uncommonly well-connected into the heart of the Queen’s household through her Whitney-family bedchamber ties.

No need here to go through all the details. Get ahold of the book, and I’m sure you’ll follow along quite happily.

But, take a moment on the broader matter. Elizabeth’s “Moor” is known to this day as the “founder” of the British Secret Intelligence Service. What a genesis is here portrayed? What unnatural coupling could ever have produced such a monstrous brood of whelps?

Well, Nicholl gives us half the story, the blackmail, the forgeries, the slanders, the frame-ups, the murders, and the under-legal-cover executions. Want an enemy removed? Have Walsingham’s secretary Thomas Philipps forge some incriminating correspondence, and plant it on him. So exits Mary Queen of Scots. And all of the others who were in any way involved in the matter of the succession to Elizabeth.

Clear it is that Marlowe was bound up in all this, knowing matters that others wished he didn’t.

Unclear, unasked, is the matter of for whom Elizabeth’s Moor worked. No difficulty—with 20/20 hindsight—to say that, like his namesake Shakespeare’s Othello, he was Venice’s Moor, doing Venice’s dirty work.

That oversight can be readily forgiven once the digging that went into ending the “bar-room brawl” cover-up is appreciated.

And, with the blood of the Lockerbie passengers, Alfred Herrhausen, Jurgen Ponto, Aldo Moro, John F. Kennedy, still crying from the streets and sidewalks for justice, it is worth asking once again, how, now, four-hundred years later, oaths of loyalty to the British crown, and life-long secrecy, still provide the wraps which enshroud the grisliest of crimes.

—Christopher White

The Uses of History

We study history to make the world better. This is the maxim of Schiller’s celebrated Universal History, and of Condorcet’s: History is the history of human progress. Thus, writing history presupposes both a moral purpose, and an intelligible (i.e., causal) representation of the subject matter; and these aims should be the motivation of those who write it, as we use their work to make history ourselves.

In our time, and with his usual profound simplicity, Lyndon LaRouche has distinguished as key yardsticks for the intelligible representation of history, the study of demography (i.e., the parameters of the human population) and physical economy (which, by subsuming scientific development under the category of technology, shows us how the human population reproduces itself materially through its spiritual activity).

Unfortunately, the history of Rome has often been written for a different, perverse purpose: to guide the oligarchic administration of empire. Such was the case of the British Lord Shelburne’s journalist scribbler Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, and of the Rockefeller-Harriman eugenicist coterie’s opus, Tenney Frank’s 1935, five-volume Economic Survey of Ancient Rome. And thus today, at the endpoint collapse of the Twentieth Century, the Roman example is dredged up by such touted think-tankers as Jean-Christophe Ruffin in his The Empire and the New Barbarians. And certainly, all the elements of comparison are present: systemic economic disintegration, continuous warfare in the hinterlands, population crisis, plagues, and the vast social dislocations and population migrations they engender.

It is against this background that these two useful specialist studies in the Johns Hopkins “Ancient Society and History” series should be read. Both books present elements which may be used to assemble an intelligible representation of the Roman Empire’s decline, from which we may draw our own moral assessments. Whether the authors understand history, or prepare us to make history ourselves, is another matter.

Demography

Tim Parkin’s Demography and Roman Society began as the author’s doctoral
research at Oxford. His short treatise is a model of clarity, providing both a primer in demographic concepts, and an extensive current survey/summary of the relevant scholarly literature on Roman population and society. Part I ("Ancient Evidence") reviews and exposes the assumptions inherent in the treatment of the various sorts of prima-
ery evidentiary data, hence questioning the validity of previous population mod-
els; Part II is his demography primer, to which are attached the life-tables and figures he believes to be his own con-
tribution to the subject; and in Part III, Parkin presents his conclusions.

