Leonardo’s Scientific ‘Leaps’

The Codex Leicester, one of Leonardo da Vinci’s remarkable scientific notebooks, was on display at the American Museum of Natural History in New York City from Oct. 26, 1996 to Jan. 1, 1997.

As with most of Leonardo’s notebooks, the Codex—which was written between 1506 and 1510, and contains some of Leonardo’s most important work on astronomy and the science of water—is not an orderly presentation for publication, but rather the scientist’s private jottings, sketches, and thought experiments. As Leonardo commented: “My concern now is to find cases and inventions, gathering them as they occur to me; . . . you will not wonder nor will you laugh at me, if I make great leaps from one subject to the other.”

It is precisely such “leaps” which are the basis of human creativity, when the mind, through metaphor, comes up with new ideas that can transform history, as it leaps from one domain to another.

Looking at the Codex, we find that Leonardo was the first person to correctly identify the phenomenon known as “earthshine”: How, as he puts it, “in some aspect of the sky the shaded side of the moon has some luminosity, and how in some other part of the sky it is deprived of such luminosity.” Leonardo surmised that the luminosity is due to the reflection of sunlight by the waters of the earth. Galileo, who was familiar with Leonardo’s manuscripts, claimed this discovery as his own a century later.

Much of the Codex is devoted to the study of water, both in its physical properties, and in engineering applications for the construction of canals and bridges, and about one-third of its illustrations are representations of water currents and vortices. Looking at the formation of vortices, Leonardo did not see incomprehensible chaos and disorder—as many do today—but rather a leap to a new ordering principle, as matter organizes itself into what G.W. Leibniz and his followers would call least-action pathways—an approach to hydrodynamics continued in later centuries by the work of Bernhard Riemann and Ludwig Prandtl.

Using the metaphor of water, Leonardo came to the conclusion that light, too, propagates by means of waves. His wave theory of light was one of the most important ideas in the history of science. It was buried until the end of the Seventeenth century, when Christiaan Huyghens, Leibniz, and the Bernouillls developed it further.

—Susan Welsh

[See: “Leonardo from LaRouche’s Standpoint: The Principle of Least Action”]
Time To Put This Country
On the March Once Again
Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Life, Liberty, and The Pursuit of Happiness
Robert Trout

The Confederate Legacy
Of Thomas Jefferson
Richard Freeman

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz—
The Unity of the Churches, and Russia
Dr. Ambrosius Eszer, O.P.

The Platonic Christian Concept
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In his encyclical *As the Third Millennium Draws Near*, Pope John Paul II wrote that the year 1997, the first of the three years leading to the celebration of the Jubilee in the year 2000, would be devoted to Christ, the Word of God, whose mission it was to “bring glad tidings to the poor, . . . to proclaim liberty to captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed go free, and to proclaim a year acceptable to the Lord.” (Luke 4:18-19, Isaiah 61:1-2) This message—of God’s earthly and continuing presence through his Son—has inspired hope in the midst of fear and suffering for two millennia; it is the subject of our cover painting, Rembrandt’s “Christ at Emmaus.”

Lyndon LaRouche, in recent remarks commemorating the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., emphasized that, to rebuild a future for our children and grandchildren—putting this country on the march once again—we must understand that the reason Dr. King was able to lead the Civil Rights movement, was because he was a Christian—a man of Providence, who “understood the message of Genesis, that *every man and woman is made in the image of God*, and given the power, as persons, which enables mankind to exert dominion over the universe.”

The responsibility to take moral leadership cannot be viewed narrowly. “It’s not a matter of should we, or should we not, help,” LaRouche—himself a man of Providence—said on another occasion, a recent policy forum on Bosnia. “The question is: Do we wish to survive? Because we will not survive *ourselves*, unless we change policies in a way which addresses our problem. But, the same policies will solve the problems of Bosnia, and, also, Africa. That’s the way to look at it: We’re all in a mess, and we can not turn our back on a neighbor, and say, ‘I don’t have time to be a Good Samaritan.’ If you’re not a Good Samaritan, you’re not likely to survive yourself. So, you are the guy who’s really in need, whether you know it or not.”

LaRouche continued in this vein at an Africa forum, pointing out that the response of most Americans, to both the genocide in Africa, and the “useless eaters” policies which are being carried out today against increasing numbers of our nation’s poor, aged, and sick, is characterized by one and the same “merciless indifference to human need.” We must oppose this. Policy for Africa, and throughout the world—as well as at home—must be rooted in the Christian view of man upon which our Constitution is based: that all human beings have an equal potential for development.

Concretely, LaRouche has outlined the following two-part solution to the current crisis. *First*, President Clinton must take the necessary steps to create a New Bretton Woods system, based upon the strengths of the first one. This would mean restoring a system of currency parities, a national economic security policy for all nations, and long-term trade and investment policy. In specific, the President must launch a general monetary and financial reform, putting the current bankrupt institutions into receivership, and establishing new relations *among* nations, which would put a premium on creating the conditions for prosperity in *every* nation.

*Second*, once the new Bretton Woods system is established, a next phase will be required, in order to stimulate the world economy. The primary development project which LaRouche has proposed, is the creation of a Eurasian Land-Bridge, as the crucial project for transforming the planet into a prosperous, peaceful community of nations.

Such a project, because it entails cooperation between the Christian West, the Islamic states of central Asia, and China, requires an ecumenical approach, which would counter the ongoing geopolitical attempts on the part of the British-centered financial oligarchy to foment a so-called “clash of civilizations.”

This issue of *Fidelio* includes a number of feature articles which address the underlying, axiomatic basis for the aforementioned policy initiatives.
how America’s founding fathers were inspired by the Leibnizian concept of Natural Law, rather than the opposing Enlightenment concept of John Locke. It was this Leibnizian viewpoint which fueled the Constitutional commitment to economic development, based upon the citizen’s ability to contribute to the scientific and technological advancement of the nation.

• On the other hand, in an accompanying article, Richard Freeman demonstrates how Thomas Jefferson—(despite his having authored the Declaration of Independence under the guidance of Benjamin Franklin)—could advocate such feudalist policies as slavery, free trade, and states’ rights, owing to his antipathy to Plato and embrace of Lockean empiricism—policies which later became the ideological basis of the British-instigated Confederacy.

• A major contribution by Dr. Ambrosius Eszer, O.P. reports on Leibniz’s efforts to bring about a reunification of the Protestant and Catholic Churches, and the development of Russia, in the wake of the Thirty Years War which devastated Europe. This article is not only a major contribution to ecumenicism today, but, also, presents us with a model through which to understand the method of Lyndon LaRouche, Helga Zepp LaRouche, and the Schiller Institute, in forging strategic initiatives aimed at creating new political alliances for development throughout the globe.

We would also like to draw your attention to three other items in this issue.

• “The Platonic Christian Concept of Time-Reversal,” by William F. Wertz, Jr., discusses the philosophical-theological history of Lyndon LaRouche’s concept of Temporal Eternity.

• In our interview, Archbishop Justin Rigali of St. Louis discusses the global dimensions of the Church’s social encyclicals.


It is our hope that this issue of Fidelio will contribute to the true liberation of mankind. As LaRouche says, in respect to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: “If we find the courage and dedication that Martin represented, or found in himself, we can do it. We have the movement; it just isn’t together. We need to find that unified principle of courage that brings us together, and enables us, once again, to do what has to be done.”
If you go back about thirty years, when Martin was still leading marches, you realize, as you look back, as I do, as a veteran of the Second World War, that in the entire postwar period, the one great thing which happened in these United States, were the Civil Rights reforms, and the movement led by Martin in those years.

Now, there were many other things that were done, like the space program and so forth, which were achievements of our country and other countries. But, this is the one fundamental change in our system of government which has been beneficial. Up to this time, many people have continued to benefit from those political changes of the Civil Rights movement. But, after Martin died—was murdered—we have been treading water. Many people have benefitted from the Civil Rights gains and political rights, but the physical conditions of life of our people have been worsening, especially over the past fifteen years.

For example, those of you who remember back in the 1960’s, and compare that with conditions today: You will know that many American families which lived decently on one income in the household, back thirty years ago, have to have two to three jobs in the household, not to achieve the same condition today. The productivity of this nation has collapsed, per person employed. The rate of employment, in reality, has dropped. The quality of employment opportunities provided to most people has dropped, our tax revenue base has dropped—which means our schools are poorer, our municipal facilities are poorer, we are losing hospitals—which we have been losing over the past twenty years.

Everything is getting worse around the world, and our children who are under fifteen, or under twenty, are looking at us and saying, “Do we have a future?” Young people under thirty are looking at the world and saying, “Do we have a future? Do our children have a future in this country and this world?” Most of them believe we do not.

So, while we’re very happy to celebrate the achievements which the Civil Rights movement accomplished, with the Civil Rights bill, the Voting Rights Act, and other things that were done—largely through this state, in Alabama, the movement here, which was a sparkplug for the entire nation—we say, the benefits are wearing down. The good is being taken away. Civil Rights politically are now in danger, economic rights are in danger. In our cities, where once people lived in houses, they now have ghettos, which are mad places to live in, where children are killing children. Things are becoming worse. Do we have a future?

It is time for us to learn the lesson of the 1960’s, and realize that once again, in one way or another, we have to put this country on the march, because things are becoming impossible. We have to put the country on the march, to rebuild a future for our children and our grandchildren. Otherwise, they won’t have one.

A Man of Providence

Now, Martin was an unusual person. You don’t get many Martins. He was, in some senses, an ordinary person; but, in another way, a very extraordinary person. And that began to show, after somebody in a ministers’ meeting picked him out to lead the Civil Rights movement here in Alabama. And, he showed that he could accept that responsibility, and behaved as a man sent by God, a man of Providence, who never failed to fulfill his mission as a leader of the movement. And, it was Martin’s personal dedication, and leadership, which was key to the movement’s success. Because, after Martin was killed, many of the same people who otherwise led the movement were still around. The same beliefs were around. The Civil Rights movement today in the United States, in some senses, is stronger than it was...
then: we have more people in influential positions now, than then. We have leaders who know how to govern, at state levels and other levels. But, we are poorly organized. We are not together; we are not moving, we are not shaking and moving the nation, as we were then.

What was the key? What was different about Martin, which made the rest of the Civil Rights movement work the way it did?

Martin was a Christian, in a very special way. There were many people in the Civil Rights movement who weren’t Christians, and their contribution is valued. But, Martin was a Christian, and that was the key for him; not just a minister, but a Christian.

Because he understood—and the genius of his leadership was this understanding—he understood the message of Genesis, that every man and woman is made in the image of God, and given the power, as persons, which enables mankind to exert dominion over the universe.

Martin understood that this was a great nation, founded on a great principle. But, this nation and its greatness was spoiled by one thing: By a rottenness which is typified by the legacy of slavery, a legacy which this nation is not free of yet. And, it was this corruption in our nation, which caused it to fail to live up to its original promise.

Martin saw the Civil Rights movement as a means of restoring this nation to what Lincoln knew it had to become, and using the Civil Rights movement as a way of transforming this nation—its role at home and its role in the world—accordingly. And, he succeeded, in significant degree, in doing that. That was the power of the Civil Rights movement: To give meaning to the Declaration of Independence, to give meaning to the Constitution. To recognize that there are no races, there is only one race, the human race; and, racism is only a form of injustice. We had to unify ourselves, we had to go through a great act of atonement, where we would recognize that every child born, is made in the image of God, and that that child must be educated, and nurtured, and given opportunities accordingly.

The Secret of True Courage

Martin also understood something else. He understood the secret of true courage. See, most of us become too attached to our physical lives, in the wrong way. Our physical life is a very good thing to have. It is bad for it to be taken away from us, particularly prematurely, as it was from Martin. And, he understood that, as he said.

But, the important thing is that when you die, you don’t take anything with you, except what you leave behind. And, therefore, if you have lived a life so that you, as Martin was, are a person of Providence, a man, a woman, of Providence, that your life enriches mankind in some way, that you do something as a vocation, as a dedication, to transform the world around you to be a better place; so that you came, newborn, as a stranger, and you left as a mourned friend, but you left something behind: You left behind the impression that your life was needed.

People who understand that, and value that, value their sense of identity. “I am a person of Providence. I am here to do something good for all humanity.” You have infinite courage. Martin had that kind of courage. Martin took people of dedication and talent around him, and he became a rallying point for them to find the same courage, by marching together, saying, “We are going to change this planet. We are going to make things better.”

And, as Amelia has said many times, in characterizing the movement, who were some of the people who were the guts of the Civil Rights movement, as Amelia has said: the have-nots! People on the street, people who had nothing, people who had no lives, no education, nothing. Their lives would seem to be totally wasted. But, they rose up, like Lazarus, and they marched. Because they knew that in marching, they had cheated the Devil, they had found a meaning for their lives. And, it was they—the have-nots—who rose, in a sense, to the highest position in a moment of our history, to give our nation its soul and dignity.

What we need today, is to understand Martin in that way. Martin was a man of God, a man of Providence, who understood that the meaning of his life—his last great speech—the meaning of his life, was to go to the mountaintop, and to see what was there, and to bring others to the understanding of that, so that when he passed, he would leave behind a legacy, so we’d say, “This stranger came amongst us, and when he left, a great thing had had happened to us. This man was sent by God.”

If we can find that in ourselves, if we can assemble together and discover that mutually in ourselves, then we can recreate the kind of movement which will address the problems which threaten our children’s future today. And the time is now, to do it.

I could tell you many things about what the problems are. They’re numerous. This world is suffering. The greatest genocide in the Twentieth century is right now occurring in the Great Lakes district of Africa. I could tell you about many other parts of the world that are suffering. I could tell you about the suffering in the United States. It’s all there.

But, those are the negative things. The positive thing is: How do we change it? How do we look at the children’s faces and say, “Yes, grandson, great-grandson, great-granddaughter, you will have a future, and we are going to see to it you have it”? And, if we find the courage and dedication that Martin represented, or found in himself, we can do it. We have the movement; it just isn’t together. We need to find that unified principle of courage that brings us together, and enables us, once again, to do what has to be done.

Thank you very much.
Life, Liberty, and
The Pursuit of Happiness

How the Natural Law Concept of G.W. Leibniz
Inspired America’s Founding Fathers

by Robert Trout

The American Revolution was a battle against
the philosophy of John Locke. Emmerich de Vattel’s
The Law of Nations was key in framing the United States
as the world’s first constitutional republic.

July 4, 1776: The Declaration of Independence is presented to the Continental Congress at Independence Hall, Philadelphia. Included in the drafting committee were Thomas Jefferson (center), flanked by Benjamin Franklin (right) and John Adams (left). Facing page: manuscript of the Declaration.
Most Americans, today, have no idea that there once existed something, commonly known as the “American System.” The vast majority of Americans today think of freedom as the equivalent of “doing your own thing.” Those who think of themselves as better educated are really no better off, believing that the Constitution of the United States came out of the tradition of John Locke’s Social Contract. Alexander Hamilton, who had played a key role in shaping both the American economy and the Constitution of the United States, is commonly described as a man whose outlook was “aristocratic.”

The myth that the founding of American Republic was based on the philosophy of John Locke could only have been maintained, because the history of Leibniz’s influence was suppressed. The American Revolution was, in fact, a battle against the philosophy of Locke and the English utilitarians. Key to this struggle, was the work of the Eighteenth-century jurist, Emmerich de Vattel, whose widely read text, The Law of Nations, guided the framing of the United States as the world’s first constitutional republic. Vattel had challenged the most basic axioms of the Venetian Party, which had taken over England before the time of the American Revolution, and it was from Vattel’s The Law of Nations, more than anywhere else, that America’s founders learned the Leibnizian natural law,¹ which became the basis for the American System.

Virtually unknown today except among specialists, Emmerich de Vattel was born on April 25, 1714, in the principality of Neufchâtel, which was part of Switzerland. He became an ardent student of Leibniz, and in 1741, published his first work, a defense of Leibniz, Défense du système leibnitzien. In another book analyzing

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¹This [previous work on the law of nations], says a writer, is evidently rather an introduction than a system; and it served only to excite a desire to see it continued with equal perspicuity and elegance. The honor of this task was reserved for the great Vattel, whose work is entitled to the highest admiration!
—James Duane, Mayor and Chief Judge of New York City, August 1784

I am much obliged by the kind present you have made us of your edition of Vattel. It came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the Law of Nations. Accordingly, that copy which I kept, has been continually in the hands of the members of our congress, now sitting.
—Benjamin Franklin, letter to Charles W.F. Dumas, December 1775

Happiness is the point where center all those duties which individuals and nations owe to themselves; and this is the great end of the law of nature . . . To succeed in this, it is necessary to instruct the people to seek felicity where it is to be found; that is, in their own perfection.
—Emmerich de Vattel, ‘The Law of Nations,’ 1758

The most perfect society is that whose purpose is the universal and supreme happiness.’
—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ‘On Natural Law,’ c.1690

The first general law that we discover in the very object of the society of nations, is that each individual nation is bound to contribute every thing in her power to the happiness and perfection of all the others.’
—Emmerich de Vattel, ‘The Law of Nations,’ 1758

‘The most perfect society is that whose purpose is the universal and supreme happiness.’
—Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ‘On Natural Law,’ c.1690

Happiness is the point where center all those duties which individuals and nations owe to themselves; and this is the great end of the law of nature . . . To succeed in this, it is necessary to instruct the people to seek felicity where it is to be found; that is, in their own perfection.’
—Emmerich de Vattel, ‘The Law of Nations,’ 1758
the philosophy of Christian Wolff, Vattel showed that Christian charity is consistent with natural law. He demonstrated that Christ's instruction, "Love your enemies," is proven by natural law. His most famous work, *The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns,* was published in 1758. He also published a piece on tragedy and comedy, and a few poems.

In 1746, Vattel entered the diplomatic service of King Augustus III of Saxony, where he was appointed the chief adviser of the government on foreign affairs in 1758. Vattel remained in this position until his death in 1767.

Vattel's *The Law of Nations* was the most influential book on the law of nations for 125 years following its publication. The first English translation appeared in 1759. Numerous editions of *The Law of Nations* were printed in England during the Eighteenth century, which were widely read in the American Colonies, along with editions in the original French. The first American edition appeared in 1796. The book was reprinted nineteen times in America by 1872. It was reprinted at least fifty times in the years following its 1758 publication. By comparison, Hugo Grotius, who is currently described as the founder of modern international law, was reprinted only around five times during the hundred years following the appearance of Vattel's work. Grotius' fame had waned in the Nineteenth century, but was resurrected in the opening decades of the Twentieth century through the efforts of especially the British and the Dutch. Grotius was, then, falsely promoted as the main representative of the law of nations as based on natural law, to serve as an Aristotelian foil for the establishment of an international law which was based upon Lockean positivism.

The majority of this essay will be devoted to reviewing the contents of Vattel's *The Law of Nations,* and its documented impact on America's founding fathers. But, we must first review certain fundamental issues of law and the nation-state, as these were considered by G.W. Leibniz, and as they have been further developed by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

**Locke vs. Leibniz**

The Eighteenth century was defined by the attempts of the financier oligarchy, or Venetian Party, then headquartered in England, to wipe out the modern nation-state. The Venetian Party launched the Enlightenment, to spread the ideology that man was no more than a hedonistic animal, controlled by his sensual urges. By destroying the ability of men to think and act like citizens, they aimed to destroy the basis for the existence of the nation-state as an opponent to their oligarchical control of human society.

The prevailing theories of the Enlightenment were based on the method introduced by the Venetian, Paolo Sarpi. Sarpi's writings became the basis for such English writers as Hobbes, Locke, Mandeville, and Bentham. All these writers started by assuming that the individual's hedonistic desires are self-evident facts, and built up society from that premise. Thomas Hobbes is generally known for his bestial portrayal of human nature. John Locke, who is usually portrayed as the source of the ideas of freedom and government which motivated the Founding Fathers, was no better.

Locke wrote that the souls of the newly born are blank tablets. He asserted that thinking is only sense perception, and that the mind lacks the power "to invent or frame one new simple idea." He wrote,

> The knowledge of the existence of any other thing, we can have only by sensation: for there being no necessary connection of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory; . . . but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. . . .

> As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me: since by their different application, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present state. (*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Vol. II*)

From this bestial view that the human mind consists of only sense certainty, pleasure and pain, Locke developed an equally bestial theory of the nation. Man originally existed in a State of Nature of complete liberty. If he was attacked by another, he was justified in seeking retribution. Men, however, being filled with self-love, extract-
ed more retribution than they justly deserved. The community or state came to be an umpire, by setting rules for the proper amount of “just retribution.” And thus, the commonwealth came into existence to set just punishments and to defend itself against outsiders. It follows, that Locke’s conception of freedom, was no more than the right of each man to follow his hedonistic instincts in all things, where not prohibited by the umpire’s rules. Not surprisingly, when Locke wrote the “Fundamental Constitution for the Government of Carolina,” in 1669, he established a feudal system which included both Black and white slavery.

The myth that John Locke was the philosopher behind the American Republic, is easily refuted by examining how Locke’s philosophy steered Thomas Jefferson, for example. Jefferson’s actions make it clear that, had Locke’s philosophy been the inspiration for the American Revolution, the U.S. would never have become the world’s leading nation and industrial power. Jefferson, who claimed that the three greatest men in history were the British empiricists Francis Bacon, John Locke, and Isaac Newton, adopted their outlook that sense certainty is the basis for all knowledge, writing:

I feel, therefore I exist. I feel bodies which are not myself: there are other existences then. I call them matter. I feel them changing place. This gives me motion. Where there is an absence of matter, I call it void, or nothing, or immaterial space. On the basis of sensation, of matter and motion, we may erect the fabric of all the certainties we can have or need. (Letter to John Adams, Aug. 15, 1820)

Having denied that human nature is creative reason, Jefferson saw society and economics as based on fundamentally fixed relationships. Consequently, he endorsed Thomas Malthus’ ideology, that man’s needs must exceed his ability to produce. He rejected national economic development through the increase of the productive powers of labor, and instead accepted Adam Smith’s free trade doctrines. Jefferson saw slavery as appropriate for Blacks, whom he considered as inherently inferior.

Jefferson opposed Hamilton’s measures for the development of the nation, and in a private letter stating his opposition to Hamilton’s National Bank, for example, he raved that any person in the state of Virginia, who cooperated with the Bank, “shall be adjudged guilty of high treason and suffer death accordingly.” Jefferson was fanatically opposed to the development of Amer-
ican industry, and described the growth of cities in America as “a canker which soon eats to the heart of its laws and constitution.” He fought to keep the nation as a feudal plantation.

If man were nothing more than a bundle of hedonistic instincts, however, whose cognitive ability were limited to sense certainty, mankind would today be no more than a few million bestial individuals on the entire planet, scratching out an existence in the dirt. In his own period, it fell to Gottfried Leibniz, who represented the best of the tradition of the Renaissance that had established the modern nation-state beginning with the France of Louis XI, to demonstrate that Locke's premises were an inhuman fraud.

Leibniz developed a science of the mind, which was coherent with human nature as creative reason, rather than animalistic instincts. For the human species to make fundamental changes in its methods of existence, men must be capable of creative reason, instead of merely taking in sensual impressions and acting on instincts. Leibniz described how the mind functions by recognizing the contradictions in sensual impressions and generating Platonic ideas, which are “by far to be preferred to the blank tablets of Aristotle, Locke, and the other recent exoteric philosophers.”

In his writings, Leibniz demonstrated how the principles of science and law are also “not derived from sense, but from a clear and distinct intuition, which Plato called an idea.” Plato discussed, in the Republic, how some sense impressions do not provoke thought, because the judgment of them by sensation seems adequate, while others always invite the intellect to reflection, because the senses give the mind contrary perceptions. These sense impressions do not provoke thought in this manner.

Lyndon LaRouche on Natural Law

The central significant fact of physical-economic measurements of societies taken as indivisible wholes, is that this approach enables us to demonstrate, by the standards of experimental physics, both certain principles of the human cognitive processes, and certain corresponding, general principles of nature. Furthermore, in this way, we are able to obtain relevant measurements, by means of which to prove certain crucial, subsidiary principles. The result is meaningfully termed “natural law,” in the sense that natural law signifies the way in which both mankind, and the universe, have been manifestly pre-designed to function, and to interact. That may be restated: Natural Law is the hypothesis which corresponds to the necessary and sufficient reason for mankind’s successfully continued existence.

Consider next, the general characteristic of successful human existence. The approach of experimental physics, shows us a most crucial general principle, underlying the growth of human population under conditions of both increased per-capita productivity, and improved demographic characteristics.

The level of potential physical productivity of a society, per capita, per household, and per relevant square kilometer of the Earth’s surface, depends both upon a certain development of the human intellect, and also certain minimal standards of both demographic characteristics and consumption. The consumption includes a standard of functionally-necessary household consumption, functionally-necessary consumption for necessary basic economic infrastructure, and functionally-necessary consumption for production and related functions of output of goods. This minimal level of requirement is increased, in terms of knowledge, and of demographic and market-basket requirements, as the transition to a higher general level of potential physical productivity is made. . . .

The method of experimental physics demonstrates to us, that there are valid discoveries of principle, proven to be valid by means of differences of measured effects. The human individual has the power which no other species exhibits, the power to discover and adopt revolutionary principles of change in human practice, through which the power of mankind over nature is increased, in the manner, and according to the general constraints which we have outlined above. The phenomena of technological attrition shows us, that mankind's continued existence, in population densities above those of the higher apes, depends upon a continued development and employment of such radical changes in human behavior, notably those changes, throughout discernible evidence of human existence, which we class, retrospectively, or otherwise, as valid, axiomatic-revolutionary discoveries of principle, through which the behavior of a society is improved radically. In such consideration of that physical-economic evidence, we have struck upon the ore from whose refinement we may extract the purer metal of “human nature.” This “ore” serves us as the evidence leading to a functional definition of natural law.

—Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., from “U.S. Law: Neither Truth Nor Justice”
impressions force the mind to conceptualize an explanation, which is intelligible rather than visible. The best example of a Platonic idea, is the demonstration which Lyndon LaRouche has developed of Eratosthenes’ measurement of the size of the earth, which Eratosthenes accomplished several millennia before anyone had actually “seen” the shape of the earth’s curvature.

Leibniz and Locke’s conception of how the mind works, was reflected in their different understanding of the nature of God. Leibniz’s God is the Creator, who is able to transform the universe to higher levels of perfection, in a fashion which is reflected in man’s transformation of human society. To illustrate how God transforms the universe, Leibniz used the example of an eternal book on the Elements of Geometry. Each new copy is made from the previous one, with new advances being added, in a lawful process of change. The nature of this lawful process of change from one copy to the next, is illustrated by the scientific discoveries made by Leibniz and his collaborators. The new copy of the Elements of Geometry, is not reached by principles of formal logic, but through a scientific discovery which takes the form of a Platonic idea. “What is true of books, is also true of the different states of the world; every subsequent state is somehow copied from the preceding one (although according to certain laws of change).”12 Leibniz quoted Plato’s Phaedo, to describe how the Creator orders the universe according to reason, and is continually acting to further the perfection of his creation.13

For Enlightenment neo-Aristotelians like Sarpi, Locke, and Grotius, the idea that the universe could be both lawful and evolving in a constant process of perfection, was incomprehensible. They saw God as trapped in the same set of fixed rules, in which their minds were trapped. Grotius stated this explicitly, arguing that, “The law of nature, again, is unchangeable—even in the sense that it cannot be changed by God.”14 Since not even God can change these fixed laws, far less powerful mankind which had been codified by Aristotle, as less universal than the reality with the perfection of the Creator.

Aristotle, Locke, et al., must live in a universe defined by these fixed relations—can change these fixed laws, far less powerful mankind that it cannot be changed by God.” It is the responsibility of the state, to make laws which transform the moral claims of equity, such as the obligation to take care of the sick, into legal claims, and thereby assure the happiness of the people.

Universal justice, however, is found only on the highest level, that of piety. The transformation from the middle to the highest level, is the difference between desiring good of others for our own benefit, and desiring good of others because it is our own good. On this level, man determines the justice of his acts, by weighing their consequences against the entirety of the past, present, and future. Leibniz expressed this again more simply, in the statement, “Parents exist primarily for the sake of children; the present, which does not last long, for the sake of the future.”15 However, the clear comprehension of the mind, needed to understand justice on its highest level, is achieved by few, and the hope for improvement for humanity rests on those great men.

Leibniz dedicated his life to efforts to educate people to understand that true happiness is found by locating their identity in benefitting mankind and their posterity. He was involved in far-reaching efforts to improve the productive powers of labor, through fostering education, and developing technology and science, so that the population could be lifted out of backwardness. His efforts to develop heat-powered machinery, so that one man could do the work of a hundred, mark the founding of economic science on a basis coherent with the natural law concept of man’s increasing perfection. He created whole new branches of knowledge, such as the calculus, and worked to develop links with far-away countries like China.

Leibniz’s understanding of natural law is best expressed, today, from the standpoint of Lyndon LaRouche, who describes himself as “in that Leibniz tradition upon which our 1776 Declaration of Independence and 1789 Federal Constitution were premised.”[See Box, p. 8]*

LaRouche has developed a rigorous proof, from a study of the demography of human society over the past two million years, that man is fundamentally different from all other species. This demographic evidence demonstrates three crucial principles. LaRouche writes,

* For his most recent discussion of the issue of natural law, see Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., “U.S. Law: Neither Truth Nor Justice,” Executive Intelligence Review, August 23, 1996 (Vol. 23, No. 34). The following summary is drawn from this discussion.
First, the increase of mankind’s potential population-density, and also our species’ improved life-expectancy and productivity, demonstrates, that the human individual is set absolutely apart from, and superior to all other living species, as Genesis 1:26-30 argues.

Second, a retrospective view of the improvement in human demography, referenced to the post-1461 establishment of the modern, western European form of nation-state, shows that this improvement in demography, is the consequence of combination of general education, with the fostering, through means of the individual mind’s creative, cognitive processes, of scientific, technological, and related discoveries of principle. It is nothing other than this creative potential, typified by valid discoveries and employment of principles of nature for scientific and technological progress, which sets mankind apart from, and above all other species.

Third, that the struggle which defines human history, to date, is between the efforts to establish a form of state based upon universal education for ongoing scientific and related progress, and against the evil heritage of so-called “traditionalist” and oligarchical (e.g., feudal-aristocratic, financier-aristocratic) forms of society, such as those conforming with the evil Code of the Emperor Diocletian.

The rigorous proof of these three principles is derived from physical economy. Natural law, rather than being a list of do’s and don’ts, or of even the most admirable moral principles, must be rigorously grounded in the requirements for successful human survival. “Natural Law is the hypothesis which corresponds to the necessary and sufficient reason for mankind’s successfully continued existence.”

In order for a society to survive, it must generate a sufficient level of physical production both to meet its current needs, and to produce a surplus for upgrading its productive powers. The level of potential physical productivity of a society depends on both the development of the intellect of its members, and a minimal standard of both demographic characteristics and of consumption. No society could ever survive by remaining in a steady state, however, since any society which remains in a fixed mode of production, runs out of the resources that are available for that mode of production. A successful economy must therefore also generate “Free Energy,” which is invested to transform it to a higher level of technology.

The successful existence of the human species depends, therefore, on such a “not-entropic” result, achieved through scientific progress, and the successful survival of any society requires that it develop within its citizens, the capability to make the scientific discoveries necessary to achieve this progress. The quality of mind required for mankind to make necessary, successive scientific discoveries, however, is completely different from the view presented by Locke et al., that knowledge is nothing more than a collection of sense impressions. This quality of mind is best expressed with reference to Plato’s concept of hypothesis, and of “hypothesizing the higher hypothesis,” which is the cognition required to compare different higher hypotheses used to generate discoveries and discern the most valid method of generating new discoveries.

LaRouche locates an individual’s ability to make such creative discoveries as dependent on agapé, or the emotion associated with creativity. Through such valid discoveries, the individual contributes to the perfection of all mankind. Plato understood this, in associating agapé with the love of truth and the love of justice, and St. Paul used it to the same effect, extending it to the love of mankind and God. This emotion of love is in contrast to eros, or a fixation on sensual pleasure.

The natural law functions as a type of hypothesis, as LaRouche identifies “higher hypothesis.” It consists of a set of principles (e.g., axioms) which govern the forming of many valid hypotheses, each hypothesis subsuming a theorem-lattice of lawful propositions. To be coherent with natural law, the constitutional law of any state must commit that state to serve the principles of progress, developing within its citizens those creative abilities which are dependent on the emotional state of agapé. This is the significance of Leibniz’s conception that, “The most perfect society is that whose purpose is the universal and supreme happiness,” and is the meaning of “the pursuit of happiness” in the opening of the Declaration of Independence, as well as its expression as the “General Welfare” clause in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution.

Now, where did the founders of the United States learn the Leibnizian natural law which was the basis of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution? Certainly not from Locke or any other of the spokesmen of the Enlightenment. Not from Grotius or other writers, who based their law on the fixed conceptions of man contained in Aristotle, Roman law, or Sarpi. At the time of the American Revolution, England’s North American colonies had a literacy rate and productivity twice that of England, as the result of the efforts of republican circles. Philip Valenti and others have written about the substantial direct influence of Leibniz in the American Colonies. We will now look at the role of Emmerich de Vattel in the transmission of Leibnizian natural law to America’s founders.

**Vattel’s The Law of Nations**

From the standpoint of our argument, the following items summarize the key points of Emmerich de Vattel’s application of a Leibnizian natural law viewpoint, to the issues of the law of nations.
Human Nature Is Creative Reason

Vattel begins *The Law of Nations* by attacking the prevailing doctrines of natural law, for failing to distinguish human from animal behavior. The Roman emperor Justinian defined natural law as “that which nature teaches to all animals”: Thus he defines the natural law in its most extensive sense, not that natural law which is peculiar to man, and which is derived as well from his rational as from his animal nature.” Vattel then attacks the writings of Grotius, Hobbes, Puffendorf, and Wolff, for being based on the same false axioms of human nature.

Grotius cut his teeth writing legal opinions for the Dutch East India Company, which was set up as part of the Venetian takeover of The Netherlands. In *On the Law of War and Peace*, Grotius used Aristotle to defend the oligarchical system: “Further, as Aristotle said that some men are by nature slaves, that is, are suited to slavery, so there are some peoples so constituted that they understand better how to be ruled than to rule.” Having adopted Aristotle’s axioms that human nature is fixed, as the basis for his natural law hypothesis, Grotius derives a false natural law, writing “The law of nature, again, is unchangeable—even in the sense that it cannot be changed by God.” He fails to understand Plato’s *Parmenides* dialogue, that the Creator of the universe is the source of change which generates the elements of the universe, and, hence, is more real than those elements within that created universe.

Christian Wolff, who is often presented as the successor to Leibniz, based his natural law hypothesis on axioms of human nature, which were completely opposite to Leibniz’s. Wolff wrote that, “the whole nation may best be thought of in the likeness of a man, whose soul is the director of the state, but whose body is the subject as a whole.” Wolff was a defender of “enlightened absolutism,” where the vast majority of people were reduced to little more than muscle labor. His extensive discussions of perfection and happiness were designed to mimic Leibniz, but stripped of Leibniz’s guiding conception that all men possess creative reason. Consequently, Wolff’s mercantilistic system was a static conception of economics, and not based on the development of the productive powers of labor.

In *The Law of Nations*, Vattel establishes a system of law governing relations between nation-states, based on natural law. In the “Preliminaries” section, Vattel first establishes a natural law hypothesis which is coherent with the approach of Leibniz and LaRouche, in direct opposition to the Lockean, positivist approach which dominates law today. He then applies this natural law hypothesis, in Book I, to develop the law governing nations, and in the three other Books, to develop the law governing relations between nations.

Vattel shows that the nature of man requires that society be organized to develop *agapé* in its members. In a section which is a remarkable predecessor to the proof developed two hundred years later by Lyndon LaRouche, Vattel demonstrates that man’s ability to provide for himself through technology developed by creative reason, defines human nature as fundamentally different from animal nature. Reason, or the capacity to develop new technologies through scientific discovery, allows mankind to survive and perfect itself, while animal nature is based merely on sense impressions. Vattel attacks the absurd notion, that human nature could be defined by looking at an isolated individual. The potential for speech and reason is inherent within each individual, but can only be developed through the education of the young by others. Therefore, man must work for the perfection of creative reason in himself, and in others, for society to flourish. He writes,

Man is so formed by nature, that he cannot supply all his own wants, but necessarily stands in need of the intercourse and assistance of his fellow-creatures, whether for his immediate preservation, or for the sake of perfecting his nature, and enjoying such a life as is suitable to a rational being. This is sufficiently proved by experience. We have instances of persons, who, having grown up to manhood among the bears of the forest, enjoyed not the use of speech or of reason, but were, like the brute beasts, possessed only of sensitive faculties. We see moreover that nature has refused to bestow on men the same strength and natural weapons of defense with which she has furnished other animals—having, in lieu of those advantages, endowed mankind with the faculties of speech and reason, or at least a capability of acquiring them by an intercourse with their fellow-creatures. Speech enables them to communicate with each other, to give each other mutual assistance, to perfect their reason and knowledge; and having thus become intelligent, they find a thousand methods of preserving themselves, and supplying their wants. Each individual, moreover, is intimately conscious that he can neither live happily nor improve his nature without the intercourse and assistance of others. Since, therefore, nature has thus formed mankind, it is a convincing proof of her intention that they should communicate with, and mutually aid and assist each other.

Hence is deduced the establishment of natural society among men. The general law of that society is, that each individual should do for the others everything which their necessities require, and which he can perform without neglecting the duty that he owes to himself: a law which all men must observe in order to live in a manner consonant to their nature, and conformable to the views of their common Creator,—a law which our own safety, our happi-
ness, our dearest interests, ought to render sacred to every one of us. (*The Law of Nations*, Preliminaries, Sec. 10)

Since men can live “consonant to their nature” only by the development of their creative potential through collaboration with others, a society which does not develop the emotion of agapē in its members, is self-destructive. Vattel leaves no doubt that he is diametrically opposed to the doctrines espoused by the Enlightenment philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Jeremy Bentham. These doctrines, which the British oligarchy promoted, argued that the best society is achieved by each individual merely following his individual greed. Vattel writes,

> It is easy to conceive what exalted felicity the world would enjoy, were all men willing to observe the rule that we have just laid down. On the contrary, if each man wholly and immediately directs all his thoughts to his own interest, if he does nothing for the sake of other men, the whole human race together will be immersed in the deepest wretchedness. Let us therefore endeavor to promote the general happiness of mankind: all mankind, in return, will endeavor to promote ours, and thus we shall establish our felicity on the most solid foundations. (Preliminaries, Sec. 10)

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**‘To Procure the True Happiness of the Nation’**

Let us continue to lay open the principal objects of a good government. What we have said in the five preceding chapters relates to the care of providing for the necessities of the people, and procuring plenty in the state: this is a point of necessity; but it is not sufficient for the happiness of a nation. Experience shows that a people may be unhappy in the midst of all earthly enjoyments, and in the possession of the greatest riches. Whatever may enable mankind to enjoy a true and solid felicity, is a second object that deserves the most serious attention of the government. Happiness is the point where center all those duties which individuals and nations owe to themselves; and this is the great end of the law of nature. The desire of happiness is the powerful spring that puts man in motion: felicity is the end they all have in view, and it ought to be the grand object of the public will. It is then the duty of those who form this public will, or of those who represent it—the rulers of the nation—to labor for the happiness of the people, to watch continually over it, and to promote it to the utmost of their power.

