Having reduced Schiller to a Kantian, Murray then attacks the straw man that he has set up. In his treatment of Letter 27, he argues that Schiller has given up his earlier attempt to arrive at a balance between man’s sense-drive and his form-drive, and has adopted a formalist Kantian solution. “The form-drive is developed at the expense of an increasingly suppressed sense-drive throughout all the Letters that deal with man’s psycho-historical development. Consequently, what Schiller unwittingly describes in his treatise is a course of psychological development which transforms the sensuous ‘savage’ into an enervated ‘barbarian.’”

In respect to art, Murray argues that “Schiller seems to have followed Kant into a rather empty aesthetic formalism. . . . Thus Schiller’s moral and political aims in the treatise have led him to produce a theory of the ideal art object which reduces it to being anaemic and formalist in character in the end.”

The key to Murray’s own epistemological bias is his statement that Schiller fails “to take full account of the body. Like many idealist philosophers, Schiller does not take on board the full consequences of the fact that man is an embodied rational being.” Thus, underneath his academic posturing, Murray is actually an Aristotelian hedonist, who reduces Schiller to Kant, because he wants to deny the alternative, presented by Schiller, to being either a hedonistic savage or an Enlightenment barbarian—that is, the alternative of creativity.

Murray’s other distortions flow from this source. For example, in his treatment of Letter 21, rather than embrace Schiller’s crucial concept of the Beautiful Soul, he goes so far as to cite Hegel attacking Schiller’s concept. He writes: “Prima facie, therefore, Schiller’s concept of the aesthetic condition appears to suffer from the same unrealizable and unproductive character as the ‘beautiful soul’ concept that Hegel criticized.” Having done the damage, he then attempts to blunt his criticism by half-heartedly writing that “it is possible to interpret Schiller in a plausible manner which extricates him from one criticism that attaches to the beautiful soul concept . . . .”

In the course of the book, Murray makes a number of other false claims about Schiller’s philosophy: (1) He claims that Schiller was influenced in his concept of the Natural State by Adam Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand” as expressed in the Wealth of Nations and in the writings of Smith’s student Adam Ferguson; and (2) He argues that “Schiller’s notion of the Moral State would seem to be based partly on Rousseau’s ‘general will’ in The Social Contract; and partly on ideas expressed by Kant in his then widely known Idea for a Universal History.”

Finally, although Murray recognizes that Schiller’s Letters are designed to transform man aesthetically, so that he might be capable of achieving true political freedom, how better from the standpoint of the geopolitical objectives of the British oligarchy to prevent this from occurring, than to portray Schiller’s aesthetics as so flawed by “proto-absolute idealism,” as to at best be capable of transforming man into an enervated barbarian?

—William F. Wertz, Jr.

British Rev Up New Attacks Against Leibniz

Mr. Meli’s work is the latest attempt in three hundred years by British and Venetian intelligence to accuse Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz of plagiarizing Sir Isaac Newton.

In 1684, Leibniz published his Nova Methodus pro Maximis et Minimis, a powerful calculus, reflecting his digestion of the work of Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo de Vinci, and Johannes Kepler, conveyed to Leibniz via Pascal, Desargues, and Huyghens. His “analysis situs” approach depended upon his location of the “maximum-minimum” topology in terms of man being created in the image of God.

In contrast, when Newton published his first work, Principia Mathematica, in 1687, the scientific community was asked to accept the numerical niceties of the inverse-square law, as a sufficient explanation of physical processes: two bodies act upon each other across some distance according to a numerical relationship, a curious scientific method rooted in superstitious beliefs.

Excluding what Newton burned before dying, it is known that he wrote voluminously and obsessively on theology, prophecy, and alchemy. Objecting to the Leibnizians, he wrote: “If God be called . . . the omnipotent, they take it in a metaphysical sense for God’s power of creating all things out of nothing whereas it is meant principally of his universal irresistible monarchical power to teach us obedience.” His reasoning: “For in the Creed after the words I believe in one God the father almighty are added the words creator of heaven and earth as not included in the former.” [New-
ton’s punctuation].

Newton’s passion was to interpret *Revelations* and *Daniel* allegorically. For example, if John saw foul spirits like frogs issuing from the mouths of dragons, beasts, and false prophets, then “frogs” means “Papal idolaters.” The Newton who wrote the *Principia* calculated that Christ’s Second Coming was 1,260 years from the Papal Anti-Christ that replaced Rome, and thus within sixty years of the 1680’s.

