecasts in the 1950’s, when the economist warned that a global financial and economic system based on consumerism and looting would lead to inevitable disaster. Taking those forecasts to heart, Zepp LaRouche set forth the agenda of achieving what Friedrich Schiller and his collaborator Wilhelm von Humboldt called “civilized mankind.” She used as a point of reference Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man, which identify his perspective. The Aesthetical Letters were written in the period after the French Revolution, and reflect the republican poet/dramatist’s grappling with the failure of the French population, in particular, to take advantage of the potential of the situation—and, as a result of that failure, the horrifying effect of the French people’s collapse into barbarism. That period of crisis, and Schiller’s solution, should be studied today, to deal with the threat to civilization which we face.

Zepp LaRouche reviewed the Institute’s interventions against the genocide in Bosnia and that in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and the fight the Institute has led for a New Bretton Woods monetary system. She stressed the failure of the established institutions to provide an effective solution to the global crisis.

Zepp LaRouche put particular emphasis on the need for the revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement, which in its early decades fought for the right to development for developing nations. In China and India alone, live 40 percent of the world’s population, and a new world economic system must implement measures which are in the interest of the majority of mankind.

The Institute leader urged the activists present to concentrate their energies on fighting the degeneration of the image of man, which has taken over as a result of the paradigm-shift 30 years ago. To do this, Zepp LaRouche called for a revitalization of Classical culture and philosophy.

‘New Bretton Woods’ Proposal Presented in Bratislava

Lyndon LaRouche’s New Bretton Woods proposal is being discussed throughout Europe, largely in the context of European election campaigns. In the run-up to parliamentary elections in Slovakia in September, Dr. Jozef Mikloško, former vice-premier of the first post-communist government of Czechoslovakia and chairman of the Slovak Friedrich Schiller Foundation, gave a joint press conference June 24 with Michael Liebig of the German Schiller Institute and EIR news agency in Europe, in Bratislava, Slovakia.

“What is conventionally termed the ‘Asia Crisis,’ ” Liebig said, “is devolving full force into the world financial crisis and a world depression.” The key question is whether or not the disastrous “crisis management” policies being applied at present, will be dumped “in favor of a radical reorganization of the world financial system”—a New Bretton Woods system, as designed by Lyndon LaRouche.

Attending the hour-long briefing were 20 media representatives, among them the country’s leading press agencies, financial newspapers, and Radio Slovakia International.
Between May 28 and June 5, the Schiller Institute in Mexico hosted a series of Classical music concerts in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Hermosillo, Guaymas, Ciudad Obregon, Sonora, and Ensenada, Baja California, which featured performances of pieces by Mozart, Schubert, Beethoven, Mendelssohn, and Brahms, as well as Ibero-American children’s songs. The spring series was aimed at building for a music symposium on Oct. 10-11 in Mexico City, to be jointly sponsored by the Institute and the Schola Cantorum.

The Hermosillo concert, given by the Children’s Chorus of the Institute in Ciudad Obregon, and by the El Dorado section of the Autonomous University of Sinaloa, was reported by the Sonora newspaper, El Imparcial, in a May 31 column, which praised the concert series for its “commitment to developing the reasoning capacities of the individual—which make possible scientific discoveries and technological development,” and for its “recognition of the fundamental role of art and Classical culture as an irreplaceable instrument for ennobling and developing the character and creative potential of the individual.”

Three hundred people attended each concert in Hermosillo and Guaymas, while 800 attended in Ciudad Obregon—in the city’s cathedral—with the additional enthusiastic presence of the Bishop of the Diocese of southern Sonora, Vicente Garcia Bernal.

On May 29 in Guadalajara, Jalisco, under the sponsorship of the Schiller Institute of Jalisco, the quartet “Ensemble Clasico,” one of the most important in Mexico, gave a magnificent concert of works by Mozart and Beethoven, with instruments tuned to the Verdi pitch of A=432 (C=256).

The October event, centered around the idea of restoring musical education at the primary-school level, picks up on last February’s Institute-sponsored music seminar entitled “Excellence in Education Through Music,” in Washington, D.C. In addition to the idea of introducing young people to Classical music, especially through training in bel canto singing—the correct tuning and registration of voices—it emphasized the need to overturn modernist and countercultural influences in music. The theme of restoring musical education in elementary school will be presented by Alfredo Mendoza, Schola Cantorum director and maestro of the National Music School.

Maestro José Briano Teaches in Chicago

Maestro José Briano, a noted professional vocal technician who was instrumental in initiating an international choral project commissioned by Lyndon and Helga LaRouche in the early 1980’s, renewed his collaboration with the Schiller Institute with a teaching visit to Chicago from July 25 to August 2.

Maestro Briano, himself an accomplished, classically trained bass singer, taught for 23 years at the National Music School and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), in Mexico City. As a college student, he studied for 12 years with vocal teachers Maestro Fausto de Andres y Aquirre and Angel R. Esquivel. It was at his first teaching assignment at the National Music School, in the 1960’s, that the Maestro realized the crucial problem: No universal, uniform method existed of...
At a conference organized in Taverne, Switzerland on June 19, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the local choir, the Schiller Institute presented *Canto e Diapason* (the Italian edition of the Institute’s *A Manual on Tuning and Registration*, or “Music Manual,” commissioned by Lyndon LaRouche) to an audience of 80-90 singers and musicians—and the Mayor of the city. Among the “special guests” of the evening introduced by the president of the local choir, was soprano Antonella Banaudi—who has sung at presentations of *Canto e Diapason* at both Milan (at the Casa Verdi) and Verdi’s hometown of Busseto, participating with tenor Carlo Bergonzi and Lyndon LaRouche. Other special guests included organist Arturo Sacchetti, and Liliana Celani of the Schiller Institute.

Celani spoke first, and presented LaRouche’s fundamental hypothesis of the Music Manual: That all music, including instrumental music, is derived from the *bel canto* human singing voice, and that it is vitally important to revive the connection between science and music as expressed, for example, by the C=256 well-tempered scale.

