From America’s Best Ally, to Pariah

When Chile’s Marxist President Salvador Allende was overthrown in 1973, Manuel Noriega, who was then head of Panama’s intelligence services, interceded to save as many of the thousands of leftists who were detained at Santiago’s soccer stadium, as possible.

Years later, Noriega had dinner with Gen. Augusto Pinochet. “Well, you Panamanians sure did save a lot of those Marxists—I’ll bet it was something like two thousand of them,” said Pinochet. “Tell me one thing, General Noriega: Have they ever thanked you?”

As this book documents, the left has no monopoly on ingratitude. Noriega did favors for the United States, from helping to reduce bloodshed during the Grenada invasion, to interceding with Fidel Castro for the release of C.I.A. contract agents caught carrying out sabotage in Cuba. When Jimmy Carter asked, Panama gave asylum to the Shah of Iran, and when C.I.A. directors from George Bush to William Casey asked, Noriega served as go-between, between the U.S. and Cuba.

As everyone knows, Bush said thanks, by ordering the December 1989 invasion of Panama, to get Noriega—in the process killing thousands of Panamanians, and more than a score of American servicemen. It “marked the debut of the multi-billion-dollar Stealth bomber in combat, fighting an enemy that had no radar to be fooled . . . nor planes or rockets with which to challenge its domination of the airways.” The stated reasons for the invasion—“supporting democracy, blocking drug trafficking, protecting the honor of a woman, responding to Noriega’s declaration of war—were lies,” writes Eisner.

So, why did Noriega have to go? For one thing, Noriega and his mentor and predecessor, Gen. Omar Torrijos, sought to transform Panama from a quasi protectorate of the United States, into a sovereign nation-state. In 1977, in the midst of the Cold War, the U.S. had little to lose by signing a treaty pledging to turn over to Panama, twenty-three years down the road, what Noriega describes as “a little canal built three-quarters of a century earlier, that was becoming obsolete and too small for the world’s greater commercial fleets.” In exchange, Panama was forced to agree to Wall Street’s demand for banking secrecy laws easing drug-money-laundering.

But, Panama was already courting the Japanese as partners for the construc-
tion of a new, sea-level canal. Japanese industrialist Shigeo Nagano took the lead in this regard. “The idea of Japan participating in or financing an alternative to the Panama Canal drove the Americans wild,” writes Noriega. Thus, the destabilization campaign launched in 1986, which culminated with the 1989 invasion, “was a result of the U.S. rejection of any scenario in which future control of the Panama Canal might be in the hands of an independent, sovereign Panama—supported by Japan.”

Noriega writes, that former Secretary of State George Shultz, and former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger—the two Bechtel corporation officials who launched the campaign against him—stood to profit by eliminating the Japanese as potential rivals in building a new canal.

Obstacle to the New World Order
Ultimately, however, it was because Noriega stood in the way of Bush’s new world order, that he had to be eliminated: He said no to Bush’s guns-for-drugs Nicaraguan Contra operation; he said no to renewing the lease on the counterinsurgency School of the Americas; and, he said no to Shultz’s protégé, Nicolas Ardito Barletta.

Following the dictum of Henry Kissinger, that “in order to solve a problem, you must first create the problem,” Noriega went from being the best ally of the U.S. in the war on drugs, to being portrayed as the world’s worst drug pusher. As he writes, he was placed in the “pantheon of the Hitlers, along with Saddam Hussein, Moammar Gadhafi, and Fidel Castro.”

Noriega’s trial in Miami did not prove his guilt, but any other outcome was ruled out of order. Witnesses, mostly major drug traffickers such as Carlos Lehder, where allowed to lie in exchange for lighter sentences, or release from prison scot-free. Prosecutors cut deals with the Cali cocaine cartel to obtain perjured testimony—“by silver or lead”—from the likes of trafficker Ricardo Bilonick. Often as not, these bought-and-paid-for witnesses offered contradictory testimony, and the chief source of the accusation that Noriega was dealing drugs, Jose Isabel Blandon, was considered such a fabricator and prevaricator, that the prosecutors did not dare call him as a witness.

The government blackmailed one of Noriega’s lawyers and forced him to become an informant. Another, Neal Sonnett, resigned suddenly before the start of the trial. Trial Judge William Hoeveler told co-author Eisner that “had Sonnett remained on the case, I think the outcome could have been different—Sonnet could have won the case.” Hoeveler at times felt doubts about Noriega’s guilt on the drug charges, “but was placated by the knowledge that Noriega was a bad character,” writes Eisner.

Noriega was not allowed to present exculpatory evidence. Nothing that would implicate Bush, Oliver North, John Poindexter, and the rest of the Iran-Contra crowd, was allowed at trial.

The famous photograph proving that Bush lied when he claimed “I never met General Noriega,” was not allowed into evidence. It showed Vice President Bush and Gen. Noriega, “the future President and the future pariah,” smiling at each other at a December 1983 meeting at Panama’s Omar Torrijos International Airport: “‘General, it’s good to see you again,’” Noriega quotes Bush. “‘I hope you’ll be supporting my old friends,’ Bush said, ‘Our pilots are already chosen and ready to start flying.’ Neither one of us realized it, but the pilots included such men as Jorge Canalias, Floyd Carlton Caceres, Cesar Rodriguez, future cocaine traffickers transporting Contra weapons in exchange for cocaine. They would later accuse me of dealing drugs.”

Judge Hoeveler now hopes that the Court of Appeals, and ultimately the Supreme Court, will rule on the issues raised by Noriega’s trial. While Bush bears the brunt of the blame for what happened in Panama, in the final analysis, as Eisner writes, “the responsibility lies with a country whose citizens should not be so complacent.”

—Carlos J. Wesley

President Clinton’s

If the times call for a strong President, he will govern much as Franklin D. Roosevelt governed—with boundless energy, great charm, and bold initiative. Faced with genuine evil or a national crisis of undisputed dimensions, Bill will rise to it. But in the more common situations where the public is uncertain about the choices it faces and what’s at stake in those choices, I worry that his leadership may fail. He’ll become unfocussed and too eager to please.”

So wrote former U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich on Sept. 28, 1992, assessing the potential of his friend of twenty-five years, his fellow Oxford and Yale Law School student, the man who would be President four months later, Bill Clinton.

This ironic, humorous, and eye-opening look at the first term of the Clinton presidency, written from diary entries kept during those four years, is must reading for anyone truly interested in ensuring that Clinton does act like FDR, and does so now, as the moment of a “national crisis of undisputed dimensions” is upon us.

Lyndon LaRouche has repeatedly stressed the strategic importance of this question over the past several months, most recently in “The U.S.A.-China Strategy,” which appeared in the April 25 issue of Executive Intelligence Review. LaRouche wrote: “It is unlikely that any presently visible governments would act competently until such time as an ‘economic Pearl Harbor effect’ suddenly transforms public opinion in the manner needed to support dramatic, sudden executive action by the incumbent President of the United States. Therefore, the great danger is, that the President, and also his key partners, come to that moment of history-shaping decision inadequately prepared, and, for that reason, flub the situation, with disastrous effects for all mankind.”

Whether or not Robert Reich, writing from his new job as University Professor of social and economic policy at