Any student of Roman society—that is, of both the Republic and the Empire—learns at the outset what the Romans knew themselves: that their population was in a continual state of collapse, below replacement levels, and that it was shored up by immigration of both freemen and slaves from the less-
developed outskirts of its territory to the metropolitan centers of Italy, most emphatically to the great city of Rome itself; and that when the territorial expansion that allowed for this transfer of population ended, the system entered a slow but irreversible autocannibal-
ization we call "the decline and fall of the Roman Empire." Thus, notwithstanding Parkin’s student exercise in debunk-
ing the methods used to interpret the limited primary data available to us, no effort to produce a quantitative histori-
cal model, Parkin’s included, disputes this general impression. As Parkin writes, "[T]he consensus of scholarly opinion . . . has been that the overall population of the empire was in decline from the late second century A.D. . . . [T]he crisis . . . [led] to the state enforcement of labor . . . ." (The state enforcement of labor referred to here, was the establishment of universal fascism by the Codes of the emperors Dio-
cletian and his successor Theodosius, who responded to the manpower col-
apse by forcing hereditary employment and outlawing any form of scientific development in the technologies of agри-
culture and production, thus creating the virtual slavery of serfdom which was the backbone of the subsequent feudal economy that reduced the vast majority of Europe’s population to the status of cattle until the emergence of the nation-state in the Renaissance.) Parkin continues, however, "The cause of manpower shortages and of depopulation is another question again. . . . [T]he relationship between the economic and demographic realities, presuming that there was such a relationship [emphasis added], is difficult to judge."

Because Parkin knows nothing of the fundamental relationships of population and physical economy—and therefore of the lawfulness in the correlation between renaissances of human civilization and periods of rapidly expanding population—he not surpris-
ingly falls back upon that popularizing ideologue of recently restored credibility among the politically correct cheerleaders of one-world government, the malevolent Parson Malthus, as he con-
cludes: "Thomas Malthus . . . developed a theory that saw preindustrial populations as growing only until they reached the maximum number possible as dictated by economic factors. . . . [I]t is certainly something that needs to be taken into account . . . ."

Social Characteristics

Notwithstanding Parkin’s failure to treat the “economic factors” which determine population development, he does summarize a useful and accurate picture of the governing ideology of the oligarchic, “bread and circuses” society which was Rome, as when he concludes that "a general mentality advocating the advantages of bachelorhood and child-
lessness seems to underlie [the decline in fertility], a mentality that was put into effect consciously through practices of abortion and exposure, and to some extent contraception . . . ." or that "the small size of families cannot be explained by mortality rates alone, but also by the limiting of fertility both by intention and circumstances: . . . not only contraception, abortion, and exposure and infanticide as part of an appar-
ent aversion to marriage and child rearing, but also natural sterility. Other social factors, such as homosexuality and extramarital relationships, may also have had a part to play."

Thus, although he does not trace the Romans’ hedonistic ideology to the loot-
ing economy which made human life in Rome a brief, inconsequential, and meaningless experience, Parkin—living as he does at a similar moment of social deterioration—has the good sense to recognize the signs of “aversion to mat-
imony and childrearing . . . homosexuality . . . extramarital relations” that infect any society vectored away from the task of improving mankind’s condition of life, which task gives meaning and scientific necessity to the role of the family in nurturing the human potential needed for this undertaking. But because Parkin pulls back from draw-
ing the comparison with our own age—so far as capitulating, in fact, to removing mention of the issue of homosexuality from his ultimate summary conclu-
sions, no doubt for fear of the wrath of the politically correct—his efforts leave us not with history, but with the data from which history is to be assembled.

It is worth noting, however, that Parkin rightly identifies fertility as having a mere secondary effect on popula-
tion development, subsidiary to that of mortality. This is extremely important in today’s so-called population debate, because efforts to reduce the rate of pop-
ulation expansion can succeed, not as a result of a decrease in the secondary effect (fertility), but only as a conse-
quence of an increase in the primary factor, namely, mortality; that is, more people have to die faster. Thus, Nazi-like policies of euthanasia, death camps, and genocide through disease, war, and social dislocation—and not condoms— are the absolutely required tools for population control, as is well understood by today’s depopulators [see Lyndon LaRouche, “How Bertrand Russell Became an Evil Man,” this issue].

The Roman Limes

The Johns Hopkins Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study by C.R. Whittaker is not the work of a begin-
ing, but of an experienced scholar. It represents a mature synthesis of an enormous range of detailed historical and archaeo-
logical investigation of the local-area con-
ditions at the boundary territories between the Roman Empire proper and the peo-
ple who lay beyond this dividing line
between “civilization” and the “barbarians.” It arrives, again perhaps not accidentally, at precisely the moment when ideological popularizers have begun to reach back to Roman history for a model of relations between the “advanced” (read Europe-North America) and “underdeveloped” (read Third World) sectors. Their ideological thesis is succinctly summarized by the title of Ruffin’s tract: The Empire and the New Barbarians: North-South Rupture, and the issues clearly intersect those of population demography, both ancient and contemporary.