To succeed in this, it is necessary to instruct the people to seek felicity where it is to be found; that is, in their own perfection,—and to teach them the means of obtaining it. The Sovereign cannot, then, take too much pains in instructing and enlightening his people, and in forming them to useful knowledge and wise discipline. Let us leave a hatred of the sciences to the despotic tyrants of the east: they are afraid of having their people instructed, because they choose to rule over slaves. But though they are obeyed with the most abject submission, they frequently experience the effects of disobedience and revolt. A just and wise prince feels no apprehensions from the light of knowledge: he knows that it is ever advantageous to a good government. If men of learning know that liberty is the natural inheritance of mankind; on the other hand they are more fully sensible than their neighbors, how necessary it is, for their own advantage, that this liberty should be subject to a lawful authority: —incapable of being slaves, they are faithful subjects.

The first impressions made on the mind are of the utmost importance for the remainder of life. In the tender years of infancy and youth, the human mind and heart easily receive the seeds of good or evil. Hence the education of the youth is one of the most important affairs that deserve the attention of government. It ought not to be entirely left to fathers. The most certain way of forming good citizens is to found good establishments for public education, to provide them with able masters—direct them with prudence—and pursue such mild and suitable measures, that the citizens will not neglect to take advantage of them.

Who can doubt that the sovereign—the whole nation—ought to encourage the arts and sciences? To say nothing of the many useful inventions that strike the eye of every beholder,—literature and the polite arts enlighten the mind and soften the manners: and if study does not always inspire the love of virtue, it is because it sometimes, and even too often, unhappily meets with an incorrigibly vicious heart. The nation and its conductors ought then to protect men of learning and great artists, and to call forth talents by honors and rewards.

—Emmerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, 1758

*Book I, Chap. XI, Sec. 110-113: ‘Second Object of a Good Government’*
Vattel elaborates a program for national economic development, which centers on the increase of the productive powers of labor. This makes possible the increase in the population density, which is a necessity for a successful society. However, economic development is only a means to allow the people to labor after their principal duty, and that is their own perfection.

The question of private property shows how the different natural law hypotheses of Locke and Vattel, lead to totally different conceptions of how society should be governed. John Locke's absurd formulation is, that the origin of private property can be traced back to antiquity, to a primitive man picking up acorns under a tree. According to Locke, an individual's private property is merely the result of his past labor. Locke concludes from this, that the rights of private property are sacred and cannot be regulated by society.  

Vattel locates the origin of private property in the increase in the population density, which necessitated the development of agriculture, to supersede a hunting and gathering society. "If each nation had, from the beginning, resolved to appropriate to itself a vast country, that the people might live only by hunting, fishing, and wild fruits, our globe would not be sufficient to maintain a tenth part of its present inhabitants." (Book I, Chap. XVIII, Sec. 209) The advancement of society, to a more advanced mode of production, required that land be cultivated, with private property the best means for doing this.

Society has the need and, therefore, the right to regulate private property, to ensure development. Nations which claim uninhabited areas must develop them, for their claims to be valid, and the landed aristocracy is not allowed to hold large tracts of land without cultivating them. In addition, since government must provide direction to society to ensure the development of the productive powers of the nation, if the owners of a corporation act in a fashion that injures society, or which will ruin the corporation, the sovereign has the duty to constrain the prodigal.

Sovereign Nations, Not World Government

Vattel locates how the duty to contribute to the general happiness of mankind, is not removed by the formation of nation-states. Instead, when men join in a nation, they must still fulfill their duties towards the rest of mankind. He writes,

That society, considered as a moral person, since possessed of an understanding, volition, and strength peculiar to itself, is therefore obliged to live on the same terms with other societies or states, as individual man was obliged, before those establishments, to live with other men... the object of the great society established by nature between all nations is also the interchange of mutual assistance for their own improvement, and that of their condition. (Preliminaries, Sec. 11-12)

From this, Vattel arrives at the first general law of relations between nations:

The first general law that we discover in the very object of the society of nations, is that each individual nation is bound to contribute every thing in her power to the happiness and perfection of all the others. (Preliminaries, Sec. 13)

The second general law of relations between nations is the sovereignty of all nations: "Each nation should be left in the peaceable enjoyment of that liberty which she inherits from nature." This is derived from natural law, since nations, like individuals, are naturally free and independent of each other, regardless of the size or strength of the nation. "A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is not less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom."

Nothing makes most modern writers on international law more upset, than Vattel's explicit rejection of the idea of a world government, or supranational institutions, governing nation-states. Numerous writers in the early 1900's, raved that Vattel had to be reduced to obscurity, because of his defense of national sovereignty. Vattel rejects the formulation, advanced by Christian Wolff, that a civitatis maximae, or great republic, exists above all nation-states:

It is the essence of all civil society ("civitatis"), that each member thereof should have given up a part of his rights to the body of the society, and that there should exist a supreme authority capable of commanding all the members, of giving to them laws, and of punishing those who refuse to obey. Nothing like this can be conceived or supposed to exist between nations. Each sovereign State pretends to be, and in fact is, independent of all others. (Preface, p. xiii)

The sovereign nation-state is the best institution, to understand and perform the duties which the state owes to its citizens. As Vattel puts it, "A nation ought to know itself. Without this knowledge, it cannot make any successful endeavors after its own perfection." Furthermore, if nations reserve the right to judge other nations and intervene in their internal affairs, this "opens the door to all the ravages of enthusiasm and fanaticism, and furnishes ambition with numberless pretexts."
Law for Man, Whose Nature Is Creative Reason

Vattel derives a system of law governing the nation-state and relations between nations, from this natural law hypothesis. To have legitimacy, all law written by man must be coherent with this natural law hypothesis. Throughout his work, Vattel constantly addresses the leaders of nations, that a well-functioning state will only exist, if they govern so that every citizen is encouraged to develop within himself those agapic qualities needed for society to flourish.

The Sovereign. When men join together in society, they must establish a Public Authority, or Sovereignty, to direct society in meeting its common aims, be it in the form of a Democracy, an Aristocracy, or a Monarchy. The rights and authority of the Sovereign are derived from his duties of preserving and perfecting the nation. Since the survival and perfection of man is based on his creative reason, the purpose of society is to create conditions for the development of those powers in each individual, and it is the duty of the sovereign to ensure that those conditions exist. Hence, the sovereign must not surround himself with a crowd of servile courtiers who convince him to consider “the kingdom as a patrimony that is his own property, and his people as a herd of cattle.”

Vattel discusses the duties of the sovereign to perfect the nation, under three headings: (1) by procuring the accommodations of life, (2) by procuring the true happiness of the nation, and (3) by ensuring the nation’s defense against external violence. Likewise, since the individual in the state, finds a well-regulated state the most powerful succor to enable him to perfect himself, he is obliged to contribute all in his power to render that society more perfect.

Constitution. Each nation must be governed by a constitution, or a fundamental regulation, which determines the manner in which government functions. The nation must choose the best constitution to allow the foundation for the nation’s preservation, safety, perfection, and happiness. Since the constitution of a nation is determined by what is best for the perfection of the nation, it can be changed. However, the constitution ought to possess stability, so its alteration should not be taken lightly, and requires the support of the entire nation. Neither the legislature, nor the sovereign, has the power to change the constitution on its own.

The assertion that each state must be governed according to a constitution, which meets these conditions, was a very revolutionary idea at that time, when Germany was made up of approximately three hundred separate, little states. In each, the prince or duke could rule with complete disregard for law. Even worse, the constitution of Germany, under the Holy Roman Empire, was a reactionary force on the German states. Vattel takes the opportunity to urge that a new constitution be adopted, so that the German nation might flourish.

Legislative Power. The legislative power is the body which makes civil and political laws to “furnish the state with laws suited to particular conjunctures,” for the perfection of the nation and its people. The nation may entrust this function to the prince or an assembly, but the laws enacted by the legislature must be consistent with the laws of nature and the constitution. “No engagement can oblige, or even authorize, a man to violate the law of nature.”

Judiciary. Vattel establishes the basis in natural law for the establishment of an independent judicial system. Since men have joined society and given up a part of their natural liberty to live in peace, the nation and its sovereign have a duty of ensuring justice. This requires both good laws, and a system which ensures that these laws are executed. It is in the interest of the sovereign, whether he be an assembly or a prince, that the people have confidence in the judicial system. “Confusion, disorder, and despondency will soon arise in a state, where the citizens are not sure of easily and speedily obtaining justice in all their disputes; without this, the civil virtues will become extinguished, and the society weakened.” The judicial system must be independent of the sovereign; a nation has the right, “to establish a supreme tribunal to judge all disputes, independently of the prince.” This independent judicial system should decide all disputes between the sovereign and the citizens. The state should also practice distributive justice in giving out rewards of the state, such as public employment, rather than treating these benefits as patronage. Vattel also stresses that the nobility must obey the laws, and attacks dueling, a “frenzy” and “manifest disorder, repugnant to the ends of civil society,” as an example of how the nobility set themselves above the law.

Three Principal Objects of a Good Government

1. To Provide for the Necessities of the Nation. The first duty of the sovereign is “providing for all the wants of the people, and producing a happy plenty of all the necessaries of life, with its conveniences and innocent and laudable enjoyments.” This allows them to better
labor after their principal duty, which is their own perfection. In other words, *a program for national economic development is a duty of the sovereign.* Vattel describes the key areas necessary for a national economic development program:

- Economic development requires “a sufficient number of able workmen in every useful or necessary profession.” Wise regulations and assistance properly granted will work better than constraint which is always fatal to industry. “Liberty is the soul of abilities and industry.”

- The development of agriculture. Large landholders cannot leave large plots uncultivated. Vattel proposes a program for public granaries to guarantee a secure food supply. These granaries must be used to keep the price of grain from wildly fluctuating. This both allows the nation to feed its people at a reasonable price during times of scarcity, and to preserve the farmers and gain higher export prices during times of plenty.

- Commerce must be regulated from the standpoint of national economic development. Trade, within the nation and with other nations, is necessary and beneficial. However, each nation has the right to impose controls on imports to protect and encourage its own industries. Therefore, nations often sign treaties to regulate trade. Nations have a duty to trade, when another country is threatened. For example, if a nation is suffering a famine, other nations with surplus food have a responsibility to ensure that it receives necessary food supplies.

- Transportation and communications. France and Holland, for example, benefit from good transportation systems. The whole nation should contribute to such useful undertakings. Vattel defends the practice of charging tolls to pay for investment in infrastructure, but attacks the strangulation of trade, by tolls charged merely for the right of passage, a practice which was strangling the German economy at the time.

- The sovereign has the right to control the issuance of money. He must guarantee the value of the coin. Unstable money hinders production and trade.

2. To Procure the True Happiness of the Nation. All the measures required for the development of the nation, are necessary, but not sufficient, to ensure its happiness. The desire for happiness ought to be the grand object of the public will. True happiness, or *agapē,* is attained when the people recognize that the development of creative reason is the true human identity. “To succeed in this [happiness], it is necessary to instruct the people to seek felicity where it is to be found; that is, in their own perfection,— and to teach
them the means of obtaining it.” The sovereign, and the entire nation, must fund and encourage the arts and sciences, and useful inventions. Public education is one of the most important concerns for government. A just ruler encourages learning; a tyrant demands ignorance. Freedom of philosophical discussion is necessary for a climate of discovery.

Merely to instruct the nation is not sufficient, however. The ruler must inspire within the people, the love of virtue and love for their country. The leaders of the government should set a personal example by themselves not indulging in hedonistic pleasures. If the rulers govern the country thus, they will inspire the citizens with an ardent love for their country. Each will then apply all his powers and abilities to the advantage and glory of the nation.

Piety and religion are essential for the happiness of a nation. Vattel is addressing this question a century after the end of the Thirty Years War, which was caused by Venetian manipulation of religious conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, and in which approximately a third of the population of Germany was killed. By piety, Vattel means, “the disposition of the soul that leads us to direct all our actions towards the Deity, and to endeavor to please him in everything we do.” The leaders of the nation should endeavor to practice piety in everything they do, and encourage piety in the people. The sovereign should allow freedom of religious belief; however, he must control actions, which are committed in the name of religion, from the standpoint of the happiness and perfection of the state. Disorders, in the name of religion, or doctrines which threaten the happiness and perfection of the state. The leaders of the nation should endeavor to practice piety in everything they do, and encourage piety in the people. The sovereign should allow freedom of religious belief; however, he must control actions, which are committed in the name of religion, from the standpoint of the happiness and perfection of the state. Disorders, in the name of religion, or doctrines which threaten the state are not to be tolerated. “It is a principle of fanaticism, a source of evils and of the most notorious injustice, to imagine that frail mortals ought to take up the cause of God, maintain his glory by acts of violence, and avenge him of his enemies.”

3. To Fortify Itself Against External Attacks. A nation is imperfect if it cannot repulse an unjust enemy. The state strengthens itself through increasing the number of its citizens, and improving their wealth and military virtues. These ends are met through the measures described in the first two objects of a good government. The nation must increase its population, through the improvement of living standards, so people can raise families. The increase in the wealth of the nation is also necessary, so spending on defense will not be an excessive burden. True glory, or the cultivation of wisdom and discernment, is intimately connected with a nation’s power. “The glory of Henry IV saved France. In the deplorable state in which he found affairs, his virtues gave animation to the loyal part of his subjects, and encouraged foreign nations to lend him their assistance. In his circumstances, a weak prince of little estimation would have been abandoned by all the world; people would have been afraid of being involved in his ruin.” (Book I, Chap. XV, Sec. 188)

A Nation Considered in its Relation To Others

“_it is impossible that nations should mutually discharge all these several duties if they do not love each other_”

Having established the principles of nations considered in themselves, Vattel next establishes the rights and duties of nations in relation to others. He opens this section by stating that his “maxims will appear very strange to cabinet politicians; and such is the misfortune of mankind.” He summarizes the basic principles, which he developed in the “Preliminaries,” that the ordering principle governing relations between nation-states, must be each nation contributing everything in its power to the perfection and happiness of other nations. Vattel lays out a detailed set of laws governing relations between nations, regarding such areas as aid and treaties. However, these agreements are meaningless unless they flow from a spirit of friendship and mutual affection between nations. He writes,

How happy would mankind be, were these amiable precepts of nature everywhere observed! Nations would communicate to each other their products and their knowledge; a profound peace would prevail all over the earth, and enrich it with its invaluable fruits; industry, the sciences, and the arts would be employed in promoting our happiness, no less than in relieving our wants; violent methods of deciding contests would be no more heard of; all differences would be terminated by moderation, justice and equity; the world would have the appearance of a large republic; men would live everywhere like brothers, and each individual be a citizen of the universe. That this idea should be but a delightful dream! Yet it flows from the nature and essence of man. (Book II, Chap. I, Sec. 16)

However, disorderly passions, and private and mistaken interests, prevent most nations from acting this way. Therefore, nations must act to protect themselves, since the law of nature cannot condemn the good to become the dupes and prey of the wicked, and a nation cannot be obliged to strengthen another, which seeks to destroy it. Instead, it must use its policies to encourage other nations to become more moderate and virtuous, setting a good example for others, with its own virtuous
conduct. A learned nation should assist another nation which desires to shake off barbarism. And, although nations have the duty to assist each other in seeking happiness, no nation has the right to impose its view of happiness on others.

The Principles of Just War

“It is an invariable truth that justice is inseparable from sound policy.”

Vattel derives a rigorous set of laws governing war, from his natural law hypothesis. He attacks Hobbes’ assertion that war is the natural state of man. For, according to Vattel, the “natural state of man” is reason, and “it is the part of a rational being to terminate his differences through rational methods, whereas, it is the characteristic of the brute creation to decide theirs by force.” The sovereign has the duty, both to his people and to other nations, to promote peace. However, the nation and sovereign have the duty, and, therefore, the right, to protect the liberty and happiness of the people. War is justified in defending the nation against those “who are deaf to the voice of justice.”

Rigorous conditions define when war is justified: War is only a last resort when other peaceful means of securing justice have been exhausted. A nation may prosecute its rights by force when its fundamental rights have been violated. Self-defense against an unjust attacker is also just. However, a just cause must not be used for unjust motives, such as self-aggrandizement, since then, the just cause becomes merely a pretext. Nations may also use force to restrain a nation which is attacking others, or showing a commitment to subjugating others. Nations which seek to aggrandize themselves through war, should be considered as enemies to the human race, in the same manner as professed assassins and incendiaries, and all other nations have a right to join in a confederacy for the purpose of punishing them.

The principles of justice are the most effective strategy for fighting a war. At all times, the offended power must hold out to its adversary the possibility of peace. Treat the adversary with the same humanity with which one treats friends, as this will establish the basis for peace, and encourage the adversary to cease his violence. Maximum force is allowed against the enemies’ ability to make war, but only against the ability to make war. The killing of soldiers is allowed, only until they have surrendered. The sole exception to this, is when soldiers are guilty of some enormous breach of the law of nations; then, they can then be punished for their crimes. The slaughter of non-combatants, such as women and children, serves no useful military purpose, and only makes the achievement of

British Efforts to Suppress Vattel’s The Law of Nations

A short biography of Vattel was published in 1913 in Great Jurists of the World, edited by Sir John MacDonell. The author of the biography, Coleman Phillipson, mocked the attempts by Americans, in the 1800’s, to popularize Vattel’s works. “Vattel is not perused with eagerness by every gentleman of liberal education or even by youth, while it is to be doubted if his masterpiece is familiar in any English University or in any English grade of population.” The author admitted that this had not always been the case: “Vattel at once found his audience, and an English edition [of The Law of Nations] appeared, as we have seen, in 1760 within two years of the publication of the original work.” The author of this short biography claimed that Vattel was a predecessor of Bentham, although he was forced to admit that this comparison did not fit.

Another British writer, J.L. Brierly of Oxford, acknowledged in his The Law of Nations, An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (1928), that Vattel had once been very influential in the United States. “He recognized in certain circumstances the right of part of a nation to separate itself from the rest, a doctrine which partly explains his great popularity in the United States, where a copy of the work was first [sic] received in 1775.” He credited Vattel with promoting the idea that all states, regardless of their size and power, were free and equally sovereign. Brierly quoted Vattel’s statement, “A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom.” He admitted that it was accurate to say that, “Grotius had written the international law of absolutism, Vattel has written the international law of political liberty.” But, Brierly then charged, that the survival of Vattel’s influence into the Twentieth century, “when the ‘principles of legal individualism’ are no longer adequate to international needs, if they ever were, has been a disaster for international law.”
peace more difficult. In contrast, the barbaric Grotius defended, as permissible in war, the slaughter of women, and even infants, and the execution of prisoners of war, without time limits. Grotius even tried to defend this conduct as lawful, by quoting the Bible, “that in the Psalms it is said that he will be happy who dashes the infants of the Babylonians against a rock.”

Vattel demonstrates that the principles of just warfare are not simply rules which nations should follow, but are a lawfulness, which nations violate only at their own peril. He uses the Roman Empire as an example, to show that a nation which expands through unjust warfare, destroys itself in the process:

“The Roman republic ruined herself by her triumphs, by the excess of her conquests and power. Rome, when mistress of the world, but enslaved by tyrants and oppressed by a military government, had to deplore the success of her arms, and to look back with regret on those happy times when her power did not extend beyond the bounds of Italy, or even when her dominion was almost confined within the circuit of her walls. (Book III, Chap. III, Sec. 30)

Finally, Vattel gives a justification for a people to throw off a tyrant, and to appeal to foreign governments for aid—something which the members of the Constitutional Convention, meeting in 1775 and 1776, must have found extremely useful:

“But, if the prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a legal right to resist him,—if tyranny, becoming insupportable, obliges the nation to rise in their own defense,—every foreign power has a right to succor an oppressed people who implore their assistance. . . . For, when a people, from good reasons take up arms against an oppressor, it is but an act of justice and generosity to assist brave men in the defense of their liberties. Whenever, therefore, matters are carried so far as to produce a civil war, foreign powers may assist that party which appears to them to have justice on its side. He who assists an odious tyrant,—he who declares for an unjust and rebellious people,—violates his duty. (Book II, Chap. IV, Sec. 56)

However, the right of a nation to support a revolt in another state should not be abused. No nation has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another, as sovereignty is crucial for the development of nations, and it is only through the development of nations, that freedom is possible for individuals. However, the rights of the sovereign are dependent on the fulfillment of his duty to the perfection of the nation, and people have the right to revolt against a sovereign who violates his fundamental duties, when no other course of action has corrected their grievances. The rebels must also demonstrate that they have the support of the people, and are a force which is independent of foreign control, rather than merely a puppet of foreign meddling. Then, and only then, do the rebels have the same rights that a sovereign possesses under the law of nations, and they can call on foreign nations for aid. As Vattel puts it,

“But, when the bands of the political society are broken, or at least suspended, between the sovereign and his people, the contending parties may then be considered as two distinct powers; and, since they are both equally independent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge them. (Book II, Chap. IV, Sec. 56)

In summary, Vattel correctly asserts, that it is impossible for any set of laws to correctly guide affairs between nations, unless nations are consciously working for the betterment of one another.

‘Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness’

“When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”

—The Declaration of Independence, 1776
Among those citing Vattel in legal cases and government documents, were Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, and John Marshall. John Adams, the future delegate to the Continental Congress, second President of the U.S., and father of President John Quincy Adams, recorded in his Diary on Feb. 1, 1763, that after spending the day frivolously, instead of reading and thinking, “The Idea of M. de Vattel indeed, scowling and frowning, haunted me.” In 1765, Adams copied into his Diary three statements by Vattel, “of great use to Judges,” that laws should be interpreted according to the intent of the author, and every interpretation which leads to absurdity should be rejected. In a letter to the Foreign Minister of Denmark, in 1779, Benjamin Franklin quoted Vattel, and “his excellent Treatise entitled Le Droit des Gens.”

James Madison, as a member of the Continental Congress in 1780, drafted the instructions sent to John Jay, for negotiating a treaty with Spain, which quotes at length from The Law of Nations. Jay complained that this letter, which was probably read by the Spanish government, was not in code, and “Vattel’s Law of Nations, which I found quoted in a letter from Congress, is prohibited here.” Later, John Marshall, during his thirty-four years as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, quoted Vattel by far the most among all authors on the law of nations.

The Law of Nations and the Declaration of Independence

Delegates to the First and Second Continental Congress, which produced the Declaration of Independence, often consulted The Law of Nations as a reference for their discussions. One important reason why the delegates chose to meet in Carpenters Hall, was that the building also housed the Library Company of Philadelphia. The librarian reported that Vattel was one of the main sources consulted by the delegates during the First Continental Congress, which met from Sept. 5 to Oct. 26, 1774. Charles W.F. Dumas, an ardent supporter of the American cause, printed an edition of The Law of Nations in 1774, with his own notes illustrating how the book applied to the American situation. In 1770, Dumas had met Franklin in Holland, and was one of Franklin’s key collaborators in his European diplomacy. He sent three copies to Franklin, instructing him to send one to Harvard University, and to put one in the Philadelphia library. Franklin sent Dumas a letter, Dec. 9, 1775, thanking him for the gift. Franklin stated, “I am much obliged by the kind pre-
The Law of Nations and The Constitution

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”
—Preamble of The Constitution of the United States

The Law of Nations was crucial in shaping American thinking about the nature of constitutions.

To this day, Great Britain does not have a written constitution, but instead a collection of laws, customs, and institutions, which can be changed by either the Parliament or the monarchy, or by the “Venetian” financiers who are the real power over the British Empire. Consequently, the British constitution remains to this day little more than a mask for the arbitrary power of the oligarchy.

The only place of appeal which the American colonists had for unjust laws was to the King’s Privy Council. Attempts by the colonists to argue that actions by the British Monarchy and Parliament were unlawful or unconstitutional would be stymied, if they stayed within this legal framework, which was essentially arbitrary. Although Vattel praised the British constitution for providing a degree of freedom and lawfulness not seen in most of the German states, his principles of constitutional law were entirely different from the British constitutional arrangements. Consequently, the American colonists attacked the foundation of the King and Parliament’s power, by demanding that Vattel’s principles of constitutional law be the basis for interpreting the British constitution.

American writers quoted The Law of Nations on constitutional law, almost immediately after the book’s publication. In 1764, James Otis of Massachusetts argued, in one of the leading pamphlets of the day, “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,” that the colonial charters were constitutional arrangements. He then quoted Vattel, that the right to establish a constitution lies with the nation as a whole, and the Parliament lacked the right to change the fundamental principles of the British Constitution. Boston revolutionary leader Samuel Adams wrote in 1772, “Vattel tells us plainly and without hesitation, that ‘the supreme legislative cannot change the constitution,’ ‘that their authority does not extend so far,’ and ‘that they ought to consider the fundamental laws as sacred, if the nation has not, in very express terms, given them power to change them.’” In a debate with the Colonial Governor of Massachusetts, in 1773, John Adams quoted Vattel that the parliament does not have the power to change the constitution.

The adoption of a constitution, by the Constitutional Congress in 1787, based on Leibnizian principles rather than British legal doctrine, was certainly not inevitable. However, British legal experts such as Blackstone, who argued that the Parliament and King could change the constitution, were increasingly recognized by the Americans as proponents of arbitrary power. The early revolutionary leaders’ emphasis on Vattel as the authority on constitutional law, with his conception that a nation must choose the best constitution to ensure its perfection and happiness, had very fortunate consequences for the United States and the world, when the U.S. Constitution was later written, as we shall see below.

Alexander Hamilton’s Approach To Natural Law

The issue of whether the American Republic would be a true republic, or merely a new government of landed aristocrats and financial oligarchs, was the central issue of the dispute, in which Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson became leaders on the two opposing sides. Contrary to most of today’s lying historians, Hamilton was the leader of the republicans, and Jefferson, a leader of the aristocratic party. Although many men contributed to the founding of the United States, it is useful to focus on Hamilton, since of all of America’s founders, he was most clearly influenced by Vattel, and his actions were most coherent with Leibnizian natural law. No one played a more important role than Hamilton, in the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, and in fulfilling its Leibnizian mandate. A number of Hamilton’s key initiatives show how Vattel’s The Law of Nations shaped Hamilton’s thinking and actions, and thereby shaped the founding of the United States.

Alexander Hamilton was born in the British West Indies in 1757. There, he developed a life-long hatred of slavery, seeing how it oppressed the slave and corrupted society in general. Hamilton was brought to the American colonies by republican circles. During the Revolution, he was Washington’s aide-de-camp. Following the Revolution, he qualified himself to practice law in New York State, in record time, and it was while studying for the New York bar examination in 1782, that Hamilton first read Vattel’s The Law of Nations. James Duane supervised his studies, and lent Hamilton his law library. Duane had been an influential member of the Continental Congress, where he was a staunch ally of Benjamin Franklin. Following his studies under Duane, Hamilton
began quoting Vattel in his writings. Duane placed his praise for Vattel into the court record in the *Rutgers v. Waddington* case, over which he presided as judge, while Hamilton appeared for the defense. Comparing Vattel to a previous author on the law of nations, Duane stated, “This last work, says a writer, is evidently rather an introduction than a system; and it served only to excite a desire to see it continued with equal perspicuity and elegance. The honor of this task was reserved for the great Vattel, whose work is entitled to the highest admiration!”

*Rutgers v. Waddington*. *Rutgers v. Waddington* (1784) is an excellent example of how Vattel shaped Hamilton’s philosophical outlook. Furthermore, Hamilton’s arguments in *Rutgers v. Waddington* were a milestone in the formulation of the American doctrine of judicial review, or the doctrine that legislative decisions must be reviewed by the courts, to determine if they are coherent with higher forms of law. In this case, a British merchant, Mr. Waddington, had occupied a brewery after its owner, Mrs. Rutgers, a patriot widow, fled New York City, following British occupation. In February 1784, at the height of anti-Tory feeling, Mrs. Rutgers filed a suit against Waddington under the Trespass Act. Hamilton represented the defendant, Waddington.

The Trespass Act and other acts by the New York legislature were extremely destructive, forcing one-fifth of the state’s population to flee, and thereby weakening the nation. Even worse, Hamilton saw these legislative actions as a new form of tyranny, spawned by the momentary passions of the mob, which could lead to a new aristocracy or oligarchy.

The case contrasts the Lockean approach of popular sovereignty, to Hamilton’s reliance on natural law.
Lawyers for the plaintiff argued that the legislature was the supreme law-giving authority of the state, and was subject to no control except that of the people. However, the New York State Constitution had adopted the common law of England, as part of the Constitution of New York. This British feature, of making past precedents part of the Constitution, Hamilton turned on its head, by arguing that, since the law of nations was part of the common law, the decisions of the New York Legislature must be consistent with the law of nations, in order to have validity. And Hamilton used Vattel as the standard for defining the law of nations.

Hamilton advanced two parallel approaches. First, he argued that state law was superseded by national law and the law of nations. He developed the concept of the law of nations, starting from the “Preliminaries” section of Vattel’s book. Amnesty in peace treaties is consistent with the law of nations. The laws of New York State must be consistent with the amnesty provisions of the peace treaty, which the Continental Congress had signed with the British, as well as with the law of nations. Therefore, the Trespass Act must be declared null and void. Second, he argued that the intent of the legislature must have been that their law be applied, only in a fashion consistent with the peace treaty and the law of nations. If the literal interpretation of a law led to an absurd, contradictory, or unjust result, it must be assumed that the legislature did not intend that the law be so interpreted. (One of Hamilton’s aphorisms was, “In law as in Religion, the Letter kills, the Spirit makes alive.”) A review of the case from this standpoint, would lead to the conclusion that the law did not apply to Waddington. Therefore, Waddington’s actions could not be punished. Both of these arguments required that the court review not simply the facts of the case, but the legitimacy of the law itself.

James Duane, then the mayor of New York City, presided over the proceedings, in an extremely charged atmosphere. He dodged the issue of whether the peace treaty, a national law, invalidated the New York State law. Responding to the second argument, Duane described the importance of the new republic abiding by the law of nations, and explained that the standard for the court would be Vattel. He ruled that the Trespass Act must be interpreted from the standpoint of its consistency with the law of nations. His judgement required Waddington to pay damages to Rutgers, although the amount was far smaller than demanded by the plaintiff, and the mob. Duane’s judgment was extremely unpopular, and the New York Assembly passed a resolution condemning his decision, even considering a resolution to replace him as mayor.

The U.S. Constitution. One of the first and most persistent in efforts to replace the weak central government with a strong one, was Alexander Hamilton. The government of the Articles of Confederation demonstrated its inadequacies during the American Revolution, and its failings became even clearer, when it was unable to halt the economic collapse which resulted from British economic warfare, following the 1783 Treaty of Paris. On Sept. 3, 1780, Hamilton, who was aide-de-camp for Washington, sent a letter to James Duane, who was then a Congressman, arguing that the weak central government was a disaster and urging specific reforms to strengthen it.40 For the next seven years, Hamilton argued in private letters, public appeals, resolutions, speeches in assemblies, and maneuvers at conventions, that a new constitution was needed to provide a strong central government.

Hamilton was a delegate to the convention which wrote the Constitution in 1787. His main concern was not the institutional arrangements of the government, but its purpose, and the creation of a central government strong enough to carry out that purpose. Three weeks into the convention, he delivered an all-day speech focusing on this. Whereas many of the delegates to the convention saw the purpose of government from the Lockean standpoint of “life, liberty and property,” Hamilton’s speech, coherent with Vattel’s “Principal Objects of a Good Government,” located the purposes of government as “the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture,” “tranquility and happiness at home,” and, “sufficient stability and strength to make us respectable abroad.”41

The concept of judicial review, which Hamilton had championed in Rutgers v. Waddington, was included in the U.S. Constitution. In Federalist Paper No. 78, “The Judges as Guardians of the Constitution,” circulated as part of the debate over the new Constitution, Hamilton developed a conception of constitutional law which was coherent with Vattel’s conception. Hamilton stated that it is a “fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness.” However, the Constitution can only be changed by the nation as a whole, and not by the temporary passions of the majority or by the legislature. Both to protect the Constitution, but also to ensure just enforcement of the law, the independence of the judiciary from the legislature and the executive branch is essential. The judiciary must be the guardians of the Constitution, to ensure that all legislative decisions are coherent with it. This idea championed by Hamilton, that the courts ensured that the Executive and Legislative
branches followed the Constitution, was later established as a principle of American jurisprudence by Chief Justice John Marshall.

The Citizen Genet Affair. George Washington became the first President of the United States, under the new Constitution, in April 1789. Hamilton was appointed the Secretary of the Treasury, which was by far the largest department. President Washington usually sought the views of the key members of his cabinet, before making important decisions on domestic and foreign policy. Hamilton relied primarily on Vattel in his writings on foreign policy.

The role of The Law of Nations, in the diplomacy of Hamilton and the Washington administration, is illustrated by the affair of Citizen Genet, the Ambassador from the French Republic. Both America and France were plunged into depression by the free trade policies which the British tricked them into adopting, as part of the 1783 treaty which ended the Revolutionary War. Patriots in America succeeded in solving the crisis by creating a strong central government. In France, British Intelligence head Jeremy Bentham used his agents in the Jacobin movement, to throw France into chaos, and destroy the nationalist leadership. As many as 40,000 people were killed, and 500,000 imprisoned, and France was destroyed as the world’s leading nation-state. Hamilton soon realized that Jacobin anarchy led quickly to tyranny. When, in February 1793, the French declared war on Spain, Great Britain, and Holland, Washington realized that neutrality was necessary for America’s survival.

Citizen Genet was given his assignment, as France was descending into the Terror, by a government which was destroying the France that had been America’s key ally. Genet arrived, not in the U.S. capital, Philadelphia, but in Charleston, South Carolina. He immediately began violating America’s sovereignty and neutrality, by recruiting Americans as privateers, to attack British shipping, and as mercenaries, for an attack on Spanish Florida and Louisiana.

Washington asked his Cabinet for advice on how to deal with the new government of France and its ambassador, Citizen Genet. Secretary of State Jefferson argued, that since all authority of governments was derived from the people, all prior treaties with France should remain in effect. Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton quoted Vattel at length, describing him as “the most systematic of writers on the laws of nations.” Hamilton argued that the French Constitution of 1791 was adopted with the approval of the entire French nation, and, therefore, was lawful. However, the seizure of power by extreme elements, who had suspended the Constitution, executed the King, and unleashed a wave of terror, had created conditions ripe for civil war. Therefore, the United States should hold its treaties with France in abeyance, until the situation was resolved. While every nation had the right to change its government, it did not have the right to involve other nations, absolutely and unconditionally, in those changes. Hamilton stated, “This would be to give to a nation or society, not only a power over its own happiness, but a power over the happiness of other Nations or Societies. It would be to extend the operations of the maxim, much beyond the reason of it—which is simply, that every Nation ought to have a right to provide for its own happiness.”

Washington made repeated attempts to control Genet’s actions, but Genet responded with increasing contempt, eventually threatening to bypass the President, and appeal directly to the people. On June 22, Genet exploded at the Washington administration, writing, “you bring forward aphorisms of Vattel, to justify or excuse infractions committed on positive treaties.” The administration eventually demanded that the French government recall Genet.

Establishing Republics in Hispanic America. Hamilton’s efforts to liberate Spain’s American colonies, began a long history of U.S. involvement in spreading the ideas of the United States as a sovereign constitutional republic into the movements toward nation-states in the Hispanic Americas. In a 1784 open letter presenting his case in Rutgers v. Waddington, Hamilton wrote that “the influence of our example” had “penetrated the gloomy regions of despotism,” and “pointed the way to inquiries which may shake it to its deepest foundations.” Hamilton argued, in Federalist Paper No. 11, that the effects of the continuance of the union would allow the nation to develop a navy strong enough to be the arbiter of Europe in America. “Let the thirteen States bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!” And, in a 1793 letter to Washington, Hamilton argued that it was “lawful and meritorious to assist a people in a virtuous and rational struggle for liberty.”

When Spain was reduced to the status of a satrap in France’s empire in 1798, Hamilton attempted to organize the U.S. government to launch a war, which would have added Florida and Louisiana to the nation, and turned the Spanish colonies into constitutional republics. South
American revolutionary leader Francisco Miranda, who praised Vattel as “the wisest and most celebrated of modern publicists,” asked Hamilton to help draw up a constitution for the liberated regions. He urged Hamilton, “At least, I am sure that your Greek predecessor Solon would not have refused.”

In Conclusion

In 1832, Chancellor Kent, the leading American author on law, ranked Hamilton as the nation’s greatest lawyer of that period. Still today, Hamilton can truly be ranked as the greatest American lawyer. While his “profound penetration, his power of analysis, the comprehensive grasp and strength of his understanding,” are indisputable, his greatest contribution to justice was to have designed and implemented a system of national economic development, which fulfilled the Leibnizian natural law embodied in the Constitution. He studied the writings and efforts of the mercantilist school of economics, such as the French Finance Minister he called “the great Colbert.” He worked to organize the population to support the use of machinery and an increased division of labor, to improve productivity, and increase the wealth of the entire nation. He saw the increase in wealth of the nation, not merely as an end in itself, but as a means to develop creative abilities of the people. The extension of the use of machinery would encourage men “to exert his imagination in devising methods to facilitate and abridge labor,” he wrote, and would develop the strongest and most active powers of the mind.

Hamilton launched a program to build up the new nation based on the Leibnizian concept of the development of the productive powers of labor. He designed the National Bank of the United States, to provide the nation with a stable monetary system and a source of credit for the development of the nation. This measure, and his reorganization of the nation’s debt, stabilized the economy, which had been in a severe crisis, and brought about the most rapid development in the history of America, to that time. In the “Report to the Nation on Manufactures,” Hamilton mapped out a grand design for the development of the nation, through measures to develop the labor force, protect and encourage domestic industry, and develop industry through science.

Far from receiving universal support, Hamilton faced mounting opposition, and was subjected to a massive slander campaign. Opponents to the National Bank of the United States argued that the establishment of a bank by the government was unconstitutional. Hamilton, in his “Opinion of the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank,” developed the arguments which became the basis for the interpretation of the Constitution according to its Leibnizian character for future generations. Hamilton, like Vattel, argued that the sovereign has the duty and, therefore, the right to take actions, which are necessary for the fulfillment of his duties to the nation. In order to provide for national exigencies and promote national prosperity, Hamilton wrote in his defense of the constitutionality of the Bank, that, “the powers contained in a constitution of government, especially those which concern the general administration of the affairs of a country, its finances, trade, defense, etc., ought to be construed liberally, in advancement of the public good.” Hamilton’s writings became the basis for later arguments in defense of the American System.