As in Busseto, Ms. Banaudi sang the patriotic aria “Santo di patria” from Verdi’s *Attila*, and then the famous Aida aria “O cieli azzurri,” first in today’s high tuning, and then in the Verdi tuning, at a piano which the municipality had had tuned low (C=256) for the occasion. In both instances, the audience could hear very clearly the difference not only in the high, third-register notes, but also in the low ones, proving that a natural tuning is equally key for high and low voices.

Organist Arturo Sacchetti contrasted some recorded examples from Mozart’s *Requiem*—under the direction of Riccardo Muti in 1987; Herbert von Karajan in 1972; Bruno Walter and the Vienna Philharmonic in 1937; and Nicholas Harnoncourt in 1982; to prove that, with the high tuning (particularly Karajan’s), not only are the voices strained, but the tempo speeds up and makes transparency of the voices impossible. “Voices can hardly compete with instruments under these circumstances” he said. “This is a moral question,” Sacchetti emphasized, “because you cannot betray the creative intent of the composers,” who, as they wrote their compositions, had in mind a very clear palette of colors and “register shifts, which cannot be moved.”

At the end of his speech, Sacchetti announced that, because of the “indifference of the music world” to this question of tuning up until now, he has decided to form his own orchestra tuned to the low tuning. This orchestra will present the first performance of Perosi’s oratorium *Mosé* in the context of the Perosi festival in Tortona, a town south of Milan, next September. The event has already been publicized by the daily *Avvenire*, which wrote that this will be done in the context of the campaign for lower tuning, “in cooperation with the Schiller Institute of Wiesbaden.”

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EIRNS/Andrew Spannaus

Soprano Antonella Banaudi demonstrates “Verdi tuning” at Milan presentation of “Canto e Diapason,” May 1996. Seated are Liliana Celani and Arturo Sacchetti.
Norbert Brainin, former head of the legendary Amadeus Quartet, turned seventy-five in March 1998. Shortly after his birthday, he granted a wide-ranging interview, with Beethoven as the focus. The interview was conducted by Ortrun and Hartmut Cramer on March 19 at Elmau castle near Munich, Germany, where Brainin was holding one of his master classes for young string quartets, and first appeared in Ibykus, the German-language sister publication of Fidelio.

Fidelio: Professor Brainin, in one of your earlier interviews [with Ibykus] you said, that Beethoven’s great achievement was in four-voice composition; that in this domain he remains unequalled. Can you elucidate that more fully?

Brainin: Gladly. Beethoven writes a type of four-voice composition in his late quartets, in which the four voices are played or sung, but each voice is treated entirely individually. All voices sing something which is important—and, indeed, everything is equally important. The balance is perfect; the voices need not concern themselves over how loudly they sing or how softly, because everything is composed so perfectly.

The most important element in this regard is the Motivführung, because the motifs Beethoven employs, all cohere and derive from the piece itself.

Especially in the late quartets, one finds that to be the case; but, naturally, already partially in his earlier works. The same is also the case here and there for Mozart. With Mozart the four voices also sing, and it is so perfectly composed, that one should actually just sing it; but, it must be sung correctly, with correct voices, correctly produced, and it must really come forth from the body. I am not a singer—but, I assume, a singer skilled in bel canto would be able to do so immediately.

Fidelio: And how is something like this done on the violin?

Brainin: The whole art consists in this, of course. In order to produce such singing on the violin, you need a certain technique, a definite bowing technique. First, you must “find” the tone on the violin; you must discover the correct point of contact between the bow and string, and then, in addition, the correct bow velocity.

And then, as the final factor, you add the pressure. This is something that the artist must discover, and it is different every day. You must learn it, and practice it every day, practice it over again, until it works. I can only explain it thus: that when it really works, a tone comes forth which is a full expression. I can demonstrate this with singing, too. Whatever my voice might be, it nonetheless really comes from me. And this voice has true expression. You need such a tone, in order to play or to sing music such as Beethoven’s four-voice composition.

Fidelio: One must practice this technique virtually every day?

Brainin: Every day. For years, this has in fact been the one thing that I really practice. It is something which a student of bel canto must learn, too. Right from the start, one must begin with the correct tone, the correct sound; it must ring right from the beginning. This is the most difficult thing for the bel canto singer, too. It is a technical concern, that his voice be right “there.” Even with my meager voice I can do this. I am not a singer, and of course I can do it much better with the bow.

The violin responds differently every day. I do not play gymnastically, never—I always play solely with expression. When I play, I think only about the expression; especially in such works as Beethoven’s
late quartets. For this is precisely typical of these works; Beethoven’s four-voice composition is absolutely the appropriate music for this technique.

Fidelio: Returning once more to your remark, that Beethoven is unequalled in the domain of four-voice composition. Why is this? Many composers, both before and after Beethoven, availed themselves of this compositional technique. Why, in your opinion, is Beethoven unequalled in this art?

Brainin: Because he really took the concept, “As free, as rigorous,” which he inscribed on his Große Fuge, earnestly. This is his first commandment, as it were. Bach also wrote in four voices; but, with him, the voices are not individual. Bach’s polyphonic technique produces a certain sound, a certain music—a great music. But with Beethoven it is such, that his manner of voice-leading contains an individuality, which is not found in the same way in Bach’s polyphonic compositional method. With Beethoven, every voice is different, although distinctly stamped by the Motivführung.

Fidelio: So that the greatest possible unity of the whole composition predominates, notwithstanding the greatest possible individuality of each of the voices?

Brainin: Exactly. This constitutes the greatness of Beethoven’s music. This is the great achievement of Beethoven.

Fidelio: This is nothing but the solution to the old paradox in Greek philosophy, the opposition between the One and the Many, expressed musically. That one can combine as many individual voices or melodies as possible, into one overall conception.

Brainin: Yes, this is above all what one must learn, in order to be able to play Beethoven’s quartets. One practices—it’s a bit coarse to say it this way, but—basically, one practices other quartets, until one has advanced to the point, where you can play those of Beethoven.

Fidelio: Where did Beethoven derive this from? How did he learn it?

Brainin: Naturally, he learned this. First, as we know, he knew Bach very well; he could write fugues. But it’s certain he was of the opinion that “to write fugues alone is not sufficient.” Beethoven never wrote fugues for their own sake, but rather employed this technique in his compositions, in order to achieve a better overall result. He learned this afresh from Mozart. He combined Bach’s polyphonic technique with Mozart’s method of voice-leading. These are different elements, which, however, are equivalent; Beethoven made a synthesis of these different elements. And, from this, a sound results, which one cannot compare with any other. It is not a quartet in the harmony alone—that is not it, not at all.

