In his "Defense of Learned Ignorance" (1449), Nicolaus of Cusa embraced St. Anselm's argument by writing: "No one was ever so foolish as to maintain that God, who forms all things, is anything other than that which a greater cannot be conceived.

In the 17th Century, Descartes put forward a flawed, "rationalist" version of Anselm's proof, which became known as the "ontological" proof of the existence of God. In his New Essays on Human Understanding, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz commended Descartes for reviving Anselm's argument and criticized the Scholastics, including Aquinas, for dismissing Anselm's argument as fallacious, but Leibniz did not consider Descartes' proof to be adequate.

Taking advantage of the inadequacy of Descartes' "ontological" argument, Immanuel Kant concluded that God's existence is merely a useful idea, but not provable. Kant's criticism, like that of Gaunilo's before him, is ultimately based upon his Aristotelian (empiricist) method, according to which only that exists, which exists contingently as an object of the senses. This method necessarily denies the existence of that which exists non-contingently.

Although Anselm's proof and Leibniz's attempts to improve upon it have been followed by the contributions of others, the most important contribution to this subject is found in the essay by Lyndon LaRouche entitled "On the Subject of God" (Fidelio, Vol. II, No. 1, Spring 1993).

LaRouche supplements the proofs of Plato, Augustine, Anselm, and Leibniz by applying the distinction between the Absolute Infinite and the transfinite, which Georg Cantor derived in part from the work of Nicolaus of Cusa in proving the impossibility of squaring a circle. LaRouche writes that "the hypothesizing the higher hypothesis,' the highest state of mind corresponding to comprehension of Plato's and Cantor's Becoming, is bounded by the unchanged cause of change (for increase of potential population-density), the Good. This relationship of the lesser (Becoming) to its master (Good) parallels somewhat the bounding of the inferior species, a polygonal process, by the higher species, circular action."

In the critical essays which appear in Volume IV, Jasper Hopkins, who later went on to translate many of the works of Nicolaus of Cusa, unfortunately is only too ready to agree with the Aristotelians who have historically attacked Anselm's proof as "unsound." Nonetheless, his translations of Anselm's complete works are to be recommended as an invaluable source of the writings of a great Christian Platonist, who insisted on the primacy of the principle of intelligibility.

—William F. Wertz, Jr.

Creation According to Moses

Philo Judaeus of Alexandria, Egypt lived from 20 B.C. to A.D. 50. He was the Greek-Jewish philosopher who synthesized the best of Plato and the Septuagint (Hebrew Bible in Greek translation). According to Eusebius, he collaborated with Peter the Apostle in Rome.

The significance of this one-volume edition being re-issued last year in an updated version, must be seen in the historical context of both the ongoing Vatican-Jewish-Islamic dialogue against the genocidal "population control" policies promoted at the U.N. conference in Cairo, Egypt last September, as well as the moves on the part of the Israeli and Arab leaderships, and the U.S. Clinton Administration, to establish peace in that troubled part of the world.

In numerous of his writings, Lyndon LaRouche has pointed out that we are indebted to Philo's "A Treatise on the Account of the Creation of the World, as Given by Moses" for being the first explicit elaboration in the Judeo-Christian tradition of the concept that man is created in the image of God (imago Dei) insofar as he is capable of creativity, and that it is this creativity which distinguishes man from mere beasts. "On Creation" can thus be read as an affirmation of the outlook of Plato's Timaeus, and as a direct attack on the contrary Aristotelian viewpoint.

As the translator Yonge points out in the Preface to the original 1859 edition, "...it appears to have been a saying among the ancients that, 'either Plato philonises, or Philo platonises.' " We encounter Philo's Platonist outlook throughout these works, as when he describes the difficulty of discovering and communicating truth, and its relation to creativity, in terms reminiscent of Plato's parable of the Cave, and of the later reflection of this in St. Paul, that "we see as in a mirror darkly": "[N]o one, whether poet or historian, could ever give expression in an adequate manner to the beauty of his ideas respecting the creation of the world; for they surpass all the power of language, and amaze our hearing, being too great and venerable to be adapted to the sense of any created being."

