

BOOKS

Friedrich Schiller Is No Kantian (British Lies Notwithstanding)

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent reunification of Germany, an extraordinary number of new books has been published by British publishing houses on the subject of Friedrich Schiller's writings. These include J. Sychrava's *Schiller to Derrida: Idealism in Aesthetics* (1989), L. Sharpe's *Friedrich Schiller: Drama, Thought and Politics* (1991); T.J. Reed's *Schiller* (1991); and now, Patrick T. Murray's new book on Schiller's *Aesthetic Education of Man*.

Although none of these books mentions the Schiller Institute, its English translations of Schiller's works, or its global political activities, the hostile attitude which each of these books expresses towards Schiller's actual thought leads one to conclude that they are a British-intelligence cultural warfare operation against both the continental tradition of Leibniz and Schiller, and the activities of the Schiller Institute itself.

Patrick T. Murray's book is perhaps the most insidious of them all, in that it purports to conduct a rigorous philosophical discussion of Schiller's most important aesthetical writing, by means of a painstaking treatment of each of its twenty-seven Letters.

Turning Schiller into Kant

The fundamental methodological error made in this book is reflected in its title. Although in the course of the book Murray identifies various locations where he reports that Schiller breaks from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, he nonetheless views Friedrich Schiller as no more than a Kantian. To arrive at this conclusion, Murray readily admits that he must cut through Schiller's "considerable usage of metaphorical language and imagery, which when 'translated' into literal language often reveals Kantian and Fichtean concepts which themselves require elucidation." In another place, Murray writes that the last three pages of Schiller's work "rely heavily on the Kantian critical philosophy for their frame-

work, a reliance made more difficult than usual to discern due to Schiller's usage of a series of unnecessarily obscure images and metaphors."


These two passages elucidate Murray's dishonest and destructive method: eliminate the metaphorical content of Schiller's writing and reduce it by means of a literal translation to Kantian philosophy. As Murray writes, "by its end, Schiller's own aesthetic position is closely identified with that of Kant."

That Murray's book is dishonest on this account, is demonstrated by the fact that he refers to a letter written by Schiller to Goethe on January 7, 1795, in which Schiller explicitly states that his analysis is not based upon any particular philosophy, but rather is drawn from an analysis of his own whole being. "As the beautiful itself is derived from man as a whole, so my analysis of it is drawn from *my* own whole humanity . . ." In the same letter, not cited by Murray, Schiller writes that "the poet is the only true *man*, and the best philosopher is only a caricature in respect to him." Schiller writes the same thing in the first letter: "My ideas, created more from uniform intercourse with my self than a rich experience of the world or acquired through lectures, will not deny their origin, will make themselves guilty of any other error rather than sectarianism and rather fall from their own weakness, than maintain themselves through authority and alien strength."

In another letter to Goethe written on February 19, 1795, Schiller writes that "one learns nothing of the final causes of the beautiful" in Kant's aesthetical writings.

Concept of Beauty

In order to portray Schiller as a Kantian, Murray goes so far as to argue that there is "a break with the theory of beauty in Schiller's Kallias letters (1793)." It was in this writing that Schiller not only



The Development of German Aesthetic Theory from Kant to Schiller; A Philosophical Commentary on Schiller's *Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795) by Patrick T. Murray
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attacked Kant's Categorical Imperative, which he does both in the "Letters on the Aesthetical Education of Man" and in "On Grace and Dignity," but Kant's entire aesthetical theory, which Schiller says, "seems to me to miss fully the concept of beauty."

As a result of this dishonesty, Murray then argues that "Letters 1 to 18 express and seek to prove Schillerian ideals (of freedom, harmony and wholeness); Letters 19 to 21 rest upon a derivatively Fichtean epistemology; Letters 22 to 27 represent the introduction of an increasingly Kantian view of beauty and aesthetic experience. It is as though, as the treatise progressed, Schiller began to doubt his philosophical ability to prove the theoretical necessity and practical viability of his ideals, and increasingly looked to one, and then the other, of his two great philosophical contemporaries for assistance in bringing his philosophical enterprise to a successful

conclusion.”