Whittaker’s study is useful in this context not for its fine points, which no doubt represent for the author the fruit of his exhaustive research, but for the overall model of the economic and social process of the Roman Empire which underlies his essential thesis. For Whittaker demonstrates that the Roman frontier (limes) was never conceived of by the Romans solely as a defensive boundary thrown up to isolate Roman territory from the marauding external populations, but rather, that it represented a zone of mutual trade, economic activity, and acculturation, in which the external populations benefited from and relied upon the level of material culture and governance transmitted by the slave-based Roman Empire from the high-point of the Classical Mediterranean culture bequeathed by the Golden Age of Greece; and that the so-called “barbarian invasions” were not, by and large, invasions at all, but the slow and desirable resettlement of external peoples into the territories abandoned by the Romans owing to the shrinking of the Roman population. Thus, for Whittaker, the “fall of Rome” resulted not from external pressure, but from internal decay—precisely the opposite picture to that of Ruffin et al., who fear the “hordes” of the Third World without realizing that it is the collapse of their own advanced sector economies and society, and hence of the great project of global development, which has made the rest of the world appear to them as threatening “new barbarians.”

The Frontier Zone

Whittaker points out that the historiography of the Roman frontiers was shaped by the empires of the Nineteenth Century: “[W]e must have some awareness of the influence of imperialism on British writing . . . C.C. Davies, author of the classic Indian [emphasis added] study in the 1930’s . . . found it proper to pronounce his verdict on Rome. ‘Rome fell,’ he said, ‘because her dykes were not strong enough to hold back the flood of barbarian inroads.’ ”

For Whittaker, rather, “[t]he myth of frontiers as iron curtains must be abandoned.” In its place, Whittaker presents a picture of the limes as a “process of acculturation”; as he says, “[O]verall, and on every frontier, there developed increasing social and economic ties between trans- and cis-frontier populations . . . [T]hey resembled each other more than they did their own upper classes. . . . [I]n the end it was unclear who were the barbarians and who were the Romans.”

It is in its portrayal of the process of population migration to resettle abandoned territories that Frontiers of the Roman Empire is especially useful. As Whittaker points out, “The Romans had encouraged immigration as a political tactic over a long period of history; settlement, that is, of border peoples within the empire . . . .” Whittaker reviews the extensive enlistment of Goths, for example, in the army, as arising from Roman policy shifts toward the manning of the frontier fortifications, shifts which were driven by Rome’s inability to supply adequate manpower to maintain the troop strength of the legions. The picture of the ultimate resettlement of deserted areas is clear: “[H]uge numbers were moving across and settling in the Roman Empire under negotiated terms in the fourth century along the Rhine and Danube. . . . at a guess well over one million foreigners along a frontier of some ten thousand kilometers.”

As an economic study, however, Frontiers of the Roman Empire is wholly inadequate, as its author appears to be ignorant of economics as the study of society’s self-reproduction of its material existence—that is, the study of physical economy. His familiarity with economic processes goes no farther than local trading relationships, or an occasional allusion to “marginal utility theory” as it pertains to agricultural cultivation. Like his colleague Tim Parkin, Mr. Whittaker suspects that “economic factors” are at work at the Roman frontier; but his insistence on examining phenomena in the small rules out, from the get-go, any means of addressing the operation of the economy of the empire as a whole, which was determining the process of territorial depopulation and abandonment assumed in his analysis. But it is precisely there, in the overall organization of the slave-based agricultural economy of Rome, and the usurious looting policies of the Roman imperium which taxed the agricultural base out of existence, that the history of the process of the “fall of the Roman empire” must be located. Because Whittaker never addresses the engine that drove the frontier developments, we are left again to assemble history out of the data which he presents to us.

Moral Assessments

If we look to the study of Rome for insight into today’s world crisis, we will certainly find it; but the picture we assemble is opposite to that of the depopulators and scribblers of the Ruffin variety. The Roman Empire—the “advanced sector” of its time—suffered a continuous and catastrophic population collapse, which led ultimately to the collapse of the empire itself. European civilization entered a dark age, from which the world recovered only a thousand years later by way of the Golden Renaissance.