In Beethoven’s string quartets, the four voices are very individually distinct singing voices. The personal action of each single player is the most important thing in the performance. All attempts to render Beethoven’s quartets with a string orchestra were unsatisfactory.

In 1987, after the death of violist Peter Schidlof, the Amadeus Quartet ceased performing concerts; the remaining members teach and promote young quartets from around the world.
Brainin: That’s difficult for me to say. Somehow, I have the feeling, as if I had always known this. Certainly, I haven’t always understood it in the way that I can now explain it. Likewise, I have actually always understood Motivführung, although it wasn’t until much later that I first spoke about it. Thus, a cognitive process starts, which is indeed similar to that which occurs in the composer; Motivführung with Haydn, for example, is such a case. It is true, that he wrote no string quartets in the nine years prior to writing the six quartets Op. 33, in which he consciously employed this “new method” for the first time. But, he had already written many quartets before that. And, in reality, they were not composed much differently—this is true especially of the Quartet Op. 20. At the very least, the direction was already established.

One can perhaps illustrate this with the following comparison: Water at 70 degrees is water; at 80 degrees also—it has only become hotter. At 99 degrees, the water is always still water, but, at 100 degrees, it is no longer the same. That means, that Haydn’s musical creation attained a point, where it no longer was the same; but, beforehand, it had not been very much different. His music already contained the impulse for the later direction; even the first beginning in the exercise of this technique is found in the previously composed works.

Fidelio: So, this “synthetic” process of composing, of composing in order to achieve a greater synthesis of different elements, was already subliminally there, but then it became at some time entirely explicit?

Brainin: Absolutely, this is exactly the case. And, from then on, according to this “boundary condition of water,” nothing was any longer as it had been beforehand. Even though, of course, for example, Beethoven composed very well before he consciously availed himself of this method. His quartets Op. 18 are masterpieces of the very first order, as are also the previously composed string trios. But everything was different from the moment he consciously employed the method of Motivführung for the first time. That was, I believe, in the Quartets Op. 59. (I am not yet entirely certain; in Op. 59, No. 2, there are passages which are just as well composed as in the late quartets; but, in fact, he does not yet always employ this method here, only off and on. In Op. 95 it is similar, especially in the second movement.)

With all composers, Schubert, for example, everything was going in this direction, although Beethoven did not yet have any notion of it, at the time when Haydn used this technique. At least, not consciously. With Schubert, the work with

Fidelio: It was, if you will, virtually in the air at that time; it was the manner of composing.

Brainin: But, as I said, Haydn and Mozart played the greatest part in it, and Beethoven thereafter.

Fidelio: Can you indicate, approximately, when the significance of Beethoven’s late quartets and the Motivführung for the overall creation of quartets, came to be consciously known by you? Probably, after you had worked through the entire classical literature with the Amadeus Quartet, had publicly performed, and also had instructed?

Brainin: Approximately. It was in the beginning, because these concerts were naturally very, very arduous. But I said to myself: “I will not miss a single one of these evenings.”

Fidelio: These were always purely Beethoven evenings?

Brainin: Yes. At that time, we did this—in the middle of the 1970’s, the beginning of the 1980’s—not only in Sicily, but also in Florence, Milan, and Turin; it was here, as it were, that “the penny dropped” for me in respect to Beethoven—but, not only in respect to Beethoven, however.

Fidelio: Which is to say, that the proper performance of Haydn and later also of Mozart, first became fundamentally clear to you in the playing or working through of all of the Beethoven quartets?
Brainin: Actually, yes. For, then we played Mozart better, too. Our first efforts with Mozart were not especially good, although everyone believed — after all, we were, of course, called the “Amadeus” Quartet — that we specialized in Mozart. But, that was really not the case. We had always played Beethoven better than Mozart. But, from a certain time, it became the case that, through the mastery of the music of Beethoven, we in fact played that of Mozart better also. I learned from Beethoven, how to play and assess Mozart correctly.

I believe the piano is really the best singing instrument. Of course, Beethoven knew that. The violin sings better than the human voice, but the piano sings better than the violin. It’s no accident, that he wrote five piano concertos, and only one for the violin.

Actually, that is not in general astonishing, if one takes seriously Beethoven’s thesis, “Tantō libre, tantō recherché” (“As free, as rigorous”). I have always adhered to that, and indeed not only in respect to Beethoven.

Take Haydn’s music, as an example: If, as often happens with the Haydn quartets, I had to play a cantabile with a rhythmically harmonic accompaniment, then, at the beginning, my colleagues literally always followed me; I had to, so to speak, “drag them along.” Until I then said: “You must carry me; I do not want to lead here, that makes my voice too heavy; I would like to be led, to be conducted. It must flow. Do this for me, and I will follow. I will follow.” And that has worked. That is the solution to the puzzle and the paradox, “As free, as rigorous.” That is the solution, and it has worked fantastically.

My colleagues were of course all happy about this, for by this means, the voices which they played obtained their own proper values. The whole piece had “head and feet,” so to speak, and the listeners thought and said: “Just listen to how well they follow the first violin.” And yet, it was exactly the reverse; I was following them. To be sure, we had to play it in such a way as it suited me; in other words, the way I should play, and also told them to, too. Otherwise, I would not have been able to do it at all. As a result, we had also to do this in the places, where the ‘cello had to play a solo, or the viola, or the second violin. We always employed the same recipe.

That has its origin with Bach — I then comprehended this. This was also the reason why I could play Bach very well. I comprehended the interpretation of this music correctly first in the 1970’s; how important the intensive study of Beethoven’s quartets was, was at that time not yet clear to me, naturally; but, that it was very important, was already clear. Somehow, all this — the understanding of Bach, Haydn, and Mozart — derived for me from Beethoven.

Fidelio: On the basis of this personal experience, would you say that the study of Beethoven’s quartets is in general the best approach to understanding all other Classical composers, even the later ones, such as Schumann, Mendelssohn, Brahms, and so forth? — In the 1970’s you also began instructing young quartets in Cologne . . . — that one therefore should take Beethoven’s art as the metric for understanding all other composers?