The measures which Hamilton described in the “Report to the Nation on Manufactures,” were largely blocked. Much of Hamilton’s economic system was dismantled. Only crises, which threatened the nation’s existence, jolted the U.S. to readopt these measures. In the crises of 1812 and 1860, great leaders were able to rally the American people to adopt measures which built the nation.

The nation and the world are now in the worst crisis in five hundred years. The effects of the triumph of the oligarchy and, especially, the last thirty years of unprecedented decay, have put the very existence of civilization in question. To deal with this threat, Lyndon LaRouche has designed a strategy for sovereign nation-states, collaborating in a grand design of economic development, to replace the bankrupt international monetary and financial system. As LaRouche wrote recently,

The successful development and continued existence of the sovereign nation-state republic, as an institution, depend, unconditionally, upon the fostering of agapē as the characteristic feature of the relationship between the individual person and the society as a whole. It also requires, the extension of this same principle to defining the relations within a globally extended community of sovereign nation-state republics. Thus agapē is the principal element of hypothesis underlying all enterprises of that republican cause.

Most world leaders and, certainly, most American citizens, would consider this as “idealistic,” that is, “totally impractical.” In fact, as we have seen, it was exactly this approach which built the United States into the greatest nation on earth. It is time to reflect on the words and deeds of Leibniz, Vattel, and Hamilton, and to ensure that Lyndon LaRouche’s design is successful, so that out of this crisis will come a new beginning for the peoples of the whole world.
NOTES

1. For the historical roots of the concept of natural law set forth by Leibniz, in the Platonic Christian tradition of man as imago Dei first developed by St. Augustine, elaborated upon by St. Thomas Aquinas, and developed further by Nicolaus of Cusa, see William F. Wertz, Jr., “Man Measures His Intellect Through the Power of His Works”: Nicolaus of Cusa’s Revolution in the Platonic Christian Concept of Natural Law,” Fidesio, Winter 1994 (Vol. III, No. 4).

2. Emmerich de Vattel, Questions de droit naturel, et observations sur le Traité du droit de la nature de M. le baron de Wolf (Berne: Société typographique, 1762).


19. Ibid., p. 40.


25. Valenti, Lowry, Müller de Paoli, op. cit.


33. Charles William Frederick Dumas was a native of Switzerland, who lived most of his life in The Netherlands. He was one of the most important agents and diplomats working for the American cause in Europe. Dumas corresponded constantly with Franklin, using his edition of The Law of Nations as a cipher for coding his communications. Franklin had to use his copy of The Law of Nations to decipher Dumas’ letters.


44. Ibid., pp. 374-75.


Among America’s founding fathers, there is no one who better embodies the matrix of axiomatic viewpoints which allowed for the British-intelligence orchestration of the Confederacy and secession, than Thomas Jefferson, third President of the United States (1801-09).

Included amongst these viewpoints may be found:

- anti-industrialism and denunciation of manufacturing and city-building as “corrupting”;
- belief in pastoral agrarianism, i.e., “rural idiocy”;
- rabid Jacobin populism, leading to an attempt to gut the Constitution’s dirigistic General Welfare clause, in so-called defense of the bigoted “little people”;
- adherence to the British free-trade doctrines of Adam Smith, and hence slavish adoption of the budget-balancing dogmas of
Anglo-Swiss financier-agent Albert Gallatin;

• support of the institution of slavery as inseparable from the Southern way of life (despite deploring individual instances of maltreatment);

• racial eugenicist ideas about Black people.

All of these viewpoints derive, hereditarily, from Jefferson’s

• hatred of Plato and “deep thoughts,” and enthusiasm for the Enlightenment empiricists Francis Bacon, John Locke, and Isaac Newton.

There is, of course, another side to Jefferson, which immediately springs to mind. After all, Jefferson certainly drafted the lofty Declaration of Independence in 1776, although admittedly under the direction of a committee headed by the towering genius of Benjamin Franklin. He was classically educated, schooled at one point by George Wythe, the leading American Platonist, and as President and after, he fostered education, writing as early as 1779 for an educational system to be constructed, such that “geniuses. . . [would be] raked from the rubbish,” meaning, that the children of the poor were to be educated. As President, he supported certain internal improvements in roads and waterways, and pursued the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, which effectively secured the continent for the republic’s expansion. And, in 1807, he helped bring to trial for treason, his former Republican Party collaborator and Vice President, Aaron Burr.

Nevertheless, despite his undeniable service to the nation, his axiomatics overruled him, and ultimately caused him, at various points throughout his life, to cause serious harm to the development of the United States, even endangering its continued existence.

Jefferson’s ideals were defined by his “gentlemanly” life as a member of the plantation class in Virginia. Here flourished the ideals of bucolic enforced underdevelopment, and of “democratic equality”—provided one knew one’s place. Although Jefferson was, to an extent, elevated and constrained by the responsibilities of office while serving as President from 1801 to 1809,— for example, as when he defended the United States against the Tory “Essex Junto” secessionists of New England,— when he returned to private life, he reverted to these parochialist views, often referring to Virginia as “my country,” and to Americans from other states as “foreigners.” In retirement, he stubbornly refused to grow in real knowledge,

Facing top: Monticello, the home of Thomas Jefferson, near Charlottesville, Virginia. (Nineteenth-century painting)

Facing: Jefferson as a young man.

What Was The Confederacy?

The Confederacy was the culmination of a string of British-intelligence operations, from the middle 1790’s onward, intended to fracture and overthrow the American republic. These included the Whiskey Rebellion, the Aaron Burr conspiracy, and the “Essex Junto.” These British-directed movements, whether from the “left” or the “right,” were all aimed against the American nationalist tradition founded by Benjamin Franklin, and continued by Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams, and Abraham Lincoln.

In New England, for example, a group of Tory sympathizers known as the “Essex Junto,” primarily from Boston Brahmin families, took over almost the entirety of the Federalist Party, causing John Quincy Adams to write of “the design of certain leaders of the Federal Party to effect a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a Northern Confederacy. This design had been formed in the winter of 1803-04 . . . to the length of fixing upon a military leader for its execution.” Later, this Essex Junto aided and abetted the British attempt to reconquer America in the War of 1812.

In the case of the southern Confederacy, the British used controlled networks, such as the Knights of the Golden Circle, and in the beginning, outright traitors like Aaron Burr and Albert Gallatin, in addition to the New England Tories, to orchestrate the dissolution of the Union. Their plan was to balkanize America into several warring micro-states, and establish a Spartan feudal economy, based on agrarianism and slave-labor.

In drafting its constitution in 1861, the Confederate States of America had an opportunity to provide counter-arguments to the Leibnizian principles embedded in the U.S. Constitution. It therefore (1) eliminated the General Welfare clause; (2) prohibited Federally-funded internal improvements; (3) prohibited protective tariffs, in favor of British “free trade”; and (4) propounded the institution of Black chattel slavery. All these arguments would have been agreeable to Thomas Jefferson, and they continue to this day to inspire America’s populist movements.

It is not astonishing, therefore, that in 1992 the head of the Conservative Revolution’s fascist Ludwig von Mies Institute, Lewellyn Rockwell, wrote an opinion column in the Richmond Times-Dispatch outrageously entitled, “Bring the U.S. Constitution Up To Confederate Standards.” The nostalgia for the “Lost Cause” of ignorance, slavery, and serfdom, has a very British pedigree, indeed.
or change his views, living in self-imposed isolation on his Monticello plantation, surrounded by aristocrats, slave-holding friends, and a pro-Confederate clique.*

From the late 1810’s onward, his populist hostility to the Federal government was mixed with increasing personal bitterness, as he deplored the efforts of the government, aided by the Supreme Court, to chart a nationalist course through the development of infrastructure and the chartering of manufacturing corporations.

Although Jefferson was not a traitor or outright witting British agent like Aaron Burr or Albert Gallatin, he was still close enough to Gallatin, Burr, and his friend Thomas Cooper, the intellectual author of the 1832 Nullification Act which helped launch the Confederacy,† to be a very malleable, and sometimes agreeing, asset. Moreover, Jefferson’s political alliances and deeds, particularly after 1809, were indispensable to the formation of the Confederacy. That Jefferson had benefitted from a good upbringing and classical educational advantages, simply made the outcome of his life that much more poignantly tragic.

Jefferson’s connection to the Confederacy is not a moot point, because the “Jeffersonian” outlook is today hegemonic amongst every stripe of populist political force in the United States. It is touted by the “Jefferson-Jackson” grouping within the Democratic Party, and the “Conservative Revolution” republicans, such as Newt Gingrich and Phil Gramm, use the same ideology to sell their fascist ideas. It is indisputably the ideological underpinning of the Ross Perot, Rush Limbaugh, and various other enraged, British-steered “protest” movements. Listen to the Southern Partisan crowd, who long nostalgically for the revival of the Confederacy—in their jargon, the defeated “Lost Cause”—, or the fascist Mont Pelerin-Von Hayek movement, which treats Jefferson as a saint, and quotes him as the foundation for their views.

If we ask why the American population is so susceptible to manipulation by these British-directed political operations, the answer is: Because, for a good part of their waking life, most Americans today think precisely in the same terms as Thomas Jefferson did, and they have mistakenly identified and enshrined these views as the ideals of American freedom and individualism. Hence, it is not surprising that, in the 1996 election, the core Gingrich-shaped Republican vote came from the South and the West, where American populist ideology is strongest (and where, if not blocked, an attempt will surely be made to resurrect a real, live Confederate movement to be imposed on the country nationally).

Let us begin, then, by examining the hereditary underpinnings of Jefferson’s espousal of the purity and values of the bigoted “common man,” in his philosophical attachment to the ideas of John Locke and the Venetian-spawned Enlightenment.

1. Platonism vs. Empiricism

Although Jefferson had the privilege of being taught by George Wythe, a leading American patriot and Platonist, it was the anti-Platonic Enlightenment which he embraced for his philosophical worldview. As biographer Dumas Malone reports, Jefferson held the British empiricists “Sir Isaac Newton and John Locke [along with] . . .

* A legion of the actual leaders of the Confederacy venerated Jefferson. Two of Jefferson’s grandsons, whom he helped raise and educate at Monticello, Thomas Jefferson Randolph and George Wythe Randolph, became leaders of the Confederacy.

† Jefferson’s life-long political and philosophical collaborator Thomas Cooper (1759-1839) was a British-intelligence agent and traitor, who is considered one of the intellectual fathers of the Confederacy. Born in Manchester, England, Cooper worked as a radical “leftist” during the French Revolution. He was an atheist, who shared with Jefferson a belief in the denial of the soul, and a pro-slavery racist. On March 16, 1826, Cooper stated, “I do not say the blacks are a distinct species; but I have not the slightest doubt of their being an inferior variety of the human species; and not capable of the same improvements as whites.”

When Jefferson was founding the University of Virginia, he selected Cooper to be a professor, to add “stature” to the University and help shape its curriculum. In 1820, angry Virginia religious leaders and scholars blocked that move. Jefferson lamented: “I know no one who could have aided us so much in forming the future regulations for our infant institution.”

In 1822, Cooper moved to South Carolina. He became the President of South Carolina College, and continued to exchange approving letters with Jefferson. In 1824, Cooper published a pamphlet, “Consolidation,” which was a radical exposition of states’ rights. He wrote that the powers of Congress are “specific, limited, enumerated”; they “do not emanate . . . from any abstract principle of what the public good may require; but from the deliberate concessions and absolute will of the sovereign and independent states.” This pamphlet was circulated among Jefferson’s “Richmond Junto.”

Jefferson died in 1826, but Cooper continued in this vein. In 1828, the U.S. government passed a tariff to further develop the country’s manufacturing. In the South, the faction which was pro-British and free-trade rose up against it, calling it the “Tariff of Abominations.” Cooper attacked the tariff as a product of the American System of economics, which he called “a system of fraud, robbery, and usurpation.” In response to this tariff, Cooper authored and organized for the 1832 South Carolina Nullification Act, the first defiant announcement of secession, which was the opening act in the launching of the Confederacy. [See Dumas Malone, The Public Life of Thomas Cooper (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1961), esp. pp. 244-45, 289, 294, 309; see also, Anton Chaitkin, Treason in America: From Aaron Burr to Averell Harriman, pps. 163-73, 173-78, 197-98 (footnote 1).]
Lord Bacon in his trinity of immortals.” He considered Plato, the founder of the creative system of thought upon which Western Christian civilization developed, as “foggy” and unreadable. It is certainly true that some Americans, even of good will, got taken in by Locke, Bacon, and Newton; but, in the case of Jefferson, the attachment to the British empiricist school went deeper: it was the basis of his outlook.

The Platonic method holds that the creative process of discovery, of human hypothesis-formation, in which man creates higher-order conceptions of greater efficiency and power, is the source of all economic wealth and human development. This method created the Italian Renaissance and the 1439-40 Council of Florence, which, in turn, created the discovery and development of America. Through the dirigistic, Platonic-republican nation-state, the vision of future progress, expressed through ideas, determines and changes the present. As Lyndon LaRouche has written in “The Essential Role of ‘Time-Reversal’ in Mathematical Economics,”

The lesson of the progress of science, in these Platonic terms of reference, is that the universe is, in effect, so pre-designed, that it is obliged to obey man’s will, whenever man’s will is expressed according to Reason; according to valid changes in hypothesis, from lower to higher hypotheses. The relevant action, by means of which the efficient principle of existence of the human species is defined, is the advancement of man’s operating hypothesis from a relatively lower hypothesis, to a relatively more valid, more powerfully efficient one.

The scientific revolution, produced by the valid higher hypotheses of individual sovereign minds, leads to the non-entropic development of the economy.

Jefferson rejected the core of this Platonist outlook. He rejected the Platonic concept of hypothesis, the effective “immaterial” ideas of the Christian Platonic tradition, including the idea of the soul. In the Enlightenment view, there is no such thing as hypothesis,— e.g., Newton’s famous “hypothesis non fingo”,— and indeed, there are no new ideas. There is no higher-order advancement from one hypothesis to another, only the cataloging of dead, logical-formal formulae, coupled to the obsessive belief that knowledge can be derived only from the senses—from what you can touch, feel, bite, or squeeze.

In an Aug. 26, 1820 letter to former President John Adams, Jefferson wrote that his system of thought rested strictly on materialism, in which true human thinking is outlawed, by being reduced to an epiphenomenon of the chemical interactions in the brain. Jefferson stated that his ideas proceeded from the materialist-empiricist premise

‘I feel, therefore I exist.’ I feel bodies which are not myself: [therefore] there are other existences . . . . When once we quit the basis of sensation, all is in the wind. To talk of

Thomas Jefferson, Jacobin

When the French Revolution began in 1789, there was much pro-Revolution sentiment in America, by all leading layers, who held out the hope that a republic would be established. That hope was soon drowned in the British-orchestrated Jacobin bloodbath. But, Jefferson continued to support the revolution, long after its promise had been dashed. On Jan. 3, 1793, when the mobs’ murderous destruction left no doubt as to its fascist character, Jefferson wrote to his friend William Short, U.S. Ambassador to France:

The tone of your letters for some time have given me pain, on account of the extreme warmth with which they censured the proceedings of the Jacobins of France. I have considered that sect as the same with the Republican patriots, and the Feuillants as the Monarchical patriots, well-known in the early part of the revolution, both having in object the establishment of a free constitution . . . . It was necessary to use the arm of the people, a machine not so blind as balls and bombs, but blind to a certain degree. A few of their cordial friends met at their hands the fate of enemies. But time and truth will rescue and embalm their memories, while their posterity will be enjoying that very liberty for which they would never have hesitated to offer up their lives. The liberty of the whole earth was depending on the issue of the contest, and was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood? My own affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated.*

During 1793, Jefferson ignominiously sponsored Jacobin France’s Ambassador to the United States, “Citizen Edmond Genet” to set up seditious Jacobin clubs—they were formally called “Democratic Clubs”—throughout the United States. This led leading American patriots to force the recall of Genet back to France. It is not an accident that Jacobin Jefferson supported the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania, an act of treason against the Federal government led by Jefferson’s later collaborator Albert Gallatin. The rebellion, which was built through the Jacobin “Democratic Clubs,” had to be put down by 13,000 militia men, under the military command of General George Washington, who was also, of course, President of the United States.

Jacobinism was a very active idea for Jefferson. In response to Shay’s Rebellion of 1786-87 in western Massachusetts, which was an uprising against the Federal government, Jefferson made the infamous comment: “I like a little rebellion now and then. . . . The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.” (Nov. 13, 1787, letter to William Smith)

* Writings, pp. 1003-1006 (footnote 4).
immortal existences is to talk of nothings. To say that the human soul, angels, god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, no soul. . . . I believe I am supported in my creed of materialism by Locke . . . .” [Emphasis in original]

In a February 1789 letter to John Trumbull, Jefferson asked for drawings of Bacon, Newton, and Locke, so that he could construct a montage of them while he was serving as U.S. Ambassador in Paris. Jefferson said,

With respect to the busts and pictures I will put off till my return [to] America all of them except Bacon, Locke and Newton, whose pictures I will trouble you to have copied for me: and as I consider them as the three greatest men that have ever lived, without any exception, and as having laid the foundation of those superstructures which have been raised in the Physical and Moral sciences, I would wish to form them into a knot on the same canvas, that they may not be confounded at all with the herd of other great men.5

[Emphasis added]

When, toward the end of his life, Jefferson drafted a recommended curriculum for the new University of Virginia which he had founded, it was the social contract ideas of John Locke which were to be taught first and foremost. The memorandum, dated March 4, 1825, asserts:

[T]he general principles of liberty and the rights of man, in nature and in society, the doctrines of Locke, in his “Essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government,” and of Sidney in his “Discourses on government,” may be considered as those generally approved by our fellow citizens of this [Virginia], and the United States . . . . 6

Compare this to Jefferson’s disparagement of Plato in a July 1814 letter written to former President John Adams:

I am just returned from one of my long absences, having been at my other home for five weeks past. Having more leisure there than here for reading, I amused myself with reading seriously Plato’s republic. I am wrong however in calling it amusement, for it was the heaviest task-work I ever went through. I had occasionally before taken up some of his other works, but scarcely ever had patience to go through a whole dialogue. While wading thro’ the whimsies, the puerilities, and unintelligible jargon of this work, I laid it down often to ask myself how it could have been that the world should have so long consented to give reputation to such nonsense as this? How the soi-disant Christian world indeed should have done it, is a piece of historical curiosity. But how could the Roman good sense do it? And particularly how could Cicero bestow such eulogies on Pla
to? Altho’ Cicero did not wield the dense logic of Demosthenes, yet he was able, learned, laborious, practiced in the business of the world, and honest. He could not be the dupe of mere style, of which he was himself the master in the world. With the Moderns, I think, it is rather a matter of fashion and authority. Education is chiefly in the hands of persons who, from their profession, have an interest in the reputation and the dreams of Plato. They give the tone while at school, and few, in their after-years, have accession to revise their college opinions. But fashion and authority apart, bringing Plato to the test of reason, take from him his sophisms, futilities, and incomprehensibilities, and what remains? In truth, he is one of the race of genuine Sophists, who has escaped the oblivion of his brethren, first by the elegance of his diction, but chiefly by the adoption and incorporation of his whimsies into the body of artificial Christianity. His foggy mind, is forever presenting the semblances of objects which, half seen thro’ a mist, can be defined neither in form or dimension. Yet this which should have consigned him to early oblivion really procured him immortality of fame and reverence. The Christian priesthood, finding the doctrines of Christ levelled to every understanding, and too plain to need explanation, saw, in the mysticisms of Plato, materials with which they might build up an artificial system which might, from its indistinctness, admit everlasting controversy, give employment for their order, and introduce it to profit, power and pre-eminence. The doctrines which flowed from the lips of Jesus himself are within the comprehension of a child; but thousands of volumes have not yet explained the Platonisms engrafted on them: and for this obvious reason that nonsense can never be explained. Their purposes however are answered. Plato is canonized; and it is now deemed as impious to question his merits as those of an Apostle of Jesus. He is peculiarly appealed to as an advocate of the immortality of the soul and yet I will venture to say that were there no better arguments than his in proof of it, not a man in the world would believe it. It is fortunate for us that Platonic republicanism has not obtained the same favor as Platonic Christianity; or we should now have been all living men, women and children, pell mell together, like beasts of the field or forest.7

Jefferson’s Enlightenment empiricism formed the matrix of his axiomatic assumptions, around which clustered a latticework of corresponding prejudices and opinions.

2. ‘Leibnizian’ Technology

Jefferson was at complete odds with the concept that making technological improvements in capital goods would fundamentally transform and upgrade for the better, the system of agriculture. Jefferson never even remotely grasped the fundamental contribution to human thought of Gottfried Leibniz, which was the basis for the founding of America.

To summarize: The science of economics begins with the idea expressed in Genesis 1:26-30, that man, who is
created in the image of God by virtue of the power of creative reason, exercises dominion over the Earth through an ordered process of continuous scientific discovery. These scientific revolutions are embodied in the design of the machine-tool sector, and capital goods industry, which impress or stamp the technological correlates of this scientific revolution on the economy as a whole. Leibniz approached this from the development of the heat-powered machine, which his networks, through Denis Papin, helped create.

Jefferson's view was the opposite of this. In “Notes on the State of Virginia,” in the section marked Query XIX, “The present state of manufactures, commerce, interior and exterior trade?, “ Jefferson wrote,

[S]uch is our attachment to agriculture, and such our preference for foreign manufactures, that be it wise or unwise, our people will certainly return as soon as they can, to the raising raw materials, and exchanging them for finer manufactures than they are able to execute themselves.

The economists of Europe have established it as a principle that every state should endeavor to manufacture for itself: and this principle, like many others, we transfer to America, without calculating the difference of circumstance which should often produce a difference of result. In Europe, the lands are either cultivated, or locked up against the cultivator. Manufacture must therefore be resorted to of necessity, not of choice, to support the surplus of their people. But we have an immensity of land courting the industry of the husbandman. It is best then that all our citizens should be employed in its improvement, or that one half should be called off from that to exercise manufactures and handicraft arts for the other? Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of the cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has admired, is essentially that of a feudal aristocracy: men looking up to heaven, to their own soil and industry, as the husbandman, for their subsistence, depend for it on the casualties and caprice of customers. Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition. This, the natural progress and consequence of the arts, has sometimes perhaps been retarded by accidental circumstances: but, generally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any state to its healthy parts, and is a good-enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption. While we have land to labor then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a workbench, or twirling a distaff. Carpenters, masons, smiths, are wanting in husbandry, but for the general operations of manufacture, let our workshops remain in Europe. It is better to carry provisions and materials to workmen there, than bring them to the provisions and materials, and with them their manners and principles. The loss by transportation of commodities across the Atlantic will be made up in happiness and permanence of government. The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body.’ [Emphasis added]

And in notes written in 1788:

[C]ircumstances rendering it impossible that America should become a manufacturing country during the time of any man now living, it would be a waste of attention to examine [mechanical arts and manufactures] minutely.

Thus, although Jefferson experimented with different root stocks, and with finding what foods and plants were suited to the North American soil, he rejected upgrading the fundamental mode of agriculture, by applying the science of economics.

Jefferson's views led him into continuing conflict with Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton had grasped several of the key concepts of Leibniz's system, and expressed them in his 1790 “Report on a National Bank,” and his 1791 “Report on the Subject of Manufactures.” In that latter work, Hamilton stated that economics is derived from the “improvement in [the] productive powers [of labor], whether to be derived from an accession of Skill, or from the application of ingenious machinery.” Hamilton spoke of the benefit to the total economy, of “artificial labor” or “labor-saving devices.” In that same report, Hamilton wrote, “To cherish and stimulate activity of the human mind, by multiplying the objects of enterprise, is not among the least considerable of the expedients, by which the wealth of a nation may be promoted.” Economics begins with creative discovery. The object of economics is to increase the density of singularities of scientific discovery, which improves “the artificial labor.”

The dispute between Jefferson and Hamilton is often mischaracterized, by being reduced to a debate over the relative merits of agricultural versus industrial development. But the issues originate at a deeper level. Jefferson’s view of man, like that of the British empiricists whom he admired, is essentially that of a feudal aristocracy: men are dumb chattel, incapable of improvement. This is the underside of the Jeffersonian “people’s democracy”: bucolic underdevelopment, a “pure democracy” achieved by eliminating the principle of change. It is a view consistent with a society dependent upon slavery.

This criticism may seem harsh, but it is true. Under Jefferson’s system, America would always be backward, always be dependent, and therefore, always be under British rule, including the method by which raw materials-producing countries are subjugated financially,
through loans, adverse terms of trade, etc. Despite his substantial contribution to its founding, Jefferson never understood the purpose of America, nor the role it was to play in the future development of the world. He opposed, violently, with the fervor of a zealot, the Leibnizian concept of man and economics, which would prove to be the only path for America to become a Republic, the path of true industrialization.

3. The ‘General Welfare’

Jefferson was not opposed to all internal improvements as such, and even approved of some important infrastructure projects, which nationalist forces had been championing, during his second term of Presidency. But Jefferson opposed the concept of the use of the state for the public good, or General Welfare.

The General Welfare clause is located in the very concise and rich Preamble of the U.S. Constitution, which states that,

We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

This clause is the heart of the Constitution. It flows directly from the Declaration of Independence, and gives the state the responsibility to improve the physical condition of the citizen, through increasing his mastery over nature, and to educate and improve the mind of the citizenry; it thus recognizes the link between the nation-state and creative scientific discovery. The concept of the General Welfare enhanced the thrust for internal improvements; served to flesh out the positively defined role of the corporation to be chartered by the state and function for the public good; set the basis for the spread of public education, and, during the Twentieth century, for the Hill-Burton Act’s provision of competent healthcare logistics for all Americans; etc.

Jefferson’s opposition was shown clearly when, for example, as Secretary of State, he wrote a memorandum to President George Washington on Feb. 15, 1791, on the subject of the Bank of the United States. In his opposition to the Bank, Jefferson took a view, which has since been called, by its backers, the “constructionist” or “states’ rights” view of the Constitution. His arguments shrank the General Welfare clause to mean only the collecting of revenues for payment of debt, while opposing the ability of the United States to control the formation of corporations, and hence, its economic activity. Jefferson wrote, I consider the foundation of the constitution as laid on this ground, that, “all powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, or to the people.” (Twelfth Amendment.) To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.

The incorporation of a bank, and other powers assumed by this bill, have not, in my opinion, been delegated to the United States by the constitution:

1. They are not among the powers especially enumerated; Nor are they within either of the general phrases, which are the two following:

1. “To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States”; that is to say, to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare; for the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They are not to lay taxes ad libitum, for any purpose they please, but only to pay the debts, or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do any thing they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please, which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless: it would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; . . .” [Emphasis in original]

Jefferson’s “states’ rights” posture is actually concomitant in large measure to his opposition to the General Welfare clause, that is, his opposition to the General Welfare clause and dirigism wasn’t based upon his support for states’ rights, but vice versa.

This becomes clear in Jefferson’s writing of the 1798 Kentucky Resolutions, in which he advocated that states had a proper remedy for infractions of the Constitutional compact, in the form of nullification. Many features of the Kentucky Resolutions became models for the later Confederate constitution, which dumped the General Welfare clause. Jefferson continued to express this same viewpoint to the end of his life. In a December 1825 document (“Draft Declaration and Protest of the Commonwealth of Virginia, etc.”), written in response to the Federal government’s building of infrastructure in the Federal territories, Jefferson wrote that, “[The Federal government] claim, for example, and have commenced the exercise of a right to construct roads, open canals, and effect other internal improvements within the territories and jurisdictions exclusively belonging to the several States . . . .” Jefferson threatened nullification of the Constitution, and dissolution, unless the Fed-
eral government backed away from its policy.

In the period of 1819 through 1824, the nationalist forces, representing the Leibnizian tradition in America, acted through the Supreme Court to render a series of rulings that strengthened and made explicit the powers implicit in the General Welfare clause. At the time, Chief Justice John Marshall indicated his heavy reliance on Alexander Hamilton’s 1791 memorandum to President George Washington, on the question of the Bank of the United States, in which Hamilton rebutted Jefferson on these issues.

Jefferson and his Virginia political clique [see Box, p. 36] went into full mobilization against the 1819-1824 Supreme Court rulings. Their battle cry was against “consolidationism” (too much Federal power), accompanied, pari passu, by the claim that the United States was nothing more than a confederate compact of sovereign states. This faction contended that the Federal government could not implement national economic policies that would be binding on the different states: To do so would be “tyranny.”

Three of the crucial Supreme Court rulings were:

McCulloch v. Maryland. In 1816, the Congress passed legislation, signed by President Madison, that incorporated the Second National Bank of the United States. Like the First National Bank, when properly run, its purpose was to direct cheap, sovereignly-controlled credit to the development of American industry and agriculture, freeing America from control by London finance. In 1819, ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress to incorporate the Second Bank. The basis for the decision, was the concept that certain natural and implied powers flowed from the Constitution’s definition of America’s national purpose to promote the General Welfare.
Dartmouth College. Dartmouth College had been chartered in New Hampshire in 1769 by the English Crown. A dispute arose at the college, and the New Hampshire legislature attempted to appoint a new board of trustees, contravening the terms of the college's original charter. In 1819, the Supreme Court ruled that the charter was binding, and that the state legislature's action was an improper invalidation of that contract. In his ruling, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that, “A corporation . . . being a mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it either expressly or as incidental to its very existence.”

In making this ruling, as well as that of McCulloch v. Maryland and others, the Court not only affirmed its right to review decisions of the state courts as to their Constitutionality, but it specifically solidified and extended the institution and force possessed by corporations and contracts—with the proviso, however, that corporate powers are not open-ended, but are derived only insofar as the government, which grants the charter, has conferred them. Beginning as early as the Sixteenth century, the role of the state to charter corporations for business and industrial purposes, and to charter patents for scientific inventions, had been a crucial ingredient in the development of Europe's economies. In these rulings, the Court's aim was to extend the corporate form into industry and finance, in a manner that allowed the government to impose criteria intended to boost industrial development.

Gibbons v. Ogden. In 1823, the Supreme Court delivered a ruling of far-ranging import. A five-year monopoly on the patent and use of Robert Fulton's steamboat had been secured from the New York State legislature in 1807, by Robert R. Livingston of the powerful New York Livingston family. The monopoly was extendable for

Jefferson’s Richmond Junto

Key members of Jefferson's Virginia clique, which later came to be known as the “Richmond Junto,” included:

Thomas Ritchie (1778-1854). Editor-owner of the Richmond Enquirer, a newspaper purchased in 1804 for the purpose of establishing a Republican-Democrat press in Richmond. Thomas Jefferson sponsored the project, by supplying Ritchie with Federal printing contracts, i.e., a steady flow of funds. By the late 1820's, Ritchie's paper was hailed as the “Democratic Bible.” Later, Ritchie became a close supporter of New York banker and then President, Martin Van Buren, and in 1840, published another Richmond paper for Van Buren, called the Crisis. From 1845 to 1851, at the insistence of James K. Polk, Ritchie published a paper in Washington, D.C., called the Union; Ritchie supported Polk's annexation of Texas as a necessity for the South. During the Civil War, the Richmond Enquirer became a leading organ of the Confederacy.

Spencer Roane (1762-1822). A cousin of Thomas Ritchie, Roane had roomed in college with Benjamin Franklin's opponent, Richard Henry Lee, and was an admirer of ultra-democrat Patrick Henry, serving as his adviser when Henry was Governor of Virginia; Roane also married Henry's daughter, Anne. He was elected to the Virginia House of Delegates during the 1780's. Roane was an original confederate. In 1787, he preferred amending the Articles of Confederation, to adopting the proposed Constitution. In 1789, he became a judge of the Virginia General Court, a position he held for the remainder of his life.

Roane led an attack on the Supreme Court's rulings of 1819-24, writing articles in Thomas Ritchie's Enquirer under the pseudonyms of “Hampden” and “Amphictyon.” Even the pro-British Dictionary of American Biography had to go to the lengths of denying the charges against Roane, which are that he was “a disunionist and a father of secession,” so well known was Roane for favoring precisely that view during his lifetime.

John Brockenbrough. President of the Virginia State Bank, and cousin to both Thomas Ritchie and Spencer Roane.

Thomas Mann Randolph (1768-1828). He was Jefferson's son-in-law, having married Jefferson's daughter, Martha. He was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1793-1794 and 1803-1807, and of the Virginia legislature in 1819, 1820, and 1823-1825; from 1819 to 1822, he was Governor of Virginia. His youngest son, George Wythe Randolph, served the Confederacy as Secretary of War during 1862, and his eldest son was also a founder of the Confederacy.
In September 1820, Jefferson wrote a letter to William Livingston, which presented a viewpoint akin to recasting the common good of the United States. This epitomized the argument that state law was not sovereign unto itself, but subordinate to the higher purpose of a nation.

Following the Supreme Court’s 1819 ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland, Jefferson’s Virginia clique flew into a rage of furious denunciations:

• In May 1821, an especially vitriolic attack appeared in the Virginia Enquirer, which presented a viewpoint akin to recommending “confederation.” On June 27, 1821, Jefferson sent a letter to Judge Spencer Roane, praising Taylor’s book, as “the true political faith, to which every catholic republican should steadfastly hold.” By mutual agreement, an extract of the letter was printed in the Virginia Enquirer, and widely circulated.

The attack by Jefferson and his associates intensified, sometimes employing language that could lead to incitement:

• In 1820, John Taylor of Caroline, Virginia wrote a book, entitled Construction Construed, and Constitutions Vindicated, which presented a viewpoint akin to recommending “confederation.” On June 27, 1821, Jefferson arranged personally for this attack to be printed in the American Law Journal.

Sensing what Jefferson et al. were up to, on July 13, 1821, Justice Marshall wrote, accurately, that Virginia “verges rapidly to the destruction of the government and the re-establishment of a league of sovereign states.”

At the same time, Jefferson was corresponding with a sitting Supreme Court Associate Justice, Jefferson-appointee William Johnson of South Carolina, containing some of the same ideas, and assailing the role and authority of the Federal judiciary to review and overrule state legislatures and state courts, along with other concepts of a Federal constitution. With Jefferson’s consent, this letter was publicly displayed in bookstores, and functioned as a mass-circulation pamphlet. An alarmed Supreme Court Associate Justice Joseph Story told Chief Justice Marshall that the purpose of the letter was to “prostrate the judicial authority and annihilate all public reverence of its dignity.” Marshall replied, in regard to Jefferson, that “[h]e is among the most ambitious, and I suspect among the most unforgiving of men. His great power is over the mass of the people, and this power is chiefly acquired by professions of democracy. Every check on the wild impulse of the moment is a check on his own power, and he is unfriendly to the source from which it flows.”

• On Dec. 25, 1820, Jefferson wrote to Ritchie: “The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated fabric. They are construing our constitution from a co-ordination of a general and special government to a general and supreme one alone.” [Emphasis added]

thirty years, and prohibited others from using this promising new technology. Livingston succeeded in having New York State enforce legislation, which seized any steamboat used by any shipping line of any other state, under the forfeiture clause. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Gibbons challenged this monopoly as a restriction of trade.

In rendering the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Marshall first delineated the power of the United States to regulate interstate commerce, and thus voided a ruling by New York State which contravened that power. Secondly, he ruled against such a monopoly, which would deny the nation the benefit of basic science. Marshall’s ruling found the monopoly repugnant “[t]o that which authorizes Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts.”

With this nationalist ruling, the Supreme Court made it clear that corporate charters could not be established, such as the Livingston one, even if backed by individual consent, this letter was publicly displayed in bookstores, and functioned as a mass-circulation pamphlet. An alarmed Supreme Court Associate Justice, Jefferson-appointee William Johnson of South Carolina, urging him to undermine the Court. Jefferson mailed copies of some of these letters to retired President James Madison. Madison responded with his own views in a letter to Jefferson on June 27, 1823. There, Madison maintained his adherence to the principles he had developed in Federalist Paper No. 39, which held that constitutional questions had to be decided by the Federal judiciary. This had been the view of the Federal Convention in 1787, and it was supported by the general public. Madison rejected the “ingenious reasoning” of John Taylor’s book, and also the views of Judge Roane. He strongly approved of the series of opinions handed down by the Supreme Court. Thus,
Jefferson’s rantings on this question, did not represent the view of the Republican-Democratic Party as a whole.

4. Racism and Slavocracy

Jefferson had a racist view of Black people, completely at odds with the Declaration of Independence’s assertion that “all men are created equal.” His views on slavery, which were at best “moderate” during the 1770’s, became more and more pro-slavery from the 1780’s onward to the end of his life.

Jefferson’s views are spelled out in his 1784-85 book, *Notes on the State of Virginia*. In “Query XIV,” Jefferson asks, if Black slaves are freed, “why not retain and incorporate the blacks into the state, and thus save the expense of supplying, by importation of white settlers, the vacancies they will leave?” He answers:

Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousands recollections by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made and many other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce convulsions which will probably never end but in the extermination of the one or the other race.

To these objections, which are political, may be added others, which are physical and moral. The first difference which strikes us is that of color. Whether black of the negro resides in the reticular membrane between the skin and the scarf-skin, or in the blood, the color of the bile, or from that of some other secretion, the difference is fixed in nature, and is as real as if its seat and cause were better known to us. And is this difference of no importance? Is it not the foundation of a greater or less share of beauty in the two races? Are not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of every passion by greater or less suffusions of color in one, preferable to that eternal monotony, which reigns in the countenances, that immovable veil of black which covers all the emotions of the other race?

Add to these, flowing hair, a more elegant symmetry of form, their own judgment in favor of whites, declared by their preference of them, as uniformly as in the preference of the Oranootan [orangutan] for the black women over those of his own species. The circumstance of superior beauty, is thought worthy attention in the propagation of our horses, dogs and other domestic animals; why not in that of man? . . . They have less hair on the face and body. They secrete less by the kidneys, and more by the glands of the skin, which gives them a very strong and disagreeable odor. . . . They seem to require less sleep. A black, after hard labor through the day, will be induced by the slightest amusements to sit up till midnight, or later, though knowing he must be out with the first dawn of the morning. . . . They are more ardent after their female: but love seems with them to be an more eager desire, than a tender delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation. Their griefs are transient. Those numberless afflictions, which render it doubtful whether heaven has given life to us in mercy or in wrath, are less felt, and sooner forgotten with them. In general, their existence appears to participate more of sensation than reflection. To this must be ascribed their disposition to sleep when abstracted from their diversions, and unemployed in labor. An animal whose body is at rest, and who does not reflect, must be disposed to sleep of course. Comparing them by their faculties of memory, reason, and imagination, it appears to me, that in memory they are
equal to the white; in reason much inferior, as I think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination they are dull, tasteless and anomalous. [Emphasis added]

It should be noted that Jefferson’s argument that Blacks share in sensation, but not reflection, and are capable of memory, but not reason, is still being promulgated by the nest of insidious Jensen-Shockley racists at genteel Harvard University, most recently, by The Bell Curve’s Charles Murray. There is nothing in the above quote, which Ku Klux Klanner David Duke could not heartily approve of.