Newton jealously guarded his insane God, who demanded blind obedience, from all who saw in God love, ongoing creation, or mankind made in His image. He blamed the early Christian Platonists for propounding “the Trinitarian heresy,” comparing any attempt to base science and culture upon the divine image of God, to an “emanation” theory, based upon the “seminal profluvia of men and menstrua of women . . . offered [in ritual by . . .] saying this is my body and this is my blood.”

Although Newton’s was a totally domineering God, who created humans as submissive animals, at the same time, he wanted to share in the Almighty’s power. His life was an awful playing out of this contradiction.

When denied his reward of a public office in the new House of Orange government, Newton went berserk. During 1692-3, Newton: (1) demanded that John Locke withdraw from printing Newton’s essay attacking the Trinity; (2) had a mysterious fire destroy part of his alchemy work—though enough remained to qualify Newton’s alchemy compendium, *Praxis*, as the largest work ever in the field; (3) engaged in an awkward correspondence with the young Swiss alchemist, Fatio de Duilliers, over whether they could set up house together in Cambridge; (4) rushed off to London, when the object of his affections was lured by another alchemist; (5) was crushed by the breakdown of these living arrangements, and lashed out at his controllers (John Locke, Samuel Pepys, and the Earl of Halifax, Charles Montague). Further, he had some scandalous inter-

change with the Archbishop of Canterbury, and he periodically claimed he could no longer see any of his former associates. The Royal Society grew concerned that Newton might be dead soon, and rumors were that he had already died.

After being without his “former consistency of mind” [Newton’s words] for twelve months, and suffering a “distemper . . . which has been epidemical,” Newton was put back together and given the office he protested overly much about—the Warden of the Mint for the Montagues’ new Bank of England. From 1696 on, his prime mission in life was to relentlessly put to death counterfeiters. He was also put in charge of the re-organization of the Royal Society around 1705. Any pretense to science was abandoned for a search-and-destroy mission against Leibniz’s continental scientific academies.

**Newton vs. Leibniz**

The supposed controversy between Newton and Leibniz over the development of the calculus was launched at a time that all scientific work for over twenty years had proceeded from Leibniz’s “least-action, maximum-minimum” method, and nobody had ever even seen a mathematical work by Newton! The initial charge against Leibniz of plagiarism was launched by Fatio de Duilliers, the same youth who so disappointed Newton in his housing arrangements earlier. (Fatio’s known intelligence activities included organizing assassination attempts against the French crown, and deploying irate Hugenots into public riots by naming the French king as the anti-Christ—these and his role in the Newton-Leibniz controversy mark him as an agent deployed by the Venetian controller, Abbé Conti, who would take personal supervision of Newton a few years later.)

In his *Equivalence and Priority*, D.B. Meli, who is funded by Cambridge University and the British Council, offers a new wrinkle on the Newton-Leibniz controversy: perhaps Leibniz did not really steal Newton’s calculus, but he did steal from the *Principia* his celestial mechanics! Meli’s main useful contribution is the publication of six Latin manuscripts, written by Leibniz probably in 1688, on his way to Italy, concerning his working-out of Kepler’s physical geometry program.

In short: Leibniz was concerned about the Royal Society’s attempt to mystify Kepler’s physical geometry program. Newton’s *Principia* undoubtedly did impel Leibniz to develop further the physical geometry of his maximum-minimum methods, and *analysis situs* methods of 1684. But in 1688, when the *Principia* came to Leibniz’s attention, Newton was a curious, reclusive nobody, put forward by a group of radically anti-Trinitarian oligarchs, explicit devotees of the Arian heresy, concluding a Venetian marriage of the Dutch House of Orange with the London financial community. Whereas, Leibniz was organizing the Vatican around repairing the unresolved splits of Western civilization, including using Cusanus’ and Kepler’s developments in the sciences to unravel the mess the Church had gotten into over the “Galileo” imbroglio.

Over the centuries, nothing has guaranteed greater hysteria among the oligarchs, than the potential for Western civilization to properly develop science and the world from the proper theological grounding that God created man in His living image—and so to overcome the splintering of our culture that ended the Renaissance in the early 1500’s.

For Cambridge’s Meli to spend the years from 1984 to 1992 preparing a 318-page “legal brief” against Leibniz, to counter what he calls the “re-emergence” of Leibniz in “comparatively recent times,” betrays nothing so much as desperation that the legal assault against the leading Leibnizian proponent in “comparatively recent times”—Lyndon LaRouche—might not have been enough to stop the impact of the efforts of LaRouche and his associates to resuscitate the Leibnizian tradition of continental science.

—David Shawin
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