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FIDELIO

"It is through beauty that one proceeds to freedom."
—Friedrich Schiller

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On the Cover
Rembrandt van Rijn, Aristotle with a Bust of Homer (1653). (See inside back cover for analysis. [Cover photo: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Purchased with special funds and gifts of friends of the Museum, 1961. 61. 198])

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The Duty of Human Solidarity

As we enter 1993, the world is overwhelmed with human misery, the unnecessary product of man's inhumanity to his fellow man.

The planet continues to spiral deeper into economic depression, because those who dictate financial policy would prefer to salvage a bankrupt financial system at the expense of human life, rather than subordinate that system to the purpose of serving mankind. In Africa, after decades of subjugation to looting by the I.M.F., millions are threatened with death due to starvation, disease, and war, unless we can transform the emergency relief effort in Somalia—which some would use as a pretext for further extending their neocolonialist vision of a “New World Order”—into a long-term solution based upon the economic development of the whole continent. Meanwhile, in Europe, the Serbian military commits genocide with impunity against the people of Bosnia.

Despite this sobering picture, which one could unfortunately elaborate with examples from every corner of the world, the Schiller Institute succeeded during 1992 in launching a global Civil Rights movement devoted to returning our world to harmony with divine and natural law, based upon the principle of love or solidarity. As reported in this issue of *Fidelio*, by the end of last year the worldwide Coalition for Peace through Development found institutional expression on several fronts. In Ibero-America, the Movement for Ibero-American Solidarity (MSIA) was formed in Mexico in May; the Movement for National Identity and Ibero-American Integration, in Argentina in October; and the Center for Ibero-American Studies and Solidarity, in Anopolis, Brazil in November. In Germany, a new political movement—Civil Rights Movement Solidarity—was also launched in November. And lastly, in this issue of *Fidelio*, we print the call for a Student Non-violent Constitutional Committee.

The ecumenical concepts which both bind these new institutions together and define their policies and practice, are twofold. First, these institutions maintain that all men and women are created in the living image of God (*imago viva Dei*). Second, they insist that it is incumbent upon each one of us to express his religious faith through “works of charity”; for, as in the words of St. James, “faith without works is dead.”

The principle of solidarity is a reflection of the Commandments to love God and our neighbor. It dictates that we must love our enemy, and that we must strive to conquer evil with good, as these injunctions are expressed in Christ’s *Sermon on the Mount*. That is the reason why, although the use of violence may be permitted as a last resort, as in the case of a just war, non-violence is “more conformable to moral principles,” in the words of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger.

Although the term solidarity has been used in many ways, the meaning used here is that of the Christian notion of social charity. For example, in his encyclical *Populum Progressio* issued in 1967, Pope Paul VI identified the moral obligation of the industrialized nations “to help develop the developing countries” as the “duty of human solidarity.” We second the teaching of Paul VI, that peace on earth can only be achieved through the development of all humanity in the spirit of universal charity.

Now of course this notion, that there is only one human race, that the goods given us by God are meant for all, and that relations among individuals and peoples should be based on love, is not the view prevalent either in our own nation or the world today. In his article entitled “Why Albert Pike’s Statue Must Fall: The Scottish Rite’s Ku Klux Klan Project,” Anton Chaitkin reveals the role played by Confederate General Albert Pike, who was the Sovereign Grand Commander of the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry Southern Jurisdiction, in founding the KKK. The fact that a monument to Pike stands promi-
nently in Judiciary Square in Washington, D.C.,
go a long way to explaining the lack of solidarity
in the institutions and people of the United States
today. If we are to end racism and restore this coun-
try to the constitutional principles of its Founding
Fathers, a necessary first step is to educate and mobilize
the population to demand that this tribute to Confed-
erate justice be removed.

One of the main obstacles to establishing social
justice based upon the principle of solidarity is
the fact that, especially since the French Enlighten-
ment, the idea that religious faith and scientific reason
are in opposition to one another has become increas-
ingly accepted. The divorce of science from
religion has been to the detriment of both. Science
without the Creator has degenerated into a mate-
rivalism which is necessarily unscientific, and
religion without science has tended increasingly
towards fundamentalist irrationalism.

In an article entitled “Why St. Thomas Aquinas
Is Not an Aristotelian,” William F. Wertz, Jr.
challenges the commonly held view that
St. Thomas was an Aristotelian, and in so doing dem-
strates that Aquinas, in the tradition of
St. Augustine, adopted Plato’s most crucial con-
cepts of the creation of the universe based upon
eternal ideas, and the participation in God of all His
creation—the very concepts of Plato which Aris-
totle rejected. As a result, Aquinas’ theology,
which is traditionally held in high esteem in the
Church, is coherent with the development of
modern science by such giants as Nicolaus of Cusa,
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Georg Cantor.

The major feature in this issue, “On the Subject
of God,” by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., is the third
article of a trilogy by the author to appear in
Fidelio. The preceding articles are “On the Subject
of Metaphor” (Vol. I, No. 3) and “Mozart’s 1782-1786
Revolution in Music” (Vol. I, No. 4).

In this essay, LaRouche rebuts the pseudoscient-
fic arguments of Oxford University Professor
of Biology Richard Dawkins, who recently
announced that faith in God is analogous to a com-
puter virus, and that evolutionary theory has
removed any scientific basis for arguing the exis-
tence of God. In refuting Dawkins, LaRouche
restates the Classical proofs of Plato and Leibniz of
the existence of God, from the standpoint of Georg
Cantor’s concept of the transfinite.

LaRouche shows that belief in God is not a capri-
cious act of arbitrary blind faith. As he says, “It is the
intelligibility of the Creator’s work, as this is acces-
sible to us within the inferior domain of Plato’s Becoming,
and Cantor’s Transfinite, which is the intelligible
basis for morality, and also the intelligible elemen-
tary basis for faith in the ontological existence of
the Creator.” LaRouche argues that the negentropic,
evolutionary development of the human species, espe-
cially as reflected in the advancement of humanity’s
potential population-density through scientific
and technological progress, is itself a negative proof
of the existence of an absolutely infinite God. If man is
able to use his capacity for creative reason—which
man has insofar as he is imago viva Dei—to change
the universe in the direction of the good, then, con-
trary to Aristotle, man participates in God. As
LaRouche stresses: “Through knowing this connec-
tion, we have access to certainty respecting the efficient
existence of God as the higher species of universal
personality which bounds and subsumes both our
universe and ourselves individually.”

LaRouche concludes (speaking of the I.M.F.
financial oligarchs who fancy themselves the new
“gods of Olympus”): “Aeschylus’ Prometheus
warns that there is a real God who will work justice
upon both Olympian pretenders and on behalf of
mankind. I am certain that Aeschylus’ Prometheus is
a true prophet; we shall have an end of Olympus’
tyranny soon, and that by aid of God’s own agent,
the imago viva Dei acting within men and women.”
That is the duty of human solidarity.
Why Albert Pike’s Statue Must Fall
The Scottish Rite’s Ku Klux Klan Project
by Anton Chaitkin

In the heart of Washington, D.C., in Judiciary Square, there is a large statue and monument honoring the most important founder of the Ku Klux Klan, Confederate General Albert Pike.