With the outlawing of importation of slaves to America, Virginia turned to becoming a slave-breeding state, marketing slaves as chattel. As Virginia’s ruling aristocratic elite chose more and more to maintain Virginia as a non-industrial state, with few modern cities, the mentality of a slavocracy dominated the ruling circles, and the institution of slavery, both as the underpinning of agriculture and as a commodity to be marketed, grew stronger.

Jefferson stated many times that he personally deplored slavery and the inhuman treatment of slaves, but could see no escape from this evil institution. Jefferson writes as if he were trapped inside Virginia’s slave system, with no effective means to end it. Concerning his own slaves (Jefferson owned 225, spread over his 10,000 acres of land), he wrote,

My opinion has ever been that, until more can be done for them, we should endeavor with those whom fortune has thrown on our hands, to feed and clothe them well, protect them from all ill usage, [etc.] . . . The laws do not permit us to turn them loose, if that were for their good: and to commute them for other property is to commit them to those whose usage of them we cannot control. [Emphasis added]

Now, the second part of this passage is just not true, as Jefferson knew. For example:

- One of Jefferson’s friends and neighbors, Edward Coles, argued with Jefferson on the moral responsibility to free the slaves. In 1819, Coles did precisely that, leaving Virginia for Illinois, where he would team up with the son of Alexander Hamilton in developing the infrastructure of the territory. Two of his slaves were old women, whom he left behind after he had provided for their needs. Ten of the others he emancipated en route to Illinois, granting each of the three families involved 160 acres of land in the southern part of the state. To provide for his remaining slaves, a woman and her five small children, he purchased the woman’s husband from a Virginia neighbor. They were allowed to settle in St. Louis, Missouri, where they were legally freed in 1825.

- The great Polish patriotic leader, Thaddeus Kosciuszko, who played a prominent part in the American Revolution, and was one of only two foreign founders of the Society of Cincinnatus to openly wear his Cincinnatus eagle—the other being the Marquis de Lafayette—knew Jefferson and was his friend. Jefferson administered Kosciuszko’s American estate. Kosciuszko wrote Jefferson that he was drafting a codicil to his will, bequeathing whatever was necessary to pay for the emancipation of Jefferson’s slaves.

- George Wythe, the Platonist who was one of the principal leaders of the republican forces in America, and who had been Jefferson’s teacher, proposed to have Jefferson teach Wythe’s son, who was an adopted former slave—no doubt intending to provoke Jefferson’s assumptions concerning the intellectual inferiority of Blacks.

- During the critical Missouri Compromise debate, the Marquis de Lafayette wrote to Jefferson on the need of freedom for the slaves. He was unsuccessful in drawing Jefferson out on this point.

Thus, there were both private examples, such as that
of Edward Coles, and money provided, by Kosciuszko, for Jefferson to free his slaves. But, despite all the positive examples and urgings, Jefferson refused; not because he couldn’t, but because his mindset could never free itself of the acceptance/toleration of slavery. Not only would Jefferson have had to challenge Virginia’s economic-social order, but he would have had to transform the entire geometry of his thinking. This he would not do.

Jefferson’s belief in the intellectual inferiority of Blacks—that they lacked reason—made it impossible for him to conceive of a racially integrated society. Hence, even when he conceded the inevitability of the freeing of the slaves, he coupled it with the necessity of racial separation. As he wrote in February 1821, in an autobiography he never finished,

Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people [Blacks] are to be free. Nor is it less certain that the two races, equally free, cannot live in the same government. Nature, habit, opinion has drawn indelible lines of distinction between them.

Jefferson wanted all freed slaves to be sent out of the country.

Although Jefferson always tried to make it appear that he had no way out, he did have one. It would have meant changing his axiomatics, however. The harsh and bitter reality is, that the model for Jefferson’s “common man” democracy was Virginia, and Virginia was firmly rooted in the institution of slavery.

Jefferson believed that any attempt to change that reality would lead to the separation of the country between North and South. As Jefferson biographer Dumas Malone writes, citing an April 13, 1820 letter, Jefferson “predicted that recurrent sectional conflicts would create such mutual and moral hatred as to render separation [between the North and South—RF] preferable to eternal discord.’ The line of separation as he foresaw it would follow the rivers—the Potomac, the Ohio, and the Missouri. He left with the North two states where slavery was still legal, Delaware and Maryland, but thought possible that the entire Northwest would cling to the South because of its dependence on the Mississippi and its tributaries.” At the time of the debate which led to the Missouri Compromise of 1820, when the issue of the extension of slavery to the Western territories applying for statehood threatened to rend the Union, Jefferson could write,

I considered it at once as the knell of the Union. It is hushed, indeed, for the moment. But this is a reprieve only, not a final sentence. A geographical line, coinciding with a marked principle, moral and political, once conceived and held up to the angry passions of men, will never be obliterated; and every new irritation will mark it deeper and deeper.

But as it is, we have the wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, and self-preservation in the other.

The “self-preservation” Jefferson referred to, was the need of the slavocracy to preserve slavery. This is even more finely etched in a December 1820 letter Jefferson wrote to Albert Gallatin. In it, he sees the abolition of slavery as dissolving the Union:

With these [the Northern states], it is merely a question of power; but with this geographical minority [i.e., the South], it is a question of existence. For if Congress once goes out of the Constitution [sic] to arrogate a right of regulating the condition of the inhabitants of the States, its majority may, and probably will, next declare that the condition of all men with the United States shall be that of freedom; in which call all the whites south of the Potomac and Ohio must evacuate their States, and most fortunate those who can do it first.

To defend the Southern position, Jefferson adopted what was in fact a vicious ruse. He postured that he desired freedom for the slaves, but said the Federal government had no right to pass statutes “imposing” manumission on the states. To do so would be tyranny, as the Constitution did not give the central government the right to act on this matter (again, Jefferson’s rejection of the General Welfare clause). Rather, Jefferson maintained, the states themselves, such as Virginia, South Carolina, etc., would have to act voluntarily, through their legislatures, to pass laws ending slavery. Jefferson was willing to try that in Virginia’s legislature. But, he knew perfectly well, the states’ rights line of approach would never lead to the end of slavery. The Virginia slavocracy was not going to vote itself out of existence through a legislature that it controlled. And thus, Jefferson acquiesced to slavery’s perpetuation.

5. Monetarism: A Slave to Albert Gallatin

Jefferson’s failure to understand Leibniz’s principle, that man’s individual creative development is fostered through the assimilation of scientific advances in the technology of economic production, led him necessarily to reject the concepts of national economy and national banking, as these were developed in the United States under the rubric of the American System of nationalists Alexander Hamilton, Mathew Carey, Friedrich List, and President Abraham Lincoln’s economic adviser Henry Carey. Jefferson preferred, instead, the British Empire’s “free trade” economics of Adam Smith, Jean Baptiste Say, and Thomas Malthus.
Thus, in a June 1807 letter to John Norvell, Jefferson wrote that, “on the subjects of money and commerce . . . [Adam] Smith's *Wealth of Nations* is the best book to be read, unless Say's *Political Economy* can be had.” As early as September 1801, Jefferson had proposed the concept of “free bottoms, free goods” in a letter to Robert Livingston, then U.S. Minister to France—an idea intended to help win the necessary acceptance by the European powers of American goods travelling in American ships, although springing from Jefferson’s lifelong adherence to the British free trade doctrine.

Similarly, Jefferson seconded the genocidal population theory of Parson Thomas Malthus, writing to physiocrat Jean Baptiste Say of “Malthus’ work on population, a work of sound logic, in which some of the opinions of Adam Smith, as well as of the economists, are ably examined. I was pleased on turning to some chapters where you treat the same questions, to find his opinions corroborated by yours.” (Jefferson had one qualification: that perhaps America, still with its large tracts of uncultivated land, was an exception to Malthus’ dictum that the quantity of food increases arithmetically, while population increases geometrically—a dictum that seemed more suited to Europe.)

Jefferson could not conceive of the government’s undertaking economic initiatives whose outcome would be seen in continued economic growth in subsequent generations. As reported by Dumas Malone, the most important among the principles Jefferson held to was that laws and constitutions could not, in right, be perpetual but were subject to periodic revision. In the present instance he applied the principle to the question of public debt, denying the right of one generation to burden another beyond the “natural” limit of its powers. This limit, he claimed, was the additional time that adult members of society might be expected to live from any particular moment. On the average, according to the best European statistics available to him, he figured that they would survive about nineteen years. Accordingly, he held that every debt should be limited to such a period at the outside.

His overriding concern, he said, was that America avoid “permanent national debt.” Hence, for example, in 1789, when the issue of the newly formed U.S. government assuming the debts of the states, according to the
plan of Alexander Hamilton and Robert Morris, was being discussed, Jefferson wrote to Madison, expressing these “principles of finance.” Madison, who at least had a better grasp of this than Jefferson, wrote back that posterity inherits benefits along with debts.

Jefferson's Enlightenment empiricism made it impossible for him to appreciate the Renaissance creation of the nation-state, beginning with the France of Louis XI, as a Platonic “idea”—a One, whose continued existence is generated by the self-developing activity of its people. In economics, this self-development is enabled through the credit and banking system. By rejecting the Platonic conception of the nation-state, Jefferson completely misunderstood the role of credit, and rejected not only the First National Bank, but any positive conception of banking at all. In the banking system, credit is neither the sum, nor the product, of Robinson Crusoe-like individual transactions, as Adam Smith would have it. Instead, credit is created by a sovereign, dirigistic act of the state, which uses its credit-creating power to foster and maintain an environment that favors real economic growth, and suppresses financial speculation.

The best way to understand this, is to conceive of the operation of the First National Bank under Washington's Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, or the parallel proposal of economist Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., today, for the establishment of a Third National Bank of the United States, out of a federalized Federal Reserve System, as an emergency solution to the current disintegration of the bankrupt financial system.

Under the LaRouche proposal, $500-600 billion in credit—not debt—would be directed by a Third National Bank to finance the building of projects of basic infrastructure: an upgraded national water management system, a new rail grid utilizing high-speed, state-of-the-art magnetically levitated trains, an expanded energy system based on nuclear power, and so forth. This would correct the existing $7 trillion infrastructure deficit, create corollary hard commodity goods orders in the manufacturing sector, and create ten million productive jobs in manufacturing and infrastructure combined, with the added effect of raising tax revenues, thus pushing the Federal budget into surplus. This dirigistic action would foster an explosive rate of growth in the physical economy, ordering the future to the benefit of our posterity—a key illustration of LaRouche's point, as developed in “The Essential Role of ‘Time-Reversal’ in Mathematical Economics,” that in terms of Platonic hypotheses, the future determines the present.

This is exactly what the First National Bank did in the years 1791 to 1811, under Hamilton's guidance: It laid the basis for America’s emergence as a modern, great industrial power.

In a monetarist system of the sort assumed by Jefferson, however, the supply of credit is created by a clique of private bankers, who dictate its use, either through unregulated “free banking,” or through a private central bank. Sooner or later, the financiers are led by the internal logic of their system, to channel credit into some form of cancerous, speculative financial bubble, which starves the credit needs of physical production. As production contracts, the tax revenue base shrinks, and the monetarists then demand that the nation-state “balance the budget”—a demand which becomes the means to attempt the dismantling of nationalist government, and the suppression of the government's vital role in building infrastructure and providing for the General Welfare. This results in further economic contraction. Precisely this pattern developed after Jeffersonian President Andrew Jackson shut down the Second National Bank of the U.S. beginning 1833, precipitating an orgy of wildcat banking, until the speculative bubble burst in the crash and Great Depression of 1837.

Thus, ironically, but lawfully, the monetarist “budget-cutting” lunacy always results in larger deficits, as has been recently illustrated by the monetarist 1985 Gramm-Rudman Act. Meanwhile, application of the Leibnizian-Hamiltonian conception of the nation-state's dirigistic power to create profit and social surplus, vastly increases the tax revenue base.

It should be remarked, that Jefferson's monetarist views on the banks correspond precisely to the views of today's Liberty Lobby or John Birch Society. Jefferson may have hated the aristocrats who ran banking and looted people, but he hated them in an impotent way, because his opposition to Hamilton's First National Bank denied America the sovereign means by which to control the issuance of bank credit. This is clear, for example, in his favoring strict gold specie payment, for the most part, rather than banknotes: since London ran the world gold markets, Jefferson's plans left American finance subject to the oligarchs' control.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Jefferson's slavish relationship to the Anglo-Swiss financial agent Albert Gallatin, a relationship which began before Jefferson became President, and extended until Jefferson's death in 1826.

Throughout his career, Albert Gallatin was sponsored by top levels of the European oligarchy as an anti-nationalist financial policy maker. His success in becoming Treasury Secretary to both Presidents Jefferson and Madison—indeed, becoming a kind of “Svengali” to Jefferson—meant that his destructive, monetarist views left a strong stamp on the United States' development.
Necker families. Voltaire, the French Enlightenment foe of Gottfried Leibniz, was Gallatin’s “most intimate friend and father-figure in his youth.”

Having moved to the United States in 1780, by 1787 Gallatin had acquired 60,000 acres of land in southwestern Pennsylvania. In 1787-88, he led the anti-ratification movement against the U.S. Constitution in Pennsylvania, with his associate John Smilie. In September 1788, he drew up the resolution of the anti-Federalists, calling for a new Constitutional Convention.

In 1791-92, Gallatin led the opposition to the excise tax on whiskey adopted by President George Washington, culminating in his orchestrating the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion, which Washington had to put down by force. Not surprisingly, when the Pennsylvania legislature appointed Gallatin to the U.S. Senate in 1793, the Senate removed him from his seat.

Gallatin opposed almost every economic measure Alexander Hamilton introduced to make America grow, including opposing the Federal government’s assumption of Pennsylvania’s debts. Gallatin obtained a seat in the House of Representatives, and in 1796, with the urging and approval of Thomas Jefferson, he drew up his *Sketch of the Finances of the United States*, which proposed a time-table to retire the U.S. debt as quickly as possible, without consideration for the needs of the growing country, nor for the plans of the First National Bank to retire the debt.

Despite their long-standing antipathy, in 1800, Alexander Hamilton split the Federalist Party to defeat John Adams and elect Thomas Jefferson President. He then backed Jefferson against the attempt of his running mate Aaron Burr to steal the presidency, recognizing Burr to be the greatest danger to the nation. Burr became Vice President, and Albert Gallatin Secretary of Treasury, in the Jefferson administration that took office in 1801. With a complicit Jefferson in tow, Gallatin instituted a financial scheme to pay off all of America’s debt of then $38 million by 1816. Since the U.S. government’s annual revenue was $10 million, Gallatin earmarked $7.3 million per year for debt service left only $2.7 million for all non-debt items, despite the fact that non-debt expenditures in the previous administration had averaged $5 million per year. Gallatin concentrated his budget cuts against the army and navy, leaving America virtually defenseless against future British attack, and clearing the way for Britain’s invasion and attempted overthrow of the Revolution in the War of 1812.

Meanwhile, during this period, Vice President Burr, who had killed Hamilton in a duel in 1804, was himself
plotting to dismember the United States, working on behalf of the British to seize portions of the United States’ Louisiana Territory and set up a separate western buffer state under British protection, a plan also pursued by the British agent James Workman. During this period, Burr was regularly meeting with Gallatin. Burr was later convicted of conspiracy against the United States.

Jefferson stuck by Gallatin throughout this entire process, and Gallatin remained his Treasury Secretary for the full eight years of his Presidency. After Jefferson left office, they continued on intimate terms. According to Dumas Malone’s *The Sage of Monticello*, in 1809, when incoming President James Madison passed over Gallatin for the position of Secretary of State (retaining him nonetheless in the very powerful post of Treasury Secretary), Gallatin confided to Jefferson that he was considering resigning. In an October 1809 letter, Jefferson advised Gallatin that resigning would be a “public calamity,” and the “most inauspicious day” ever seen by the new Madison government. Gallatin was needed to follow through on the dishonest plan to “extinguish” the national debt.

Meanwhile, Jefferson teamed up with Gallatin to force the budget balancing on Madison, even though they were on the eve of war, when increased U.S. military expenditures were urgently needed to prepare for the planned attack.

Later, during 1812-15, when the British finally invaded America and burned down the Capitol, Jefferson, through his son-in-law John Wayles Eppes, the chairman of the powerful House of Representatives’ Ways and Means Committee, continued to pressure the government to provide for retiring its debt. By raising a hue and cry about “fiscally acceptable limits,” Jefferson’s actions threatened to sabotage the war mobilization. This was aid and comfort to the British.

Jefferson wrote three principal letters about public finance to Eppes. In a reply written to Jefferson on July 21, 1813, Eppes stated that only a “rigid adherence” to the principles laid out in Jefferson’s letters would secure the country against the evil of a “permanent debt.” Eppes wrote, that at the next session of Congress, he would attempt to make provision, so that the recently voted war-loan was repaid within fifteen years, and requested an outline of Jefferson’s fiscal-conservatism plan. “By executing such a task,” Eppes wrote, “you will add one more essential benefit to the long list of important services already registered in the hearts of your countrymen.” Eppes then used his powerful position in Congress to attempt to apply Jefferson’s proposals.

Meanwhile, President James Madison was trying to fight a war against the British. In 1813, he bundled Gallatin off to Europe, to get that traitor out of the post of Treasury Secretary. Jefferson continued to write to Gallatin as his most trusted adviser. For example, in a Nov. 24, 1818 letter to Gallatin, Jefferson denounced the “parasite institutions of banks.” He wrote: “The flood with which they are deluging us of nominal money has placed us completely without any certain measures of value, and by interpolating a false measure, is deceiving and ruining multitudes of our citizens.” Gallatin, who was a thorough tool of the Anglo-Swiss financier oligarchy, must have laughed uproariously at Jefferson’s letters. Jefferson’s simplistic, anti-bank populism, made it easy for Gallatin to manipulate him on banking matters.

To the end of Jefferson’s life, Gallatin would continue to effectively dictate his financial policies. In 1823, three years before his death, he wrote to Gallatin,

> A visit from you to this place would indeed be a day of jubilee, but your age and distance forbid the hope. Be this as it will, I shall love you forever, and rejoice in your rejoicings and sympathize in your ails. God bless and have you ever in his holy keeping.

In his later years, Gallatin would establish the pseudo-scientific race science of ethnology. In 1842, Gallatin created the American Ethnological Society, and became its first president. This branch of “race science” was used to profile, stir up mischief, and exterminate American Indians—a “science” in keeping with the oligarchical outlook he shared with his friend Thomas Jefferson.

**Conclusions**

From his race science view of Blacks and support for the institution of slavery; to his bolstering of feudalistic agrarianism; to his rejection of the Constitution’s General Welfare clause and the Leibnizian concept of America as based on science and manufacturing; to his championing of states’ rights; Jefferson’s axiomatic outlook was made to order for the British attack against America called the Confederacy.

It is time to recognize the near identity of the Jeffersonian outlook with Confederate principles. The influence of the Enlightenment, unresolved at the time of America’s founding, created a cultural susceptibility which opened the nation to British political manipulation against the republican ideals embodied in its creation. The manipulated rebellion was quelled in the great Civil War, but the illness went uncured. Removing Jefferson’s ideas as an object of admiration or a guide to action, is a crucial step to clearing the way, so that the American nation can rise to meet the challenges of the current world crisis, a task upon which the future existence of global civilization now depends.
NOTES


11. Thus, Jefferson’s outlook, when applied to foreign affairs, led him to later oppose the Monroe Doctrine when it was formulated by John Quincy Adams in 1823. The Doctrine’s intention was to end the colonial status and establish sister republics in Ibero-America, in accordance with the concept of a “community of principle.” Jeffrey endorsed British Foreign Minister George Canning’s plan to install the British as the policemen for the hemisphere.


13. “Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions” (1798), in *Writings*, pp. 449-56. Jefferson’s preference for confederation over dirrgist national government was longstanding. He had opposed adopting the Constitution back in 1787, preferring instead the anarchistic and paralyzing Articles of Confederation, writing at the time that “all the good of this new constitution might have been couched in three or four new articles to be added to the good, old, venerable fabric [Articles of Confederation—RF]” (ibid., pp. 912-14). This was the root of the Kentucky Resolutions.


31. For these three letters, see *Writings*, pp. 1176-79, 1090-95, and 1143-44, respectively.


33. Jefferson was strongly influenced by the “anti-banking” viewpoint of Henry St. John, the Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751). Bolingbroke was a High Tory, who endorsed the agrarian outlook from the standpoint of the feudal aristocracy which supervised that life, and he remonstrated against the “monied interests,” which encroached upon the landed aristocracy’s power by trading in money alone. In 1709, Bolingbroke wrote to Lord Orrey, “A new Interest [the monied men] has been created . . . and a sort of Property, which was not known twenty years ago, is now increased to be almost equal to the Terra firma of our Island. The Consequence of all this is, that the Landed Men are become poor and dispirited.”

In his young adulthood, Jefferson kept a notebook in which he wrote down key ideas from philosophers and poets, which came later to be known as Jefferson’s *Literary Bible: His commonplace Book of Philosophers and Poets*. One-sixth of this book’s two hundred pages are filled with the writings of Bolingbroke.

Jefferson’s lifelong remonstrations on behalf of the Virginia tobacco plantation owners against the London and Liverpool financial factors to whom they were indebted, was identical. It is not that the London financiers did not exploit the American tobacco plantations—they did—but that Jefferson’s anti-financier rhetoric was on behalf of landed interests.


34. Chaitkin, pp. 35-92, *pasim.*


ADDITIONAL SOURCES

In addition to references cited in the notes, the following works have been drawn upon in preparation of this report:


Dumas Malone’s *Jefferson and His Time* is a six-volume biography. This article has drawn particularly on Vol. 1 (*Jefferson the Virginian*), Vol. 2 (*Jefferson and the Rights of Man*), and Vol. 6 (*The Sage of Monticello*), which were published in 1948, 1951, and 1977, respectively.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz—
The Unity of the Churches, and Russia*

by Dr. Ambrosius Eszer, O.P.
Rome, March 25, 1996

The year 1996 celebrated the 350th birthday of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz—
the critical philosopher, diplomat, and scientist whose strategic memoranda and plans for scientific academies created the foundations for modern Europe after the devastating Thirty Years War. The central theme of his numerous political memoranda was the creation of a European order of peace, based upon national economy, scientific progress, and the development of the entire Eurasian continent. In this article, Dr. Ambrosius Eszer, O.P. provides a fascinating picture of Leibniz’s efforts to reunify the Churches, as well as his proposals for the development of Russia.

I. Biographical Sketch

I.1. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz came into the world in Leipzig on June 21, 1646, the son of Professor Friedrich Leibniz and his wife Katharina, née Schmuck, daughter of a famous jurist. His father was a notary, Registrar of the university, and Professor of ethics, who died on Sept. 15, 1652. Gottfried Wilhelm showed early indications of outstanding intelligence and possessed a memory that was as enormous as it was rigorous. At the St. Nicolaus-School in Leipzig, he read Livy at eight years of age, without need of a dictionary. By the age of twelve, he had mastered Latin and Greek quite completely and devoured Cicero, Seneca, Herodotus, Xenophon, and Plato, as well as the works of various Church Fathers. His devout mother raised him in the spirit of the Augsburg Confession of Lutheran orthodoxy.1

* The following essay consists of a series of lectures presented in March 1995 at the Ecumenical-Patristic, Greek-Byzantine Institute St. Nicolaus in Bari. Footnotes have been added by the author.
I.2. Around Easter in 1661, Leibniz matriculated at the university in his native city. On March 30, 1663, at the age of sixteen, he defended a thesis on the principle of individuation, and was named to a baccalaureate. In the same year he went to Jena, in order to study jurisprudence. There, in 1665, he wrote a dissertation, De conditionibus [On Conditions], in which he developed a kind of juridical logic, which was based upon the works of Roman jurists.\(^2\) Owing to certain intrigues of the wife of the dean of the judicial faculty in Leipzig, he was not granted the pleasure of obtaining his doctorate in his native city. He accomplished that at the University of Altdorf, which belonged to the territory of the free Imperial city of Nuremberg. There he presented the thesis De casibus perplexis in iure [On Perplexed Cases in Law], which must be solved according to the principles of natural law.\(^3\) In Nuremberg, Leibniz met the former chancellor of the Archbishop-Elector of Mainz, Christian Baron von Boineburg, who had converted from Protestantism to the Catholic Church, and invited him to join him in Frankfurt am Main. But the young scholar did not want to remain in the free Imperial city, but rather to become acquainted with the Archbishop-Elector and Imperial Archchancellor, Johann Philipp Freiherr von Schönborn\(^4\) himself.

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Chronology

1618 Beginning of the Thirty Years War.
1646 Birth of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on July 1 in Leipzig. Son of a Lutheran family of Slavic origin. His father, Friedrich Leibniz, was a jurist and Professor of Moral Sciences at the University of Leipzig; his mother, Katharina Schmuck, was the daughter of a professor of jurisprudence.
1648 Peace of Westphalia; end of the Thirty Years War.
1650 Descartes dies in Stockholm.
1652 Death of Leibniz’s father.
1652-61 First studies at the Nicolai School; he reads extensively in his father’s library. Leibniz learns Latin and Greek.
1661 Death of Mazarin. Colbert becomes Finance Minister of Louis XIV in France. Invention of the manometer by Christiaan Huyghens. Leibniz matriculates at the University of Leipzig.
1662 The Royal Society is founded in London. Leibniz hears lectures by the philosopher and historian Jakob Thomasius.
1663 Beginning of the Turkish Wars, which last until the end of the century and finally end with the victory of the European and Russian armed forces, the former under Prince Eugene. Leibniz matriculates at the University of Jena and hears lectures by the mathematician Erhard Weigel. Leibniz writes the disputation *De principio individui* [On the Principle of the Individual].
1664 Leibniz finishes graduate studies in Leipzig with a Master of Philosophy degree. Death of his mother.
1666 Colbert founds the Paris Academy of Sciences. Leibniz composes *De arte combinatione* [On the Art of Combination]. Leibniz is prevented from receiving his doctorate in Leipzig, matriculates at the Nuremberg University of Altdorf and defends his doctoral dissertation *De casibus perplexis in iure* [On Perplexed Cases in Law].
1667 Milton composes *Paradise Lost*.
Leibniz makes the acquaintance of Johann Christoph von Boineburg, the former political advisor of the Elector of Mainz. Leibniz composes the paper *Nova methodus discendae docendi aequae iurisprudentiae* [A New Method for Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence], which he dedicates personally on the advice of Boineburg to the Elector of Mainz.
1668 *Confessio naturae contra atheistas* [The Confession of Nature against Atheists].
1668-69 Various political activities of Leibniz in respect to the intended publication of the *Demonstraciones*

I.3. In order to prepare for this meeting, during various trips he wrote the work *Nova methodus discendae docendi aequae iurisprudentiae* [A New Method for Learning and Teaching Jurisprudence], which he dedicated to the Elector in 1668. The latter commissioned him at once, to work together with Lasser, the Assessor to the Imperial Chamber Court, on the improvement of the Roman law. To the Imperial Privy Councillor (Hofrat) Portner at Regensburg he sent his work *Elementa Iuris romanis hodierni* [Elements of present-day Roman law]. By 1670, Leibniz, although a Protestant, was promoted to be councillor [Rat] at the High Court of Appeal, the highest court of the Electorate. But, in March 1672, the Elector sent him to Paris as advisor of the Mainz ambassador, where he could devote himself to extended scientific activity. Among other things, he invented his famous calculating-machine with four operations, and met with numerous of the personalities of intellectual life. Independently of Sir Isaac Newton, he discovered the infinitesimal calculus. With the ambassador von Schönborn, the nephew of the Elector, he undertook a journey to England, which provided further opportunities for scientific acquaintances. On April 18, 1673, the Royal Society elected him a member. Then followed the somewhat unpleasant argument with Newton over the infinitesimal calculus. His protector, Johann Philipp, died in the same year, whereby his situation became to some extent insecure.7

I.4. Since as early as the year 1669, the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Johann Friedrich von Calenberg, who had become a Catholic in 1661, had been attempting to draw Leibniz to his court in Hannover. Therefore, the young universal scholar came back to Germany in October 1673, by way of England and The Netherlands. In The Hague he met Spinoza, with whom he had frequent and extensive discussions. In Hannover, he made the acquaintance of the blessed Niels Stensen, of whom he

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5. Although Leibniz retained his position in Mainz, his connections to the Elector-state soon became weaker, for which he himself was not entirely blameless (Cf. Nora Gädeke, “Leibniz als Gelehrter im höfischen Europa,” in *Leibniz und Europa*, ed. by Albert Heinekamp and Isolde Hein (Hannover: Stiftung Nieder- sachsen, 1994), pp. 39-74; here, p. 47).
attested in Chapter 100 of his Theodicy, indeed, that he transformed himself from an outstanding anatomist and natural scientist into a mediocre theologian. In the year 1677, the prince appointed Leibniz director of the ducal library as well as Court and Chancellery Councillor. During these years, the scholar occupied himself thoroughly with the mining industry in the Harz Mountains, which had already occupied another famous scholar, namely, St. Albert the Great, O.P.

I.5. After the death of Johann Friedrich, his brother Ernst August I ascended to the ducal throne. Thanks to the historical and juridical investigations of Leibniz, he was to receive the IXth Electorate of the Holy Roman Empire on December 19, 1692. In the year 1685, he commissioned the scholar to compose a history of the House of Guelph, the first four volumes of which were only to appear after his death. In the year 1686, Leibniz wrote his Discours de la métaphysique [Discourse on Metaphysics], the first systematic presentation of his fundamental philosophical ideas. From 1687 to 1690, our universal scholar undertook journeys to Hesse, Franconia, Bohemia, Bavaria, Austria, and Italy, always on the official grounds of necessary investigations for the history of the House of Guelph. In 1694 he published De primae philosophiae emendatione et de notione substantiae [On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance], and in 1695 the Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances [A New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances], in which the original harmony of all things is presented. In recognition of his services in attaining the Electorate, the Duke named Leibniz to the Privy Justice Council [Geheimer Justizrat] in 1696. In the following year, the latter wrote De rerum originacione radicali [On the Radical Origination of Things] incorporating fundamental ideas of the future Theodicy.

I.6. With the death of Ernst August I, Leibniz’s most pleasant years ended. His successor, Georg I Ludwig, who was to become King of Great Britain and Ireland on
August 1, 1714, was a quite coldly calculating statesman, who showed little understanding of Leibniz’s greatness of thought, which led to a growing estrangement between the two. But, in 1699, the scholar was elected a member of the Paris Academy of Sciences, and in 1700 as President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, which was founded by him. Sophie Charlotte, daughter of Ernst August and wife of the Elector Friedrich III of Brandenburg, who in 1701 made himself King Friedrich I in Prussia, became the favorite correspondent of Leibniz, but soon died in 1705. She occasioned the Théodicée, in which Leibniz defends the Goodness of God in the face of evil in the world, and which, having been put into written form, was published in 1710.12

L7. During the years 1711-1712, Leibniz met with Peter I the Great of Russia in Torgau, Karlsbad, Teplitz, and Dresden, and convinced him of his plan to found an Academy of Sciences in Russia. On November 1, 1712, “We Peter I, Czar and Autocrat of all of Russia” appointed Leibniz to the Privy Justice Council [Geheimer Justizrat]. The document was signed by the Sovereign himself and the Lord High Chancellor Gavriil Ivanovich Count Golovkin (1660-1734).11

L8. From 1713 to 1714, our thinker stayed in Vienna, especially at the court of Emperor Charles VI,14 who appointed him the Imperial Privy Councillor as well as his personal counsellor. At that time the friendship also began with Prince Eugene of Savoy-Carignano, the Catholic Imperial Fieldmarshal and Lieutenant-general of the Emperor.15 For him, Leibniz wrote a shortened version of the theory of monads, namely the Principes de la nature et de la grâce [The Principles of Nature and Grace]. To Leibniz’s misfortune another princely protec-
II. The Religious Orientation of the Young Leibniz: The Idea of Universal Harmony

II.1. Both of Leibniz’s parents were devout Lutheran Christians. His mother, who died when he was just seventeen years old, is portrayed as a true model example of Christian life. As a result, his scientific interests and studies were not able to destroy his religious life. The study of the syllogistical logic of Aristotle awakened his power of understanding. He was the only student in his class, who was able to apply the logical rules of the Stagirite to practical cases, but he also discovered certain limits to these rules. He found new solutions, and noted them down. He especially interested himself in the theory of categories, of which some were included in others, others mutually excluded. In his father’s house he read works on metaphysics and theology, and above all the great controversial theologians of the different religious confessions captivated him. He devoured the works of the Jesuit Francisco Suárez, as if they were exciting novels.

II.2. Beginning Easter 1661, Leibniz studied Euclidian mathematics in addition to Aristotelian philosophy. In his dissertation Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui, Leibniz follows the teaching of Aristotle and of St. Thomas Aquinas, according to which, respectively, matter is the principle of individuation of the earthly species, while the angels, as pure forms, form a separated species. Later, Leibniz wrote to the Landgrave Ernst of Hesse-Rheinfels, that he had generalized the theory of Thomas

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16. Aiton, where, in addition, the allegation is refuted, that Leibniz during his last years of life never participated in (Protestant) divine services.
Aquinas concerning angels, insofar as the expression species is understood not in the physical, but rather in the metaphysical sense. Leibniz’s teacher Thomasius, in his commentary on the paper of the former, had utilized the expression *monad*, which was to assume a central significance in the Leibnizian metaphysics. Generally speaking, our thinker, despite a certain disdain on his part for the Scholasticism of the late Middle Ages, which he understood as the result of nominalist thinking, had already by this stage discovered Thomas Aquinas, for whom he was always to retain an especially high regard, and whom he, like the Catholic theologians and philosophers, often referred to as “Divus [divine] Thomas.” During a walk in the valley of roses near Leipzig, Leibniz came to another decision: substantial form is a scholastic principle which is valid for the entire universe. At that time, at the age of seventeen—and not of fifteen, as he wrote erroneously in old age to Rimond—, he was inclined to Cartesian mechanics: “Finally, mechanical theory gained the upper hand and caused me to occupy myself with mathematics, whose deepest mysteries I was to comprehend only during conversations with Mr. Huyghens in Paris. But, in the search for final causes of the mechanical sort and, eventually, for the laws of motion, I discovered to my surprise, that it was impossible to find them in mathematics, but necessary to return to metaphysics. That led me back to the entelechies, and from the material things to the forms.”

The general principle of Leibnizian thinking refers back at all times to the ideas of his youth, which are then extended and developed into a system. The same thought, the same certainty ensue from the consideration of a unifying principle, from which the plurality of phenomena proceed and effects the construction of this system, which is already announced in the still indistinct surmise of the young student. He finds no satisfaction in the observation of a dead mechanism, because such a one, although in the position to satisfy the “logique de raison,” contradicts the original experience of the “esprit de finesse.”

The “logique de cœur” demands its right, and its view, which is directed to the totality, and proves itself superior to pure analysis. For Leibniz, to think dialectically means the recognition of the living completeness of nature as a sequence of effects. Thus, his highest principle becomes, that every being is connected with other beings, and that nothing in the world can be considered to be separate from others. On the other hand, each single being reflects the whole world (repraesentatio mundi), and the totality is a unity, which works toward an end, the pre-established harmony. Without doubt the idea of the unity of the world forms the background, before which Leibniz’s thinking concerning the unity of the Church also unfolds. Although he himself is principally a philosopher and a scientist, his thinking, like that of the great thinkers of the Middle Ages and of the Baroque Scholastic, whom he frequently quotes, remains open to the truth of Christian revelation.

II.3. The religious search also led Leibniz in one or another wrong direction. In Nuremberg, he joined the Rosicrucian Society, founded by the mythical Christian Rosenkreutz, which attempted to make gold on the basis of a confused pseudomysticism. More consequential than this fleeting encounter remained that with the Catholic convert Baron von Boineburg, which led him to the court of a Catholic Archbishop-Elector. Nevertheless, one does not get the impression, that the atmosphere at the court in Mainz made a decisive impression on the young scholar. Notwithstanding, he entered into correspondence with another convert, the aforementioned Duke Johann Friedrich von Brunswick, to whom he sent two works, *De usu et necessitate demonstrationum immortalitatis animae* [On the Use and Necessity of the Demonstration of the Immortality of the Soul] and *De resurrectione corporum* [On the Resurrection of the Body], with brief explanations, which are contained in his *Hypothesis physica nova*. Of particular interest here is Leibniz’s reference to a vital substantial core, which is of such fineness, that it even remains in the ashes of burned things and possesses the capability of contracting itself into an invisible center. As an example, Leibniz advances, among other things, the regeneration of plants, and the experience, according to persons whose limbs have been amputated, of continuing to sense them nevertheless. The idea of not extended, vital centers, which survive a change like origination and decay, shows clearly the concept of the Monad. At this occasion it should be mentioned, that in this period Leibniz defended the Catholic concept of the Transubstantiation (of bread and wine in the Eucharist) with excellent arguments and with total emphasis. However, the first really influential Catholic, with whom Leibniz now began a long-lasting correspondence, was—unfortunately—a

20. Cf. Aiton, pp. 36-38, where above all the work *Confessio naturae contra atheistas* [The Confession of Nature against Atheists] is treated.
21. This concerns the *Demonstratio possibilisitatis mysteriorum Eucharistiae* from the year 1671 (Kiefl, *Leibniz*, p. 6).
Jansenist, the Great Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694). Here, too, the issue at the beginning was the transubstantiation of certain substances in the Eucharist. Leibniz refuted the Cartesian theory and built on Aristotle’s theory of substance. In the work Demonstratione possibilitatis mysteriwm Eucharistiae [Demonstration of the possibility of the Eucharistic Mystery] from the year 1671, Leibniz underscored, that the mysteries of Transubstantiation and of the Real Presence meet in one and the same deep root of thought, and that the controversies related to these originate from the inability to understand one another in the Church.

Of course, one should here remember, that in the Lutheran Church, under the influence of the “moderates” of the stamp of Melancthon, Aristotelianism had achieved a leading position, Luther himself, however, had been everything other than an Aristotelian, namely anti-Aristotelian, anti-Thomist, and nominalist.