Brainin: Yes, above all Beethoven’s use of the Motivführung. Also, Brahms is quite typical of this. Dvořák also, and Mendelssohn naturally; Schumann, absolutely. Absolutely! Since, for me, Beethoven was the key to the understanding of all other Classical composers, it became clear to me, that Beethoven was actually the greatest composer, indeed the greatest artist of all time. Until approximately ten years before his death, there had been many other artists, who were of equally high rank with Beethoven in their achievements. But, from then on he was utterly all alone on the wide field. An artist.

I believe he must have known that. He felt it; he was indeed very humble about it, but he did not conceal it.

Fidelio: The point in time identified by you is certainly important in this connection, for after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, and especially after the Carlsbad Decrees of 1818, there was something like a restoration of feudalism — and that only a few years after the European “Liberation Wars.” Prince Metternich did not have only his political opponents spied upon and arrested — like, for example, the young Friedrich List, who had to go into exile in America — but he also extended this surveillance to artists. We know Beethoven suffered greatly under this. Yet, Beethoven possessed such a strong character — not least his Heiligenstädtter Testament demonstrates this — that precisely in such extremely oppressive circumstances, he created his greatest works: master works like the Ninth Symphony, the Missa Solemnis, or the late quartets, which were written quite consciously for their effect upon posterity.

Brainin: What concerns Beethoven’s mastery, occurs to me — not absolutely apropos — to be precisely something, which has to do with his treatment of solo instruments; I mean, above all, the relationship in Beethoven between the violin concerto and the piano concerto. The Beethoven violin concerto is, in fact, a modification of a piano concerto, in which Beethoven above all changed the key from C-major to D-major. In the violin concerto, he attempted to treat the violin just as he treated the piano in the piano concertos. Naturally, that did not quite work. But he attempted it, and in the second movement, the violin certainly “fit” excellently, as it was really in the correct place. Beethoven was much more successful on the piano than on the violin.

What I want to say with this is: The particular “tone,” which I spoke of previously, I had heard in his violin concerto. But it struck me later, that this is yet more manifest in his piano concertos. For, on the piano, you can do practically everything that each of the other instruments can do; moreover, the piano sings better. The violin sings better than the human voice, but the piano sings better than the violin.
I believe the piano is really the best singing instrument. Of course, Beethoven knew that. It’s no accident, that he wrote five piano concertos, and only one violin concerto; and that after the violin concerto, he no longer engaged himself with this kind of music.

**Fidelio:** If, in comparison to the violin, the piano is the better singing instrument; then, is that nevertheless probably not true, for Beethoven’s treatment of the string quartet?

**Brainin:** That’s correct. Absolutely. For Beethoven writes his string quartets, such that the four voices are very individually distinct singing voices, whose development depends very much upon the personal initiative of the performer. This personal . . .

**Fidelio:** . . . action?

**Brainin:** . . . yes, action! The personal action of each single player is the most important thing in the performance of Beethoven’s quartets. It is for this reason, that all attempts to render Beethoven’s quartets with a string orchestra were so unsatisfactory. Even with Furtwängler, it did not work. Certainly he even admitted that often, and accordingly said: “Yes, I know that that can’t be done; but I very much wanted to perform the work, and since the orchestra is my instrument, I wanted to try it with it; and, above all, because I have never heard an adequate rendition of Beethoven’s string quartets.”

**Fidelio:** He did not hear the Amadeus Quartet in its prime.

**Brainin:** Unfortunately, Furtwängler did not hear us at all.

**Fidelio:** But this also means, that there exists an underlying connection between what you said at the beginning about four-voice composition—concerning the greatest possible freedom and individuality of the individual voices, with the greatest possible strength of the composition as a whole—, and the fact that Beethoven brought string-quartet composition to a height never attained.

**Brainin:** Yes, and this is also a striking demonstration of his solution to the paradox of the One and the Many: his string quartet is really a unity, even though it simultaneously involves a composition of four entirely different voices. It has been realized perfectly in this manner, it is almost incredible.

**Fidelio:** In conclusion, once again to Furtwängler. He became famous for his expression, to play that which is “between” or “behind the notes.”

**Brainin:** Yes—that is the true task of the artist. Of course, this is connected again to the previously mentioned correct sound, which you need for the adequate representation of a musical idea. If you do not concentrate on this, and do not practice this constantly, then no true interpretation can result.

As is well known, Furtwängler always had difficulties, when beginning a piece that demanded a particular sound. Of course, something like this can be conveyed to an orchestra only with great difficulty—formally, not at all. I believe the only one which was able to follow him in such situations was the Berlin Philharmonic, because they were acquainted with it, they already knew it. One of its concert-masters, Szymon Goldberg, when once asked a similar question, expressed this laconically as follows: “So, then look at each other for a little while, and then we simply start up!” But, then, they would begin correctly! So, that was what Furtwängler was all about.

**Fidelio:** In other words, to drive the tension to the maximum . . .

**Brainin:** . . . yes, he did that intentionally. Naturally—entirely irrespective of all his other abilities—he made use of a quite “normal” technique for beating time, which he was able to use, when he wished; but that did not suffice him, he wanted something special.

**Fidelio:** Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau has expressed Furtwängler’s art in an essay, as “music that breathes”—as a process of becoming, which communicated itself by way of the orchestra to the audience. There were indeed already in Furtwängler’s lifetime countless anecdotes about how he allegedly “could not decide, how to make the entry,” and therefore “so comically put himself out of joint.” In this way, with Furtwängler, the first tone was already the expression of a creative process! But he could only evoke the capacity in his performers, to render this process with vitality—as his concert masters above all have emphasized—only insofar as he put the musicians under extreme tension, so that they literally “broke out in a sweat”; they sat, as it were, “on tiptoe,” and thought, felt, and acted as a single large instrument under his direction.

**Brainin:** That was exactly what he wanted to achieve! Furtwängler’s “trembling” and “quaking” at the beginning of Beethoven’s Fifth is indeed a legend, but there is yet also the famous example of his Eroica. It begins with two forte-strokes. A normal conductor makes these two strokes in forte, and then proceeds. But what did Furtwängler do? He quickly, but intensely, looked at his musicians, and even if the musicians were not yet quite ready,—boom!—he would strike it. Furtwängler was someone who trusted himself to do something like that.