These two books help fill out the details of this picture, although we cannot call them history in a scientific sense. They can be usefully contrasted to “Ethical and Pastoral Dimensions of Population Trends,” a short but condensed study recently issued by the Pontifical Council for the Family in preparation-response to the upcoming United Nations Cairo population conference. In this study of contemporary global population trends—growth in the Third World, collapse in the advanced sector—and their social ramifications, we find a better and more profound method of analysis to be applied to
Rome, than is to be found in the works of these academic historians. In its insistence that a full and truthful picture be assembled, this short study shines forth, like the works of Schiller and LaRouche, as a call to action in defense of the common interest of all mankind, at a moment when the world stands poised for the imposition of universal fascism on a scale beyond the imaginings of Diocletian and his epigoni.

—Ken Kronberg

Shall We Get To Mars?

This exciting book spans the twentieth century—that century in which mankind took the giant step into space and then retreated.

Hermann Julius Oberth was born on June 25, 1894. Certainly, America’s Robert Goddard and the Russian scientist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky also envisaged the possibility of space travel, but it is to Oberth that we owe the greatest debt. His was the vision of manned space flight which led us directly to the moon.

In 1957, Oberth wrote Man into Space, which expressed the goal of his entire life: “To make available for life every place where life is possible. To make inhabitable all worlds as yet uninhabitable, and all life purposeful.” He lived to witness the Apollo moon landing.

Oberth was the teacher of the generation of German scientists who actually made space travel practicable. Best known to Americans from among these is, of course, Werner von Braun, whom Mrs. Freeman describes, not inappropriately, as the “Columbus of Space.”

From 1960 to 1970, von Braun was the director of the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, where the Saturn V moon rocket was created. Without him, President Kennedy’s grand design to land an American on the moon in the space of only one decade, would have been a noble but empty dream.

Von Braun’s vision reached to Mars, and indeed, as early as 1953, he was trying to awaken Americans to the possibilities of flight to that planet.

By the 1970’s this dream was turning into an American nightmare. This was the era of the counter-culture, which fostered the rise of a rabidly anti-science mob. Environmentalists used the tactics of terrorists to sabotage nuclear development. Rather than man taking his rightful place in the stars, the refrain was sounded that man did not even belong on Earth, because he was displacing animals from their natural habitats.

For Oberg, Von Braun, and their younger associate Krafft Ehricke, the turn toward cultural pessimism in the United States could only bring back unhappy memories of the Nazi period in their native Germany. Cultural pessimism was something to be fought.

In 1982, Krafft Ehricke wrote The Extraterrestrial Imperative, yet to be published, which is a stirring affirmation of Western civilization. Ehricke directly counterposed space exploration to the evil of Malthusianism, and attacked the Global 2000 report, which pretended to give scientific arguments why an increasing population could not be sustained on the biosphere. Ehricke wrote: “The Global 2000 report, a warmed-over version of the original limits-to-growth nonsense, contains outright misinformation and, like its infamous predecessor, totally ignores the human capacity for limitless growth. Growth, in contrast to multiplication, is the increase in knowledge, in wisdom, in the capacity to grow in new ways.”

At a 1985 Schiller Institute conference honoring Krafft Ehricke, Schiller Institute Chairman Helga Zepp-LaRouche opened the conference with a very stirring tribute: Krafft Ehricke, she said, “was convinced, and so am I, that only through space travel, only when man lifts his eyes away from the Earth, looks into the stars and actually thinks what his role can be, can he achieve what Schiller called the dignity of men. And only if we start to think about space, and the colonization of space, will the Age of Reason that the great humanists of European civilization were thinking of accomplishing be possible. That was the belief of Schiller, that was the belief of Krafft Ehricke: the fact that man is capable of reason even under the most horrible of crises.”

Freeman quotes these words, and then writes a short epilogue to her book in which she asks the poignant question: “Where would we be today if we had adopted and followed the space exploration schedule put forward by the German space pioneers during the past fifty years?”

Clearly we could be seeing an era of abundance, in which there might be an industrial colony on the moon and man would already have landed on Mars. We would have seen a new industrial revolution, but best of all, cultural optimism would be recognized as the birthright of all young people. To quote the last line of this important new book, “This was the goal of the German space pioneers—to make all worlds habitable, to disprove that there are limits to growth, and to open the Age of Reason. Although there have been decades of lost time, it is not too late.”

—Carol White