Inscribed on the base of the statue are the words, “poet”—the terrorist anthem of the KKK was his most famous literary work—and “jurist”—he was called the KKK’s chief judiciary officer, and reputedly wrote the organization manual for the terrorist anti-black movement after the U.S. Civil War.

The statue is a tribute to the influence of Pike’s organization. It has power in the Executive Branch, and the Congress, and it is decisive in the courts.

Do I mean that the Ku Klux Klan has such sway over the government? No, I’m speaking here of the “Scottish Rite of Freemasonry Southern Jurisdiction,” of which Pike was the chief, or “Sovereign Grand Commander.”

The Ku Klux Klan, the Southern Confederacy, and the pre-Civil War secession movement were a single, continuous project, with Pike’s “Scottish Rite” at its center. Though the Confederacy was defeated, this project still dominates U.S. political life.

Freemasonry was founded in the early 1700’s in England by the so-called Venetian Party. The Scottish Rite was formally organized in the United States in 1801 by a group of Tory partisans on the losing side of the American Revolution; it came to rule over American Freemasonry during the nineteenth century.

American colonial leaders had used the British Empire’s Freemasonic lodges as political clubs, and had turned them against the British Crown in the American Revolution. But in the 1820’s and 1830’s, Masonry had been widely condemned and virtually run out of the U.S. as a would-be dictatorial grouping.

With British assistance, the Masonic lodges were reintroduced, under the control of the Scottish Rite based in Charleston, South Carolina, as a force for Southern...
secession. Thus, since the 1840's, the U.S. Freemasonic structure has been strictly dominated by the Scottish Rite. The Scottish Rite dispenses the fourth and higher Masonic “degrees” of initiation, up to the thirty-third. The Scottish Rite was divided into a Southern Jurisdiction, and a Northern Jurisdiction based in Boston, that remains politically subordinate.

The influence of Scottish Rite-dominated Freemasonry is shockingly pervasive in American government and culture, particularly in the South. But it has come under attack from some surprising quarters.

The Southern Baptist Convention recently voted to conduct an investigation of Freemasonry in all forms, and to prepare a report on whether Masonry is compatible with Christianity.

At their annual meeting last June in Indianapolis, the Baptists also adopted a resolution against secret societies, which reads in part: “we . . . call upon all Christians to . . . [avoid] any association which conflicts with clear Biblical . . . teachings concerning the taking of oaths, the secrecy of activities, mystical knowledge, or racial discrimination . . . .”

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The 2.5 million member Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod says in its official Handbook: “The Synod has declared itself firmly opposed to all societies, lodges and organizations of an un-Christian or anti-Christian character.” The Southern Baptist Convention has also adopted a resolution against secret societies, which reads in part: “we . . . call upon all Christians to . . . [avoid] any association which conflicts with clear Biblical . . . teachings concerning the taking of oaths, the secrecy of activities, mystical knowledge, or racial discrimination . . . .”

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There are excellent reasons for this apparent race discrimination which only a Mason can fully understand . . . [racial integration] would endanger the harmony of the lodge . . . . Secondly, although Negroes today may technically fulfill the Masonic requirement of being “free,” their subordinate economic, educational, and cultural position is such that they hardly fulfill the spirit of that prerequisite to initiation.

‘The True Religion of Masonry’

But let us ask, does Mr. Pike’s organization have an “un-Christian or anti-Christian character”? Albert Pike responded in 1861 to a Mason who tried to claim the Scottish Rite was somehow Christian. Pike said that if the Scottish Rite “had a Christian basis, how did it chance that most of those who had possession of it in this country from 1763 to 1800 were Hebrews?”

For in fact, Pike and the Scottish Rite had borrowed a good deal of numerology and other superstition from the Cabbalah, the occult Jewish writings directly opposed to the Mosaic traditions of Judaism.

But if the Rite is not specifically Christian, is it anti-Christian? We may judge this from Sovereign Grand Commander Pike’s words, on his method, and on the true religion. In Pike’s book, Morals and Dogma, he explains his method:

Magic is the science of the ancient magi . . . . Magic unites in one and the same science, whatsoever Philosophy can possess that is most certain, and Religion of the Infallible and the Eternal. It perfectly . . . reconciles these two terms . . . faith and reason . . . . [T] hose who accept [magic] as a rule may give their will a sovereign power that will make them the masters of all inferior beings and of all errant spirits; that is to say, will make them the Arbiters and Kings of the World . . . .

Thus, Pike is an illusionist, a conjurer. But what is the underlying belief? In France in 1889, Pike said:

That which we must say to the crowd is, we worship a God, but it is the God one adores without superstition . . . . The Masonic religion should be, by all of us initiates of the high degrees, maintained in the purity

Gang leaders of British Freemasonry’s U.S. terror project: Left: Confederate General Albert Pike, in Masonic garb. Above (left to right): Mississippi governor John Quitman; New York Democratic Party boss August Belmont; Confederate Secretary of State Judah Benjamin; Louisiana Senator John Slidell. Pike, Benjamin, and Slidell were all Confederate leaders.
of the Luciferian Doctrine. If Lucifer were not God, would Adonay (the God of the Christians)—whose deeds prove his cruelty, perfidy and hatred of man, barbarism and repulsion to science—would Adonay and his priests calumniate him?

Yes, Lucifer is God, and unfortunately Adonay is also God. For the eternal law is that there is no light without shade, no beauty without ugliness, no white without black, for the absolute can only exist as two Gods. . . . Thus, the doctrine of Satanism is a heresy; and the true and pure philosophical religion is the belief in Lucifer, the equal of Adonay; but Lucifer, God of Light and God of Good, is struggling for humanity against Adonay, the God of Darkness and Evil.

The Terror Project

The Scottish Rite of Freemasonry, an instrument of British Empire strategy, directed a continuous offensive of murder and racist terrorism against the United States and neighboring countries, during the middle decades of the last century. We shall trace this endeavor, from the U.S. occupation of Mexico in the Mexican War (1846-48), to the slaveowners' rebellion or U.S. Civil War (1861-65), through the Ku Klux Klan's war against Reconstruction of the South (1867-1870's).

A few individuals will come into view repeatedly as gang leaders and project directors: Boston's Albert Pike, boss of Arkansas; New York's John A. Quitman, boss of Mississippi; New York's John Slidell, boss of Louisiana; Slide's nephew and partner, British banker August Belmont, boss of the Democratic Party; Slide's trainee and partner, Britain's Judah Benjamin, boss of the Confederate secret service.

Patriots such as then-Congressman Abraham Lincoln saw the 1846 U.S. invasion of Mexico as a crime and folly, pushed by strategists of slavery who also aimed at the destruction of the United States. Transplanted Southern Democrat John Slidell, and Whig leader Caleb Cushing, spokesman for Boston's opium and slave-running fortunes, had both planned and promoted the attack on Mexico.