**Fidelio:** Unfortunately, the situation today is indeed different. At present, for example, the most prized recordings are made by some remarkably sterile sounding orchestras. It seems as if with these recordings, they consciously want to counteract the tradition of Furtwängler. It is, in fact, more than merely a fad, to try each time to make something once again completely different; rather, on the contrary, it is an attempt to attack the essence of music.

**Brainin:** I know—such musicians play only the notes. Certainly, they play them more or less correctly—in a certain, technically adequate way,—but that is all. Technically, their playing is surely correct in this way, but it contains no expression, and hence no radiance. What’s more, it is actually deficient rhythmically. You hear that especially clearly, if the musicians play beforehand, to warm up: they are entirely occupied with merely not making mistakes. Only, in order that nothing take place!

**Fidelio:** And then nothing happens.

**Brainin:** To be sure!

**Fidelio:** Professor Brainin, our thanks for this interesting discussion.
‘A Collector’s Cabinet’:  
Exploring Both the Cosmos and the Soul

An exhibit on display at the Washington, D.C. National Gallery of Art May 17-Nov. 1, creates a fine tension between a celebration of the arts and sciences, including music, botany, zoology, astronomy, optics and more, in Seventeenth-century Holland and Flanders, on the one hand, and an elegant form of conspicuous consumption on the part of the newly rich Dutch burghers, on the other. The art objects, scientific and musical instruments, books, and other items found in the collections of the new bourgeoisie, were made possible by the ocean-going voyages and explorations of new worlds during the period. Thus, there are included all sorts of wonderful exotica, from beautiful seashells, to representations of strange and delightful flora and fauna.

The exhibit recreates a Dutch “collector’s cabinet,” or kunstkamer, an intimately scaled room for displaying the private collection of the liefhebber, or art-lover. As the exhibit catalogue says, “the liefhebbers strove to assemble in microcosm all that existed in the cosmos.” Unlike the grand palaces and estates of the upper aristocracy, these merchants and other middle-class collectors were unable to provide the setting for large works of art, and so their collections sought smaller items to display.

A painting by Jan Brueghel the Elder (Flemish, 1568-1625) presents a kunstkamer of the period, the walls covered with paintings, musical instruments, a globe and other scientific instruments signifying voyages to the far-flung reaches of the empire, shells from the beaches of the new world, porcelains from China, flowers from Holland’s prolific gardens, and every manner of sumptuous bric-a-brac [SEE detail, inside back cover, this issue].

Circulating among these treasures are elegantly attired members of the haute bourgeoisie, engaged in refined conversation. At the center of the painting are portraits of the guest of honor, Archduke Albert and the Archduchess Isabella, regents of the southern Nether-
lands. The painting is not so much a work of art, as a kind of “slice of life”; it is a window into a time when man’s mastery over the physical universe was taking a giant leap forward. This was the Golden Age of Holland; it was the age of Kepler and Leibniz, and, in The Netherlands, of Huyghens, Rembrandt, and Vermeer. The Renaissance had moved north to Germany and the Low Countries, and Antwerp and Amsterdam, under Venetian financial tutelage, had become the leading trading centers of the world. All the treasures of the Americas and the Orient now passed through their markets.

Portraying the ‘Inner Life’

The northern provinces, under William the Silent, had broken away from Hapsburg Spain in 1581, but it was not until 1648, when the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War, that the independence of the United Provinces, today known as The Netherlands, was formally recognized. Two of Holland’s greatest painters, Rembrandt van Rijn (1609-1669) and Johannes Vermeer (1632-1675), lived and worked during this period, and both are represented in “A Collector’s Cabinet.”

Both Rembrandt and Vermeer, while employing in their works many of the outward manifestations of Holland’s wealth and cosmopolitan manners, were primarily concerned with man’s “inner” life: the life of the mind and of the soul. In Vermeer’s “Woman Holding a Balance,” painted in 1664, Vermeer shows us a young woman, apparently pregnant, holding the kind of balance used by goldsmiths to weigh precious metals and gems, such as those strewn on the table before her. She has a thoughtful and serene expression on her face, indicating that she is fairly confident as she takes the “measure” of her life. As we examine more closely, we can make out on the wall behind the woman’s head, a painting depicting the “Last Judgement,” which reinforces the idea that this is, indeed, a kind of “Vanitas” painting—a popular genre intended to remind us of our own mortality. Although the question of whether or not the young woman will soon bear a child is left ambiguous, I believe Vermeer has meant her “pregnancy” to be read as a metaphor for posterity. It is another way to remind us that what we do today, will have consequences in the future for generations yet unborn.

Both Vermeer and Rembrandt actively collaborated in the scientific circles of their day. Vermeer is believed to have worked with his fellow Delft citizen Anthony Van Leeuwenhoek, the renowned microscopist, and Rembrandt may likely have collaborated with the mathematician and physicist Christian Huyghens, who also did important work in optics. In the National Gallery exhibit, we find several examples of optical instruments, including both microscopes and telescopes.

A more direct reminder of the ephemeral nature of physical existence are the “Vanitas” paintings, which typically incorporate a human skull, a standard Renaissance invention for man’s mortality. In this genre we find such works as the “Vanitas Still Life,” c.1665, of Jan van Kessel the Elder—who also painted the “Study of Butterflies and Insects” shown on the inside back cover of this issue—in which the customary human skull is posed in a still-life with an hourglass, soap bubbles, and gorgeous red roses—all perfect metaphors for the fleeting nature of physical existence.

Another way of presenting this idea, was through humor—the “political cartoons,” or jokes, in the form of paintings, etchings, and so forth, of the time. These often depicted common people engaging in popular entertainments, such as drinking and gambling, and usually looking very foolish. One artist who specialized in these paintings, and whose works were often found among the collections of Dutch and Flemish art lovers, was Adriaen Brouwer (c.1605-1638), represented in the exhibit by his hilarious “Youth Making a Face.” Despite the seemingly light-hearted subjects, these pictures were intended as ironic reminders of what happens to those who succumb to sensual pleasures.