III. The Encounter with the World of French Catholicism

III.1. Before Leibniz began the journey to Paris, he had devised the so-called Egyptian Plan, the goal of which was, to direct the military and political appetite of the “Sun King” to that land, in which his forefather, St. Louis IX, had suffered some of his worst defeats. The plan resembled that of the Venetian Marino Canuto, who at the beginning of the Fourteenth century had sent similar plans to the Pope. Naturally, Leibniz’s idea could be granted no success, on the one hand because its author obtained no audience, in which he could have explained the project to the King, and on the other, because Louis XIV with the greatest likelihood would have observed, that it would be a diversion from his European goals. The environs in Mainz pleased Leibniz, but his greatest goal was to reach Paris, the center of scientific and artistic life. The Archbishop-Elector sought an agreement with the dangerous French Monarch, who demanded that he allow the French army pass on the waterways through the Mainz territories. The Elector attempted to frustrate the English-French attack on The Netherlands; as soon in January 1672 as the new French foreign minister had assumed his office, von Schönborn decided to send a diplomatic delegation to Paris. First, Leibniz travelled there in the beginning of March 1672, alone and as a delegate of the Baron von Boineburg. On his arrival at the end of March, the attack of the French and the English on The Netherlands was close at hand, so that the diplomatic purpose of Leibniz’s stay in Paris had already gone up in smoke.

He continued to concern himself with the personal interests of Boineburg, and only in November did the nephew of the Elector and son-in-law of Boineburg, Melchior Friedrich von Schönborn as official ambassador, and the young son of Boineburg, who were to advance the plan of a peace conference in Cologne, arrive in Paris. Louis XIV received the ambassador, wherewith his diplomatic success was exhausted. On December 15, Leibniz’s patron, Johann Christian Baron von Boineburg, died. Besides the Great Arnauld, Leibniz met Molière, the Oratorian and Occasionalist Malebranche, and naturally the representatives of the mathematical sciences. Among other things, he passed his time with the invention of his calculating machine. With Arnauld he had a small conflict, when he showed him the “Our Father” in a form acceptable to Christians, Jews, and Muslims. When, in 1676, Leibniz left for Hannover, Arnauld gave him a sealed letter of recommendation, in which it was written, that the bearer lacks only the true religion, so that he could in truth become one of the greatest men of the century.

The meeting with the Cartesian Malebranche had to remain without result, because Leibniz had already decided definitively against Decartes’ theory. The journey to England in the entourage of Baron von Schönborn brought to maturity considerable scientific, but no religious-church results. On April 18, 1673, Leibniz was elected a member of the Royal Society in London. There were also no particular religious developments after the return from England. At the moment, Leibniz endeavored in vain to be admitted into the Academy of Sciences of Paris.

IV. Plans for the Unity of the Churches

IV.1. By the time of his friendship with Baron von Boineburg, Leibniz was already convinced, that it would be possible for a Lutheran of the Augsburg Confession, to accept the decisions of the Council of Trent, except for some smaller and unimportant passages. At the beginning of the year 1679, he exchanged letters with the then most important theologian and clergyman of France, Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, with whom strangely enough he had not met during his sojourn in Paris. Bossuet’s

22. Ibid., cf. Huber, p. 156.
24. Aiton, p. 55; Huber, p. 77; Kiefl, Leibniz, p. 8. —The machine could execute four operations, its prototype constructed by Pascal only two.
26. Aiton, pp. 68-69: Officially it was said, that two foreigners in paid positions at the Academy, namely Jan Huyghens and Cassini, were enough.
Exposition de la foi de l’Église catholique had not only found the papal appro-
bation, but had also ob-
tained the approval of the
Duke Johann Friedrich.
Without doubt, the latter
induced Leibniz to enter
into this relationship. Bos-
suet responded delightedly,
that in the event his book
would find a good recep-
tion in Germany, he would
be prepared to append
some special chapters for
the Lutherans. Since Leib-
niz believed that the
Pope—Innocent XI—was
an enlightened and under-
standing man, he resolved
to again take up his work
for the reunification of the
Catholic and Lutheran
Churches, and began to
work on Demonstrationes
catholicae [Catholic De-
monstrations], which, however, was never to be complet-
ed. Three parts were intended: The first was to contain
the demonstration of the existence of God and natural
theology, the second the defense of the theology of revela-
tion, the third the explanation of the relations between
Church and state. At the beginning of the whole work,
Leibniz wanted to place a philosophical introduction, as
well as an essay on universal language.\textsuperscript{27} But, because the
Duke Johann Friedrich died during an Italian journey,
the work did not make progress. After being confirmed
in all of his offices by Duke Ernst August, our scholar
composed a long Latin poem in honor of the Bishop Fer-
dinand of Paderborn, whose friend he had become. Lat-
er, Fontenelle described the work as altogether one of the
most perfect Latin poems. In May 1680, Leibniz began a
correspondence with the Landgrave Ernst of Hesse-
Rheinfels, who had become a Catholic, and who was very
interested in religious questions. The opportunity for this
exchange of letters arose, when the Landgrave sought a
copy of his book, The Upright and Discreet Catholic. The
philosopher hoped Ernst would support his efforts for
the unity of the Lutheran and Catholic Churches.\textsuperscript{28} At
the beginning of 1697 in Hannover, Leibniz met Cristóbal de Rojas y Spino-
la, O.F.M., Titular Bishop of Tina, later Bishop of Vienna
Neustadt,\textsuperscript{29} at that time the most important representa-
tive of the Roman-German
Emperor in the peace nego-
tiations of Nijmegen (1678)
between France and the states invaded by her. In
him, Leibniz found a kind-
dred soul, since the Bishop
wanted in every possible
manner to set into motion
the unification process
between the two Churches.
Leibniz met the prelate for
the second time in March
1683, when the latter came
to Hannover, in order to par-
ticipate in a unification dis-
sussion with Lutheran the-
etologists. In the autumn of the same year, the Landgrave
attempted to convert the philosopher to the Catholic
faith, but the latter resisted the appeal of the princely con-
vert, and made the distinction between inner and exter-
nal communion of the Church, that is, of the invisible
and visible Church, but he could not bring himself to
accept the fundamental principle of incarnation, accord-
ing to which all spiritual values and efforts are expressed
in the Church, and therefore must become visible. Leib-
niz acknowledged also that the Church is infallible in all
matters of faith necessary for salvation; yet, he did not
want to accept the fact, that the visible Church demanded
of its members to retain some errors in respect to philoso-
phy and the natural sciences, as for example, the Ptole-

\textsuperscript{27} Aiton, pp. 120-122. Franz Xaver Kiefl, Der Friedensplan des Leib-
niz zur Vereinigung der getrennten christlichen Kirchen [The Peace
Plan of Leibniz for the Unification of the Divided Christian
Churches] (Paderborn: 1903), X-XI.

\textsuperscript{28} Aiton, pp. 126-127.

\textsuperscript{29} b. in Geldern around 1626, son of a Spanish officer, in Cologne
Franciscan of strict observance, 1663 General-Visitor of the
Thüringen Province, 1664 General-Definitor, 1664 Ambassador
of Emperor Leopold I to the Parliament in Regensburg. July 3,
1666 Emperor’s designee as Bishop of Knin in Hungary, March
11, 1678 consecration as Bishop. 1678 Ambassador of Leopold’s to
all German princely courts for the religious and political unity of
the Empire. July 7, 1685 nominated to Bishop of Vienna
Neustadt, May 3, 1687 papal investiture. 1688 construction of
cathedral-chapter. d. in Vienna Neustadt March 12, 1695. Die
Bischöfe des Heiligen Römischen Reiches 1648-1803, ed. by Erwin
Gatz (Berlin: 1990), pp. 397-398.
maic system in place of Copernican-Galilean. 30

Here the actual problem of Galileo’s Lettera a Madama di Lorena does not seem to have become apparent to Leibniz, which consists not in the fact that the Holy Scripture needed a new interpretation because of the results of natural science, but rather in the fact that Galileo wanted to give this interpretation in place of the ecclesiastical office, leaving aside that Galileo’s proof of the movement of the earth around the sun on the basis of the “flussì e reflussì del mare” [flux and reflux of the sea] was simply false, which his famous friend Tommaso Campanella, O.P., already noted in the letter of thanks for his copy of the Dialogo sui massimi sistemi. In his correspondence with Ernst, Leibniz spoke again of the Catholic Demonstrations, but he wrote in this time period only the Systema theologicum, about which we shall speak later. A second attempt on the part of the enterprising Landgrave Ernst in Autumn 1683 to draw Leibniz to the Catholic Church failed, too. The Landgrave had written, that even he as a Catholic did not agree with certain decisions of lesser significance, like those of the Inquisition. But Leibniz insisted upon his standpoint. Nonetheless, he reported with pleasure to Ernst on January 20, 1686, that at the Christmas celebration in the ducal church in Wolfenbüttel an Italian oratorio had been performed, in which had been sung the praise of Pope Innocent XI, who was undertaking such great exertions to unite the Christians in battle against the Turks. Leibniz thought, probably correctly, that this was the first time that praise for the Pope had been sung in a Lutheran church. During this time period, he also intensified his correspondence with the Great Arnauld, who at that moment lived in voluntary exile in The Netherlands. Leibniz sent to him his first attempt at an integral philosophy, the Discours de métaphysique, which was to have formed the introduction to the Demonstrations catholicae. Through the Landgrave, he also requested from Arnauld confirmation, that the views held by him in no regard contradicted Catholic teaching. 31 However, he did not receive it, because Arnauld and the Landgrave were far more interested in Leibniz’s conversion. In reality, Leibniz had to take offense at the fact, that in the event of his conversion, he would have had to swear absolute obedience to the Catholic Magisterium, whereas his French friends were almost all Jansenists or Gallicans, but nevertheless could call themselves Catholic, without it up until then resulting in an excommunication.

V. Concrete Action for the Unification of the Churches

V.1. The already mentioned interconfessional conference of theologians in Hannover from 1682–83 remained without result. 32 Nonetheless, the new Duke Ernst August, although himself a Protestant, encouraged further efforts for the unity of Lutherans and Catholics, because this

30. Aiton, pp. 146-148. The basis of the adherence of the Catholic Church to the Ptolemaic system of the universe, which Leibniz frequently used, may have been a pretext. For it cannot have escaped him, that this outlook rested fundamentally on the falsity of the Galilean proof by means of the “flussì e reflussì del mare,” therefore the tides. —Despite his conversion to Catholicism, Ernst Landgrave of Hesse-Rheinfels was a very tolerant prince: b. in Kassel Dec. 1623, d. in Cologne Dec. 16, 1693. 1641-1644 Protestant army commander, 1648 Landgrave, Jan. 6, 1652 became a Catholic in Cologne. Various publications, numerous letters (Schmidt, in LThK, III (Freiburg: 1931), cols. 769-770).

31. Aiton, pp. 156-161. The chief organizer of the conference was Gerard Wolter Molanus, b. Hameln Nov. 1, 1633, d. Hannover Oct. 7, 1722. Studied in Helmstedt with Professor Calixt who was strongly inclined to a union, 1659 Professor at the University of Rinteln, 1674 Consistory-councillor, 1677 also Abbot of Loccum, unmarried, prayed the Breviary. Beginning 1679 in negotiations with Spinola (W. Koch, in LThK, VII (1935), col. 259).

32. November (N.S.) 1712.
had to make him appear sympathetic to Emperor Leopold I, from whom he wanted to receive the IXth Electorate of the Holy Roman Empire. The blessed Innocent XI also wished this reunification. In 1688, Leibniz undertook his great journey to the South, which was to lead him to Italy also, in order to investigate the Italian forefathers of the Guelph. Before he crossed the Brenner mountains, our philosopher again met with Rojas y Spinola in Vienna. Both drafted a Pro memoria for the Emperor, in which they informed him concerning the current state of the Catholic-Lutheran relations and asked for the Emperor's support of further negotiations. Leibniz also wrote to the Duchess Sophie, wife of Ernst August, a lady of brilliant intelligence, who was staying at that moment in Berlin, to persuade the Prince of Anhalt-Desau and the Elector Friedrich III to enter into a correspondence with Rojas y Spinola. In the beginning of the 1690's the latter resumed his journeys in behalf of unification of the Churches. At the same time Leibniz also attempted to include important French personalities in the union-negotiations, because, namely, it was precisely France, which interrupted every action favorable to union, in view of the fact that the confessional discordance in Germany seemed to be useful for the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Louis XIV. On the other side, the Gallican Church of France had obtained certain special rights, above all in respect to the authority of the Pope, and this caused Leibniz to hope to be able to negotiate more easily with the French. Such negotiations, in the form of an exchange of letters, were opened by the Electress Sophie and her sister Louise Hollandine (1622-1709), who, converted to the Catholic faith, had become the Abbess of Maubouisson. Sophie gave Leibniz the book Differends de la religion by Paul Pellisson (1624-1693), court-historian of Louis XIV and administrator of the fund of the converts' pay-office. Leibniz composed a detailed commentary on Pellisson's book, which Sophie sent to her sister. She in turn delivered the commentary to Pellisson, with whom Leibniz forthwith kept up a close correspondence. The former appended Leibniz's commentary to the second edition of his work on the distinctions of faith, as well as the correspondence with him, and gave the work the title De la tolérance des religions (Paris: 1692).

V.2. The Abbess of Maubouisson and her genial but also somewhat neurotic secretary, Madame Marie de Brinon, earlier Mother Superior of the Institute for Noble Daughters of St. Cyr, took the greatest pains to uphold this dialogue, and they succeeded in involving the famous Bossuet, who occasionally came to Maubouisson. The latter had already communicated to Leibniz in 1679, that on January 4 of that year Innocent XI had approved his Erklärung des katholischen Glaubens [Explanation of the Catholic Faith]. An exchange of views between Bossuet and the already mentioned Abbot Molanus remained without effect, because the former insisted on the validity of the entire Council of Trent. However, Leibniz did not let himself become discouraged, and undertook to prove that the Council was not really ecumenical, and therefore had also not been infallible, because, among other reasons, some protests had come from France, the royal ambassadors had been recalled, and the great power in the West had denied its political recognition of the Council. To these objections responded Edmund Pirot, Professor of Theology at the Sorbonne, who confirmed the argument of the philosopher insofar as he defended the absolute authority of the Council only on questions of faith; which, however, was not generally recognized, because the French clergy had already come to certain decisions. Leibniz answered with the detailed Deuxième réponse sur la reception et l'autorité du Concile de Trente, in which he elaborated, how some teachings of the Council had evoked sharp controversies in France, which made the revision of some of its decisions necessary. Furthermore, he enumerated some examples from Church history, in which certain, already condemned teachings had been permitted once again, in order to promote the reestablishment of ecclesiastical unity. In particular, the Council of Basel rehabilitated some teachings of the Hussites, which the preceding Council of Constance had forbidden. This time, not Pirot, but rather Bossuet himself gave the answer. He vehemently disputed Leibniz's standpoint, and maintained that although historical examples may be interesting for the historian, they cannot be utilized in order to shake the ecclesiastical principle of infallibility of an ecumenical council. The Bishop of Meaux explained that he was not in a position, to waste even one further word concerning partial revocation of the Council of Trent, the validity of which ought not to be touched. This letter discouraged the Abbot Molanus completely, so that he did not want to write Bossuet any more. Leibniz, on the other hand, composed a further work on the validity of the Council of Trent, in which he affirmed that a general revocation of certain decisions of the same was not necessary, but rather only an explanation, that they were not obligatory for Protestants, while the special view of the latter should not be declared as specifically heretical. But, Bossuet had already said his last word, and did not want to answer anymore. Only a half year later did he write that he expected an answer of...
Abbot Molanus, who of course did not wish to continue the discussion, which in his view was useless, any longer. Leibniz, on the contrary, sent Bossuet a very carefully formulated letter, together with the introduction to Molanus’ work of the preceding year, as well as three further small works of the Abbot. The latter had at first been elaborated for Emperor Leopold I. Thus, Leibniz attempted to press the French Bishop into a more conciliatory attitude, in connection with which he also utilized the Viennese negotiations on the “external” union between Protestants and Catholics, as an argument. This plan did not function, perhaps because Bossuet suspected a pious attempt at blackmail from Leibniz’s side.\(^\text{35}\)

**V.3.** In the meantime, Bishop Rojas y Spinola had resumed his ecumenical journeys and attempted to invite a congress of theologians to Frankfurt am Main. He had drafted a *Confessio hungarica* and hoped, with the help of German Protestant theologians, to move the Hungarian members of the Reformed Church to acceptance of the concordat formulas, which were contained in the *Confessio*. The Hungarian Calvinists showed little enthusiasm, and Molanus maintained that he could not travel. Together with Leibniz, he wrote the *Liquidationes controversiarum*, while the latter composed a *Iudicium doctoris catholici* (Judgment of a Catholic Doctor). Rojas y Spinola could no longer respond, because he died at the beginning of 1695. In 1698, in the aftermath of the Peace of Ryswick (1697), which ended the Palatine War, during which the French had totally devastated the Palatinate, Leibniz undertook a further attempt to resume the discussion with Bossuet. Both men apologized to one another for the interruption, which had occurred owing to the conditions of warfare. But Bossuet immediately demanded the participation of Molanus. Leibniz replied, that the Bishop already knew all the thoughts of the Abbot. The true grounds for this hesitancy lay in the fact, that the official agencies in Hannover no longer wanted to remain in communication with Catholic authorities, because the hope for obtaining the British throne necessitated a sharp anti-papal attitude.\(^\text{35}\)

Bossuet might have guessed that, for Leibniz had chosen as patron for the new round of negotiations Duke Anton Ulrich von Wolfenbüttel, who in the past had been an opponent of the acquisition of the IXth Electorate through his relatives in Hannover, and who now sought a closer relation with France as a new possibility. The main theme of the second correspondence between Leibniz and Bossuet was the declaration, by which the Council of Trent had designated the deutero-canonical books as belonging to the canon of the Holy Scriptures. For Leibniz, this declaration signified the conclusive proof, that the Council had not been infallible. If the Catholic Church really relied upon tradition, how could it then have turned against a tradition, which rested upon the authority of St. Jerome, who had expressed considerable doubt as to whether the deutero-canonical books ought to belong to the canon of Holy Scriptures? According to Vinzenz of Lerin, that is Catholic, which has always, everywhere, and by all been believed. With the rejection of the aforementioned decision of Trent, the Protestants had proven themselves truer to tradition than the Catholic Church itself. What Leibniz does not say is, that by far the majority of Catholics had not accepted the opinion of St. Jerome, who in this case had sung outside the choir, and that tradition relied always on the majority of the Church Fathers. Also, that the Councils of the early Church had always decided against a minority. In any case, the discussion of this question overheated and in 1702 was interrupted by Bossuet, who died in 1704. With him passed away the Catholic discussion partner most highly esteemed by Leibniz.\(^\text{36}\)

**V.4.** While Leibniz endeavored to soften the Catholic position, at the same time he attempted to put down the Protestant resistance against a recognition, even though conditional, of papal primacy. During the conference of theologians of 1683, Molanus and some professors of theology from Helmstedt had ventured the explanation, that they would be ready to recognize the primacy of the Pope, legitimized, however, only through human legislation, not by divine right. This distinction had already been introduced by Melanchthon. During the last years of the Seventeenth century, Leibniz dedicated himself, among other things, to university politics and succeeded in having a number of professors appointed, who were far from the strict Wittenberg school and, on the other hand, were disposed to revive the irenic tradition of...

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Helmstedt. Since Duke Anton Ulrich was also moving along the same line, in 1698 Leibniz succeeded in extracting a statement from the theological faculty, which indicated a modified recognition of papal primacy, based upon divine right! Nevertheless, this position contained formulas, which satisfied neither Leibniz, nor Molanus, nor the Duke. Therefore, Leibniz drafted new formulas, which, with the help of professors Johann Andreas Schmidt and Johann Fabricius, he inserted into the statement of the faculty. Finally, the recognition of papal authority was found in an Addendum responsum, in the form of an appendix.\(^7\) Leibniz had elaborated, that as in the world, God also wills an order in his Church, and therefore the hierarchical structure of the Church, which culminates in the Papacy, is to be considered as divine right. However, the establishment of the highest ecclesiastical authority in Rome must be looked upon as human law. Nevertheless, this document was not used in the negotiations with Roja y Spinola’s successor as Bishop of Vienna Neustadt, Count Buchheim,\(^8\) because the new ecclesiastical alignment of the Court of Hannover became noticeable. Perhaps Leibniz himself had come to the conviction, that his efforts would first experience a lasting success in a later epoch. The fact remains, that in the first half of the Eighteenth century, under his influence Catholics and Lutherans came so close as they later never did again. In consequence of the Enlightenment and the philosophy of German Idealism, the rift between the religious communities broadened enormously. Leibniz was the only great Protestant thinker of Germany, who proceeded from the traditional concept of revelation and from the “Philosophia perennis” (the lasting philosophy)—the expression comes from him. For him, the true Catholic Church had to be a communion of particular—and national—Churches. His concept of Church corresponded with the monadistic structure of his philosophical system: Every particular Church represents an image of the Universal Church, whose “inner unity it represents in individual and limited ways.”

### VI. Leibniz’s Closest Approach to the Catholic Church, the Systema Theologicum

VI.1. The small work at issue was written around 1686\(^9\) and was never published by the author, probably because already at that time he did not venture to hope for a union in the not-too-distant future. Leibniz did not even give it a title; the current one came from an Hannoverian librarian. It consists of 29 pages, 360 mm high and 205 mm wide, but the margin always takes up half of the page. Characteristically, it found

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38. Kiefl, Peace Plan, LIV. —Franz-Anton Count of Puchheim (Buchheim), b. Vienna 1664, baptized July 18, 1664, Dr. utr. iur. of Parma, 1682 Canon in Passau, Renounced his spiritual state in order to continue his family, after the death of his wife resumed his spiritual state, childless. July 27, 1695 nominated by Leopold I as Bishop of Vienna Neustadt, Sept. 19, 1695 papal appointment, worked with all his might for the unification of Catholics and Protestants (Alfred Kolaska, in Gatz, Bishops, pp. 353-354).
39. Aiton, p. 147. —An article on this work composed by us, “Il ’Systema theologicum’ di G.W. Leibniz,” has been published in Miscellanea Brunero Gherardini (Studi tommistici 61) (Città del Vaticano: 1996), pp. 193-217. There we analyzed, among other things, the interpretation of Kiefl, who consciously ignores the remarks and commentaries of Duke de Broglie.
great interest first in France. At the time of Napoleon I, the Sulpician and Leibniz-specialist André Emergy (d. April 28, 1811) aroused the interest of the uncle of the Emperor, Cardinal Joseph Fesch (d. Rome May 13, 1839), in the work, who prevailed upon King Jerome Bonaparte of Westphalia to try to find the manuscript and to have it sent to Paris. But Emery died before its publication. In 1821, a French-German edition appeared in Mainz, which relied upon a transcript of Emery’s, and showed numerous errors. The Canon Pierre Lacroix from Lyon discovered the booklet in the library of Cardinal Fesch, and in 1846 in Paris provided for a critical Latin-French edition, to which Duke Jacques Victor-Albert de Broglie (1821-1901)\(^4\) contributed the introduction and explanatory remarks. The title read *Système religieux de Leibniz* [sic!]. In the meantime, in October 1843 the Hannoverian ambassador to the papal court, August Kessler, came into possession of the manuscript and sent it to the royal library in Hannover. Habent fata sua libelli!

**VI.2.** In the manner of a catechism or of a detailed creed, the work presents the essential Catholic doctrine, almost always in a completely correct manner. There are small exceptions, for example, when the author exaggerates the power of the Church and maintains that under certain circumstances it could even dissolve a valid marriage or permit polygamy. But the doctrine on the Trinity, Christology, Grace, and the Sacraments is altogether correctly reproduced. Naturally, sometimes it could even dissolve a valid marriage or permit polygamy. But the doctrine on the Trinity, Christology, Grace, and the Sacraments is altogether correctly reproduced. The title read *Système religieux de Leibniz* [sic!]. In the meantime, in October 1843 the Hannoverian ambassador to the papal court, August Kessler, came into possession of the manuscript and sent it to the royal library in Hannover. Habent fata sua libelli!

\(^4\)Alfred the fourth Duke de Broglie, b. Paris June 13, 1821, d. there Jan. 19, 1901. April 25, 1873 Deputy Prime Minister of France until 1874 (Spuler, *op. cit.*, p. 142, 145). The Duke was prominent certainly more through his scientific activity, especially as a historian, than through his political services. —With all necessary caution, de Broglie regards the *Systema theologicum* as the expression of Leibniz’s conviction, not as a kind of theological exercise, in which is to be said, that all doctrines could not be relinquished by Catholics: “Sans sortir de la Réserve où nous sommes renfermés, dans la préface, et qui nous parait commandée par la nature singulière de l’ouvrage que nous publions, nous nous bornerons à rappeler que toutes les pages du Systema Theologicum portent l’esprit de caractère personnel et des opinions connues de Leibnitz, et qu’on ne met guère à l’exposition des convictions étrangères tant des soins, de sentiment et d’éloquence.” [“Without giving up the reservation set forth in the foreword, which we brought to expression in connection with the unique work published here, we want merely to recall, that all pages of the work *Systema Theologicum* bear the personal character traits of Leibniz and are the expression of his understandings. And that one seldom set forth foreign convictions with so much care and eloquence.”] (*Système religieux de Leibnitz*, publié d’après le manuscrit original, trans. by Albert Broglie, ed. by L’Abbé Lacroix (Paris: 1846), p. 388).

regarding miracles, although he himself, as is well known, had laid down the principle for the natural sciences that “natura non facit saltus—la nature ne fait pas des saults” [nature does not make leaps]. Personally, I am of the view, that here in truth is a personal creed of Leibniz, and not an attempt to present the essential teaching of Catholics. The author knew very well, that some of his expressions would find no favor before the doctrinal Magisterium. The influence of Bossuet and of Gallicanism is unmistakable. Our view accords with that of the learned Duke de Broglie:

“Nous ferons remarquer seulement que Leibnitz embrasse ici, et étant même peut-être au dela de la juste mesure la doctrine de l’Église Gallicane, qui subordonne l’autorité des Pontifes à celle des Conciles et place l’infallibilité comme le souverain pouvoir dans l’Église entière et non dans la personne du Prince des Éveques qui la gouverne. C’est en effet, dans ce sens qu’il s’est toujours prononcé dans sa correspondance avec Bossuet, et ce grand prél at, dont les opinions sont connues, n’avait pas contribué à l’en détourner. Du reste, ce n’était pas une hardiesse médiocre chez un protestant que de prononcer le nom d’hierarchie, et d’accorder à la Papauté une autorité même restreinte. Leibnitz en avait déjà fait preuve dans ces Traités de Droit publique. Il avait établi à plusieurs reprises que la république chrétienne devait reconnaître deux chefs: l’empereur aux temporel, le Pape pour le spirituel; mais il ne s’appuyais alors, il est vrai, que sur des considérations du bien public et de l’utilité générale. Ici, il rapporte sans difficulté l’origine de l’autorité pontificale a une institution divine.”

[“We would like to call attention to the fact, that Leibnitz here excessively follows the doctrine of the Gallican Church, according to which the authority of the Pope is subordinated to the councils, and therefore the infallibility as sovereign power is located in the whole Church and not in the person of the Prince of Bishops. He always expressed himself in this way in the exchange of letters with Bossuet and that great prelate, whose views are well known, *did nothing, to dissuade him from this view*. Moreover, it was nothing extraordinary for a Protestant to pronounce the name of the hierarchy and to grant a limited authority to the papacy. Leibnitz had shown this in the treatises on public law. He had explained repeatedly, that a Christian republic should recognize two heads: the Emperor in the worldly domain, and the Pope in the spiritual domain. But it is true, that he based his considerations in these cases only on the idea of the general welfare and what is universally beneficial. Here he ascribes the source of papal authority to a divine institution.”]\(^4\)

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 382, note.
VII. Why Didn’t Leibniz Become A Catholic?

VII.1. In October 1689, Leibniz arrived in the Eternal City, where society received him enthusiastically. He wrote a poem of praise not only to the dying Innocent XI, but to his successor Alexander VIII, whom he called upon for a Holy War (against the Ottoman Empire). He visited the Vatican Library and the Barberiniana, in addition to yet other scientific institutions. The Physical-Mathematical Academy of Ciampini elected him as a member, and Cardinal Girolamo Casanate, founder of the famous Dominican Library Casanatense, offered him the post of a custodian of the Vatican Library and therewith indirectly the cardinalate, naturally under the condition of his conversion. For this reason, he turned down the offer. Leibniz met frequently with the Jesuit Grimaldi, who imparted a great amount of information to him about China. For this reason, he later wrote the work *Novissima sinica*. But the opportunity for conversion slipped by unutilized. Why?42

VII.2. Leibniz always maintained that the obstacle which stood in the way of his conversion was the claim of the Catholic Church, to force certain views, even in the sphere of natural science, upon their faithful, for example, the Ptolemaic system. But, as we have already detailed, this was indeed most likely a pretext. The official grounds for the rejection of the Copernican-Galilean world-system was, that until then no one had demonstrated its correctness. But, Leibniz wanted the reunification of the Lutheran and Catholic Churches, and his conversion would have immediately deprived him of any influence among the Lutherans. The second reason, as already noted, may have been the double standard which Rome used in relation to its faithful, under the pressure of political relations: On the one hand, there were the normal Catholics, on the other, the Galicians and Jansenists, who for a long time were granted greater leeway; the latter also because they defended Innocent XI against the capricious actions of Louis XIV. Finally, Leibniz could not reconcile himself to the principle of authority of the Catholic Church, also in respect to questions of faith. Certainly he accepted almost all Catholic doctrines without particular difficulty, but he did not understand why they had to be taught with authority. For him, they ensued logically from Revelation. He saw himself as a faithful Christian, but he must have forgotten, that not all the faithful had his enormous logical intelligence and powerful knowledge of tradition at their disposal, and therefore had need of support in the teaching office of the Church.

VIII. Leibniz and Russia

VIII.1. As a young man, Leibniz had had a somewhat negative view of Russia. However, by observing political events in the gigantic land, as well as the government activity of Czar Peter I the Great,43 he gradually became convinced of the fact that Russia was the realm of the future and of unlimited possibilities, in which he could perhaps realize his plans for a new order of society based on reason. On January 16, 1712, Leibniz wrote the Russian Chancellor, Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin (1660-1734): “And, as it has been my great goal since my youth, for the glory of God through the increase of the sciences, which most strongly show the Power, the Wisdom, and the Goodness of God (in which I had in part succeeded through God’s grace through new discoveries, which are rather well known in the Republic of Letters), and as I have always preferred this goal to honor and wealth, although the circumstances have forced me to accept offices, in which I had to concern myself with justice, history and political affairs, I am nevertheless always ready to apply myself to that great goal, and I seek a great prince, who has the same goal. . . . In this connection I make no distinction of nation or party, and I would be very happy to see a vigorous blossoming of the sciences with the Russians, which in Germany are only moderately cultivated. The land in which that succeeds best, will be the most beloved to me, for all of mankind will derive advantage therefrom, and its true treasures will multiply. That is what distinguishes man from animal, and cultivated people from barbarians. These are, my Lord, my true and ardent feelings.”44 For Leibniz, a true hero is the prince, who acts on behalf of the well-being of mankind.

By 1671, he wrote to the Great Arnauld: “That prince is a true hero, who seeks the object of his glory in the happiness of mankind,”45 as it reads in the letter of March 20, 1692 to Kochansky. In Peter the Great, Leibniz believed to have discovered this princely hero, also because the Czar seemed to realize his national plans with the work of his own hands, when, in the role of carpenter, he took part in the construction of his war ships: “Qu’il faisoit construire à present 75 vaisseaux de guerre, qu’il y travailloit lui-même, quand il s’y trouvait present et montra pour marque ses mains, qui estoit rudes, pour s’y estre appliqué.” (He had 75 war ships built, and helped personally in their construction. His calloused hands, marked by the work,

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43. b. June 9, 1672, Czar (Car) Sept. 6, 1689, Emperor (Imperator) of all of Russia, d. Feb. 8, 1725 (Spuler, *op. cit.*, p. 351).
45. Latin text in Richter, p. 42. —Leibniz understood the word *héroïque*—heroic—as human greatness in the humanitarian sense, and only in a subordinate sense as military bravery, by which he approximates the Catholic explanation of the virtue of fortitude.
are the proof). The hero must possess an extremely strong will, wisdom and great power. At the age of thirty, Leibniz admitted: “My whole ambition has consisted solely in finding a great prince, who has more than usual insight, and I believe, that there is nothing in human affairs so beautiful and noble as a great wisdom, which is united with great power.” Precisely because the philosopher believed he recognized in Peter this generous, unusually intelligent, wise, and above all powerful prince, he sought a meeting with him, in order to set forth his plans. The first meeting took place in Torgau on the Elbe, where the Czarevich and the granddaughter of the Duke Anton Ulrich von Wolfenbüttel were to be married. Leibniz wanted to persuade the Monarch, to have magnetism in his wide empire measured, and linguistic investigations undertaken. On Dec. 14, 1711, he wrote to the orientalist La Croze: “I had the honor of speaking to the Czar in Torgau, and His Majesty will have magnetic measurements undertaken in their spacious lands. Additionally, he seems to be ready to favor other investigations as well, and if you, my Lord, want to specify projects, which should deserve investigations in Russia, Siberia, and China, thus I hope that this Monarch will aid us.” Duke Anton Ulrich introduced Leibniz to the Czar: “His Serene Highness the Duke possessed the goodness to introduce me to the Czar, who has spoken to me several times and always with great intensity. Two days after the departure of His Serene Highness, I paid my respects to the Czar and dined at his table.” Indeed, Leibniz was invited to the royal table on Oct. 30, 1711, and spoke for two hours with Peter, in particular about the plan for founding an Academy of Sciences (Collegium) in Russia. But, the philosopher among the diplomats also endeavored to forge an alliance between Russia and the States of the Holy Roman Empire, in order to launch a war against the Ottomans and to strengthen the position of the Empire in respect to France. On Oct. 25 Anton Ulrich had a document issued, by which Leibniz was accredited as a representative to the Czar. Leibniz accompanied Peter during his journey to Karlsbad by way of Teplitz, to Dresden. While in Karlsbad, Peter appointed the philosopher not only his Privy Justice Councillor, as reported already, but also granted him a pension of 1,000 taler, of which 500 were paid immediately. The corresponding document, which is to be found in the Hannoverian state library, bears the date of November 1, 1721, and is signed by Peter I, as well as by his Chancellor Gavriil Ivanovich Count Golovkin (1660-1734). Leibniz’s gratitude showed itself in a series of expert opinions concerning the most varied

46. French text in Richter, p. 43.
47. Richter, p. 48.
49. Richter, p. 48.
issues. The last meeting with Peter the Great occurred in May 1716 in Bad Pyrmont, from whence Leibniz accompanied the Ruler as far as Herrnhausen near Hannover.\footnote{For Leibniz’s plan for the Russian academy, see Richter, pp. 133-136.}

**VIII.2.** The plan for a Russian Academy of Sciences was only to be realized after the death of its author. By 1708, Leibniz had spoken in Vienna with the Russian Ambassador, Johann Christoph Baron von Urbich, about the idea, that the convening of a world council should be suggested to Peter I. After he returned to Moscow, Urbich informed the Czar. According to the plan, it would have been necessary to negotiate with the Sublime Porte, in order that it approve the participation of the eastern Patriarchs. Leibniz spoke obscurely of an unfailing means to bring Rome into participation in this world council, but he did not say by which means. The relevant correspondence abounds with secret codes in place of names, so that it appears impossible to pass judgment on this operation.\footnote{Aiton, p. 362.} On the other hand, Peter the Great was at that time very intensely occupied: In 1708 he had annihilated the army of Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava, and immediately afterwards conquered the Baltics. But, in 1711, he himself was defeated by the Ottoman Turks at the river Pruth and lost Azov, the base of the Black Sea fleet. Inter arma silent Musae. Regardless of this, Leibniz attempted to influence Peter by way of Duke Anton Ulrich von Wolfenbüttel, who had become a Catholic, and his granddaughter Charlotte, Peter’s daughter-in-law. However, since the marriage between Charlotte and the Czarevich Aleksei proved itself to be a disaster, this channel was blocked. In the year 1713, Leibniz wrote a further memorial, in which he suggested to Peter to assemble the ancient documents of the Greek councils, an idea which in large part had already been realized during the Council of Ferrara-Florence.\footnote{62.} According to Leibniz’s view, these documents on the development of Christianity in Russia, could have helped with respect to what was essential, making this country the center of the world, and should have made it the center of a universal Christian empire. In the projects of Leibniz for the education of Russian youth, the name of the Patriarch Photius appears, whose famous “library” was to serve to track down the oldest books of Christendom. Otherwise, the plan for the founding of an Academy of Sciences was supposed to have helped to establish the unity of Europe and the world.

On January 28, 1724, Peter I published the first plan of the Academy, which was originally to consist of three principal sections: (1) the actual academy, whose members have the task of promoting divisions of mathematics, natural science, medicine, Humaniora (classical philology), natural law, constitutional law, politics, and ethics; (2) the university, at which the academicians must teach their own respective disciplines; (3) the Lyceum, at which must teach the advanced students, whom the academicians have brought with them from their journeys abroad. Analogous to the plan for the academy, Leibniz also sent Peter the plan of a new form of government for Russia, which was to replace the old prikazy [executive orders] and naturally consisted not of classes, but rather of councils, namely, those of the state, of war, finances, the police, justice, trade, religion, review, and the scientists, i.e., of the Academy of Sciences, which here acquires the aspect of a culture ministry. Certainly, Leibniz did not want to abolish the Patriarch of Moscow. Peter I implemented the Council of Religion in a manner, which was to bury the freedom of the Church for two centuries, because he made the “Over-Procurator,” standing at the head of the Council of Religion, practically the ruler of the Orthodox Church or its Holy Synod, as the case might be.\footnote{54. b. Yavor near Lemberg (Lviv) 1658, d. Moscow Dec. 6, 1722. 1684 Catholic, 1687 Orthodox again, 1700 Metropolitan of Ryazan, 1701 leader of the Moscow Academy, 1702 Deputy of the Patriarchate of Moscow, 1721 President of the Holy Synod (Bernhard Stasiowski, in LThK, Vol. V (Freiburg: 1960), col. 885. Cf. Dictionaire de Théologie catholique, Tables générales, XII partie (Paris: 1967), cols. 2161-2162, where it is noted that Yavorsky wrote a letter to the doctors of the Sorbonne on the union of the Churches.) For the Paterikon desired by Leibniz, it is to be said, that it was more a matter of a special kind of Church books, in any case, more than one copy existed (Gerhard Oelskalsky, Christentum und theologische Literatur in der Kiewer Rus, (München: 1982), esp. p. 60, 100, 166, for the Paterikon of Kiev, passim).}

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\footnote{50. Text of the draft of the commission, see Richter, pps. 51-52, 55-56. Aiton, p. 362. Kiefl, Peace Plan, LXXXVII-LXC. Leibniz had dis-\footnote{Text of the draft of the commission, see Richter, pps. 51-52, 55-56.} 

IX. Why Did the Unification Efforts of Leibniz Remain Without Success?

As has become apparent in the course of our presentation, Leibniz was not the only one who strove for the unity of the Churches, especially between Catholics and Lutherans. However, in the final analysis, the political will to support the union was lacking on the part of most rulers. And this was indispensable in the world of “cuius regio eius religio.” But, the policy was pursued in accordance with dynastic interests. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important north German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity. The most important south German prince of the Eighteenth century, Friedrich II the Great of Prussia, was officially a Protestant, but personally despised Christianity.