As that first U.S. war of aggression drew to a close, volunteer General John A. Quitman became the military governor and dictator over Mexico City. The United States prepared to seize Mexico's northern territory, the area from California to Texas. Yet Quitman proposed to President Polk a plan for the forcible annexation of all Mexico, to be an area for Negro slave plantations.

During the peace negotiations, Quitman travelled as a conquering hero to Charleston, South Carolina. He was crowned a Sovereign Grand Inspector General of the Scottish Rite, and became the most powerful and prominent member of the Rite's Supreme Council.

John Quitman's grandfather was governor of the island of Curacao, the Dutch West India Company's slave concentration camp; his parents had fled the Caribbean slave revolts, taking their slaves with them to New York where John was born. In 1830, young Quitman had been formally commissioned by the Scottish Rite, leaders of the secession movement, to establish their organization in the state of Mississippi.

In the autumn of 1849, General Quitman held a meeting of anti-Union operatives from throughout the South. They resolved to call a formal convention of the Southern states for the following June, to begin the breakup of the United States.

Quitman became governor of Mississippi in January 1850, and his Nashville secession convention met from June 3 to 12. Delegates from nine states proclaimed the rights of slaveholders. Quitman proposed to lead a private army from Texas, to conquer the new U.S. territory of New Mexico on behalf of slavery.

President Zachary Taylor faced Quitman down. President Taylor was determined to bring the new southwest into the Union as free states. On June 21, 1850, nine days after the secession convention, Governor Quitman was indicted by a federal grand jury for violating the U.S. Neutrality Laws!

The charge was based on Quitman's leadership of a well-financed conspiracy to invade and "liberate" Cuba from Spanish rule. Then, two weeks later, on July 3, President Taylor threatened to hang those "taken in rebellion against the Union." The next day the President fell ill, vomited blackish material, and died soon after. The Quitman prosecution was delayed.

The following summer, 1851, Quitman brought fellow Mississippian Jefferson Davis to Massachusetts to meet with Caleb Cushing. They picked the man to be nominated by the Democrats for the U.S. presidency: volunteer General Franklin Pierce, a member of their clique in the Mexican War. Pierce surprised everyone by taking the nomination at the convention. Then, August Belmont, the U.S. representative of Britain's Rothschild banks, paid for Pierce's 1852 election campaign.

Pierce was elected the fourteenth President, and his foreign and domestic backers took over. Caleb Cushing became Attorney General. Jefferson Davis became Secretary of War. Banker August Belmont became Ambassador to Holland.

Scottish Rite chief John Quitman was now ready for serious business. Some months earlier, when he had finally gone to trial, he was fortunate that Louisiana private attorney Judah Benjamin had been especially
hired by the federal government to run the prosecution against him. The jury was hung, and the charges were dropped. This outcome should not be too surprising to us, given prosecutor Benjamin's own growing role in the faction of which Gen. Quitman was then the shining star. Benjamin joined Slidell as a U.S. senator from Louisiana at the next election, and later became a top leader of the slaveowners' insurrectionary government.

Let's look for a minute at the trio of Slidell, Belmont, and Benjamin. Slidell had a master's degree in political dirty tricks, learned as a member of Aaron Burr's machine in New York and Louisiana. Slidell had politically schooled Belmont and had brought him into the Democratic Party, and Belmont married Slidell's niece. Slidell had also virtually adopted, taught, and brought into politics the young Judah Benjamin, a British West Indian Jew living in Louisiana. Both Belmont, and his banking client Benjamin, were passionate backers of the expansion of slavery into Latin America.

When he was a young private secretary for the Rothschild family, Belmont had toured continental Europe doing financial and political intelligence work for the Rothschild bank, a pillar of the British royal family. With Britain meddling in Spain’s civil war, the Rothschilds had sent Belmont off to the Spanish colony of Cuba in 1837 to “take charge of Rothschild interests” there. Belmont’s ship stopped over in New York and he never went on to Cuba, but his subsequent U.S. banking and political career was often focused on Cuba’s wealth and strategic location.

Following the 1853 presidential inauguration of their candidate Pierce, Scottish Rite chief John Quitman and his New York financiers signed a formal agreement making Quitman the “civil and military chief of the revolution” which they would impose on Cuba. Quitman’s criminal enterprise recruited as many as 50,000 American mercenaries for the intended invasion. But the Spanish authorities brought these plans to grief. They emancipated most of Cuba’s slaves, encouraged racial intermarriage, armed the freed blacks, and recruited them into a militia through which they could defend their own freedom from the “gringo” attackers. The Spanish governor arrested Quitman’s intriguer, Captain James D. Bulloch, when Bulloch brought his ship, the Black Warrior, into Havana.

Senator John Slidell of Louisiana demanded that U.S. neutrality laws be repealed. Attorney General Caleb Cushing called for a naval blockade around Cuba. But
The "Golden Circle" was to be a new slave empire centered in Cuba (map left). Slidell, Cushing, and Quitman agitated for a Cuban invasion in the 1850's. Teddy Roosevelt finally delivered it in the 1898 Spanish-American War (bottom, right). Below: Slaves work a Cuban sugar plantation.

Quitman was placed under legal restraint.

After the Black Warrior affair, the Quitman mercenary force was absorbed into a new, more aggressive movement with enlarged aims. The Knights of the Golden Circle appeared first in Cincinnati, under the supervision of the Scottish Rite's midwest organizer Killian Van Rensselaer. From there the Knights spread throughout Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, down the Mississippi south to the Gulf of Mexico, and into Maryland and Virginia.

The Golden Circle was to be a new slave empire centered in Cuba. It would break up the United States and conquer Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. The Knights armed and drilled up to 100,000 men. They were organized into lodges called "castles." They were to kill the hated Catholic Hispanics, and fill their places with black slaves brought fresh from Africa.

Led by Quitman and his allies in the lower South, the Knights of the Golden Circle formed the heart of the secession military machine.

When John Quitman died in July 1858, Albert Pike was brought into the Supreme Council, where he was elevated to Commander of the Southern Jurisdiction in 1859. Joining Pike's new Supreme Council in 1859 was U.S. Vice President John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. He would soon run for President on a secession platform, his campaign managed by Caleb Cushing.

In March 1860, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Howell Cobb, also joined the Supreme Council. Cobb was a ruler of the Georgia Masonic mafia with Robert Toombs and James Bulloch. In December 1860, following Abraham Lincoln's election to the presidency, Cobb resigned his Treasury post. Two months later, he was president of the convention in Alabama which created the Confederate government and broke up the United States. Cobb's name appears at the top of signers of the Confederate Constitution, a document which Cobb and Albert Pike are supposed to have drafted together.

The Lost Cause

The rebellion of the Southern slaveowners was a British Empire-sponsored insurrection. For the final three years of the four-year Civil War, Judah P. Benjamin served as Confederate Secretary of State. Benjamin supervised the financial and supply relations to the British Empire and its ally, Napoleon III of France, and ran the Confederacy's international network of spies and saboteurs.

Benjamin's secret service liaison man in England and the Confederacy's chief arms procurer there was James Bulloch, the man arrested in Cuba in 1854.
John Slidell became the famous Confederate commissioner to France, where he married off his daughter Mathilde to Baron Emil Erlanger. The baron was an eminent German-French Jewish banker, closely tied to the British government and the highest levels of British freemasonry. Slidell and Benjamin negotiated the famous Erlanger Loan, the series of Confederate war bonds floated by this banker.