Music and Science

Among the most interesting and beautifully crafted objects displayed, are the scientific and musical instruments. These include an armillary sphere—a schematic model of the celestial sphere, which demonstrated, according
to the Ptolemaic system, the motion of the Sun, Moon, planets, and stars, about the Earth. These finely wrought objects had, by Kepler’s time, become scientifically obsolete, but they were treasured as reminders that the study of the heavens also implied spiritual concerns as well.

This particular armillary sphere was the creation of Caspar Vopell of Cologne, Germany, who built it in 1543. The small globe at the center shows Asia and North America as one landmass, some fifty years after Columbus’s first voyage to America [see inside back cover, this issue].

According to art historian Arthur K. Wheelock, the church fathers of Delft celebrated the discovery by the famous microscope-maker Anthony Van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) of tiny living organisms, as contributing to the “honor of God,” because they helped to reveal the fullness of His “eternal power.”

The Dutch interest in the natural world extended to a love of precise renderings of insects, plants, small animals, and so forth, which is apparent in the van Kessel “Study of Butterflies and Insects,” as well as in other still-life paintings included in National Gallery exhibit, for example, the “Still Life of Shells,” painted by Jacques Linnard in 1640.

In the Seventeenth century, music and science were known to be closely related disciplines: Kepler’s *Harmony of the World* (1609), for example, derived the relative distances of the planetary orbits in the Solar System, from the intervals of the well-tempered musical scale. While public musical performances were frowned on by Calvinist officialdom, music played an important role in the home, where amateur ensembles would play and sing both religious and secular music. Among the exquisite musical instruments on exhibit are an Octave Spinet, which would have been used on such occasions, and an Italian viola made in 1678 by the renowned Tyrolean violin maker, Jacob Stainer (1621-1683). Among many accomplished musicians of the time was Constantijn Huyghens (1596-1687), secretary to the prince of Orange and father of the scientist Christian, who both played and wrote music. Huyghens was a collector as well, and owned lutes, viols, virginals (a small spinet popular at the time), harpsichords, and even guitars.

After the exhibit closes on November 1, the newly constructed Dutch Cabinet Galleries at the National Gallery will continue to display many of the works collected for “A Collector’s Cabinet.” Others may be seen in Washington’s Smithsonian Institution, while many of the musical instruments will return to the collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City. Jan Brueghel the Elder’s “Collector’s Cabinet” is on permanent display at the Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore, Maryland. Visitors to any of these collections will have an opportunity to learn, first hand, why the world of Rembrandt and Vermeer was still an Age of Discovery.

—Bonnie James
This author—a very infrequent movie-goer—highly recommends the Steven Spielberg movie *Amistad*, which depicts the historic Nineteenth-century legal battle over the fate of 36 enslaved Africans, who fought and won their freedom, only to be threatened with the return to slavery, and death, by the judicial authorities of the United States. I recommend it not because all the historical details are necessarily correct: they are not. But, because Americans need to be provoked, once again, to think about the great principles and men who shaped our republic in its fight to become the force for truth and justice which it was created to become.

The principle which *Amistad* shows in action, is the principle of the *inalienable rights of man*, as reflected in our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution. This was an embattled principle throughout the entire first hundred years of our nation’s existence. Although victory was won in the Civil War, the opponents of those principles did not give up, with the result that the foundations of our nation are still under mortal threat today.

In the *Amistad* case, argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1841, that principle was affirmed. And although the victory did not lead to the elimination of slavery, it is an inspiring depiction of the fight for the rights of man.

Equally important is the fact that *Amistad* introduces the viewer to the man John Quincy Adams, our nation’s sixth President. The film by no means portrays the depth and brilliance of J.Q. Adams’ character and achievements—but it should arouse the curiosity of the viewer. Here was a former President, now serving as Congressman, willing to challenge the growing forces of the slavocracy, and enunciating the case against slavery based upon our Founding Principles. Who in the United States knows anything about him, nowadays?

John Quincy Adams, like Benjamin Franklin, embodies the character of the American republic at its best. He was a man of universal education and culture, who understood that education and science were man’s highest mission, and devoted himself to building and perfecting the institutions of the United States toward that end. It was under Quincy Adams that the United States forged a foreign policy devoted to a community of principle with other republics, and began the extensive government promotion of infrastructure-development required for the industrial takeoff which occurred after the Civil War.

To understand our nation, and its mission today, one must understand John Quincy Adams.

The *Amistad* Case

The story upon which the movie is based portrays some of the complexities of the political battle going on in the United States during the first part of the Nineteenth century. Our summary necessarily simplifies the matter.

A Spanish crew has kidnapped a shipload of Africans, destined to become slaves in Cuba. After horrific treatment and many deaths, these slaves are given Spanish names in Cuba, and transferred to another ship, the *Amistad*, for transport to another part of the island. After the *Amistad* takes off, the slaves, under their leader Cinque, revolt, and take over the ship, killing all but two of their captors, whom they keep alive to help steer the ship back to Africa. But the Spanish captain and his aide doublecross them, directing them instead to the coast of New England, where they are captured.

At this point, the Africans are imprisoned, and the government of Connecticut is faced with the decision of what to do. The Spanish captains claim them as property; the Spanish monarchy does the same. On the other side, a group of abolitionists seeks to win their freedom. In national political circles, the case is red hot, with the Southern slave-holders determined that a precedent of freeing slaves who successfully gained their liberty, not be set.

Attorney Roger S. Baldwin won the case in two courts, successfully proving that, given the international ban on the slave trade then in effect, the Africans had been unlawfully kidnapped, and therefore must be freed, and not returned to the Spanish or Cubans. But, under pressure from the pro-slavery faction, and facing an election, President Martin van Buren arranged for an appeal of the matter before the U.S. Supreme Court.

At this point, former President J.Q. Adams joined Baldwin in arguing the case, and prevailed. The Africans were freed.
The Rights of Man
Quincy Adams’ argument before the U.S. Supreme Court—then headed by no less a scoundrel than Roger Taney, of later Dred Scott-decision infamy—lasted about two days, and cannot be fully summarized here. It dealt with treaty law, property law, and the most profound issues of the philosophy of law and statecraft. At this time, February 1821, the courts had not yet eliminated all discussion of reason and principles in legal cases; it was later that they imposed narrow strictures on court arguments.