Having reduced Schiller to a Kantian, Murray then attacks the straw man that he has set up. In his treatment of Letter 27, he argues that Schiller has given up his earlier attempt to arrive at a balance between man’s *sense-drive* and his *form-drive*, and has adopted a formalist Kantian solution. “The form-drive is developed at the expense of an increasingly suppressed sense-drive throughout all the Letters that deal with man’s psycho-historical development. Consequently, what Schiller unwittingly describes in his treatise is a course of psychological development which transforms the sensuous ‘savage’ into an enervated ‘barbarian.’ ”

In respect to art, Murray argues that “Schiller seems to have followed Kant into a rather empty aesthetic formalism. . . . Thus Schiller’s moral and political aims in the treatise have led him to produce a theory of the ideal art object which reduces it to being anaemic and formalist in character in the end.”

The key to Murray’s own epistemological bias is his statement that Schiller fails “to take full account of the body.

Like many idealist philosophers, Schiller does not take on board the full consequences of the fact that man is an embodied rational being.” Thus, underneath his academic posturing, Murray is actually an Aristotelian hedonist, who reduces Schiller to Kant, because he wants to deny the alternative, presented by Schiller, to being either a hedonistic savage or an Enlightenment barbarian—that is, the alternative of creativity.

Murray’s other distortions flow from this source. For example, in his treatment of Letter 21, rather than embrace Schiller’s crucial concept of the Beautiful Soul, he goes so far as to cite Hegel attacking Schiller’s concept. He writes: “*Prima facie*, therefore, Schiller’s concept of the aesthetic condition appears to suffer from the same unrealizable and unproductive character as the ‘beautiful soul’ concept that Hegel criticized.” Having done the damage, he then attempts to blunt his criticism by half-heartedly writing that “it is possible to interpret Schiller in a plausible manner which extricates him from one criticism that attaches to the

beautiful soul concept”

In the course of the book, Murray makes a number of other false claims about Schiller’s philosophy: (1) He claims that Schiller was influenced in his concept of the Natural State by Adam Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand” as expressed in the *Wealth of Nations* and in the writings of Smith’s student Adam Ferguson; and (2) He argues that “Schiller’s notion of the Moral State would seem to be based partly on Rousseau’s ‘general will’ in *The Social Contract*; and partly on ideas expressed by Kant in his then widely known *Idea for a Universal History*.”

Finally, although Murray recognizes that Schiller’s Letters are designed to transform man aesthetically, so that he might be capable of achieving true political freedom, how better from the standpoint of the geopolitical objectives of the British oligarchy to prevent this from occurring, than to portray Schiller’s aesthetics as so flawed by “proto-absolute idealism,” as to at best be capable of transforming man into an enervated barbarian?

—William F. Wertz, Jr.

British Rev Up New Attacks Against Leibniz


Mr. Meli’s work is the latest attempt in three hundred years by British and Venetian intelligence to accuse Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz of plagiarizing Sir Isaac Newton.

In 1684, Leibniz published his *Nova Methodus pro Maximis et Minimis*, a powerful calculus, reflecting his digestion of the work of Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo de Vinci, and Johannes Kepler, conveyed to Leibniz via Pascal, Desargues, and Huyghens. His “*analysis situs*” approach depended upon his location of the “maximum-minimum” topology in terms of man being created in the image of God.

In contrast, when Newton published his first work, *Principia Mathematica*, in 1687, the scientific community was asked to accept the numerical niceties of the inverse-square law, as a sufficient

explanation of physical processes: two bodies act upon each other across some distance according to a numerical relationship, a curious scientific method rooted in superstitious beliefs.

Excluding what Newton burned before dying, it is known that he wrote voluminously and obsessively on theology, prophecy, and alchemy. Objecting to the Leibnizians, he wrote: “If God be called . . . the omnipotent, they take it in a metaphysical sense for God’s power of creating all things out of nothing whereas it is meant principally of his universal irresistible monarchical power to teach us obedience.” His reasoning: “For in the Creed after the words I believe in one God the father almighty are added the words creator of heaven and earth as not included in the former.” [New-



**Equivalence and Priority:
Newton versus Leibniz**
by D. B. Meli
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