John Slidell handled relations between the French Empire and the Masonic “filibusters,” the raiders of Latin America. Slidell promoted the joint European-Confederate invasion of Mexico in the 1860’s.

The Confederate secret service, meanwhile, attempted to weaken the resolve of the Union to carry on the war. The key to their strategy was the old Knights of the Golden Circle, still in place in the North, Midwest, and Southwest, involving pro-slavery whites—and American Indians.

Sioux Indians, strangely organized into military Masonic lodges, wiped out seven hundred citizens of New Ulm, Minnesota and the surrounding area, while the town’s young men were off in the Union Army. Albert Pike was at the time the Confederate general officially in charge of arranging Indian attacks against the Union; Minnesota was also part of Commander Pike’s Masonic Southern Jurisdiction.

Judah Benjamin based his main secret service group in Montreal, a safe haven since Canada was then still British territory. They coordinated across the border with Golden Circle networks in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin, and with the August Belmont Democratic Party machine in New York. Agents led by Jacob Thompson planned prison breaks, tried to burn down Northern cities, and instigated anti-draft riots.

This ugliness was in vain. But just when his nationalist monetary policies and our industrial strength overwhelmed the rebellion, President Lincoln was murdered. A dragnet went out for the Confederate secret service operators, accused of participation in the assassination. Albert Pike escaped and joined Jacob Thompson in Canada. Judah Benjamin fled to England, joining the exiled Robert Toombs and James Bulloch. John Slidell stayed permanently in France.

Confederate secret service agent John Surratt made it to Italy, while his mother was convicted and hanged on the charge of plotting with John Wilkes Booth to kill Lincoln. John Surratt was discovered and returned for trial. He was acquitted. But in 1870, Surratt admitted publicly that he had plotted with Booth to “abduct” Lincoln. He told of the days preceding the murder, of his trip to Montreal carrying money and messages from Judah Benjamin. The secret service bank in Montreal, where gold from Britain was deposited for Benjamin’s crew, was the same bank in which Lincoln’s assassin John Wilkes Booth had made his deposits six months before the killing.

The war was over. But the defeated Confederacy was transformed into the romantic Lost Cause, an object of cultish reverence.

**During Reconstruction**

Anti-slavery congressmen pressed ahead with plans for Reconstruction, designed to break up the power of what was called the “chivalry,” the feudalist lords of the pre-war South. In Tennessee, the pro-Union faction tried to increase its political strength by putting through a law, granting the right to vote to the newly freed blacks.

The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was a terrorist counterattack, beginning in Tennessee, designed to block Reconstruction and reverse the outcome of the Civil War. The Klan and the Scottish Rite were one and the same enterprise, continuing the imperial effort behind the slaveowners’ rebellion.

Pike, Benjamin, Slidell, Toombs, Bulloch, and Thompson were all in exile at war’s end. Although Judah Benjamin had quickly become a wealthy lawyer for the British merchant oligarchs, his continuing preoccupation with defeating Reconstruction is indicated in letters he wrote back to the U.S. with complaints such as these:

“I have always looked with the utmost dread and distrust on the experiment of emancipation so suddenly enforced on the South by the event of the war. God knows how it will all end!”; “the South is kept crushed under Negro rule”; “I can never consent to go to New Orleans and break my heart witnessing the rule of Negroes and carpetbaggers”; and, “nothing is so abhorrent to me as Radicalism which seeks to elevate the populace into the governing class.”

From his British sanctuary in Canada, on July 15, 1865, Albert Pike issued a summons to the Supreme Council, to resume the operations of the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry Southern Jurisdiction. Six weeks later, “under pressure from Masonic officials in the government,” the new President Andrew Johnson permitted Pike to re-enter the United States. The Rite was reborn over the next few years, as money and messengers went back and forth between Pike and the Confederacy’s sponsors in England.

In April 1866, a year after the murder of Abraham Lincoln, Albert Pike’s Supreme Council met in full costume inside the White House. There Lincoln’s successor, President Andrew Johnson, granted a pardon...
to Pike. The following year, the awed and grateful Johnson was advanced from the fourth through the thirty-second degrees by the Scottish Rite.

Albert Pike could not go home to Arkansas, however. He was still under indictment for treason by state authorities there, for inciting the Indians to break laws or treaties. So he settled in Memphis, Tennessee, becoming a newspaper publisher, lawyer—and ultimately, president of the Tennessee Bar Association.

Tennessee Blacks got the right to vote in February 1867. Beginning that spring, Albert Pike and a small group of Confederate generals held several meetings in Nashville, at the Maxwell House Hotel, to form the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.

The name was taken from the Greek word "kuklos," or "circle." It was no mystery to the pro-Unionists: The Knights of the [Golden] Circle had reappeared.

Pike was appointed chief judicial officer of the Invisible Empire. He is said to have written the Klan's military manual and ritual, and was the Klan's expert on secrecy of organization. At one of the later Nashville meetings, General Nathan Bedford Forrest was chosen Imperial Wizard of the Klan. Albert Pike organized the Ku Klux Klan in Arkansas after General Forrest appointed Pike the Grand Dragon of that Realm.

The Tennessee leaders of the Klan at the time of its founding were prominent Masons subordinate to Grand Commander Pike.

Pike's old comrade and financial backer Robert Toombs returned from England in 1868. Toombs was appointed dictator of Scottish Rite activities inside Georgia, and Toombs and his family ran all aspects of the Klan within Georgia.

President Ulysses Grant said that the Klan worked "by force and terror to prevent all political action not in accord with the views of the members; to deprive colored citizens of the right to bear arms and of the right to a free ballot; to suppress [i.e. burn] schools in which colored children were taught and to reduce the colored people to a condition akin to that of slavery."

In his newspaper The Memphis Daily Appeal for April 16, 1868, publisher Albert Pike wrote:

With Negroes for witnesses and jurors, the administration of justice becomes a blasphemous mockery. A Loyal League of Negroes can cause any white man to be arrested, and can prove any charges it chooses to have made against him.

The disenfranchised people of the South ... can find no protection for property, liberty, or life, except in secret association .... We would unite every white man in the South, who is opposed to Negro suffrage, into one great Order of Southern Brotherhood, with an organization complete, active, vigorous, in which a few should execute the concentrated will of all, and whose very existence should be concealed from all but its members.

In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, British-centered finance gained supremacy over American industry and U.S. policy-making. Under British sponsorship, Pike's Scottish Rite, Southern Jurisdiction, came to rule over much of the world's Freemasonry. At length its headquarters moved from South Carolina to Washington, D.C.

Theodore Roosevelt, a racist Anglophile and passionate Freemason, became President September 14, 1901, upon the shooting death of William McKinley. Teddy Roosevelt's reign was the Lost Cause triumphant: Roosevelt's revered exiled uncle, James Bulloch, Judah Benjamin's secret service chief in England, had ghost-written young Teddy's book on naval history; and Teddy's clique had finally conquered Cuba in the 1898 Spanish-American War.