This convergence was advanced on the Evangelical side by professors, first in Helmstedt, then in Göttingen, who were under the influence of the great individualist, such as Samuel Christian Hoffmann (1696-1787), professor of natural theology, but also through numerous other theologians in different cities of Germany. Despite a certain inclination to rationalism, the connection to scholasticism and to “Philosophia perennis” remained. But with no Protestant of his time did the “Catholic consciousness” show itself so strongly, as with Leibniz himself.57 Kant, who wrote about Leibniz with open hostility, had taken leave of Christianity. Neither in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft [Critique of Practical Reason], nor in Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft [Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason] do Christian revelation, original sin, the incarnation of God, salvation, and resurrection have any place. Instead, he speaks of “clericalism as a regiment in the would-be-service of good principle,” he speaks of fetish-service, and the like. According to Kant, all religions have some truth-content in some way or other, but they must liberate themselves from the “historical encrustations,” in order to empty themselves into the great unity-pot of universal morals. Without at present being able to give an assessment of the philosophical contents, it cannot be denied that Kant and other important representatives of German Idealism renounce Christianity, and their thinking has a post-Christian character. But, their teachings became the ideological substratum of Protestant theology in Germany, whereby a rift between Protestantism and the Catholic Church was ripped open, which has hardly become less deep through the encroachment of Idealism into Catholic theology.


57. In July 1691, Leibniz wrote from Hannover to Madame de Brinon: “Vous avez raison, Madame, de me juger catholique dans le coeur; je le suis même ouvertement: car il n’y a que l’opiniâtrêté, qui fasse l’hérétique; et de quoi, grâce à Dieu, ma conscience ne m’accuse point. L’essence de la catholicité n’est pas de communier extérieurement avec Rome; autrement ceux qui sont excommuniés injustement cesseraient d’être catholique malgré eux, et sans qu’il y eût de leur faute. La communion vraie et essentielle, qui fait que nous sommes du corps du Jésus-Christ est la charité.” [“You are correct, Madam, when you describe me as someone who in his heart is Catholic; I am even quite open about it: for only fanatical tenacity leads to one becoming a heretic, and one cannot, praise God, in good conscience reproach me for that. The essence of Catholicism does not consist of being in purely external communion with Rome; otherwise all those, who were unjustly excommunicated, would cease to be Catholic, even though this is not their fault. The true and essential communion, which makes us part of the Body of Christ, is love (caritas).”].

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The purpose of this essay is to elaborate the history of the Platonic Christian concept of time-reversal, which Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., has applied to the domain of mathematical economics in a number of recent essays. This concept was first developed by Plato (427-347 B.C.) and elaborated upon by some of the leading Christian theologians, from St. Augustine (A.D. 354-430), Boethius (A.D. 480-524), St. Anselm (A.D. 1033-1109), and St. Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1225-1274), to Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (A.D. 1401-1464).

In his essay “The Truth About Temporal Eternity” (Fidelio, Summer 1994) and in two more recent articles cited below, LaRouche argues, contrary to the prevailing empiricist view, which assumes that the present and the future are determined mechanistically by the past and that the universe is entropic, that the future shapes the present through the power of human creativity, and that the universe is not-entropic.

LaRouche argues, as do Plato and the above theologians, that the Good Itself, or Being, is Absolutely Infinite, Eternal, and Immutable, while the created universe or realm of becoming is good, finitely or relatively infinite (transfinite, to use the language of the German mathematician Georg Cantor [1845-1918]) and characterized, as Heraclitus (500 B.C.) maintained, by change. However, LaRouche emphasizes that, because man is created in the image of God the Creator (imago Dei) and because the physical universe is created according to the Logos or Reason, man, by imitating God the Creator through the generation of hypotheses, higher hypotheses, and hypothesizing the higher hypothesis, has both creativity, and that the universe is not-entropic.
the capacity (capax Dei) and mandate to exert dominion over, and thus develop, the physical universe (Genesis 1:28), which will obey him to the extent that his hypotheses are valid, i.e., in harmony with the lawful ordering principles according to which the universe is created (natural law).

Man is thus the instrument or agent of God’s ongoing creation. Insofar as he acts in the image of God by generating valid hypotheses, his hypotheses, higher hypotheses, and he himself, in hypothesizing higher hypotheses, are relatively timeless. Such ideas or thought-objects (referred to by Cusanus as entia rationis or rational entities, and by Bernhard Riemann [1826-66] as Geistesmassen), share the characteristics of Eternity in the temporal domain, including the characteristic of simultaneity.

Thus, in his essay entitled “U.S. Law: Neither Truth nor Justice” (Executive Intelligence Review, Aug. 23, 1996), LaRouche writes in the section on the Good:

Given: a series of events, each and all consistent with a specific theorem-lattice. These events are located in time and place. The relevant theorems are determined by an underlying hypothesis. In what part of that span of time and place, does that hypothesis exist? The hypothesis never changes during any part of that span of space-time; it exists, “simultaneously,” in all the places and times defined by that theorem-lattice, but is confined to none of them. Meanwhile, that hypothesis is the necessary and sufficient cause for the selection of all of the theorems adopted as propositions for the occurrence of the events. In this respect, as sufficient and necessary cause, the hypothesis has the form of the Good. Yet it is not, otherwise, The Good indicated by Plato, since the existence of the highest Good (The Good, or Absolute Good) can not be conditional, can not be the predicate of an hypothesis. Yet, as efficient necessary and sufficient cause the Good (Absolute) is located in no place or time, but simultaneously in all, just as the hypothesis relevant to a specific theorem-lattice….

If one says, from this latter standpoint, that the future acts to shape the present, or that the present shapes the past and future, it is only in the Platonic sense of hypothesis and Good, that such an efficient role of time is to be premised. It is through the relatively timeless hypothesis which shapes past, present, and future, that these three aspects of a continuing process behave as if they might be efficiently interactive at all times. They do not interact directly, of course! Like the past, the future is presently implicit in the relevant hypothesis (hypothesis, higher hypothesis, or hypothesizing the higher hypothesis), and always implicit in the Good. It is through the mediation of sufficient and necessary reason (hypothesis), that the effect, which acts as if from future upon past, occurs. (pp. 27-28)

In his essay entitled “The Essential Role of ‘Time-Reversal’ in Mathematical Economics” (Executive Intelligence Review, Oct. 11, 1996; Fidelio, Winter 1996) LaRouche writes:

“When” is the future? At what point in time? Similarly, what is the beginning-point in time from which to define the cumulative past with which the future is to collide? The answer to this seeming paradox, was already known by Plato, by Augustine of Hippo, and, therefore, also, Thomas Aquinas: All time is subsumed under a general regime of simultaneity! The highest expression of change, is that lattice of higher hypotheses which expresses the transfinite notion of hypothesizing the higher hypothesis. What underlies that lattice? That lattice is underlain by what Plato distinguishes as the Good. In the analysis situs of hypothesizing, that Good is “simultaneously” efficient in all times and places which might exist. Thus, in those terms of reference, the past and future, as hypothesis, are existent as efficient agency in each present moment.

He then indicates that this does not mean that there is therefore a mechanistic predestination or predetermination which annuls freedom:

Does this signify that each and all events are predetermined—‘predestined.’ No… The general set of relations defined by the principle of hypothesis are otherwise describable as relations within an hierarchy of available “pathways of change.” The ordering principle underlying this hierarchy is cardinality, as we have indicated that principle of ordering of Riemannian physical space-time manifolds here. It is in terms of efficient choices of pathways of change, that the future acts upon the present.

The Platonic concepts of hypothesis, higher hypothesis, and hypothesizing the higher hypothesis employed by
LaRouche in the above passages, are most explicitly developed by Plato in his discussion of the “Divided Line” in Book VI of the Republic. [See Figure 1]

In Book VI of the Republic, Plato argues that hypotheses are the “children” (506c) or the “offspring of the Good itself.” (508c) They therefore have the form of the Good. Thus what is characteristic of the Good itself, i.e., being present simultaneously in all, while at the same time not located in any particular time or place, is also the characteristic of hypotheses as having the form of the Good. One translation of the Republic by Paul Shorey refers to the offspring of the Good, i.e., hypotheses, as “boniform.” (509a)

In his discussion of hypothesis in Book VI of the Republic, Plato writes that the human mind “using as images the things that were previously imitated, is compelled to investigate on the basis of hypotheses.” On the simplest level, the mind generates a hypothesis from which it derives theorems deductively. As Plato writes, through such hypotheses the mind “makes its way not to a beginning but to an end.” (510b) Such a simple hypothesis thus generates a deductive theorem-lattice. In this domain, as Plato argues, “a soul . . . is compelled to use hypotheses, and does not go to a beginning because it is unable to step out above the hypotheses, and it uses as images those very things of which images are made by the things below . . . .” (511a)

However, as Plato makes clear in the Parmenides, a paradox necessarily arises when new evidence emerges, which is inconsistent with the deductive theorem-lattice of a pre-existing or established fixed hypothesis. Since the characteristic of the created universe is change, any attempt to comprehend the laws of the universe based upon a fixed hypothesis is doomed to failure. The resultant paradox can only be resolved through the creation of a deductively discontinuous, superior or higher, hypothesis.

In the Republic, Plato writes, that in hypothesizing such higher hypotheses, the human mind “makes its way to a beginning that is free from hypotheses; starting out from hypothesis and without the images used in the other part, by means of forms themselves it makes its inquiry through them.” (510b)

Thus, the mind of man both has the capacity and is compelled to generate a sequence of valid higher hypotheses. Plato refers to this capacity and to the mental act of generating such a sequence of higher hypotheses as “argument itself” which operates with “the power of dialectic.” (511b) This is what Lyndon LaRouche refers to as “hypothesizing the higher hypothesis.” In hypothesizing the higher hypotheses, as Plato writes, the mind makes “the hypotheses not beginnings but really hypotheses—that is, steppingstones and springboards—in order to reach what is free from hypothesis at the beginning of the whole. When it has grasped this, argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning and in such fashion goes back down again to an end; making no use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms themselves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too.” (511b-c)

In order to conceptualize the “idea of the Good,” one must hypothesize the hypothesis of the higher hypotheses. However, the Good itself, the First Principle, is itself “free from hypothesis,” because it is uncreated. It is the Good itself, which underlies this entire hierarchy of hypotheses as generated by man in God’s image. Because each valid hypothesis, higher hypothesis and the mental act of hypothesizing the higher hypotheses is an “offspring of the Good itself,” they are each relatively good and thus share in the characteristics of Eternity through participation.

Reflections on Temporal Eternity

For Plato, the paradox of the participation of time in the Eternal, is a reflection of the paradoxical relationship between Being and becoming, or Unity and plurality. This is the paradox of the One and the Many, which Plato develops negatively in the Parmenides dialogue, and positively in the Philebus.

In the Parmenides, as referenced above, Plato demonstrates that a devastating paradox necessarily arises, if one attempts to apply a fixed hypothesis (a One) deductively to a multiplicity (a Many), while excluding the possibility of change to a superior hypothesis capable of accounting for new evidence inconsistent with the fixed hypothesis.

In the Philebus, Plato resolves this paradox of the One and the Many, by pointing out that in addition to the One in the form of a fixed hypothesis, which limits the unlimited Many, the mind of man, which belongs to the family of the Cause or Maker of the universe, is capable of hypothesizing an unlimited family of limits, i.e., an unending multiplicity (Many) of higher hypotheses (Ones).

Thus, although the Eternal is unchanging, the mind of man, which is akin to God, is capable in the domain of temporality, through its capacity to hypothesize the
hypothesis of the higher hypothesis, i.e., Eternity itself, to assume a relationship in the world of becoming similar to that of God in respect to his creation.

Thus, in *On Beryllus*, Nicolaus of Cusa writes:

For just as God is the Creator of real entities and of natural forms, man is the creator of rational entities and artificial forms. These are nothing other than similitudes of his intellect, just as the creatures of God are similitudes of the divine Intellect. Therefore, man has intellect, which is a similitude of the divine Intellect, in creating. (pp. 303-304)

The distinctions between Eternity and time, Being and becoming, and Unity and multiplicity which underlie the concepts of temporal Eternity and time-reversal, are most explicitly developed by Plato in the *Timaeus*, Section 7. Every one of the Christian theologians, whom I shall discuss, bases his consideration of this subject matter upon the argument developed in this dialogue.

What Plato argues is, that the created universe is an image of its pattern, which is an eternal living being. He says that Eternity cannot be attributed fully to the created universe. In fact, Eternity is the actual pattern of the created universe, which latter is the image. Time is “a moving image of Eternity,” (37d) whereas Eternity remains ever one. In respect to time, one can say past, present, and future, but in respect to Eternity, all one can say is that it is. There are no such distinctions of time in Eternity, and parts of time cannot be attributed to Eternal Being. He writes,

We must in my opinion begin by distinguishing between that which always is and never becomes, from that which is always becoming, but never is. (27d)

He writes further that,

We say of it that it was and shall be, but on a true reckoning, we should only say is, reserving was and shall be for the process of change in time: for both are motions, but that which is eternally the same and unmoved can neither be becoming older or younger owing to the lapse of time, nor can it ever become so. (38a)

If one looks at the Old Testament, this is the meaning of God’s self-description as “I am who am.” (Exodus 3:14) We see this in St. Augustine’s discussion in the *City of God*, of the concept of God, in connection with Plato’s *Timaeus*. In Book VIII, Section 11, entitled “How Plato has been able to approach so nearly to Christian knowledge,” St. Augustine writes,

But the most striking thing in this connection, and that which most of all inclines me almost to assent to the opinion that Plato was not ignorant of those writings, is the answer which was given to the question elicited from the holy Moses when the words of God were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what was the name of that God who was commanding him to go and deliver the Hebrew people out of Egypt, this answer was given: “I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me unto you”; as though compared with Him that truly is, because He is unchangeable, those things which have been created mutable are not—a truth which Plato vehemently held, and most diligently commended. (pp. 256-257)

In the Gospel of John, it is similarly significant that Christ refers to himself in the same terms as “I am.” (Jn 8:28, 13:19)

In other writings of Plato, besides the *Timaeus*, it is clear that his concept of Eternity is cognate with his concept of Unity. As Plato argues, Unity cannot have parts, it is not divisible. In the *Sophist*, for example, Plato writes: “Surely unity in the true sense and rightly defined, must be altogether without parts.” (245a) Thus eternity, as in the case of unity, does not have parts, and can therefore not experience succession, which is characteristic of multiplicity, mutability, and divisibility.

Furthermore, in the *Republic*, in his discussion of the “Divided Line” in Book VI, Plato writes: “Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the Good, but also existence and being are in them besides as a result of it, although the Good isn’t being, but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity and power.” (509b)

What Plato is developing here, is the notion that the Good is not being in the sense of existence or of the created universe, but is Infinite Being, which is prior in nature to and of a higher cardinality than existence. This is the distinction made by Georg Cantor between the Absolute Infinite, and the transfinite realm of becoming. Here, Plato is making the distinction between Eternal Being and the existence or being of the created universe: The Good itself transcends being in the sense of the created universe, both in dignity and in power.

Let us now review the views of the Christian theologians concerning these issues.

**Nicolaus of Cusa**

Rather than proceeding chronologically, we will begin with Nicolaus of Cusa, who most efficiently communicates the concept of time-reversal.

In his book *On Actual Potential* (or as Jasper Hopkins translates it, *On Actualized Possibility*), Cusanus introduces the image of a spinning top. [SEE Figure 2] He writes,
Nevertheless, we desire to be led by a sensible image—especially regarding questions how Eternal Being is all things at once and how the whole of eternity is within in the present moment—so that when we leap forth, having left this image behind, we may be elevated above all sensible things . . .

I shall try to show you such an image. I will take the example of boys playing with a top—a game known to us all, even in practical terms. A boy pitches out a top; and as he does so, he pulls it back with a string which is wound around it. The greater the strength of his arm, the faster the top is made to rotate—until it seems while it is moving at the faster speed to be motionless and at rest. Indeed, boys speak of it as then at rest.

So let us describe a circle, bc, which is being rotated about a point a as would the upper circle of a top; and let there be another fixed circle, de: Is it not true that the faster the movable circle is rotated, the less it seems to be moved?

Suppose, then, that the possibility-to-be-moved is actual in it; i.e., suppose that the top is actually being moved as fast as possible. In that case, would it not be completely motionless?

Since the motion would be infinite velocity, points b and c would be temporally present together at point d of the fixed circle—without its being the case that point b was temporally prior to point c. (For if b were temporally prior to c, the motion would not be maximal and infinite.) And yet, there would not be motion but would be rest, since at no time would points b and c move away from the fixed point d.

Hence the maximal motion would at the same time also be minimal motion and no motion.

In that case, just as the opposite points b and c would be always at point d, would they not always also be at the opposite point from d, namely, at e?

Would this not likewise hold true for all the intermediate points of the circle be?

Therefore, the whole of the circle would at every instant be simultaneously present at point d. And the whole of the circle would be not only at d and d, but also at every other point of the circle de.

Let it suffice, then, that by means of this image and symbolically we are somehow able to see that (if the circle be were illustrative of eternity and circle de were illustrative of time) the following propositions are not self-contradictory; that eternity as a whole is at once present at every point of time and that God as the beginning and the End is at once and as a whole present in all things. (pp. 83-85)

This is an example of the simultaneity of Eternity, which cannot be divided into parts and is immutable. Therefore, Eternity is not located merely at the beginning before creation, because you can not refer to what is before time, in terms of time. Nor is Eternity in the future after some so-called end times. Rather, Eternity is simultaneously as a whole present in every moment, past, future, and present.

In On the Vision of God, Cusanus writes similarly in respect to Eternity versus temporal succession:

Now, posterior to most simple eternity no thing can possibly be made. Therefore, infinite duration, which is eternity itself, encompasses all succession. Therefore, everything which appears to us in a succession is not at all posterior to Your Concept, which is eternity. For Your one Concept, which is also Your Word, enfolds each and everything. . . . [A]ll things exist because You conceive them. Now, You conceive in eternity. but in eternity succession is—without succession—eternity itself, i.e., your Word itself, O Lord God. Any given thing that appears to us in time was not conceived by You before it existed. For in eternity, in which You conceive, all temporal succession coincides in one and the same now of eternity. Therefore, where the future and the past coincide with the present, nothing is past or future. (p. 167)

In the same work, Cusanus, using the metaphor of a clock, writes:

So let the concept of a clock be, as it were eternity itself. Then, in the clock, movement is succession. Therefore, eternity enfolds and unfolds succession, for the Concept of a clock—a Concept which is eternity—both enfolds and unfolds all things. (pp. 169-171)

St. Augustine

After his conversion, St. Augustine also discusses time in Book 11 of his Confessions. Addressing God, he writes,
Although You are before time, it is not in time that You precede it. If this were so, you would not be before all time. It is in eternity, which is supreme over time, because it is a never-ending present, that you are at once before all past time and after all future time. . . . Your years are completely present to you all at once, because they are at a permanent standstill. (p. 263)

Think of Nicolaus of Cusa’s image of a top which is spinning so rapidly that there is no motion. Augustine continues,

You made all time; You are before all time; and the “time,” if such we may call it, when there was no time was not time at all. (p. 263)

Boethius

Boethius, in the Consolation of Philosophy, Book 5, Section 6, writes that “God is eternal” and that eternity is the “whole simultaneous and perfect possession of boundless life.” He continues:

Whatever comprehends and possesses at once the whole fullness of boundless life, and is such that neither is anything future lacking from it, nor has anything past flowed away, that is rightly held to be eternal, and that must necessarily both always be present to itself, possessing itself in the present and hold as present the infinity of moving time. (p. 423-425)

Boethius cites Plato specifically: “Following Plato, we should say that God is indeed eternal, but that the world is perpetual.” (p. 427) In other words, the world cannot be eternal, since that which is eternal has no beginning or end, or rather is the beginning and end of the world, which as an image of the eternal is created, and therefore has a beginning. But the world, even though it has a beginning, does not have an end. Therefore, it is perpetual, although not eternal. The fact that the world is perpetual, means that it does not wind down and perish, but rather is not-entropic.

St. Anselm

St. Anselm, in Chapter Eighteen of the Proslogion, writes,

You are unity itself, divisible in no respect. . . . Your eternity exists always as a whole. (p. 106)

He then discusses the relationship of Eternity to space and time. In Chapter Nineteen, he writes,

He is not in space and time, but all things are in him. . . .

In no case, were You yesterday, or will You be tomorrow. Instead yesterday, today and tomorrow You are. Or better, You simply are, existing beyond time. You do not exist yesterday or today or tomorrow, for yesterday, today, tomorrow are nothing other than temporal distinctions. Now although without You nothing can exist, You are not in space or time, but all things are in You. For You are not contained by anything, but rather You contain all else. (p. 106)

One should recall Lyndon LaRouche’s discussion of hypotheses as having the same form as the Good itself, in that the hypothesis is present in the entire theorem-lattice defined by that hypothesis. It is present in all time and space within that theorem-lattice, without being itself contained by time and space, rather containing time and space.

This is a concept which Nicolaus of Cusa discusses in all of his writings. God is “all in all” (I Cor 15:28), and yet is not in any one thing. He cannot be defined or contained by anything created or finite, anything characterized by space and time. But He is nonetheless present in all.

In Chapter Twenty-two, St. Anselm continues:

In a proper and unqualified sense you are who you are [this is a reference to the self-description of God in Exodus as “I am Who am”—FWF] because You have neither a past nor a future, but only a present and because You can not be thought ever not to be. (p. 108)

In Chapter Twenty of the Monologium, St. Anselm writes,

The Supreme Being exists everywhere, in all things and through all things; and the fact that it neither began to be nor will cease to be entailed that it always was, is, and will be. (p. 31) . . . [It is necessary that it exist everywhere and always, i.e., in every place and at every time. (p. 32)

Think back to what Plato wrote in the Sophist respecting unity not having any parts.

In Chapter Twenty-one of the Monologium, St. Anselm writes, “Neither the Creative Being, its life time nor its eternity admits in any way of a past or a future.” (p. 34) And, in Chapter Twenty-two, entitled, “How the Supreme Being Exists in Every Place at Every Time and at No Place at No Time”:

Only those things which exist in space and time in such way that they do not transcend spatial extension or temporal duration are bound by the law of space and time. (pp. 35-36) . . . [The Supreme Being] does not receive into itself distinctions of space and time. . . . Nor does it exist in the fleeting temporal present, which we experience, nor did it exist in the past, nor will it exist in the future. For these are distinguishing properties of finite and mutable things; but it is neither finite nor mutable. (p. 38) . . . [Nevertheless,] it is
present to all finite and mutable things. . . . According to the consistent truth of two different meanings, the Supreme Being exists everywhere and always, nowhere and never—i.e., in every place and time, and in no place and time. (p. 38)

In succeeding chapters, St. Anselm argues that the Supreme Being “contains all things by its pervasive presence” (p. 38):

The Supreme Substance is without beginning and without end, and it does not have past, a future, or a temporal, i.e., a fleeting present, such as we experience; for its lifetime, or eternity, which is identical with itself, is immutable and without parts. . . . Hence, what else is true eternity, befitting the Supreme Being alone, other than unending life existing as a complete whole at once? (p. 39)

St. Thomas Aquinas

In the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas writes in answer to Question VIII in respect to The Being of God in Things: “God is in all things, as an agent is present to that upon which it works.” (Q.VIII.a.1) With this argument, Aquinas introduces the concept that the Eternal is present in the temporal world, as a cause is present in that which is caused or created.

Think of what Lyndon LaRouche emphasizes in respect to the ontological issue in “U.S. Law: Neither Truth nor Justice”:

If all elements of a theorem-lattice are efficiently generated by the efficiency of the hypothesis underlying the entirety of that theorem-lattice, is reality located primarily in that hypothesis, or in the elements explicitly referenced by a theorem? Or: If one element is the result of a change imposed upon another element, which is more “real,” those elements, or the agency which imposes the change upon their existence? Equivalent: Which is more real, the Creator of the universe, or the elements within that created universe? (p. 29)

What we are dealing with here is the question of causality in the sense of a final, rather than instrumental cause, i.e., the hypothesis which underlies an entire theorem-lattice. We see the same method in Nicolaus of Cusa, where, for example, using geometry, he demonstrates in On Learned Ignorance and in On the Quadrature of the Circle, that circular action is primary in respect to any polygon, or as Plato would have put it, the circle exceeds the polygon “in dignity and power.” The polygon, no matter how many times its sides are multiplied, can never attain to equality with the circle which circumscribes it. [See Figure 3] However, a polygon is generated, i.e., caused, by folding a circle. For example, a line is generated by folding a circle once, and a square is created by folding the circle twice and then connecting the points where the folds intersect the circumference. [See Figure 4] Thus, the circle has a higher cardinality and ontology than the polygon. The circle is therefore present in every polygon, as a result of the fact that it is the causal agent of the polygonal figures upon which it works, in the same way that the Creator is present in the created universe as the cause of that which He has created. St. Thomas continues:

Spiritual things contain those things in which they are as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things as containing them. (Q.VIII.a.1) . . . He is in all things as giving them being, power and operation, so He is in every place as giving it being and power to be in a place. (Q.VIII.a.2) . . . He is in all things by His essence, because He is present to all as the cause of their being. (Q.VIII.a.3)

On the question of the immutability of God, and
therefore His Eternity, Aquinas cites the Book of Malachi 3:6, in which it is said, “I am the Lord and I change not.” (Q.IX.a.1) In that respect, Aquinas answers by citing St. Augustine, who wrote, “God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable.” (Q.IX.a.2) Again we have here the distinction between the domain of the Absolute and that of the transfinite, the latter being characterized by change, whereas that of the Absolute is unchanging.

In respect to Eternity, Aquinas quotes Boethius: “Eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of interminable life.” (Q.X.a.1) He continues:

Time is nothing else, but the measure of before and after in movement . . . . Whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning and no end. . . . Eternity is interminable—that is, lacks beginning and end. . . . Eternity lacks succession, being simultaneously whole. (Q.X.a.1). . . . The notion of Eternity follows immutability as the notion of time follows movement. . . . Eternity is nothing else, but God Himself. (Q.X.a.2)

Citing Boethius, he concludes: “Eternity is simultaneously whole, which cannot be applied to time, for eternity is the measure of a permanent Being, while time is the measure of movement.” (Q.X.a.4)

The New Testament

This concept of Eternity is also reflected in the New Testament concept of God as the “Alpha and the Omega.” (Rev 1:8) God is simultaneously both the beginning and end, while having no beginning or end. God is the beginning in the sense that He is the Origin, the Source or the First Principle of everything created, but also the End in the sense of the purpose of the created universe. In the transfinite domain of becoming, the end of the created universe as mediated by man is to come closer to the Good itself through a process of directive change. By hypothesizing higher hypotheses, man brings himself and the universe, of which he, as created in the image of God, i.e., imago Dei, is the master, into increasing harmony with the Origin of creation, i.e., God. Man is the only being who can conceive of the Good itself and who desires Eternity. Therefore, the mandate he receives in Genesis is to use his agapic reason to exert dominion over nature.

The paradoxical concept of time-reversal is otherwise central to the concept of the Incarnation as expressed in the New Testament. As the Gospel of John states, “In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came to be through him, and without him nothing came to be.” (Jn 1:1-3) And yet in time, “the Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us.” (Jn 1:14). This paradox, which defies mere logic, is only comprehensible from the standpoint of temporal Eternity.

In On Learned Ignorance, Nicolaus of Cusa writes,

And we ought not to believe that the Firstborn—viz., God and man—preceded the world temporally but should believe that He preceded it in nature and in the order of perfection and above all time. Hence, by existing with God above time and prior to all things, He could appear to the world in the fullness of time, after many cycles had passed.

(p. 133)

Cusanus writes further in the same work:
And all these things were done not serially (as a concept is temporally expressed by us) but by an instantaneous operation—beyond all time and in accordance with a willing that befits Infinite Power. (pp. 136-37)

Does God's Foreknowledge Deny Man's Free Will?

As indicated earlier, this concept of Eternity does not mean that man is predetermined in such a way as to deny him his freedom. Free will is necessary, if man is to have the capacity (capax Dei) to hypothesize the higher hypotheses, required to exert dominion over nature, and to bring himself and the universe into ever greater proximity and harmony with the Good itself. The universe, as we have seen, is perpetual or not-entropic. However, man, who is the highest expression of that created universe, has a responsibility to contribute to the ongoing creation and to make progress by overcoming fixed hypotheses and the entropy, or attrition, which is the result of remaining within a fixed mode of behavior or production.

As Nicolaus of Cusa indicates in the Game of Spheres, what distinguishes man from an animal is that animals lack the free power that is in us. When I invented this game, I thought, I considered, and I determined that which no one else thought, considered or determined, because each man is free to think whatever he wishes. In the same way he is free to consider and determine whatever he wishes. This is why everybody does not think the same thing, because each person has his own free spirit. But beasts do not have this freedom. Therefore they are impelled to do those things that they do by their nature so that all the members of each species hunt and make nests in the same way. (p. 71)

In contrast to the animal, who is moved by the “necessitating command of nature,” Cusanus argues that “our regal and imperial spirit is not bound by this structure. Otherwise it would not invent anything, but would follow only the impetus of nature.” (p. 71)

It is this concept of free will, not merely of the freedom to choose between good and evil, but rather of a not-entropic freedom based upon creative reason, which characterizes man as in the image of God. Man’s true freedom consists of the “free power” to invent something new and thus, in contrast to the beast, to change the social reproductive behavior of our entire species in an evolutionary, not-entropic manner.

This concept of the free will, which participates in Eternity through creative intellect, is the solution to the Parmenides paradox of the One and the Many. With such freedom, man is not a slave to either sense perceptions, nor to a fixed hypothesis, on the basis of which his conclusions are predetermined. Rather, man is capable of rising to the level of creative reason and hypothesizing higher hypotheses. As LaRouche develops in all of his writings, the validity of this hypothesizing power is manifested in increases in the potential relative population-density of mankind, as mediated through axiomatic-revolutionary discoveries of principle and their application technologically and culturally.

The apparent contradiction between God’s foreknowledge in Eternity, and man’s free will in time, can only be resolved from the standpoint of time-reversal as discussed above. For example, Boethius writes,

If you should wish to consider God’s foreknowledge, by which He discerns all things, you will more rightly judge it to be not foreknowledge, as it were of the future, but knowledge of a never-passing instant, and therefore it is called not prevision (praevidentia), but providence (providentia), because set far from the lowest things, it looks forward on all things as though from the highest peak of the world. (p. 427)

The notion of foreknowledge, if it is seen from the standpoint of temporality, implies that the foreknowledge occurs in the past in respect to the future and therefore predetermines the future. But what Boethius suggests is, that foreknowledge is not “prevision,” in the sense of seeing from a temporal standpoint. It is a mistake to impose upon God’s foreknowledge, the notion of temporality. One should not conclude that God, in the past, has foreknowledge of the future, and that He is therefore making that future necessary, i.e., predetermining or predestining it. Rather, it is a question of providence from the highest peak. The paradox results from not actually having a correct understanding of Eternity in respect to time, i.e., not having a correct understanding of the paradox of temporal Eternity.

There is no past in God, from which standpoint He predetermines the future. Rather, God in Eternity only has an eternal present, or rather, is only an eternal present, which is all-embracing of what in the temporal transfinite domain is seen as succession. What we do now, is only foreknown by God, Who is Eternity, from
the standpoint of an all-embracing or enfolding present. Thus, Boethius argues,

There are really two necessities, the one simple, as that it is necessary that all men are mortal; and the other conditional, as for example, if you know that someone is walking, it is necessary that he is walking. Whatever anyone knows cannot be otherwise than as it is known, but this conditional necessity by no means carries with it the other simple kind. For this sort of necessity is not caused by the thing’s proper nature but by the addition of a condition; for no necessity forces him to go who walks of his own will, even though it is necessary that he is going at the time when he is walking. (pp. 429-431)

And, continuing,

But God beholds those future events which happen because of the freedom of the will, as present; they, therefore when related to the divine perception, become necessary to the condition of the divine knowledge, but considered in themselves do not lose the absolute freedom of their nature. Therefore, all those things which God foreknows will come to be, will without doubt come to be, but certain of them proceed from free will. And although they do come to be, yet in happening they do not lose their proper nature, according to which, before they happen, they might also not have happened. (p. 431)

In “The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice,” St. Anselm makes the same distinction as Boethius:

For although God foreknows all future events, he does not foreknow that all of them are going to occur by necessity. Rather he foreknows that some of them will occur as a result of the free will of a rational creature. . . . For since what God wills is not able to not to occur, when He wills for no necessity either to compel the human will to will or to prevent it from willing, and when He wills that the effect follow the act of human willing, it is necessary that the human will be free and that there occur what it wills. . . . And before these things occur it is possible that they never occur. Nevertheless, in a certain sense they occur necessarily and this necessity derives, as I said, from free will. (pp. 186-187)

St. Anselm cites the following statement by the Apostle Paul: “Whom He foreknew, He predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, so that His Son would be the firstborn among many brethren and whom he predestined, these He also called, and whom he called, these he also justified and whom He justified, these He also glorified.” (Rom 8:28-29) St. Anselm argues that the Apostle Paul is merely using the past tense, because there is no verb for the eternal present, and that the past tense, because it is completed action, is closer to the eternal present, than is the temporal present, which is merely fleeting. He writes,

Thus we can recognize that for lack of a verb properly signifying the eternal present, the Apostle used verbs of past tense; for things which are temporally past are altogether immutable, after the fashion of the eternal present. . . . Free choice and God’s foreknowledge are not at all inconsistent with each other. There consistency results from the nature of Eternity, which encompasses the whole of time and whatever occurs at any time. (pp. 190-191)

Thus, both Boethius and Anselm emphasize that God’s foreknowledge, which should be seen from the standpoint of the eternal present, is a foreknowledge that man will act with free will, because that is the nature of man as created in God’s image and therefore, that is the nature of God’s foreknowledge in respect to man, as opposed to a creature which was not created with free will.

The Trinity:
Man’s Mind
As a Similitude
Of Eternity

As Lyndon LaRouche has written in The Science of Christian Economy, “economic science was developed, in fact, by Christianity; furthermore, the evidence is that perhaps economic science could not have been developed except by Christianity. The essence of this connection is expressed by the Filioque of the Latin Creed . . . .” (p. 230) The Creed states that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. (Filioque means “and the Son.”) Since the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Trinity, is love (agapê), and the Son, the second person of the Trinity, is the Logos or Reason, through which all things are created, and since the Logos or Word became man, the Christian concept of the Trinity implies that all men and women created in the image of God, through imitation of Christ, have the capacity and the responsibility to express their love (agapê) for God by hypothesizing the higher hypotheses necessary to benefit their fellow man, by enabling him to exert increasing dominion over the physical universe.

As LaRouche writes in the Science of Christian Economy, chapter V, entitled “Agapê”: “What is em-
phrased at this immediate juncture, is the agreement, the coextensive congruence of agapē and of universal acts of creative reason. The reaching out to the universality of mankind's past, present, and future, for the love of God, is agapē expressed practically, as a creative act directed toward perfection of the creative powers of mankind.” Echoing the Apostle Paul’s first Epistle to the Corinthians (I Cor 13), he writes “Without such agapē, there is no creative power, no creative act.” (p. 238)

Since man is created in the image of God, in Christian theology, the human intellect is triune. Moreover, since man is in the image of God in respect to his creative capacity, which he shares with God, the Trinity must be reflected in the creative process of the human mind.

In The Game of the Spheres, Nicolaus of Cusa discusses how this is the case through the example of the invention of a game. He writes,

I thought to invent a game of knowledge. I considered how it should be done. Next I decided to make it as you see. Cogitation, consideration, and determination are powers of our souls. No beast has such a thought of inventing a new game which is why the beast does not consider or determine anything about it. (p. 69)

Cusanus stresses that these are three distinct powers of the one intellective soul, “because thinking is the first, and the next consideration, and the last determination. Thinking generates consideration, and determination proceeds from them.” (p. 71)

As Cusanus emphasizes, when man rises above sense perception and ratiocination, both of which are based on temporal images, to the level of creative intellect, which functions in the realm of hypothesizing higher hypotheses, his mind, which is a similitude of Eternity, experiences a form of timelessness appropriate to a creature in time.

In this argument, Cusanus bases himself both upon the discussion of the “Divided Line” in Book VI of Plato’s Republic, and the Apostle Paul’s description of the Third Heaven in II Corinthians 12:2-4. Thus, in On Learned Ignorance, Cusanus writes, “For when the soul is in time, where it does not apprehend without images, it seems to be the senses or reason (ratio) rather than the intellect; and when it is elevated above time, it is the intellect, which is free from images.” (p. 142) He further argues that when we ascend to the level of creative intellect, we have been “raptured” into the “third heaven of the most simple intellectuality.” (p. 150) Because “the intellect is not temporal and mundane, but is free of time and of the world,” (p. 138) it can be described as “timeless time.”