To the question, then, how man can attain knowledge, Philo responds: love God, and love wisdom. He makes use of literal, allegorical, moral, and analogical methods throughout his works, to introduce the reader to various biblical characters who embody these teachings, most importantly the philosopher-king-priest-prophet Moses. Some Philo biographers think these essays were original-
ly sermons, delivered by the Alexandri-an rabbi on the Jewish sabbath.

In “On Creation,” Philo directly attacks various of Aristotle’s assertions about God, and God’s relationship to the created world. He writes: “For some men, admiring the world itself rather than the Creator of the world, have represent-ed it as existing without any maker, and eternal; and as impiously as falsely have represented God as existing in a state of complete inactivity, while it would have been right on the other hand to marvel at the might of God as the creator and father of all, and to admire the world in a degree not exceeding the bounds of moderation. But Moses, who had early reached the very summits of philosophy, and who had learnt from the oracles of God the most numerous and important principles of nature, was well aware that it is indispensable that in all existing things there must be an active cause, and a passive subject; and the active cause is the intellect of the universe, thoroughly unadulterated and thoroughly unmixed, superior to virtue and superior to science, superior even to abstract good or abstract beauty.”

Philo emphasizes that the intellect is superior to the external senses: “God . . ., when he had determined to create this visible world, previously formed that one which is perceptible only by the intellect, in order that so using an incorporeal model formed as far as possible on the image of God, he might then make this corporeal world, a younger likeness of the elder creation, which should embrace as many different genera perceptible to the external senses, as the other world contains of those which are visible only to the intellect.” And later: “[W]e must form a somewhat similar opinion of God, who having determined to found a mighty state, first of all conceived its form in his mind, according to which form he made a world perceptible only by the intellect, and then completed one visible to the external senses, using the first one as a model.”

Philo then says, “this is the doctrine of Moses, not mine. Accordingly he, when recording the creation of man, in words which follow, asserts expressly, that he was made in the image of God—and if the image be a part of the image, then manifestly so is the entire form, namely the whole of this world perceptible by the external senses, which is a greater imitation of the divine image than the human form is. It is manifest also, that the archetypal seal, which we call that world which is perceptible only to the intellect, must itself be the archetypal model, the idea of ideas, the Reason of God.”

Finally, Philo makes it absolutely clear that man is in the likeness of God not in respect to his body, but in respect to his creative intellect: “So then after all the other things, as has been said before, Moses says that man was made in the image and likeness of God. . . . And let no one think that he is able to judge of this likeness from the characters of the body: for neither is God a being with the form of a man, nor is the human body like the form of God; but the resemblance is spoken of with reference to the most important part of the soul, namely, the mind: for the mind which exists in each individual has been created after the likeness of that one mind which is in the universe as its primitive model . . .”

If one wants to understand the mind and soul of the powerful moral intellect of Lyndon LaRouche, one should get this book and study it.

—Sander P. Fredman

In Search of Ideas To Save China

For those searching for an alternative for China, the history of the immediate past deserves special attention.

There are two consecutive and lengthy dynasties stretching from the middle of the Fourteenth Century to the early Twentieth that left us a weak, decadent, and divided China. The first of these dynasties, the Ming (1368-1644), was marked by the restoration of traditional institutions, as advocated by some formal Confucians; the succeeding one, the Qing or Ch’ing (1644-1911), which was the last imperial dynasty, was ruled by the Tungusic people of Manchuria who conquered China and ruled for almost three hundred years.

Both imperial monarchies, at least at the beginnings of their rule, expanded the Chinese Middle Kingdom broadly. However, it is of interest to compare the two, because in the early Qing, ruled by the emperor Kang Xi and his million Manchurians, China revived its Confucian moral and philosophical teachings among the elites, and China even learned Western sciences, and 300,000 people, including government ministers, at one point, converted to Christianity; whereas, the early Ming emperor Zhu Di, aided by his many eunuch and Taoist advisers—and often against the will of the few existing Confucian scholars—over taxed his subjects in order to build the monumental Forbidden City, to wage five major expeditions against the Mongols, to consume Korean “comfort women” by the hundreds, and to send gigantic fleets out into the world.

Another striking fact is that in the pivotal period of the transition—when the Qing replaced the Ming—Jesuit missionaries came from afar with sciences. They couldn’t save the country, but they taught Kang Xi to read Latin, they translated Western mathematics texts into Chinese, they built advanced observatories for the imperial court, and they reported what they saw in China.