The Washington, D.C. statue honoring Klan founder Albert Pike was dedicated thirty-nine days after Teddy Roosevelt's inauguration.

The B'nai B'rith and 'Egyptian Principles'
In his admiring biography of Judah Benjamin, Eli Evans quotes the famous attack against Benjamin's pro-slavery fanaticism by Ohio's Senator Ben Wade:
[W]hen old Moses, under the immediate inspiration of God Almighty, enticed a whole nation of slaves, and ran away ... to old Canaan, I suppose that Pharaoh and all the chivalry of old Egypt denounced him as a most furious abolitionist. ... There were those who loved Egypt better than they loved liberty.... They were “Israelites with Egyptian principles.”

Senator Wade’s barb hit its mark. Judah Benjamin had deserted the religion of Moses. He had spat on the law of freedom, the gift that Jews celebrate in the Passover seder, as Jesus celebrated it at the Last Supper.

Since then, other “Israelites with Egyptian principles,” those Jews who like Benjamin attached their destinies to the British Empire and its racialism, have become a vital component of the Anglo-American Eastern Establishment.

In the Civil War, twice as many Jews fought for the Union as for the Confederacy. Northern Jews, many of them recent German immigrants, were strongly pro-republican and anti-slavery. These sentiments were encapsulated by the courageous immigrant Rabbi David Einhorn, one of the founders of the Jewish Reform movement in America, whose anti-slavery tracts forced his expulsion from the city of Baltimore:

Scorning the entire civilized world, the rebellious South wants to overturn the principle of the innate equality of all beings created in the image of God, in favor of the opposing principle of innate servitude, and to set slavery and the law of might recognized as a force in the formation of states, as the basis of civilization. It wishes to tear the glorious Stars and Stripes to pieces. ... If this diabolical undertaking should succeed, who would have more to fear than Israel, the very ancient slave of slaves?

But the predominant Jewish tradition in the South was not only pro-slavery, but overwhelmingly Freemasonic.

The Independent Order of B’nai B’rith was formed in 1843 as a Jewish community sub-project in the restoration of Masonry by the Scottish Rite and the British foreign office. Although most of its lodges were in the North, B’nai B’rith was openly pro-Confederate. And although it claimed to be neutral in the war, many of the Order’s northern spokesmen were stridently pro-slavery. B’nai B’rith’s post-Civil War leaders were pro-Confederate operatives, including later president Simon Wolf, who had been arrested in Washington, D.C. as the lawyer for a Confederate spy ring. Rabbi Isaac Wise, perhaps the most well-known leader of both B’nai B’rith and the Reform movement centered Cincinnati, was officially neutral in the Civil War.

Core leaders of the B’nai B’rith from then on have been Scottish Rite Masons. The political establishment associated with the Order has always had its headquarters in London.

In Richmond, the Confederate capital, Gustavus A. Myers was Confederate Secretary of State Judah Benjamin’s closest friend and Benjamin’s channel to banker August Belmont. The former president of the Richmond City Council, and the undisputed head of Richmond’s Jewish community, Myers was Freemasonry incarnate.

Myers’s maternal grandfather, Moses Michael Hays, had brought the original “patent” and rituals from England to found the Scottish Rite in the American colonies. A Tory and financial partner of Boston’s slave-trade millionaires, Hays passed his fortune and his Masonic and British underground connections to his daughter’s husband and sons, the Myers clan of Richmond.

Moses Myers, merchant partner of the Richmond family, was head of Norfolk’s Jewish community. His house is now a public museum, located on Norfolk’s Freemason Street. Inside is a large wooden plaque given to the family by Queen Victoria, in recognition of the family’s long service to the British crown and cause. Several generations, living in that same Moses Myers house, were British consuls.

All of Virginia’s Jewish leaders then were Masons, one of them Rothschilds’ official Virginia agent who was grand master of Virginia Masons during the war of 1812.

After the Civil War, the Belmont/Rothschild faction took absolute control over the Jewish leadership within New York City and trans-Atlantic finance. Joseph Seligman, who had been pro-Union like most American Jews, joined the British banking syndicate of Rothschild and J.P. Morgan, which ran U.S. government finance from the 1870’s onward.

London’s Anglo-Saxon and Jewish employees, banking partners of the Confederates against Lincoln’s nationalist monetary policies, were now merged as the Eastern Liberal Establishment.

While Alabama cotton broker Emanuel Lehman was living in Civil War New York, he sailed back and forth to England to raise money for the Confederate war machine. Continuing the family tradition, his Lehman Brothers firm supported the racist eugenics movement, and tenaciously defended their investments in Nazi Germany.

But the big-shot was Jacob Schiff of Kuhn Loeb private bank. Schiff’s power was entirely trans-Atlantic: Travelling back and forth between London and New York, Schiff was Sir Ernst Cassel’s American partner and representative. Cassel was the personal banker and the most intimate friend of Prince Edward VII, the grand master of British freemasonry.

On behalf of the royal family, Ernst Cassel managed
the finances of the British Fabian Society leaders, along with the British Round Table in its outrageous racist endeavors in South African and elsewhere.

At Kuhn Loeb in the 1890’s, partner Otto Kahn (a British subject) directly supervised Schiff and Cassel’s project to build up a certain snarling little railroad man who was a favorite of the old Belmont Confederate machine, Mr. E.H. Harriman. At that same time, the Warburg family joined Kuhn Loeb; the Warburgs’ preoccupations were anchored in their gnostic Warburg Institute in Hamburg and London.

Look at the first years of this century: Teddy Roosevelt is President, Edward VII is King, and the racist cult-master Lord Arthur Balfour is his Prime Minister. The British Masonic clique at Kuhn Loeb founds the American Jewish Committee, and makes its president, Louis Marshall, the official legal adviser to the Harriman eugenics laboratory—one of the mothers of this century’s nightmare race theories. It was Kuhn Loeb and the Warburgs who would officially broker New York’s banking ties to Hitler’s Nazis, as well as Harriman’s entree to the Soviet dictatorship.

A striking instance of the Confederate Lost Cause persisting and haunting the present century, is to be seen in the attic of The New York Times.

Iphigenie Ochs married Arthur Hays Sulzberger in 1917. He succeeded her father Adolph Ochs as publisher of the Times, which Mr. Ochs had bought in the 1890’s.

Adolph Ochs and his father founded the “Baroness Erlanger” Hospital in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The hospital was named for John Slidell’s daughter, who married the Confederacy’s chief financier, Baron Emil Erlanger. The Baron had bought up the main railways between the bankrupt South and Cincinnati. Adolph Ochs had married Iphigenie Wise, the daughter of B’nai B’rith’s Cincinnati leader Isaac Wise. When the Ochs family had lived in Cincinnati during the war, Adolph’s mother Bertha had been arrested for smuggling drugs to the Confederate army.