Thus, in On Equality, Cusanus writes,

The soul sees also that it is timeless time. For it perceives that time is in transmutable being and there is transmutation only in time. It perceives therefore, that time is always other in the temporal. Consequently, it sees that the time in it, removed from all otherness, is timeless. If it therefore sees that number is in the various numbers, it also sees that the all-numerating, innumerable number is in it. (p. 367)

Cusanus presents a paradox. Man as created is finite, but as created in the image of the Creator, he is also relatively infinite. He is therefore a finite infinite. He is in time as created, but insofar as he rises to the level of creative intellect in the image of God Who is Eternity, he is relatively timeless. Time is defined by change, but when man utilizing his creative intellect hypothesizes higher hypotheses, he has the form of the Good itself, and thus is timeless. If one removes everything other, and locates one’s activity from the standpoint of Eternity, then one has risen to a level of intellect, which is characterized by timeless time. If he sees that plurality presupposes unity, then he sees that God, Who is Absolute Unity, is present in his own mind. Cusanus continues:

And thus it sees that the time in it and the number in it are not other and diverse. And if it sees time contracted in the temporal and in itself absolved of contraction, then it sees that time is not eternity, which is neither contractible nor participable. Hence the soul also sees that it is not eternity, since it is time, although timeless. It sees therefore, that it is temporally incorruptible beyond the temporal in the horizon of eternity, however, not simply, as eternity, which is simply incorruptible, since incorruptibility precedes all otherness. Hence the soul sees that it is conjoined to the continuous and the temporal. Therein indeed are the operations which it effects with help of the corruptible organs, as for example perception, ratiocination, deliberation and the like, successive and temporal. And it sees, however, that it is absolved of the continuous in the work of the intellect, which is separate from the organ, since while it understands, it understands suddenly. And thus it finds itself between the temporal and the eternal. (p. 367)

Because man is created, he cannot be eternal, he cannot be God, Who is Absolute, although he can be an adopted son of God, or, as Cusanus writes in On Learned Ignorance, a “created god” (p. 93) and in On Conjectures, a “human god.” (p. 127) His temporality refers to his finitude; his timelessness to his relative infinitude as created in the image of God. His intellect is therefore beyond the temporal in the horizon of Eternity. As such, the work of
the intellect, hypothesizing the higher hypotheses, occurs
suddenly beyond time. Cusanus continues:

However, how it is with the vision of time, consider the fol-
lowing: The Hebrews say that the beginning of time is the
past, after which comes the present, and the future follows.
If you look at the past as time gone by, you see that it is past
in the present and in the future will be past. If you look at
the present, you see that it was present in the past and will
be present in the future. If you look at the future, you see
that in the past it has been future and in the present is
future and in the future will be future. And the soul, which
is timeless time, sees all this in itself. It sees itself therefore
as timeless triune time, as past, present and future. However,
the past time, which always is and will be past, is perfected
time. Likewise the present time, which always was and will
be present, is perfected time. Thus also the future, which
always was and is future, is perfected time. And there are
not three perfected times, but rather one perfected time,
perfected in the past, perfected in the present, and perfected
in the future.

This time will never be able to pass away. The past as
past does not vanish, because it always is and will be past,
just as little do the present and the future. Therefore, there
is nothing new in that timeless time, where nothing is past
that were not also present or future, although the past has
indeed passed in the past and the future is not yet in the
future, but rather only the present exists in the present;
however, otherwise in the past and future time, as previously
stated.

Therefore, the soul, which is timeless time, in its essence
sees the past and future as present and names the past mem-
ory, the present intellect, and the future will. . . . (p. 368)

This consideration of timeless time makes manifest that
the soul is the similitude of eternity and that it intuitts every-
thing through itself as through the similitude of eternity,
while it itself aims towards the eternal life, which it alone
desires . . . .

Therefore, what the soul finds in itself in respect to the
perfection of its essence—namely the unicity of timeless
time and the generation of the second, which succeeds the
first time, and the procession of the third from both; the
equality of nature in the three hypostases of timeless time
and the existence of one hypostasis in the other, etc.—that it
transfers to its Origin, which is eternal, in order to be able
somehow to intuit this Origin in itself as though in a mirror
and enigma. (p. 369)

The human mind as triune, having memory, intellect,
and will, is an image of eternity. Therefore, man has a
foretaste of and shares in eternal life, in hypothesizing
higher hypotheses. The human mind as past, present,
and future shares in the simultaneity of Eternity. Man is
not merely finite. He is also relatively or contractedly
infinite. The characteristics of Eternity are not just in
Eternity, and not not experienced in any way by man.

Rather, man, insofar as his mind is timeless time, has the
capacity through hypothesizing the higher hypotheses to
share in the form of the Good itself. As Plato says,
hypotheses as offspring of the Good are boniform, even
though not the Good itself. Therefore, as LaRouche
emphasizes, a hypothesis is simultaneously present
throughout a theorem lattice defined by that hypothesis.
It is present in all places and time within that theorem-
lattice. That which underlies hypothesizing the higher
hypothesis is the Good itself.

Even as there is a qualitative distinction between Eter-
nity and temporal time, in the form of man’s mind, that is
not an unbridgeable gap, because man’s mind is a simili-
tude or image of Eternity. Therefore, man himself is capa-
bile of experiencing Eternal Life within temporal existence,
in the agapic hypothesizing activity of his intellect, in
which he transcends time in the “horizon of Eternity.”

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A conference sponsored by the Schiller Institute and the International Caucus of Labor Committees on Dec. 14-15, near Wiesbaden, Germany was attended by guests from thirty countries, including a majority of the nations along the corridors of the Eurasian Land-Bridge—Russia, Poland, Pakistan, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Hungary, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Slovakia.

The keynote was given by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., and was titled “Nothing Can Save the System.” LaRouche declared, “I come with a word of optimism,” comparable to an announcement that one is about to “get rid of a set of stinking old clothes.” The inevitable collapse of the global financial system now in progress, LaRouche said, marks the end of a “mixed” system which lasted four hundred years: A system of nation-states, dedicated to fostering development of their citizens through education, scientific, and technological progress, but which have been ruled by a “parasite,” the international financial oligarchy, centered in London.

As the oligarchy was unable to destroy the modern nation-state, which first arose in 1461 in France, because of the nation-state’s superior military force, it took to subverting it, with the so-called “Enlightenment.” But, the “symbiosis” of two opposing systems, stressed LaRouche, ended thirty years ago, when the oligarchy decided it no longer needed the nation-state, with its military capabilities—because the policy of “detente” seemed to make general nuclear war impossible.

Thus, in 1966, there started a “cultural revolution,” in which the power of sovereign nation-states began to vanish, and economic production declined, as Western nations embraced the “post-industrial society,” We are now reaching the end of that process; “the patient is nearing death.” What must be done today, is to bring “the good from the old system,” the positive features of the nation-state, into the new period. The best way to do this is by unifying many nations around a common goal. That common goal should be the development of the Eurasian Land-Bridge.

That afternoon, Dr. Jonathan Tenenbaum spoke on “The Poetry of Hypothesis of Carl Gauss, Wilhelm Weber, and Bernhard Riemann.” On Sunday morning, the chorus and orchestra of the Schiller Institute presented selections from Joseph Haydn’s oratorio, The Creation.

Cooperating with China

Helga Zepp LaRouche gave the second day’s keynote, “China: Leibniz vs. British Geopolitics.” She declared
The need for the Clinton administration to adopt a policy of reconstruction of Bosnia-Hercegovina, as part of the Great Project of the Eurasian Land-Bridge, was the central theme of a foreign policy forum, sponsored by the Schiller Institute and the FDR-PAC in the nation’s capital on Jan. 4. Key-noting the event, which drew more than 120 policymakers and diplomats, was a representative of Bosnia’s ruling Party of Democratic Action (S.D.A.), Faris Nanic.

Nanic made an appeal for the United States to take the lead in committing resources to rebuild his nation: “Is the expense of helping the region to recover, to develop, greater than the expense of infinite military police and political presence of the international community in the region? Because if you want peace there, if you want stability, without providing the things that I’ve just mentioned, then you will have to face the fact that the military presence should continue on indefinitely.”

Through economic reconstruction, he stressed, Bosnia can reintegrate its 800,000 refugees, integrate the separatist Serbs back into the historically multicult-
n this case, the findings of the study, which was conducted in the spring of 2023, indicate a strong correlation between... The implications of these findings are significant for public health policy, as...
that the realization of the Eurasian Land-Bridge will create the greatest economic miracle in history, combined with a new international renaissance. This prospect, together with the imminent collapse of the global financial and monetary system, means a shock for the financial oligarchy in London, which will try to stop the development of the Land-Bridge by bringing it under the control of supranational institutions, like the I.M.F., and will develop war scenarios, like those published by Sir Caspar Weinberger and Samuel Huntington, against China, Iran, etc.

British foreign policy has from the beginning of this century taken up the doctrine of “geopolitics,” which sees the integration and economic development of Eurasia as the greatest danger to the British maritime world power, and which has led Britain to organize two world wars, Zepp LaRouche warned. As the great Chinese statesman Sun Yat-sen wrote, Britain never has friends among nations, except when it considers those “friends” useful. Once that usefulness is over, the former “friends” are disposed of “like silkworms.”

Leibniz’s Vision
Against this type of policy, the Schiller Institute was founded to bring about real understanding among nations. She gave an overview of the fruitful relations between Europe and China, which started with the Jesuit priest Matteo Ricci, who moved to China in the late 1500’s. She cited the similarities between Confucianism and Christianity, which G.W. Leibniz described in his works on China.

Now, she said, we can make Leibniz’s vision come true—that of linking the civilizations at the western and eastern ends of Eurasia, through the Land-Bridge—and thus establish a basis for world peace.

Lothar Komp, of the economics staff of Executive Intelligence Review, concluded the discussion with a presentation on “Creating Millions of Jobs: Aspects of Eurasian Development Opportunities.” The conference ended with performances of a Haydn string quartet, and lieder by Schubert, Mozart, and others.

LaRouches Visit Embattled Sudan

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during the week of Dec. 17-23, Lyn
don and Helga LaRouche visited the embattled nation of Sudan, where they held public meetings and met with government and other officials. They were received by the President, Gen. Omar al Bashir; the Minister of External Affairs, Ali Osman Taher; the Speaker of the National Assembly, Dr. Hassan al Turabi; and the Secretary General of the National Congress, Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin Attabani. They also met with a group of political and military leaders of rebel groups in the south, who have joined the peace process.

In his public lectures, both at the Khartoum University on Dec. 19, and at the Friendship Hall, in a gathering sponsored by the Center for Strategic Studies, on Dec. 22, LaRouche focussed on the ongoing collapse of the world financial and monetary structures.

Although fraught with danger, the crisis, stressed LaRouche, should be seen as a “blessing in disguise,” even for Sudan. The reason is, that the symbiotic relationship of the past four centuries, between the institution of the nation-state, on the one hand, and the imperial institutions of a financial oligarchy, on the other, is coming to an end. Thus, mankind will have the chance to reestablish nation-states, and to reorganize financial and monetary institutions to serve the true interests of sovereign nations.

Several Sudanese political figures and academics attending the lectures, brought up the so-called Asian Tigers, the developing-sector economies in southeast Asia which have been promoted as a model for countries like Sudan. LaRouche dispelled the illusion that these could provide a viable model, by explaining the difference between profit, which may appear on the balance sheets of firms or even countries, and actual economic development. In the case of the so-called Asian Tigers, the fabulous profits being touted by investors, are profits in “hot money,” ultimately linked to the booming drug trade in the region.

As far as industrial production is concerned, he pointed out that what is occurring, is that companies from Europe and the U.S. have been outsourcing—moving their facilities, based on existing technologies, to these areas with cheap labor pools.

The other major area of discussion concerned the U.S. itself. Members of the Sudanese intelligentsia find it difficult to understand why Washington continues its relentless drive to demonize Sudan. LaRouche’s in-depth presentation of the “British problem” in U.S. political life, was of great importance in clarifying this question, which plagues most developing-sector nations.
On Nov. 30, Lyndon LaRouche was the guest of honor at a conference in Busseto, Italy, the hometown of composer Giuseppe Verdi, to present the book *Canto e Diapason*, the Italian edition of *A Manual on Tuning and Registration*, which was written under LaRouche’s direction. The conference was hosted by the world-famous tenor Carlo Bergonzi, himself a native of Busseto, and was attended by baritone Piero Cappuccilli.

The Busseto meeting was the third presentation of *Canto e Diapason* in Italy during 1996. Conferences were also held in Milan, at the Casa Verdi, and in Rome, at the Pontifical Institute of Sacred Music, during the spring. The Busseto conference was a further step forward in the campaign to lower standard musical tuning from the current level of $A=440$ Hz and above, to the scientific tuning of $A=432$ ($C=256$), the tuning proposed by Verdi himself.

The conference was held in the historic Barezzi Room, in the house where Verdi lived when he was young. Still to be seen in the room, is the fortepiano on which Verdi composed the opera *I Due Foscari*. This fortepiano was used to accompany the musical examples sung by soprano Antonella Banaudi in a demonstration of the lower and higher tunings.

LaRouche told the audience of over one hundred singers, students, and other music specialists, that he had launched this initiative in order to save our civilization from a generalized cultural degeneration, which has its roots in the Romanticist separation of science and art. LaRouche said art and science are one and the same, and that, “classical music is a representation of how the mind works.”

Conference participants were also treated to a reconstruction of Mozart’s *Ave Verum Corpus*, sung in the church in which Verdi was married. LaRouche explained that the *Ave Verum* is an embodiment of this process of creative mentation, because of its dense development of musical ideas governed by a unifying concept, which becomes clear to the listener only at the end.

**Music Conference in Italy**

**Art and Science Are One and the Same**

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**U.S. Supreme Court Accepts Amicus**

An *amicus curiae* brief submitted by the Schiller Institute in the Washington State “assisted suicide” case, was accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court on Dec. 9, 1996. The Schiller Institute brief provided documentation for the following argument:

“The Supreme Court should reverse the Court of Appeals on grounds that there is no constitutionally protected right to suicide. To judicially accord a terminally ill, competent individual, a constitutional right to the assistance of a physician to commit suicide, will lead to punishable acts under future Nuremberg-type tribunals established to punish those who commit such crimes against humanity.”

Argument occurred on Jan. 8, 1997, before the U.S. Supreme Court on the cases of *Washington v. Glucksberg* and *Vacco v. Quill* (the appeals by Washington State and New York State, respectively, of Circuit Court of Appeals decisions in favor of assisted suicide). A ruling is not expected until summer.
Alabama Martin Luther King Celebrations

LaRouche: ‘Put this Country on the March Again!’

The Northwest Alabama chapter of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Committee invited Lyndon LaRouche to be their featured speaker Jan. 19-20 in celebration of Dr. King’s birthday. In three appearances, LaRouche addressed hundreds of residents of the Florence-Sheffield metropolitan area, along with elected officials, ministers, and Civil Rights leaders, on Dr. King’s unique Christian qualities of leadership, which the Civil Rights movement needs to emulate today.

The high point of the King celebration was a march, on Monday, Jan. 20, by three hundred adults and children through Florence, culminating in an outdoor rally at the Lauderale County Courthouse. After various choral performances, and after speeches by the Mayor and the Chief of Police of Florence, James Barnett, a leader of the King Memorial Committee, introduced Lyndon LaRouche as the guest speaker. [See pages 4-5 for the text of LaRouche’s remarks.]

On Sunday, Jan. 19, LaRouche addressed sixty people at the St. Paul A.M.E. Church. As he was speaking, Amelia Boynton Robinson, the legendary Civil Rights fighter from Tuskegee, Ala., who is vice-chairman of the Schiller Institute, entered, at which point LaRouche interrupted his remarks to embrace her. A picture of their greeting appeared on the front page of the Times Daily the next day, with excerpts from LaRouche’s presentation. Mrs. Robinson also spoke at the courthouse rally.

She told the crowd that Martin Luther King Day “is a day of atonement in a small way... When you think of the man who gave his life, then I think it is a good thing for us to realize, what are we giving—what are we doing? When I think of Martin, when he finished, the good Lord said, well, you have finished your course, you have run the race, now come up a little higher... I hope that each and every one of us will realize that we have something to live for, and we have something to leave to these younger people. Let us realize that Martin will never die. He will live as long as we keep the legacy alive.”

The culminating event of the program was on Monday evening, Jan. 20, at the First Missionary Baptist Church of Sheffield. The featured speaker was Dr. Larry McCoy, president of the Northwest-Shoals Community College, who stressed the importance of education in fulfilling Martin Luther King’s dream. LaRouche was asked to speak once again, this time to make the closing remarks.

NBCSL Calls for

The National Black Caucus of State Legislators (NBCSL), at its 20th Annual Conference in Biloxi, Miss. on Dec. 3-7, unanimously endorsed Resolution 97 in “Support for an Investigation of the Role of U.S. Government Agencies Regarding the Flow of Drugs into the United States.”

The resolution was introduced by
Movement Builds To Restore Pa. Medical Cuts

Pennsylvania State Representative Harold James (D-Phila) was joined by eight other Democratic state legislators and by Philadelphia City Council president John Street, in a Dec. 30 press conference in Philadelphia, to call upon Gov. Tom Ridge to restore his deadly cuts in the state medical assistance program, using the $123-million surplus announced by Ridge’s Budget Secretary on Dec. 11.

Representative James said that Gov. Ridge could use his executive powers to restore the medical cuts immediately. He said the alternative mechanism would be passage of a bill sponsored by Rep. John Myers (D-Phila), to restore eligibility for the 220,000 unemployed, working poor, and disabled persons who were cut off earlier this year. James has also introduced legislation to impose a 0.2% tax on security transfers.

Phil Valenti, state spokesman for Lyndon LaRouche and leader in the movement to impeach Ridge, stated: “If Gov. Ridge rejects the proposal, knowing that his cuts have already resulted in deaths, injuries, and threats to the lives of innocent people, he will likely have condemned himself to impeachment for Nazi crimes against humanity.”

Among the state representatives in attendance at James’ press conference were Rep. Dwight Evans, Democratic chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and Rep. Mark Cohen, chairman of the House Democratic Caucus. Representative Cohen pledged to sponsor hearings on the deadly impact of Ridge’s cuts, if the Republicans refuse to do so.

Representative James’ initiative was also supported by Bill George, president of the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, Richard Benfer, president of Braddock Hospital in Allegheny County, Henry Nicholas of the Hospital Workers Union, and Ed Cloonan, president of the Independent State Store Union.

In the press conference, James cited the devastation already inflicted by Ridge’s policies: “New evidence is continuously coming into my office about the casualty toll, and the devastating effects on people’s lives, that have been wrought by this mean-spirited Act 35... . . . This includes testimony and evidence from forty-eight witnesses and sources, describing nine deaths and twenty life-threatening situations, directly and indirectly related to Gov. Ridge’s medical assistance and health care cuts.”

Representative LeAnna Washington then discussed the case of Lolita Cunningham: “Lolita Cunningham became Philadelphia’s first childhood heart transplant recipient in 1985, at the age of twelve. Despite all the obstacles of poverty and ill-health, she was determined to become a scientist... . [L]ike many of our working poor citizens, she received no health benefits at work. When she applied for state medical assistance five months ago, she was denied, despite the fact that her anti-rejection drugs alone cost $600 a month. Lolita Cunningham stopped taking some of her drugs for lack of money. She collapsed at work Dec. 11, and died several hours later. She was only twenty-four years old.”

Investigation of Bush Role in Crack Epidemic

Pennsylvania Black Caucus chairman Harold James, approved by the Law and Justice Committee on Dec. 4, and ratified in plenary session on Dec. 7. The full text follows:

“WHEREAS, a series of investigative reports published in the San Jose Mercury News, August 18-20, 1996, contained highly credible allegations concerning the role of U.S. Government agencies, including the C.I.A. and the Dept. of Justice, through covert operations, in aiding and abetting the flow of drugs into the United States, including crack cocaine into the African-American communities of Los Angeles, as part of covert support for the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980’s; and,

“WHEREAS, these reports reaffirmed the conclusions of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Operations, also known as the ‘Kerry Committee,’ whose final report, dated December 1988, stated: ‘On the basis of this evidence, it is clear that individuals who provided support for the Contras...”
Continued from page 83

were involved in drug trafficking, the supply network of the Contras was used by drug trafficking organizations, and elements of the Contras themselves knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers; and,

"WHEREAS, during the period in which drugs were allegedly brought into the country with the connivance of U.S. government agencies, then-Vice President George Bush was appointed by President Reagan to run the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and a series of executive orders and 'national security decision directives' were signed by President Reagan, placing most covert intelligence operations of the U.S. government, including covert support for the Contras, under the directions of a Special Situations Group also headed by George Bush, with Oliver North functioning as one of his key lieutenants; and,

"WHEREAS, Congresswoman Maxine Waters, Senators Feinstein and Boxer, and the Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Jackson, and St. Louis, and other City Councils have called for Congressional and other investigations into the role of the C.I.A. and other agencies and individuals in these operations; and,

"WHEREAS, such investigations must go right to the highest levels of responsibility for the devastation and violence in our communities associated with drugs and guns.

"NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, by the 20th Annual Legislative Conference of the National Black Caucus of State Legislators, assembled in Biloxi, Miss., Dec. 1-7, 1996, that the NBCSL endorses the call by the Congressional Black Caucus Chairwoman Maxine Waters, Senators Feinstein and Boxer, the Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Jackson, and St. Louis City Councils, and others, for a congressional investigation, and the appointment of an independent special prosecutor, for a complete, thorough, and independent investigation of these allegations, and for vigorous prosecution of individuals, where justified by probable cause, irrespective of their current or former official status."

Most Reverend Justin Francis Rigali,
Archbishop of St. Louis

‘The need to have the global view is not sufficiently understood’

Archbishop Justin Francis Rigali was born in Los Angeles, California, April 19, 1935. He was ordained a priest in Los Angeles on April 25, 1961. During the first two sessions of the Second Vatican Council he was one of the priest assistants in St. Peter’s Basilica. In June 1964, he attained the Doctorate in Canon Law from the Pontifical Gregorian University.

From 1964 to 1966 he studied at the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy in preparation for service to the Holy See. In November 1964, he entered the English-language Section of the Secretariat of State. For three-and-a-half years beginning September 1966, he served at the Apostolic Nunciature in Madagascar.

In February 1970, he returned to Rome and was appointed Director of the English-language Section of the Secretariat of State, becoming English-language translator for Pope Paul VI. From 1979 to 1987, he accompanied Pope John Paul II on a number of his international journeys. On June 8, 1985, he was appointed Titular Archbishop of Bolsena, and President of the Pontifical Ecclesiastical Academy. On Sept. 14, 1985, he was ordained a bishop by Pope John Paul II in the Cathedral of Albano.

During the years 1985-1990, he was named to positions with various Vatican commissions. In December 1989, he was named Secretary of the Congregation for Bishops, and in January 1990, he became the Secretary of the College of Cardinals. On Jan. 25, 1994, Archbishop Rigali was appointed eighth Bishop/seventh Archbishop of St. Louis by Pope John Paul II. In June of the following year, Archbishop Rigali was appointed by Pope John Paul II to the Preparatory Council of the Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops for America.

The following interview was conducted by Nina Ogden and William F. Wertz, Jr.,
You can pinpoint the great significance of John XXIII calling for the Vatican Council, and writing ‘Pacem in Terris,’ with a powerful appeal for peace, and the encyclical ‘Mater et Magistra,’ which insisted that the criteria for all economic activity be justice and charity. Then came the fruition of the pontificate of Paul VI and his encyclical, in 1967, ‘Populorum Progessio,’ which emphasized the global dimension of social justice: There is no way we can solve our own problems.

on Nov. 12, 1996, at the annual meeting of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in Washington, D.C.

Fidelio: A few months ago, you gave a speech in Missouri on the subject of the Catholic social teachings.

Archbishop Rigali: I approached the speech to the Missouri Catholic Conference in Jefferson City in view of my particular history. As you may know, I spent thirty years in the service of the Holy See—twenty-seven years in Rome, and three years for the Holy See on the isle of Madagascar. I had the opportunity to follow these teachings of the Church in a special way under John XXIII. I then worked for Paul VI for many years, and then John Paul II. I absorbed the passion of the Popes for the social encyclicals—for putting into the life of the Church the words of St. Paul: “Help carry one another’s burdens, in that way you will fulfill the law of Christ.” (Gal 6:2)

This understanding of human solidarity on a global plane is inspiration for all the Church in the mandate of solidarity and love. This was articulated in a special way a little bit more than a hundred years ago by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical Rerum Novarum, and then a hundred years later Pope John Paul II celebrated its anniversary with the document Centesimus Annus. This whole development was a coherent one, always from the same principle. They reflect an urgent mission, a pattern in the Church to proclaim dignity in action.

Fidelio: In his speeches in the last few days, Pope John Paul II has certainly emphasized this in his emphasis on debt forgiveness at the meeting of Justicia et Pax and at the FAO conference.

Archbishop Rigali: The Pope has a special viewpoint of this practice in the Millennium. Go back to the Jewish practice of holy years, in which the forgiveness of debt was a part, along with the freeing of the slaves. The application of this is a principal part of our tradition. And especially this anniversary, which is the greatest anniversary in the history of the world, which is itself so unique, gives us the unique opportunity to apply this social doctrine.

Fidelio: In your speech in Missouri you talked about a pluralism of options in applying the Church’s social teaching, and made the point that while there can be a pluralism of options, there can never be a pluralism of principles.

Archbishop Rigali: Pope Paul VI addressed this in Octogesima Adveniens, observing the eightieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum, in 1971. He confirmed the universal dimension of the Church’s social teaching. He makes very clear that there will always be different people of good will who will apply the teachings in a certain diversity of situations. But, we are not talking about a free-for-all. There is no pluralism in the teaching of the sacredness of human life.

Fidelio: Is the knowledge of the social encyclicals especially lacking in the U.S.?

Archbishop Rigali: When I gave this speech in Jefferson City, one man asked, “Why is this the best kept secret in the Church?” This truth, when presented, has the power to make an enormous impact, typical of the Word of God. The Constitution on the Church in the Modern World of Vatican II, called Gaudium et Spes, says “we are witnesses of the birth of a new humanism, in which man is defined first of all by his responsibility toward his brothers and sisters and toward history.” Certainly, we must teach the social encyclicals and they are known, thanks be to God, but insufficiently as far as our goal must be. We have never done enough to obtain our end.

Fidelio: The Bishops conference just voted to put the economic policy of the Church into a ten-point framework. It will help shape the national debate on economics through an education drive down to the local parish level.

Archbishop Rigali: At this meeting, during the presentations made by the chairman of the committee, the hope was expressed that this statement would go into the dioceses and parishes, and even be organized in such a way as to be
Go back to the Jewish practice of holy years, in which the forgiveness of debt was a part, along with the freeing of the slaves. The application of this is a principal part of our tradition. And especially this anniversary, which is the greatest anniversary in the history of the world, which is itself so unique, gives us the unique opportunity to apply this social doctrine.

Fidelio: We just reviewed the book by Msgr. Higgins on Organized Labor and the Church. It was interesting to see how much the labor movement in this country was influenced by the social encyclicals. However, by the late 1960’s, interest in the encyclicals declined significantly. Today, we are seeing a revitalized labor movement under the leadership of John Sweeney, who has pointed to the formative impact of the encyclicals on his thinking.

Archbishop Rigali: It starts with Rerum Novarum. Forty years later, in Quadragésimo Anno, the splendid teachings of Pope Pius XI emphasized that relations between capital and labor be, always, according to the strictest justice and Christian charity. Then you had the war years, and the post-war years.

You can pinpoint the great significance of John XXIII calling for the Council, and writing Pacem in Terris, with a powerful appeal for peace, and the encyclical Mater et Magistra, which insisted that the criteria for all economic activity be justice and charity. Then came the fruition of the pontificate of Paul VI and his encyclical, in 1967, Populorum Progressio, which emphasized the global dimension of social justice. There is no way we can solve our own problems. The need to have this global view is not sufficiently understood in the United States. This is very clearly the teaching of the Church. Populorum Progressio was followed by the 1971 synod emphasizing social justice.

John Paul II has, of course, hundreds of writings on the Church’s social teaching. On the ninetieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum he issued his own encyclical on work, Laborem Exercens, and later Solicitude Rei Socialis, on solidarity, where he identified that the principal obstacle to be overcome in the way to authentic liberation is sin, and the structure of sin. On the hundredth anniversary of Rerum Novarum, he issued Centesimus Annus, which explains clearly that the Church’s social teaching itself is a valid instrument of evangelization.

The call by the Pope for development and debt forgiveness in Africa, applied these teachings of the Church, which are not just theories. I was very privileged to be in Rome in these years.

Fidelio: The Final Appeal in Populorum Progressio calls upon the laymen, without waiting passively for orders and directives, to take the initiative freely, and to infuse a Christian spirit into the mentality, customs, laws, and structures of their communities and nations.

Archbishop Rigali: The role of the laity is a very important theme ringing through the social encyclicals. There is no doubt about it in the Second Vatican Council. Pius XII emphasized this, as did Cardinal Spellman in the U.S. The laity are the Church—not in an exclusive sense, not any more than the Bishops or priests or religious, but with them.

Vatican II called upon the laity to enter fully into the mystery of the Church, into the life of the Church. This is apparent in Lumen Gentium, where the principle emerges that the laity from their baptism are a great part of the Church. Their call is crucial, and is reiterated at every turn, as one of the profoundest convictions of Vatican II.

The work of social justice, for example, belongs to the laity, who can fulfill it so well, if they will always be mindful of the teachings of the Church and the unity of the Church in context with the hierarchy—not in the context of individualism, but as one body, one Church, one community in Jesus Christ.

Fidelio: Some neo-conservatives today overemphasize the principle of subsidiarity, to the exclusion of the principle of solidarity—to the point that they actively undermine the role and the responsibility of government to promote the General Welfare. These same neo-conservatives, who slander Populorum Progressio as “Euro-socialist,” also overlook John Paul II’s calls for debt forgiveness and for reform of international financial institutions as necessary for the development of peoples.

Archbishop Rigali: Certainly solidarity is required. We cannot wash our hands, at any level, of human problems. If you think about the quote from Populorum Progressio you referred to—people of good will may see things differently, but they can be reconciled if they always hold out for the principle. The United States must be keenly aware of the need for good throughout the world. Solidarity is the balance, the most effective way to proceed. To say that big problems only belong to individuals and are not the problems of the Church, is not true. We proceed from total sympathy and compassion. The inspiration of the Church is found in the application of the social teaching “to love one another as I have loved you.”

This is our challenge at this moment—to apply the apostolic teachings of the Church—to apply St. Paul’s lessons to the Galatians, “Help carry one another’s burdens, in that way you will fulfill the law of Christ.”

Por cinco siglos, los escritos y descubrimientos de Leonardo da Vinci han sido dispersados y sometidos a "la trituradora", sus pinturas mutiladas y perdidas, por una oligarquía determinada a extinguir cada rastro de su método de descubrimiento creativo. Al menos dos terceras, y posiblemente más de tres cuartas partes, de su legado han desaparecido.

Sin embargo, cada tanto, alguien descubre una nueva verdad sobre el gran científico-artista, lo que sorprende a los aristotécnicos. En 1965, se redescubrió, en la Biblioteca Nacional en España, lo que hoy se llaman los Codex de Madrid—dos cuadernos llenos de dibujos e investigaciones de tecnología, hidrodinámica, ciencia militar, y muchos otros campos de conocimiento. El Codex había languidecido en el estante de la biblioteca, perdido al mundo durante 135 años, porque de confusión en el sistema de clasificación de la biblioteca.

Ahora, un nuevo descubrimiento: La geóloga Ann Pizzorusso, en una conferencia en el American Museum of Natural History en noviembre del pasado año, presentó pruebas convincentes sobre una sospecha entre los historiadores de arte de que, de las dos versiones de Leonardo's "La Virgen de los Roques," la de Londres no fue pintada por Leonardo (las dos versiones se encuentran en el Louvre en París, y el National Gallery en Londres). O mejor, al menos no toda la pintura fue pintada por Leonardo. La presentación de Pizzorusso fue parte de una serie de conferencias realizadas en el Vínculo Octubre 26, 1996-enero 1, 1997 exhibición de Leonardo's Codex Leicester.

Resulta que por cinco siglos, cuando las personas miraron las pinturas, miraron a las Virgenes; ahora, alguien ha mirado a los rocaes. Las descubrimientos de Pizzorusso son muy sorprendentes. Mientras la precisión geológica de las formaciones de roca en la versión Louvre es "asombrosa... una formidable hazaña geológica," las rocas de la versión de Londres son "sinópticas, estilizadas, grotescas". Además, en la versión Louvre, la vegetación es apropiada para el entorno y se encuentra entre solo aquellos rocas donde se podrían realmente crecer plantas, mientras que en la versión Londres, las plantas están dispuestas de manera arbitraria y "se asemejan a plantas cultivadas que necesiten considerablemente más luz que estaría disponible en la gruta."

Pizzorusso menciona la sensibilidad de Leonardo al retrato de paisajes, y su objeción a los artistas, como Botticelli, los pintores de "muy malas paisajes", como telones para figuras humanas. Escribió Leonardo, "Un pintor no es bien balanceado quien no tengan un igual interés en todos los campos de la pintura."

¿Por qué es el descubrimiento de Pizzorusso tan interesante? ¿Por qué Leonardo se preocupaba tanto por la importancia de los paisajes? Esto llega al corazón del tema de da Vinci como científico. Los cinco siglos de misinterpretaciones han intentado etiquetar a Leonardo como "empiricista." Martin Kemp, en su ensayo en el catálogo de la exhibición Codex Leicester, admite solo que Leonardo's "empirismo" fue "temperado por el papel que le asignó a la razón deductiva." Ivor Hart, en...
his book on Leonardo, goes so far as to describe Nicolaus of Cusa, the founder of Renaissance science who profoundly influenced Leonardo, as a forerunner of Francis Bacon. According to such an idiotic view, Leonardo painted rocks accurately because of his “realism.” In a word: “He painted them that way, because that’s the way they looked.” Or, as Aristotle had it: The purpose of art is to imitate nature.

In this brief article, I shall indicate why this is not the case, drawing upon the in-depth treatment of the epistemological issues provided in many works by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Leonardo’s Conception of Physical Geometry

Contrary to the empiricists, Leonardo approached the natural world from the standpoint of the Platonic method of hypothesis: looking beyond the Many—the predicated phenomena of the natural world—to conceptualize the One—the higher-order idea that generates and encompasses that diversity. Studying the geometry of natural forms (whether rocks, water, air, or living bodies), in collaboration with mathematician Luca Pacioli, he sought to understand the way in which the physical geometry of space-time bounds the patterns of natural growth and development.

LaRouche has described the epistemological current in history of which Leonardo was a part: “[T]he literature of modern physical science is divided into two camps. The first camp, which founded modern physical science in terms of reference to Plato and Archimedes (287-212 B.C.), is the school of Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Johannes Kepler, G.W.F. Leibniz, Gaspard Monge (1746-1818), Carl Gauss, and Bernhard Riemann, based upon the ‘hereditary principle’ of synthetic physical geometry. The second camp, which invaded the province of physical science from the outside, during the Seventeenth century, about two hundred years later, is based upon the ‘hereditary principle’ of the deductive theorem-lattice. Although the literature of the two camps often appears to coincide, on closer scrutiny of both, there is an unbridgeable gulf between the two.”

It is that “hereditary principle of synthetic physical geometry” that holds the key to Leonardo’s so-called landscapes, and the depiction of the geological formations in the Virgin’s grotto.

The breakthrough in the science of perspective made during the Renaissance by Leonardo and other artists, for the first time located geometry firmly in the study of real physical processes. From their investigations of optics and of how human beings perceive the world around them, they developed an understanding of the laws of perspective that went far beyond the linear, Euclidean geometry of their predecessors.

Compare the Earth-centered geometrical universe of hoaxter Claudius Ptolemy, for example, who described the universe as a complex interaction of circles upon circles, to account mathematically for the observed paths of the celestial bodies. While Ptolemy’s geometrical construct succeeded, up to a point, in describing the motions of the sun, moon, and planets, it was never even intended to be a description of reality. The concatenated sets of epicycles, equants, and deferents imposed by Ptolemy were never assumed to have any physical reality, and no explanation was ever offered, as to how this description might relate to the actual physical processes at work. (Of course, it couldn’t!)

But, for Leonardo, mathematics—i.e., geometry—must describe real processes in space-time. It is therefore, necessarily, a description of change, of continuing transformation. Starting with the division of a spherical shell by means of the Golden Section (or what Leonardo and Pacioli called “the Divine Proportion”), to generate the five Platonic solids, Leonardo would proceed to investigate the specific geometries expressed by both living and non-living processes. He studied what happens to a shape, such as a triangle, when it is deformed by wind, water, or other physical process. He probed the geometry of wave formation, founding the science of hydrodynamics. His astronomical and optical drawings, such as those in the Codex Leicester, were an attempt to understand how light actually behaves. This quest led him to two revolutionary conceptions: (1) that light is propagated at a finite rate, not instantaneously (two hundred years before Ole Rømer proved this); and (2) that light is propagated by transverse wave motion, not by “rays” of tiny particles (two hundred years before Christiaan Huyghens and Johann Bernoulli elaborated this). The two ideas are related, since if light travels in

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Diagram of the Louvre Virgin of the Rocks

“From top to bottom: Rounded (spherically weathered) mounds of horizontally layered (bedded) sandstone form the top of the grotto. The column of rock above the Virgin’s head is diabase, an igneous rock deposited on the sandstone as a molten liquid. As it cooled, the diabase formed a layer of rock (a sill) and shrank in volume. The contraction caused the rock to crack perpendicular to the sandstone, forming columnar joints (fractures). The columnar joints in the painting are not perfectly vertical, but inclined slightly. This implies that the sandstone dips a few degrees away from the observer, which is borne out by close study of the layers. Directly above the Virgin’s head is a horizontal line (basal contact) that separates the diabase sill from the weathered sandstone below. The texture and rounded weathering pattern of the sandstone below the basal contact are the same as they are at the top of the grotto. In the foreground, the sandstone is layered, or bedded, with the utmost accuracy. In the background, rocky towers, or pinnacles, rise from a blue-gray mist. These towers are remnants of erosional processes that strip away the overlying softer rock and leave the more weather resistant, harder rock intact.”

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waves, it cannot propagate instantaneously. Without the idea of the finite rate of propagation of light, there can be no scientific comprehension of optics—only Newtonian magic.

An Example: The Least-Action Principle

The contribution of an outstanding individual such as Leonardo is best understood by looking at the current of human thought from which it derives, “hereditarily,” and where it leads. Starting with Nicolaus of Cusa’s discovery of the Maximum-Minimum Principle, we work our way through the founding of applied physics by Leonardo and Pacioli, through Kepler’s establishment of a comprehensive mathematical physics, and on to the work of Leibniz, Gauss, Riemann, and LaRouche.

To understand Leonardo’s conception of physical geometry, it is useful to look at what LaRouche has called “the Cusa-Leonardo-Kepler-Leibniz-Riemann definition of the Principle of Least Action.” (Actually, we need another hyphen: “-LaRouche.” It is only with LaRouche’s contribution that the continuity of the work of the earlier figures comes into clear focus.)

As Martin Kemp notes in the Codex

Leicester catalogue, Leonardo believed that every phenomenon was constrained to act in accordance with the laws of nature, and that every form was designed to perform its function by the “shortest way.” But, these are none other than Leibniz’s principles of necessary and sufficient reason and least action, two of the most important ideas in the history of science (although Kemp mentions them only in passing, and does not identify them by name). Indeed, two hundred years before Leibniz, Leonardo wrote: “Every action in nature takes place in the shortest way possible.”

What is the least-action principle? Many lies have been told about this in the past five hundred years. If you are an “Information Age” modern, and search for it on the Internet, you will find that it was “stated for the first time by Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) as ‘Nature is thrifty in all its actions.’”

Thrifty? —“Thrift, thrift, Horatio!” said Hamlet, with reference to his mother’s marriage to her husband’s murderer: “The funeral baked meats did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables.”

No, the least-action principle is not a question of thrift, although Adam Smith and the bankers of the City of London might think so! It is a principle of creation. Leibniz described it as “God’s decree always to produce his effect by the simplest and most determinate ways.”