A few excerpts from the court record, however, will demonstrate how the former President approached the issue:

“I know of no law . . . , statute, or constitution, no code, no treaty, applicable to the proceedings of the Executive or the Judiciary, except that law (pointing to the copy of the Declaration of Independence, hanging against one of the pillars of the court room), that law, two copies of which are ever before the eyes of your Honors. I know of no other law that reaches the case of my clients, but the law of Nature and of Nature’s God on which our fathers placed our own national existence.”

Later in his presentation, Quincy Adams directly attacked the point of view of his opposition, which demanded that the Africans be returned as slaves to their “masters,” as deriving from the ideas of Thomas Hobbes. He cited an argument in the Official Journal of the Executive (who was President van Buren) which argued that the enslavement of the Africans had to be upheld as a natural consequence of man’s natural state. Again pointing to the Declaration of Independence on the wall of the Court, Adams said:

“It is alleged in the Official Journal, that war gives the right to take the life of our enemy, and that this confers a right to make him a slave, on account of having spared his life. Is that the principle on which these United States stand before the world? That Declaration says that every man is ‘endowed by his Creator with certain inalienable rights,’ and that ‘among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ If these rights are inalienable, they are incompatible with the rights of the victor to take the life of his enemy in war, or to spare his life and make him a slave. If this principle is sound, it reduces to brute force all the rights of man. It places all the sacred relations of life at the power of the strongest . . .”

“II will not here discuss the right or the rights of slavery, but I say that the doctrine of Hobbes, that War is the natural state of man, has for ages been exploded, as equally disclaimed and rejected by the philosopher and the Christian. That is utterly incompatible with any theory of human rights, and especially with the rights which the Declaration of Independence proclaims as self-evident truths. The moment you come to the Declaration of Independence, that every man has a right to life and liberty, an inalienable right, this case is decided.”

These statements are only vaguely referenced in the movie version—but they are fully available by Internet and other means. They open up a whole realm of American history unknown to most citizens—a realm that must be known once again, if we are to recapture our national purpose, and survive.

—Nancy Spannaus

Murder Will Out

For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak . . .
—Hamlet, II, ii

Long years of bloody sectarian violence. Catholic versus Protestant. Nationalist versus Loyalist. The Irish versus the British. All this comes to mind when the “Troubles” of Northern Ireland are mentioned. But filmmaker Sean McPhilemy, in his new book, goes beneath the surface phenomena to tell a blood-curdling tale of collusion, from 1989 to 1991, between the Royal Ulster Constabulary (R.U.C.), Loyalist paramilitary death squads, and respected Protestant “citizens above suspicion,” to plan and execute the murders of Republican paramilitaries and Catholic civilians.

There has been Irish armed resistance to British rule since the Eighteenth century, when Irish patriot and American Revolution supporter Henry Grattan attempted to force the British Crown to grant a declaration of rights to the Irish, including economic independence from Britain and an end to discrimination against Catholics (who were not allowed to hold office, vote, or own land). The full story of this centuries-long political and religious warfare is beyond the scope of this review; but, in itself, McPhilemy’s explosive documentation reveals a new chapter in the sordid history of Northern Ireland, which provides another piece in the puzzle of London’s control of terrorism, both domestic and international. The book’s weakness lies in its failure to identify the policy command structure at the highest level. However, there are threads suggested in the book which, if pulled, would likely lead to the boardrooms of the Club of the Isles and the Queen’s Privy Council.

A brief review serves to set the recent context of this tale. From 1968 to 1972, the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland began to build a Civil Rights movement. Violent clashes occurred, British Army troops were brought in to assist the local police force, the R.U.C., and, in
1971, when the first British soldier was killed there since the 1920’s, a counterin- surgery warfare apparatus came into being which included both the R.U.C. and Army intelligence specialists. In September 1971, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was set up as the main Loyalist (loyal to the British Crown) paramilitary force, and the ranks of the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) swelled after the 1972 Bloody Sunday massacre. Since then, sectarian violence has been orchestrated by British Intelligence, on both sides of the “religious” divide.

The charge of R.U.C. collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries had been raised many times. In early March 1991, this issue surfaced when a gang of Loyalist gunmen entered an isolated Catholic area and killed four people. McPhilemy, a film producer, had a young research assistant, Ben Hamilton, who insisted on pursuing the story. He was soon given access to “a source,” who, as an insider, revealed details of how the collusion worked.

‘The Committee’

What emerged was that a private group, “The Committee,” composed of Ulster businessmen, clergy, and others, conspired with elements of the R.U.C., to assassinate Republican paramilitaries and Catholic civilians. The collusion included organizing the financing for arms deals from South Africa to Loyalist gunmen, based on laundering the profits of drug- and pornography-trafficking. Some of the evidence pointed to British Intelligence and Secret Air Services (SAS) commando involvement.

The “Committee” structure was highly organized, reports McPhilemy. In mid-1986, the Ulster Loyalist Central Co-ordinating Committee came together, assuming “full authority over all Loyalist military and political activity.” It included political groups, such as the Ulster Independence Party; paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association, which sometimes went by the cover-name Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF); in addition, prominent businessmen, clergy, and lawyers. Its chairman was Billy Abernethy, a bank manager at the Ulster Bank, the Northern Ireland subsidiary of National West-minister Bank (NatWest is a powerful institutional force of the British oligarchy). Another person alleged to be at the top of the “Committee” was the former Assistant Chief Constable and former head of the R.U.C. Special Branch, Trevor Forbes, O.B.E.

The “Committee” structure included disgruntled R.U.C. officers, who constituted an “Inner Force” to be found within “every R.U.C. division in the province.” The Inner Force designated the “most militant Loyalists within the force,” to be members of an “Inner Circle,” effectively an executive body.

R.U.C. Counterattack

More than one-third of The Committee describes the “dirty tricks” the R.U.C. used to discredit the documentary film exposé produced by McPhilemy and Hamilton, which aired on Channel 4 TV. R.U.C. Chief Sir Hugh Annesley initiated two lines of attack. First, the R.U.C. orchestrated a media barrage, denouncing the documentary as “a pack of lies.” The political constituency leader who surfaced to denounce the film was David Trimble, now Northern Ireland’s First Minister.