In 1991, Arthur Sulzberger’s daughter Ruth sponsored the visit to America of British banker Rodolphe d’Erlanger, John Slidell’s great-great grandson. At a reception for Erlanger hospital, he said that his great grandfather, Baron Emil, was the partner of Cecil Rhodes in his nightmare race projects in Africa, and that Emil and his wife Mathilde Slidell had introduced Wagner’s Tannhauser to Paris—a work which was booed off the stage.

Arthur Sulzberger’s Philadelphia uncle, David Sulzberger, joined the Confederate army in Arkansas. Cousin Cyrus Adler, born on the Sulzberger’s Arkansas slave plantation, became the occult, psychic, Masonic, and gnostic expert for the New York Jewish establishment and for London and Cambridge Freemasonic strategists. At the same time, under the Teddy Roosevelt regime, cousin Mayer Sulzberger was president of both B’nai B’rith International and the American Jewish Committee. At that time, B’nai B’rith leaders (such as the Sulzberger’s partners the Morgenthau) directly represented

Left: Confederates Slidell and James Mason are shown obtaining British and French loans to finance their war effort. Banking ties to the British Freemasonic elite were maintained by Kuhn Loeb’s Jacob Schiff (top right) and Otto Kahn (bottom right).
British crown interests in the Middle East, and worked as a bridge for Scottish Rite Masonry between the Middle East and Washington.

In the 1930's, Cyrus Adler, president of the American Jewish Committee, coordinated with the family's B'nai B'rith and the family's New York Times, to crush all U.S. political action against Adolf Hitler in Germany. The B'nai B'rith was the only Jewish organization that Hitler deliberately left open and allowed to function under Nazi rule in 1933.

In 1939, Britain made a dramatic change in its policy toward Hitler. After helping teach Hitler his race theories, and after backing his takeover of Germany, Britain now changed publicly to opposing Hitler. Only at that point, in 1939, about a year after Hitler finally closed B'nai B'rith's Nazi-allowed German operations, did B'nai B'rith decide to "approve" an international boycott against the Nazi regime.

B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League (ADL) recently opened a vicious campaign to label American black leaders as anti-Semites, aiming at inflaming racial conflict, and stomping on the memory of the young Jews who fought for Civil Rights in the 1960's. It is essential that the religious, national, and historical character of this racialism be precisely understood.

Now a surprising breakthrough has occurred. Leaders of U.S. Black Freemasonry have attacked white Masonry, particularly the Scottish Rite, as a center of racialism. The attack is contained in the latest issue of the News Quarterly, official publication of the Supreme Council, Scottish Rite, Southern Jurisdiction, Prince Hall Affiliation, in an article by Joseph A. Walkes.

Walkes exposes Albert Pike as the national Chief Justice of the Invisible Empire of the Ku Klux Klan, and the organizer and Grand Dragon of the Klan in Arkansas. Walkes describes Albert Pike as a "traitor to his country." The article carries a photograph of the Washington memorial statue to the KKK founder. Walkes calls the statue "an affront" to the residents of the nation's capital, a majority of whom are Black.

With this and similar initiatives, a strong potential now exists for members of all faiths and ethnic groups to think about and to solve another central problem of our era:

In the Mideast today, fanatical Zionists are urged on by Anglo-American backers, to brutalize and displace Arab residents and Muslim religious institutions from Israeli occupied territory. Among the Anglo-Saxons cheering them on in their blind racialism, are many known as "fundamentalist Christians." They have seen a vision of Semitic warfare in the Holy Land, ending in mankind's annihilation, which they cheer as "God's will" and "Bible Prophecy."

Many have called this madness the "British balance-of-power strategy." But its familiar name ought to be: "British Freemasonry."
In 1989, it seemed that humanity had entered a new era, as communist dictatorships in the East, challenged first by the courageous, non-violent action and inspiration of the Chinese students in Tiananmen Square, crumbled and fell throughout Central Europe. The people of Lithuania, also committed to non-violent action, rallied the people of the Baltics; Germany’s unification, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, was bloodlessly achieved; and even the people of Russia swept the former Soviet Union out of existence, in a near-bloodless transition. A power greater than nuclear weapons had triumphed.

Then, disaster struck, which emanated not from the East, but from the West. The collapsing monetary system of the West, and the corrupt real estate and financial markets, imposed a “bankers’ dictatorship” upon the newly free nations, through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The United States and Great Britain imposed “free trade” acts, to destroy the fragile industries of the newly free nations. Drugs and pornography were made more available than machine tools, power plants, tractors, or medical supplies. Nonetheless, by September 1992, the West’s financial system, symbolized by the bankruptcy of the British pound, collapsed.

The situation is even more brutal in Africa, an entire continent condemned to death by these same foolish policies. National Security Study Memorandum 200, adopted by the United States as official policy during the 1970’s, claims that Africa is over-populated and must restrict population in the interest of U.S. “national security.” The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse—Famine, Plague, Pestilence, and War—are allowed to ravage the continent. Then the U.S., in an “humanitarian gesture,” militarily occupies a Somalia. The “New World Order” thus grinds whole nations and continents under its heel, in a genocide orders of magnitude greater than that of Adolph Hitler.

Today, the United States no longer honors its Declaration of Independence or Constitution. It has fought two wars, in Panama and Iraq, in order to force these nations back into colonial status. The U.S. Supreme Court has supported this illegal effort, even going so far as to justify overriding the laws of other nations to kidnap foreign nationals. There is the notorious death penalty, which provides for the execution of the mentally retarded, juveniles, and even the innocent, sacrificing “due process” to legal expediency at the cost of human life.

A new element is required to achieve economically independent, institutionally sovereign government on the planet, and to replace the bankrupt looting policies. The Rev. James Bevel, a founder of the Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC), has called for a mobilization of students, in the United States and all other nations, to form a new Student Non-violent Constitutional Committee, to assist in resolving this crisis.

The Student Non-violent Constitutional Committee sees the definition, nature and purpose of man, as well summarized in Genesis 1:27-28 and in Genesis 2:7:

“So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, replenish the earth and subdue it . . .”

“And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.”

Further, it adopts the passage from the Declaration of Independence:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their power from the just consent of the governed . . .”

This passage provides the definition, nature, and purpose of government.

We wish to add that economic justice, the right of all people to have and use the most advanced, efficient,
scientific means for economic growth, is an inalienable right.

Finally, it adopts this passage from the Sermon on the Mount:

"You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, Love your enemies... For if you love those who love you, what reward have you? Do not even the tax collectors do the same? And if you salute only your brethren, what more are you doing than others? You, therefore, must be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect."

This passage identifies non-violence as the chosen method of action.

Non-violent action is consistent with the outlook identified by St. Augustine in his writings on just war. It is the best weapon in the arsenal of military science. It operates from the fact that every human being is capable of redemption. By extending the principle of restraint to an enemy, who denies his humanity, we assert our own humanity and his; we seek, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, to "overcome with our capacity to love."

This does not mean that non-violence is the only weapon of military science. Lincoln's prosecution of the Civil War against the Confederate system of slavery and free trade, is a case in point. Yet in even this case, it was the failure of the American Christian churches, and the citizenry, to assert, as Lincoln and his associate Frederick Douglass urged, that all men are in the living image of God, and to practice the Sermon on the Mount, that made the use of war to protect the republic inevitable. And it was not until the non-violent Civil Rights movement of the 1960's, that America began to correct injustices still remaining after that war, such as "racial segregation," largely through the initiative of the student movement.