In fact, Maupertuis stole the least-action principle from Leibniz, stripping it of its true scientific-epistemological content, and turning it into a calculus for the later economics of Adam Smith and utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. When his swindle was exposed, he was defended by the Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler, who otherwise devoted his career to crushing the influence of Leibniz.

From Cusa to LaRouche

To find the true origins of the least-action principle, we must begin with Nicolaus of Cusa. By his proof of the impossibility of “squaring” the circle, he made possible the entire future development of mathematical physics. As LaRouche writes, the crucial feature
was the “Maximum-Minimum” principle, from which the isoperimetric principle of topology is derived, and also Leibniz’s principle of least action. The circle is the minimum form that encloses the maximum area.

Among the implications of Cusa’s isoperimetric principle, writes LaRouche,13 are that (1) circular action is a distinct geometrical species of action in space-time; and (2) it is defined as the least action of closed perimetric displacement required to subtend the relatively largest area. “Thus, the Fermat-Huyghens-Leibniz-Bernouilli principle of least action is already implicit, ‘hereditarily,’ in Cusa’s discovery.”

Cusa’s work set the stage for the crucial discoveries of Pacioli and Leonardo respecting the importance of the Golden Section. They showed that all living processes are ordered harmonically, bounded by the Golden Section relationship, whereas non-living processes are not. For living processes, the Golden Section represents a least-action pathway of growth and development.

In the same way, Leonardo investigated least-action pathways in wave and vortex formations in water. In optics, he explored the pathways of the propagation of light, the formation of caustics, and which geometrical configurations of lenses could eliminate the caustic and allow a light beam to focus.

“Then, with stunning force, comes Kepler,” writes LaRouche.14

Reflecting on the work of Cusa, Pacioli, and Leonardo, Kepler comments that “there were three things in particular about which I persistently sought the reasons why they were such and not otherwise: the number, the size, and the motion of the circles [planetary orbits].”15 He discovers that the orbits of the planets are far from arbitrary; they are determined by the curvature of physical space-time itself, as reflected in the Platonic solids, harmonic musical proportions, and conic functions. (That is, he supplies a particular sort of “why” missing in Ptolemy’s descriptive construct.)

LaRouche emphasizes the aspect of curvature in Kepler’s work: “The additional crucial feature of circular action, is that it defines our universe in terms of both negative and positive curvatures, with the demonstration that negative curvature predominates. This point is summed up rather neatly in Johannes Kepler’s 1611 booklet, On the Six-Cornered Snowflake. The snowflake is a non-living process determined by the function of positive curvature in determining the close packing of spherical bubbles. The negative curvature of the interior of each and all bubbles determines structures ‘hereditarily’ cohering with the five Platonic solids, and, thus, with the harmonic orderings cohering with the Golden section of the circumscribing sphere’s great circle.

“The universe can be considered as everywhere superdensely packed with spherical bubbles of all imaginable radii, as the unique, bounding characteristic of generalized ‘non-algebraic’ function shows this to be necessarily the case. By the close of the seventeenth century, it was implicitly demonstrated that this bubbly universality of the least-action principle is otherwise characterized by the combined notions of electromagnetic least action and hydrodynamic forms of such action. Thus, frequency of radiation is associated with a corresponding resonant set of bubbles—e.g., of corresponding radii.”16

Leibniz’s concepts of necessary and sufficient reason and least action derive, hereditarily, from Kepler’s work.

The first, Leibniz defines simply as “that nothing happens without it being possible for someone who knows enough things to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is so and not otherwise.”17 This is the principle underlying Kepler’s question, quoted above, as to the number, size, and orbits of the planets.18

The least-action principle is a special
case of the principle of necessary and sufficient reason. As Leibniz explains: “It follows from the supreme perfection of God that he chose the best possible plan in producing the universe, a plan in which there is the greatest variety together with the greatest order. The most carefully used plot of ground, place, and time; the greatest effect produced by the simplest means; the most power, knowledge, happiness, and goodness in created things that the universe could allow. For, since all the possibilities have a claim to existence in God’s understanding in proportion to their perfections, the result of all these claims must be the most perfect actual world possible. And without this, it would not be possible to give a reason for why things have turned out in this way rather than otherwise.”^39 [Emphasis added]

Now, returning to the Virgin of the Rocks after this quick tour through the history of ideas, we are better situated to look at the “landscape” through Leonardo’s eyes. He wonders about the processes that long ago formed the diverse varieties of rocks in the grotto. At the top of the cave, in the Louvre painting, reports Pizzorusso, are mounds of sandstone, a sedimentary rock. It has crumbled sufficiently to allow the roots of plants to grow. Above the Virgin’s head is diabase, an igneous rock. No plants grow here—it is too hard and resistant to erosion. Directly above the Virgin’s head is a horizontal crack in the rocks, called a base, an igneous rock. The crumbled sandstone layer of sandstone below.

In the Codex Leicester, Leonardo puzzles over how fossils of seashells and other creatures can be found at the tops of mountains. He rejects the theory that they were swept there by the turbulent biblical Flood: If they had been, they would all be a jumble, and yet, we find them in orderly groups and colonies, just as they grow today. The mountains must, he writes, have been covered by standing water at one time.

So, too, in the Louvre Virgin of the Rocks, Leonardo asks: How did this come to be? He records his exploration of the processes, in physical geometry, which produced these geological forms.

The processes must result in the most perfect actual world possible, a world whose perfection lies in the greatest possible variety coupled with the greatest order. The scientific exploration of this plan of perfection is the reason why, for Leonardo, the painted landscapes are no less important than the human dramas man plays out upon them.

—Susan Welsh


5. LaRouche, Common Sense, op. cit., p. 36.


7. “Just as a stone thrown into water becomes the center and cause of various circles, sound spreads in circles in the air. Thus every body placed in the luminous air spreads out in circles and fills the surrounding space with infinite likenesses of itself and appears in all and in all in every part.”—Codex Atlanticus, folio 9v

“It is impossible that the eye should project the visual power from itself, by visual rays, since, as soon as it opens, that front portion [of the eye], which would give rise to this emanation, would have to go forth to the object, and this it could not do without time. And this being so, it could not travel as high as the sun in a month’s time when the eye wanted to see it.”—Codex Ashburnham, 2038, folio 1r


8. Quaderni d’Anatomia, IV, folio 1or, quoted by Argentieri, p. 410.


11. In the Dictionary of Scientific Biography, biographer Bentley Glass quotes A.O. Lovejoy, that Maupertuis represents “the headwaters of the important stream of utilitarian influence through the work of the Benthamites.” Glass describes Maupertuis’ calculus of pleasure and pain, a product of intensity and duration, as “strictly analogous to his principle of least action in the physical world, and shows how he extended his philosophy of nature into a philosophy of life.” Maupertuis belonged to the network of Enlightenment ideologues organized by the Abbé Conti; see Webster G. Tarpley, Venice’s War Against Western Civilization, Fidelio, Summer 1995 (Vol. IV, No. 2), p. 12.

12. LaRouche, Common Sense, op. cit., p. 29.


14. LaRouche, Cold Fusion, op. cit., p. 29.


18. Compare this to the prevalent modern view, reflected in the statement of Franklyn M. Branley, the former director of New York’s Hayden Planetarium, in a book on astronomy for young people: “Why are there nine planets? ... There appears to be no particular reason why our system is made up of nine planets.” (Mysteries of the Planet) [New York: E.P. Dutton, 1988], p. 8.)

An Intimate Poetry of Pain and Laughter

Georges de la Tour (1593-1652), who is honored by an exhibition recently on view at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., and scheduled to appear from Feb. 2 until May 11, 1997 at the Kimbell Museum in Fort Worth, Texas, is an artist very much in the process of being discovered. I saw the major La Tour retrospective in Paris in 1972, where the Seventeenth-century French master’s current fame was aptly described as a triumph of traditional art history; painstaking connoisseurship and archival work had revived knowledge and appreciation of La Tour beginning only in 1918, because the renown he had enjoyed during his own lifetime had vanished soon after his death in 1652. By the middle of the Seventeenth century, the dominant art world of France was swept up in the grandiose decorations designed to flatter the imperial ambitions of Louis XIV, the Sun King, and the Academy which flourished to create and implement a vast array of rules through which the principles of (largely Aristotelian) rhetoric could be applied to the visual arts. It was a style at the antipodes of La Tour’s intimate poetry, and for the intervening centuries, many of La Tour’s works came to be admired under the names of other Seventeenth-century artists, such as the Spaniard Velazquez or the Dutchman Hals.

The current show, entitled “Georges de la Tour and His World,” manifests the “becoming” of the renewed image of La Tour in several ways. No fewer than six new works by the master have come to light since the Paris show, and they are all in this exhibition. Secondly, in keeping with a current fashion for involving the public in issues of attribution (once the exclusive domain of scholars), the question is raised concerning which paintings are by La Tour himself (including autograph replicas of his own compositions), which are copies, which may involve the hands of studio assistants or followers, and finally, which are originals in poor condition, where the hand of the master is masked by damage and restoration.

Link to Literary Genius

But perhaps the most exciting part of the rediscovery process, is that which links La Tour to a literary genius of his own time, the Spaniard Miguel de Cervantes. La Tour was born in 1593; Cervantes, born in 1547, published the first volume of his immortal Don Quixote in 1605, and the second in 1615, at a time when the young La Tour was undoubtedly reaching his first artistic maturity. Three years later, in 1618, the Thirty Years War, which was to devastate Central Europe, broke out. The Thirty Years War involved the entire population as no war in Europe had done before, transforming peasants and villagers into camp followers and soldiers of fortune, decimating the population, and destroying peaceful pursuits to such an extent that it took literally centuries for the area to recover its former prosperity.

Visitors to the Washington exhibition who treated themselves to the recorded audio tour, would have heard the intriguing—and quite convincing—hypothesis, that the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art’s painting of a Fortune Teller, in which a young dandy is having his fortune told (and his purse lifted) by a group of gypsies that include three lovely young girls and an old hag [See inside back cover, this issue], is none other than an illustration from one of Cervantes’ most celebrated literary creations, “The Little Gypsy Girl” (“La Gitanilla”), which is featured as the first of the Novelas Exemplaries, or Exemplary Stories, published as a collection in 1613, and already available in French translation as early as 1615. The story was widely popular throughout northern Europe.

This link is of exceptional importance. 

EXHIBITS

An Intimate Poetry of Pain and Laughter


Collection of the J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles
Although, since his own lifetime onward Cervantes—like his contemporary Shakespeare—has always been honored as a literary genius, there are nevertheless few illustrations of his work by competent artists, and almost none from the era in which he lived. The first serious attempt to illustrate Don Quixote occurred in Eighteenth-century France, when the meaning of the work had already undergone a major reinterpretation; and the well-known illustrations by Gustave Doré and Honore Daumier in the Nineteenth century, and Pablo Picasso in our own era, mirror the distortions of a Romantic world-outlook which is ultimately alien to Cervantes' unique ability to condense into a short paragraph the most intense, simultaneous imagery of pain and laughter. La Tour, an artist who raised the painful and humorous conditions of his contemporaries living in the cockpit of the Thirty Years War in the Lorraine region, situated between France, Germany, and The Netherlands, to untold heights of poetic contemplation, and who found beauty amid even the ridiculous and the morbid, possessed a soul capable of expressing something analogous to the spirit of Cervantes. This almost never happens in art—witness the failure of most composers to set the poetry of a Schiller or a Shakespeare in appropriate musical form.

In “The Little Gypsy Girl,” Cervantes invented the story of a girl raised from infancy by an old gypsy woman whom she believed to be her grandmother, although “she gave every sign of having been born of better stock than gypsies, for she was extremely polite and could talk well.” This is the fair-haired maiden who occupies the central position in the La Tour painting, looking off to one side as she deftly cuts the coins from the young dandy’s belt. Known as Preciosa, the fifteen-year-old girl sings and dances so beautifully, and expresses such devotion to the Virgin Mary and her mother St. Anne, that she causes a young noble to fall in love with her; and to prove his love, he agrees to leave his family behind and follow her, living as a gypsy named “Andres” for two years. Early in the story, Cervantes alludes to the picaresque world of Spain, so like that of the Lorraine which was depicted by La Tour only a few years later: “... There are poets who condescend to deal with gypsies and sell them their works, just as there are poets who write poems for the blind, and invent miracles for them to get a share of the profits. It takes all sorts to make a world, and hunger can drive clever people to do unheard of things.”

In the unfolding of the plot, the nobleman is framed up as a thief, and is about to lose his life, when the old gypsy woman appears, to reveal that Preciosa is really the long-lost daughter of the magistrate before whom her lover stands accused. The story concludes: “In the happiness which followed the finding of the betrothed couple, vengeance was buried and mercy revived”—a line which might well apply to the stories narrated by La Tour.

Daylight and Lamplight

La Tour’s “diurnes,” or paintings of daylit scenes, are filled with “clever people who do unheard of things,” like those spoken of by Cervantes. They manifest his highly original contribution to a genre that was born out of a European-wide movement of the early Seventeenth century, somewhat misnamed “Caravaggism” after the rogue artist of Rome who painted some of the first and most shocking images of this kind, in which ordinary people of the time, including the numerous social outcasts, prostitutes, assassins, and cheats of all descriptions, are incorporated into “high” art, and even into religious paintings, as a way of
carrying out the mandate of the Catholic Reform to make religious painting more emotionally accessible, by relating its contents to the everyday lives of the people. The “Musicians’ Brawl,” for example, portrays several layers of deceit (or truth), as is frequently the case with La Tour, because the “blind” musician, a favorite subject of La Tour’s paintings, is here exposed as being sighted at least in one eye, when he winces at the lemon juice squirted into it by his rival.

Two paintings in the retrospective are variants by La Tour, of a theme first popularized by Caravaggio, whose own “Cardsharps” is featured in the show as part of the “world” of La Tour advertised in the exhibition title. Caravaggio’s cheat, with the fingers of his gloves cut away in an allusion to the custom of cutting away the outer skin in order to feel tiny alterations in the surface of marked cards, is a figure drawn from the exaggerated traditions of the Commedia dell’Arte. In the two La Tour versions, it is, characteristically, a team of cheats at work, all apparently orchestrated by the woman who sits at the center of the table, described in the catalogue essay by Gail Feigenbaum as “one of the most unforgettable figures in the history of art.” It is startling to recognize, in one of La Tour’s numerous versions of the Penitent Magdalen, a repentant courtesan, which has been lost but is known through an old copy, this very same face. The coincidence is easily ascribed to the use of the same studio model, and yet we have perhaps here a clue to how La Tour thought that his picaresque characters could be transformed into saints. [See a candlelit version, “The Magdalen at the Mirror,” inside back cover, this issue.]

One of the most moving of La Tour’s religious pictures, the “St. Peter Repentant,” which belongs to the Cleveland Museum of Art, illustrates this thematic relationship. It is a nocturnal scene. The apostle Peter sits in a gloomy corner with a rooster perched on a table next to him, and a lantern at his feet. A different light from above, outside the picture, and presumably of Divine origin, falls strongly on his grizzled face and hands, revealing an expression of surprise and remorse. The man who was chosen by Christ to lead the Church, is here revealed in all his human weakness and in the strength of his atonement. The lantern conveys a sense of “hidden light” within the heart of the saint, evoking the lines from the Epistle of St. Peter, referring to prophecy, “whereunto ye do well that take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day star arise in your hearts.” (II Peter 1:19).

**Atonement and Optimism**

Perhaps the most beloved of Georges de la Tour’s pictures, is the “Newborn” from the Rennes Museum in Brittany, France, which is featured in the current show. There is still some debate about the subject of the painting, because no halos or other attributes exist to identify it positively as a Nativity of Christ. La Tour is often deliberately ambiguous about the lines that might divide the sacred and secular worlds, because, as we have seen, the notion of atonement bridges those worlds. Here again, the writing of Cervantes comes to mind, in the poem to St. Anne, recited by Preciosa in the opening pages of “The Little Gypsy Girl,” which ends:

> Holy Anne, with her to share pain and suffering humans bear.

La Tour had a supreme talent for fashioning beauty out of hardship. We see this in the condensed drama of the “Job,” and Job’s counterpart, the penitent St. Jerome; in the harsh scenes of the Tax Collector and the Denial of St. Peter; in his early series of bust-length apostles, many bearing the instruments of their own martyrdom; in the numerous versions of the blind musicians and the repentant Magdalen; in the puzzling “Flea Catcher,” where the humble ritual seems to have some transcendent significance; and in the Ecstasy of St. Francis, in which the saint’s death agony is alleviated by a private vision of celestial music. For La Tour, as later for Leibniz, optimism is not a matter of denying the reality of evil, or even of maintaining that all evils inevitably lead to consequences of greater good. Rather, these evils exist in the best of all possible worlds, created by God, in which man can exercise the freedom of atoning and changing his ways to achieve a greater good even out of tragedy.

Today, in a world in which “hunger can drive even clever people to do unheard of things,” and powerful oligarchies openly conspire to unleash “Thirty Years War” conflicts on whole sections of the world, it is a positive good that Georges de la Tour can bring his message to so large a public.

—Nora Hamerman
Economic Wealth Flows from the Mind

The release of this book has come none too soon. As the world is in the process of a financial meltdown—a disintegration of the global monetary system, the writings of Friedrich List offer the conceptual basis for avoiding such economic chaos and destruction.

Following the fall of communism, the world has been dominated exclusively by the doctrines of free trade. It is the adherence to the “freedom of the markets” that has driven the financial and monetary system past the point where it can be saved, except by cutting out the core of the disease: the axiomatics of the free trade ideology itself. However, fortunately, there has existed for over two hundreds years, an alternative to both Marxism and free trade. Although virtually unknown today, the American System of Political Economy came into existence in the young American republic as a form of political economy explicitly opposed to the British-centered free trade methods of colonial looting. And the historical record has shown conclusively, that whenever American System economics has been practiced, it works! Friedrich List was a leader of this school of thought, which makes the release of his early writings so valuable to all German and English readers.

This book is divided into three sections, all in English with German translation on the facing page. It begins with List’s twelve letters, followed by an historical and political commentary by Michael Liebig, and concludes with an essay by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., entitled “Leibniz and the List Hypothesis.”

List’s Outlines of American Political Economy, in the form of twelve letters written between July 10 and July 27, 1827, during the period in which he lived in the United States, together with the larger work written in 1841, The National System of Political Economy, provide the most thorough and devastating refutation of Adam Smith’s free trade lunacy.

The Outlines were first published in the U.S. in the National Gazette, between August and November in 1827, under the title of “The American System.” Later that same year, the Society for the Promotion of Manufacturing and Mechanical Arts in Pennsylvania, whose vice president was Charles Jared Ingersoll, published the letters in a pamphlet. The Pennsylvania Society had been initiated in 1787 by Tench Coxe, Alexander Hamilton’s Treasury assistant, and later was headed by Mathew Carey, the father of President Lincoln’s economic adviser Henry Carey. Deployed into this hotbed of Hamiltonian American System thinkers by his pro-American, European co-conspirator the Marquis de Lafayette, List was able to mature his earlier disagreements with Adam Smith’s theories. In his letters and later writings, List provided sound reasons for the necessity of the nation-state to exercise “protectionist” and “dirigist” measures, to guarantee its political and economic sovereignty for the welfare of its citizens.

Refuting Adam Smith

In the first letter to Charles Ingersoll, List writes: “I confine my exertions, therefore, solely to the refutation of the theory of Adam Smith and Co., the fundamental errors of which have not been understood so clearly as they ought to be. It is this theory, sir, which furnishes to the opponents of the American System the intellectual means of their opposition.”

Later on in the same letter, List makes fun of Americans, were they to be so foolish as to follow the nostrums of Smith, by suggesting how future historians would commemorate the decline of the U.S.: “They were a great people, they were in every respect in the way to becoming the first people on Earth; but they became weak and died, trusting in the infallibility—not of a Pope nor a king—but of two books imported into the country, one written by a Scotchman...” Here he is referring to Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, written in 1776.

The British Empire’s foreign minister, Lord Shelburne, personally instructed Adam Smith to write the Wealth of Nations in 1763, to subvert the American System revolution already underway in the colonies. The revolution succeeded, but British did not give up, and have not given up, their quest.

In his ninth letter, List discusses England’s manipulations: “Her aim was always and ever to raise her manufactories and commerce, and thereby her navy and political power, beyond all competition of other nations, and always she accommodated her conduct to circumstances—using at one time and in one place liberal principles, at another, power or money—either to
raise freedom or to depress it, as it suited her. Even her measures against the slave trade are said to have originated from her interest, and gave her a pretext to prevent other nations’ colonies from supplying themselves, whilst her own possessed already the necessary quantity.”

Sovereignty of the Nation-State

Today, we are forced to view the unsightly spectacle of a band of Republican extremists running around the country advocating the destruction of our Federal government by returning to the Confederate system of the primacy of “states’ rights.” Unlike these scoundrels, List understood the absolute necessity for intervention by the state for the benefit of society. In the second letter he writes: “The idea of national economy arises with the idea of nations. A nation is the medium between individuals and mankind.”

Later in the same letter, List enumerates some of the responsibilities of the nation-state: “Government, sir, has not only the right, but it is its duty, to promote every thing which may increase the wealth and power of the nation, if this object cannot be effected by individuals. So it is its duty to guard commerce by a navy, because merchants cannot protect themselves; so it is its duty to protect carrying trade by navigation laws . . . . agriculture and every other industry by turnpikes, bridges, canals, and railroads—new inventions by patent laws—so manufactures must be raised by protecting duties, if foreign nations and foreign laws.”

List advances the concept of productivity power of labor. Contrary to Adam Smith and his follower Karl Marx, civilization has not prospered and grown to over five and one-half billion people based on the empty notion of the “exchange value” of commodities. No object has any inherent value outside of the level of the technologically bounded process of production for that potential population-density. Alexander Hamilton, in his “Report on the Subject of Manufactures” (1791), developed the notion of the productive powers of labor, and the use of artificial labor to improve the productivity of agriculture and industry in harmony. List continues the Hamiltonian train of thought in his fourth letter: “This object [political economy] is not to gain matter, in exchanging matter for matter. . . . But it is to gain productive and political power . . . . They [Smith and Say] treat, therefore, principally of the effects of the exchange of matter, instead of treating productive power.”

List advances the concept of productive power against the notion of “exchange value,” by dividing capital into three interrelated classes: “a capital of nature, a capital of mind, and a capital of productive matter—and the productive powers of a nation depend not only upon the latter, but also, and principally, upon the two former.” Later on, in the fourth letter, List articulates one of the most fundamental principles of political economy: “It is not true that productive power of a nation is restricted by its capital of matter. Say and Smith having only in view the exchange of matter for matter, to gain matter, ascribe to the matter an omnipotent effect which it has not. Greater part of the productive power consists in the intellectual and social conditions of the individuals, which I call capital of the mind.”

Two Views of Man

Many people who mindlessly genuflect before Adam Smith, that false deity of free trade, do not know that he was not a student of economics. In reality, Smith was a fanatical follower of the most radical form of British Liberal philosophy. He shared with Thomas Hobbes, Francis Bacon, Bernard de Mandeville, John Locke, and David Hume, to name a few, the deep-seated prejudice, that the nature of man is akin to that of the beasts, determined by instincts of hunger, thirst, sex, greed, and the unsuitable desire for pleasure. It is this ideological view of man as a degraded, mindless animal, guided by Smith’s satanic “Invisible Hand,” and nothing else, which is the ugly source for all of Smith’s so-called economic writings.

List, like all of the thinkers belonging to the American System school, adamantly opposed this British-oligarchical conception of man. They knew that real economic wealth emanates from the mind, not from one’s bodily urges. It is only through the development of “intellectual capital,” that improvements and advancements for mankind are made. In Liebig’s Commentary, he quotes List on this very subject: “The present condition of nations is a consequence of an accumulation of all discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfections and efforts of all generations which have lived before us. They form the capital of mind of all living humanity, and each nation is only productive to the degree to which it assimilates these achievements of earlier generations and knows how to enhance them with its own achievements.”
Lyndon LaRouche, who embodies and transcends the best of the American System school of thought, takes direct aim in the Epilogue at the core of Smith’s bestial notion of man: “[N]o variety of higher ape known or conceivably comparable to mankind could have attained the population of more than several millions individuals. . . .”

Where in any of the axioms of free trade, or in Smith’s view of the animal-like behavior of human nature, is there any location of that, which is responsible for the phenomenal growth of human population over the last five hundred years? Nowhere in Smith’s matrix of free trade ideas, is the quality of creative mentation, which is the unique governing quality of human behavior, to be found. All of Smith’s gobbledygook can be boiled down to the practice of making money, i.e., making a “profit” by robbing your neighbor; “buy low to sell dear.”

In LaRouche’s conclusion, he addresses the actual source of new wealth—“real profit for society: “The central principle of both economic science and a science of history is the creative principle of cognition, by means of which the individual person may be developed to generate, to impart, and to receive those mental acts by means of which valid axiomatic-revolutionary discoveries in principles of art and science are made available for human knowledge and practice.” Only a human being endowed with potential for creative reason can “add” new wealth to the economic process. Only through the input of human beings can “more” come out of the system of production than is put into it.

Thus, one of the biggest frauds in modern history has been the acceptance of the free trade dogma, a theory which cannot account for the actual progress of the human race, because it fails even to recognize the role of the creative powers of the human mind; what List refers to as “intellectual capital” or “capital of the mind.”

It is no exaggeration to state, that it is precisely because so many silly people still worship at the altar of free trade, that our planet is in the mess it is in today. It may only be under the force of the onrushing implosion of the banking and monetary system, that the fraudulent doctrine of free trade is relegated to the “dustbin of history.” Under conditions of such a conjunctural crisis, responsible leaders who wish to have their nations survive, will be compelled to turn to List’s American System, which is uniquely represented today by Lyndon LaRouche.

—Lawrence K. Freeman

Beethoven, ‘Da Capo’

Only a few months after Ludwig van Beethoven’s death in Vienna on March 26, 1827, this little book—which reads more like a pamphlet than a full volume—was published in Prague and began circulating throughout Europe and America. Little is known about its author, except that he was an enthusiastic admirer of the great composer, and that he was probably not acquainted with him personally. The material he hastily gathered, was taken from a mixture of published musical lexicons, and conversations with some of Beethoven’s closest friends. In Schlosser’s preface, he is also quite open about an ulterior motive for bringing out the book; namely, to raise funds for the erection of a monument to Josef Haydn, with whom Beethoven had studied during the early 1790’s.

But although the author’s haste introduced some minor factual errors about Beethoven’s career, these are far outweighed by the freshness and lack of deliberate falsification and distortion which characterized many other biographies to follow, such as the one by the vain Anton Schindler, who had functioned as Beethoven’s amanuensis in his final years. Not surprisingly, Schindler, in a letter to Ignaz Moscheles, described Schlosser’s book as “a highly wretched biography.”

The bulk of Schlosser’s account of Beethoven’s early education, for example, properly places emphasis on the influence of Johann Sebastian Bach (whose biography he also sketches in an extended footnote). Later, Schlosser remarks that, “Those who admire Bach comprehend Beethoven most readily, for the two are kindred spirits.”

Schlosser’s biography is also unencumbered by the Romantic, “Clockwork Orange”-like image of the morally depraved but brilliant artist—the image that movie-goers have been subjected to in such perversions as “Amadeus” and the recent “Immortal Beloved.” Instead, Schlosser argues that, “Great as Beethoven’s art was, his heart was yet greater. It was filled with an ineradicable loathing of hypocrisy, obsequiousness, vanity, and avarice. . . . Those who shared these feelings readily recognized him as a man in the fullest sense. His attachment to his family was one of his most attractive qualities.” [Emphasis added] This evaluation flies in the face of every other published account of Beethoven’s life—including, incidentally, the “authoritative” biography published later in the Nineteenth century by Alexander Wheelock Taylor.

Perhaps the most endearing part of the book, is where Schlosser discusses
Beethoven’s marvelous sense of humor. “Often he would mention only a single key word pertaining to an anecdote, believing that it was sufficient to convey his meaning. Those who were unfamiliar with the anecdote, or who did not immediately catch the allusion, would be puzzled, but those who caught on would quickly burst into laughter.”

For example: Beethoven might be sitting in the audience at a concert, listening to a singer who is performing poorly on stage, and would nudge the person seated beside him, saying the single phrase, “Da capo!” [Encore!] This traced back to the following story: “In Paris, a mediocre singer, with a weak voice, slight chest, and so forth, performed an interminable bravura aria. Everyone longed for it to end. It finally did, and the singer was roundly booted. Only one person in the audience called out ‘Da capo.’ The singer, listening only to that one voice, bowed humbly, and gratefully repeated the entire aria, because of the ensuing uproar in the house. When he ended, the hissing and booing was worse than before, but as it died down, the same low male voice shouted very loudly again, ‘Da capo!'”

Indeed, the singer bowed once more and launched into the aria for the third time. The other listeners were about to turn against the man who had caused all the trouble, when he exclaimed, ‘Je voulais faire créer cette canaille!’ [I was hoping the wretch would sing himself to death!].”

Schlosser’s biography also publishes a private letter by Beethoven, whose content is useful for clearing up yet another popular myth, that Beethoven was insensitive to “proper” bel canto singing, and to “proper” setting of musical texts. It is a letter dated Feb. 6, 1826, addressed to his friend Abbé Stadler, who had just published an in-depth defense of the authenticity of Mozart’s Requiem, which had been called into question by the composer Gottfried Weber (not the famous opera composer). After thanking the Abbé profusely for his paper, Beethoven adds, with irony, that it is hardly surprising that Weber’s “extraordinary knowledge of harmony and melody” also resulted in the following clumsy passage in one of Weber’s own works:

If you sing these three musical examples in succession, it becomes clear that in the Weber settings, Beethoven has placed an “x” near the two eighth-notes on the syllables “tol-” and “ca-,” in order to indicate that these syllables must be sung over a single note, and not tied over two or more notes. Weber’s phrasing destroys the unity of the phrase as a whole: “Qui tollis peccata mundi” [Thou who take away the sins of the world], not to mention the rising notes on the syllable “-lis” of “tollis,” which completely throw off the poetic stresses in the phrase.

—John Sigerson

Product of a World of Genius

Lea Salomon Mendelssohn started her daughter Fanny on piano, five minutes at a sitting, extending it as interest grew. At thirteen, Fanny memorized the whole of Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier, while studying science, languages, geography, history, poetry, and reading Schiller and Lessing. At fourteen, she sang alto in the famous (adult) Singakademie. At fifteen, Goethe responded to lieders she had composed, with “To the Distant Girl.” Fanny and her three siblings played games by composing poems, riddles, lieders, and plays.

Her mother Lea read Homer in the original Greek. She raised her children on Bach, Handel, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven. Lea’s aunt, Sara Levy, a student of W.F. Bach, played J.S. Bach concerti for the Berlin Singakademie concerts. One Christmas Eve, Sara left a present for Fanny’s fourteen-year-old brother Felix—a copy of Bach’s long-forgotten St. Matthew Passion. Another of Lea’s aunts, Fanny Arnstein, provided Mozart with his copy of Moses Mendelssohn’s work, Phaedon, which contained a reprise of Plato’s arguments in his Phaedo dialogue. Of course, Lea had married into the illustrious Mendelssohn family. Her poor husband Abraham, son of Moses and father of Felix, would later lament: “Until now I was known as father’s son; henceforth, I shall be known as my son’s father.”

Françoise Tillard, a pianist who has recorded Fanny Mendelssohn’s works, published this biography in French in 1992. There is no lack of rich material for the author to develop, to make this
first-ever biography of Fanny accomplish its sincerely desired goal: to make people “love” Fanny, so they will “approach Fanny’s music and rescue it, at last, from the anonymity of her private life.”

The problem is, that Tillard has chosen a subject which is richer than she knows how to explain. She herself has not learned from the study which Fanny’s grandfather conducted of Plato’s Socrates, and seems, therefore, to be unaware of what it is she does not know. As a consequence, she provides a lot of “Sociology 101”-type explanations for culture, history, and ideas, which fall far below the intellectual level of events within the Mendelssohn household.

‘Feminist’ Criticism

What’s more, there is the equivalent of an unpleasant nervous tic lying beneath the narrative, which surfaces at irregular intervals. For example, when Fanny wishes to meet her brother Felix’s fiancée, we are told that this is “again the archaic notion that a woman changes when she is no longer a virgin.” Possibly; but the naive assumption, that the person who most shared Felix’s upbringing, mind and soul, might wish to meet his fiancée sooner rather than later, is not necessarily the wrong one. Or again, when Felix does not push Fanny out into the world of publishing, to be left to conquer the prejudice against women composers, Tillard lashes out: “Did he really need to crush her so completely, in order to fulfill his own artistic potential?”

It gets worse. The book’s most telling fault comes with Tillard’s willingness to defend her woman composer, by attacking the concept of “genius” as a masculine imposition: “Above all, however, the notion of genius belongs to a world of masculine concepts that do not include female creativity.”

Tillard’s client doesn’t need this defense. The author knows, after all, that the Mendelssohns could overcome odds, specifically citing the case of Moses, who, as a poor, hunchbacked Jew, had to overcome prejudice just to pursue his education. She also knows that whatever the sisters Fanny and Rebecka accomplished, was “judged on its own merits, without being subject to ‘feminine’ criteria.” However, she chooses not to apply the Mendelssohns’ own standards when writing Fanny’s biography.

In reality, Fanny Mendelssohn was very insightful on what was for her, not a cause, but a very real problem. When Felix tries to be sympathetic, suggesting Fanny’s slower progress in composition is caused by the new demands of running her home, she corrects him: “I’ve been wondering how I came to compose [as I have]... I think it comes from the fact that we were young during Beethoven’s last period and... had assimilated his art and style. But that style is very emotional and wrenching... I’ve remained stuck in it, but without the strength through which that sensitivity can and must endure. That’s why I think you didn’t hit the right mark in me or address the issue. It is not so much the compositional skill that is lacking, as a certain approach to life, and because of this deficiency my longer pieces are already dying of old age in their infancy: I lack sufficient strength to sustain my ideas and give the necessary consistency. That’s why I’m best at writing lieder, where an appealing idea may suffice, without much strength to develop it.”

Fanny wrote lieder as naturally as breathing: “[This morning [her husband Wilhelm, an artist and expert on Raphael] came and without saying anything, put a piece of paper [with verse] on the piano; five minutes later I called him back and sang him the music, which was set down on the paper in another quarter of an hour.] Lieder were the bulk of her four hundred works.

The Humboldt System

Lea’s children were trained to look behind the ostensible subject, and to address the underlying process—in a poem, in politics, drama, science, and, yes, music. They received the epitome of the “Humboldt” education. Fanny attended Alexander von Humboldt’s physical geography lectures (calling them “infinitely interesting,” she pursued another “lecture series... on experimental physics”). Their childhood tutor, philologist Karl Heyse, taught at Wilhelm von Humboldt’s university. (In fact, the two Humboldt brothers had themselves studied Leibniz at the feet of Fanny’s grandfather Moses.) Abraham Mendelssohn built a special observatory in his garden for Alexander to measure magnetic fields. He brought his protégé, Dirichlet, from Lafayette’s republican networks in France, to help. They would work, listening to Felix and Fanny rehearsing, four-hand, for the now-famous revival of Bach’s St. Matthew Passion. It makes perfect sense that Dirichlet fell in love with the younger sister, Rebecka, and married into the Mendelssohn clan. Of course, he had to compete with suitors Eduard Gans (who had read Plato with Rebecka) and Heinrich Heine (whose unique style of courting included sending his greetings to “chubby Rebecka... so charming and kind, and every pound of her an angel”).

Fanny is intelligent, passionate, honest, witty, blunt, and usually right. Her phrase for dealing with artists when setting up her Sunday salon concerts, was: “There are so many cows with tails that need untying.” She follows world politics insightfully, trashes Napoleon, confronts pianists who have magic fingers but no brains, notes who is pushing up the pitch, confronts family illnesses and miscarriages. And, yes, she does, at the age of forty, become confident enough to publish. At forty-two, she composes a glorious D minor Piano Trio. But, within weeks, she suddenly dies. Felix was crushed; less than six months later, he himself was dead at thirty-eight.

A reader of German should go straight to Fanny’s Tagebuch, and her son’s family history, for another thousand precious anecdotes. But, for the English-bound, its few hundred anecdotes by themselves make this book worth reading. Just look the other way when the facial tic appears.

—David M. Shavin
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An Intimate Poetry Of Pain and Laughter

Georges de la Tour (1593-1652), who is honored by an exhibition recently on view at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., and scheduled to appear from Feb. 2 until May 11, 1997 at the Kimbell Museum in Fort Worth, Texas, is an artist very much in the process of being discovered.

Perhaps the most exciting part of the rediscovery process, is that which links La Tour to a literary genius of his own time, the Spaniard Miguel de Cervantes. Cervantes, born in 1547, published the first volume of his immortal Don Quixote in 1605, and the second in 1615, at a time when the young La Tour was undoubtedly reaching his first artistic maturity. Three years later, in 1618, the Thirty Years War, which was to devastate Central Europe, broke out.

La Tour raised the painful and humorous conditions of his contempories, living in the cockpit of war, to untold heights of poetic contemplation, with a supreme talent for fashioning beauty out of hardship. He possessed a soul capable of expressing something analogous to the literary spirit of Cervantes, who could condense into a short paragraph the most intense, simultaneous imagery of pain and laughter.

La Tour is often deliberately ambiguous about the lines that might divide the sacred and secular worlds. As for Leibniz later, his optimism is not a matter of denying the reality of evil, or even of maintaining that all evils inevitably lead to consequences of greater good. Rather, these evils exist in the best of all possible worlds, created by God, in which man can exercise the freedom of atoning and changing his ways to achieve a greater good even out of tragedy.
In This Issue

Time To Put this Country on the March Again

On the occasion of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday, Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. emphasizes, ‘Martin was a Christian, in a very special way. He behaved as a man sent by God, a man of Providence, who never failed to fulfill his mission as a leader. He saw that the power of the Civil Rights movement was, to give meaning to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.’

Life, Liberty, and The Pursuit of Happiness

Robert Trout demonstrates how America’s founding fathers were inspired by Leibniz’s concept of Natural Law. And Richard Freeman outlines how Thomas Jefferson’s hatred of Plato, and embrace of Lockean empiricism, underlay his support for agrarianism, racism, and free-trade monetarism—policies which became the axiomatic basis of the British-created Confederacy.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz—The Unity of the Churches, and Russia

The philosopher, diplomat, and scientist G.W. Leibniz created the foundations for modern Europe, by launching strategic initiatives to transform the political geometry of the entire Eurasian continent. Dr. Ambrosius Eszer, O.P. reviews Leibniz’s extensive ecumenical efforts to reunify the Protestant and Catholic Churches, as well as his plans for the development of Russia.