A few days after the film aired, Channel 4 TV’s “Right to Reply” program was given over to Trimble and his constituent, the Rev. Hugh Ross, who had appeared in the film’s segment on the Ulster Independence Party. Ross denounced the “misuse” of his interview.

Second, a legal assault was launched. McPhilemy had complied with laws which require anyone with information about terrorism in Northern Ireland to present it to the police, by providing a dossier to the R.U.C. when the film was aired. The R.U.C. was not interested in pursuing these leads, however; instead, it went to court to compel the name of McPhilemy’s source! (McPhilemy had refused to divulge the name of his source, who feared for his life.) Using the full weight of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, three Scotland Yard detectives, on behalf of the R.U.C., served McPhilemy with court orders to turn over the name of his source—advising him that he could spend five years in prison if he refused.

A protracted legal battle ensued, as both McPhilemy and Channel 4 refused to divulge the source. Contempt proceedings were sent to Attorney General Sir Patrick Mayhew, a cabinet minister in Thatcher’s Conservative Party government.

Meanwhile, R.U.C. propagandists wrote that McPhilemy and Hamilton had bribed sources, scripted on-camera confessions, and relied on I.R.A. sources, among other misdeeds. Perjury charges against Hamilton, stemming from the contempt proceedings, were hoked up, resulting in his arrest and the search of his home. During the search, a document was found with an indirect reference to the source, enabling his eventual identification. Jim Sands was discovered, arrested, squeezed, and turned by the R.U.C. Sands’ boss had been the Rev. Hugh Ross.

Once the R.U.C. had gotten Sands to recant everything he had told the two filmmakers, the most reliable “R.U.C. spin-doctors,” Rupert Murdoch’s Sunday Times and Lord Steven’s Sunday Express, published repeated articles branding the documentary a “hoax.”

Meanwhile, Chief Annesley announced that an R.U.C. investigation proved that the film’s “outrageous allegations” were “without foundation.”

Cui Bono?

By today, cracks in the R.U.C. cover-up have appeared. McPhilemy reports how he has unearthed independent verification of aspects of Sands’ original tale of terror.

Much of what McPhilemy reveals will not seem far-fetched, but the question remains, after reading this devastating book: Who benefitted from this orgy of murder and political destabilization in Northern Ireland?

Hints are in the book, but not elaborated. For example: Does Abernethy’s association with Natwest, a leading institution of the British oligarchy, imply control by the monarchy in coordinating Loyalist terror operations? And, the charge that drug-money laundering was used to finance arms shipments from South Africa is an important lead; if verified, it leads potentially into the filthy drugs-for-arms networks exposed in EIR’s Special Report, George Bush and the 12333 Serial Murder Ring.

—Mary Jane Freeman
Learn to make history.

The issue of individual human freedom, is not the issue of “democracy.” The essence of freedom, is the right to define oneself as a world-historical individual—to be a resident of the simultaneity of eternity—rather than some self-debased libertarian fool.

—LYNDON H. LA ROUCHE, JR.
May 28, 1998

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Exploring Both The Cosmos and the Soul

A Collector’s Cabinet,’ an exhibit at the National Gallery of Art, creates a fine tension between a celebration of the arts and sciences, including music, botany, zoology, astronomy, optics, and more, in Seventeenth-century Holland and Flanders, on the one hand, and an elegant form of conspicuous consumption on the part of the newly rich Dutch burghers, on the other. The exhibit recreates a Dutch ‘collector’s cabinet,’ or kunstkamer, an intimately scaled room for displaying the private collection of the liefhebber, or art-lover.

As the exhibit catalogue says, ‘the liefhebbers strove to assemble in microcosm all that existed in the cosmos.’

This was the Golden Age of Holland; it was the age of Kepler and Leibniz, and, in The Netherlands, of Huyghens, Rembrandt, and Vermeer. The Renaissance had moved north to Germany and the Low Countries, and Antwerp and Amsterdam had become the leading trading centers of the world.

Both Vermeer and Rembrandt actively collaborated in the scientific circles of their day. Vermeer is believed to have worked with his fellow Delft citizen Anthony Van Leeuwenhoek, the renowned microscopist, and Rembrandt may likely have collaborated with the mathematician and physicist Christiaan Huyghens, who also did important work in optics.

Yet, as the exhibit demonstrates, both artists, while employing in their works many of the outward manifestations of Holland’s wealth and cosmopolitan manners, were primarily concerned with man’s ‘inner’ life: the life of the mind and of the soul.

Jan van Kessel the Elder, ‘Study of Butterflies and Insects,’ c.1655

Jan Brueghel the Elder and Adriaen Stalbemt, ‘The Archduke Albert and the Archduchess Isabella in a Collector’s Cabinet,’ c.1620 (detail)
Beethoven and the Liberation of Creative Power through Freedom

In ‘Beethoven’s Christ on the Mount of Olives: Gethsemane, As Schiller Would Treat It,’ Fred Haight compares Beethoven’s oratorio to his opera Fidelio, to demonstrate Beethoven’s artistic expression of Man’s Promethean nature. Anno Hellenbroich follows, in ‘Reflections on Leonore (1806) and Fidelio (1814),’ to explore Beethoven’s creative process, as he re-worked the ‘Great Opera’ Fidelio under the influence of the ideas of Friedrich Schiller.

‘As free, as it is rigorous’—Beethoven’s Art of Four-Voice Composition

Interview with Professor Norbert Brainin

The Primarius of the legendary Amadeus Quartet shares his insights into Beethoven’s method of composition in the late string quartets. Here, four voices play together, but each voice develops entirely individually—a solution to the paradox of the One and the Many. Brainin explains why Beethoven was the greatest artist of all time.

Laughing Between the Lines: Metaphor and Metric in Nicolaus of Cusa’s About Mind

Dennis Small demonstrates how philosophical concepts like ‘time-reversed causality,’ ‘the One and the Many paradox,’ and ‘not-entropy,’ all recently elaborated by Lyndon LaRouche, are manifested in the telling and appreciation of a good joke. For a hearty laugh, read this insightful article on how the creative mind—and therefore, the universe, of which it is the