Someone must uphold the standard of civilization, and be willing to risk his life to do so. The economist Lyndon LaRouche, a political prisoner in the United States, demonstrates that determination, in a way all should emulate. His unjust incarceration should be responded to by students all over the world in the words of Friedrich Schiller:

"No, there's a limit to the tyrant's power,
When the oppressed can find no justice, when
The burden grows unbearable—he reaches
With hopeful courage up unto the heavens
And seizes hither his eternal rights,
Which hang above, inalienable
And indestructible as the stars themselves."

LaRouche is as important to the United States today, as Lincoln was to the United States in the 1860's. If students must fill the jails to secure his release, no matter what, this injustice must be corrected.

The principles upon which we build our movement, are inalienable, eternal, indestructible, and non-negotiable. We believe that if we are militant in the propagation of the truth, regarding the definition, nature, and purpose of man, that the power of our ideas is superior to that of the armed forces of already deceased institutions, headed by the dead husks of the unjust.

The word education means "to lead out of." So shall we lead our nations out of ignorance, poverty, disease, and war, into wisdom, economic freedom, health, and peace.

**Action Program**

The Student Non-violent Constitutional Committee (SNCC) says:

1. **No to the genocidal policies of the I.M.F. and World Bank.** New, non-colonial, sovereign, national financial institutions must replace the old, imperial central banking structures.

2. **No to the use of the death penalty** by the United States government and other governments of the world.

3. **No to the Rehnquist kidnapping doctrine of the Supreme Court** of the United States, which violates national sovereignty.

We will rally and organize to achieve these goals.
This issue is not the simple assertion, whether God exists, or not; the immediate question is a far more modest undertaking:
By what means might human beings have the capability to know with certainty whether God exists? What aspect of human intelligence might bear upon such a special quality of knowledge? What relevant form of scientific incompetence, commonplace among academicians, has Dawkins exhibited?

On the Subject of God

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

July, 1992

According to the daily London Independent of the most recent April 16, the preceding evening's participants in an Edinburgh (Scotland) international science festival had heard an Oxford University professor of biology describe belief in God as a disorder of the brain analogous explicitly to a transmittable "computer virus." Oxford's Richard Dawkins' address had included the formulation: "These are arbitrary, hereditary beliefs which people are told at a critical age, passed on from your parents rather like a virus." He had added: "that 'evolutionary theory' has removed any scientific basis for arguing the existence of God, and said that people who believe in a God who is responsible for the order and beauty of the universe are 'stupid.' I

Report of Dawkins' address was relayed to the present writer by Charles B. Stevens of 21st Century Science quarterly. Stevens suggested, that several persons, whom he listed at that time, co-sponsor the submission of a rebuttal of Dawkins to the Independent, to consist essentially of a 1960's ontological proof of the existence of God authored by Princeton University's late Professor Kurt Gödel. 2

At first glance, that suggested rebuttal was particularly relevant, since the choice of formulation reported by the Independent might imply to a knowledgeable reader that Dawkins had intended to single out Gödel's 1961 ontological proof for attack. Nonetheless, Gödel's work appeared to be inadequate rebuttal on three counts. Firstly, presently available versions of Gödel's proof add nothing significant to the Classical argument by Plato and Leibniz. 3 Secondly, it would be disingenuous not to attack directly the shameless illiteracy of Dawkins' rhetoric; this should be a crucial included point to be submitted in refuting him. Thirdly, the best available argument, which Gödel should have been able to offer, but apparently did not, the Classical argument restated from the standpoint of Cantor's Beiträge, 4 deserves to be presented as a supplement to the Classical proofs by Plato and Leibniz.

The formal question begged, in speaking of such an ontological proof, is not the issue as posed so ineptly by Dawkins. The issue is not the simple assertion, whether God exists, or not; the immediate question is a far more modest undertaking: by what means might human beings have the capability to know with certainty whether God exists? More precisely, what aspect of human intelligence might bear upon such a special quality of knowledge? Also to the point is: what relevant form of scientific incompetence, commonplace among academicians, has Dawkins exhibited?

For Plato, to whom we owe the original ontological proof, as for the present writer, human knowledge pertaining to the existence of God is to be discovered, uniquely, within a correct grasp of the notion of "Platonic ideas" (eide). 5 The Christian Platonist, Gottfried Leibniz, employed the term monad as a referent for such ideas. 6 To the same purpose, Bernhard Riemann once employed the term Geistesmassen. 7 These terms, and this writer's term, "thought-objects," are each and all related in an essential way to (Christian Platonist) Georg Cantor's 1890's conception of transfinitic types. 8 In these following pages, we shall summarize the kernel of the proof, that the conception of a Judeo-Christian God occurs as a matter of human knowledge only in the form of a "Platonic idea," or "thought-object."
I. The Definition of ‘Human Knowledge’

That quality which sets the human species above, and apart from all lower species, is empirically reflected most simply, but nonetheless crucially, in all that pertains to the simple fact, that mankind has risen, by successive advances, above the miserable potential population-density of a baboon-, or yaho-like “primitive hunting and gathering” culture, to a population-density of a thousandfold greater today. This successful transformation has occurred without a change in the present-day human genotype, but, nonetheless, a succession of changes to an effect which is paralleled in the animal kingdom only by means of evolution from inferior to superior species. In mankind, this achievement occurs through upward transformations in quality of culture, a transformation effected uniquely by means of an agency termed “creative reason.”

To restate this: the notion of “human knowledge” is so defined, as the ordering of progress, from inferior, to superior forms of culture, a progress effected by that agency of change which we term human creative reason. The difficulty which impedes fatally the argument of a Richard Dawkins from the outset, and many other putatively educated illiterates voicing conceits like his own, is the fact, that no formal system of deduction/induction could portray positively such progress in human knowledge. That difficulty can be located in the following terms of reference.

The central feature of a process of successive increases in a society’s population or potential population-density, is scientific and technological progress. From the standpoint of formal systems of argument, the level of scientific knowledge (technology) of a society at a given time may be represented, approximately, by a mutually consistent open-ended set of theorems. This set of theorems is implicitly consistent with some underlying set of interdependent axioms and postulates. This arrangement is termed a “theorem-lattice,” and the associated, underlying set of interdependent axioms and postulates is sometimes termed an “hereditary principle.” Let one such theorem-lattice be represented by “A.” Let this A be associated with a specific potential population-density for that society. Let a fundamental discovery, overturning some part of the interdependent set of axioms and postulates of A, be correlated with an increase of that society’s potential population-density. This change defines a new theorem-lattice, “B,” associated with a new set of axioms and postulates. That transformation, from A to B typifies a rudimentary definition of “scientific and technological progress.”

As we have shown in various other locations, no theorem of lattice A can be consistent with any theorem of B; an “unbridgeable” chasm of formal discontinuity separates mutually each lattice from all other lattices of such a series. That “chasm” corresponds, as does a map to a terrain, to that action of change by means of which B, for example, is generated from A. The series A, B, C, D, E, . . . , is generated as a series by a higher factor of change. This higher order of change orders the succession of individual changes AB, BC, CD, DE, etc., as a series. This higher change cannot be represented by any formal algebraic or similar representation of an ordered function—since each and every term of the series A, B, C, D, E, . . . , is separated from all others by an “unbridgeable” formal discontinuity. Yet, this higher factor of change defines in its own way the effective generation of successive increases in potential population-density, increases on which succession the continued existence of that society ultimately depends.

A detour is needed at this point; an example of the change from lattice A to B must be supplied. For this purpose, the reader is referred to Nicolaus of Cusa’s 1430’s discovery of the isoperimetric principle, as the relevant features of that discovery are emphasized in this present writer’s “On the Subject of Metaphor.” Briefly, the highlights most relevant to the ontological proof are the following.

To estimate the area of a square which is equal to the area of a given (e.g., “unit”) circle, use some form of the following algorithm. Construct two squares by means of a single, continuous construction, one inscribed within the given circle, the other circumscribing it. Repeatedly, double the number of sides of this pair of polygons, to generate a series of paired regular polygons of 2^n sides, from n = 16 to an astronomical n = 256. The average of the areas of the two polygons will approximate the size of a given circle, and the average of the perimeters of the polygons that circle’s perimeter. That perimeter divided by the length of the diagonal of the inscribed polygon yields an approximate value for π; the estimated area divided by the square of half that diameter, is also an approximation of π.

However, even if n is increased astronomically, as for the cases that n = 256 or much more, a well-defined, discrete difference in area and perimeters persists between the circle and each of the polygons. The perimeter
of the polygons never converges upon congruence with that of the circle. The polygon and circle are of different species of existence. A strong proof, using the seventeenth-century notions of "infinitesimals," for example, leads us, as in this illustrative case, to recognize that a circular action cannot be accounted for in terms of the set of interdependent axioms and postulates of Euclidean formal geometry.

However, let us define circular action in a different axiomatic way, as Cusa did. Let us define this circular action by means of what Cusa identified as his "Maximum-Minimum" principle; this principle is recognized in its more superficial aspect as the isoperimetric principle, of least action required to generate a given area, or the form of closed action which defines the largest enclosed area. Then, reference the way in which the same "Maximum-Minimum" principle came to be viewed over the course of the seventeenth century, as the Leibniz-Bernoulli principle of universal least action.17

We cannot define continuous circular action within the implicitly Eleatic terms of a formal Euclidean theorem-lattice. We must expel the disabling axiomatic features of that lattice, notably the presumption of a formally axiomatic existence of the asserted point and straight line. We must arrive at a formal description of actually existent points and lines, as consistent theorems generated by an appropriate new set of interdependent axioms and postulates. This new "hereditary principle," from which such new theorems are to be derived, allows only the self-evident form "circular" (isoperimetric, "least") action.

The seventeenth century concept of the cycloid (circular action acting reciprocally upon circular action), and its derivatives (involutes, evolutes, analysis situs, and envelopes), as the basis for an anti-Cartesian, non-algebraic calculus of universal least action, by Huygens, Leibniz, the Bernoullis, et al., shows us that our new mathematics ("Lattice B") enables us not only to eliminate the vicious paradoxes of "Lattice A," but to equip mankind with the power of knowledge over nature which had not been possible within the framework of an inferior, merely algebraic "Lattice A."

That, in brief, is the gist of this short detour. Note that we have underscored three features of the discontinuity between A and B.

1. The preconditions for the discovery. A paradoxical feature of theorem-lattice A is driven to beyond its limit. This shows, contrary to the anti-Monge, anti-Leibniz Augustin Cauchy, that processes defined by the inferior, initial lattice A, could never become coincident with a higher, bounding state of form. Thus, as this principle's method is typified by Plato's Parmenides dialogue, we show a formal flaw of A to be not only axiomatic in nature, but of the form of an ontological paradox.

2. The discovery. This negative (Platonic dialectical) proof requires that the higher, externally bounding form, unreachable by the lower, is ontologically superior to, and existing independently of the lower. However, the lower is derivable from the higher; thus, a new theorem-lattice's underlying set of interdependent axioms and postulates is required, in which the ontological superiority of the higher form is axiomatic, and the existence of the inferior is a derived one. (Note, however, the fact that the inferior theorem-lattice's underlying set of axioms and postulates can be accessed from the higher does not mean that there is any consistency between the axiomatic structure of the higher theorem-lattice and any or all of the theorems of the lower lattice.)

3. The proof of discovery. The proof of a discovery is threefold: (a) it must satisfy the paradox's requirement for a formal solution; (b) the discovery must increase implicitly mankind's power over nature; (c) the discovery must be one of an ordered series, of a method of discovery which generates a series of a type A, B, C, D, E, ..., which correlates with increasing potential population-density.

All that which is properly termed "human knowledge," must be nothing different from that characteristic of individual human behavior which is essential to the perpetuation of the human species as an indivisible whole. It is a fact of physical economy, that such existence of the species depends upon no less than some critical, minimum rate of increase of potential population-density. In other words, "change" in human behavior to such effect. This change is generated uniquely by those processes of creative reason referenced here. In other words, knowledge occurs solely in the form of "thought-objects," Platonic ideas, and never as Aristotelian, Cartesian, empiricist, or Kantian forms of deductive concepts.

That point, crucial for the ontological proof in question, is best illustrated by reference to the evidence supplied by modern Classical forms of Christian humanist secondary education—from the Brothers of the Common Life of Groote and Thomas à Kempis, through Wilhelm von Humboldt's nineteenth-century reforms.21
This bears upon our third point, 3(c) above, under "the proof of discovery."

The relevant kernel of such a Christian humanist form of secondary education, is emphasis upon the guidance of (a sense of) primary sources to prompt the student to relive the creative-mental experience of many great original discoveries in Classical natural philosophy, Classical forms of fine arts, and statecraft. This has two leading aspects, for our purposes here. Firstly, each discovery, relived successfully by the student in that way, is a reliving of, a replication of the processes of valid discovery, virtually those which were experienced by the original source. Thereafter, that portion of the creative-mental capability of the original discoverer lives again in the mind of the student. This replicated portion of that original discoverer’s creative-mental capability lives on in that student’s mind as a “Platonic idea,” “monad,” or “thought-object.”

Secondly, the process of such education is historical, each discovery located in time and place of original discovery, and also located, in time and place, in respect to each of those subsequent original discoveries for which it serves functionally as an indispensable predecessor. Thus, in this higher analysis situs, each such individual discovery is a member of one, or more series, each latter of the form representable by our pedagogical series A, B, C, D, E, . . . . With each series, there is associated implicitly the appropriate, required, higher order of thought-object. The idea of a “universal history,” as for Friedrich Schiller, in such a Christian humanist educational program, is a “Platonic idea,” a “thought-object” of this second, higher order.

Contrast such a Christian Classical humanist education to the stultifying philosophical banality of today’s far worse than merely mediocre secondary and university programs. The latter chiefly drilling future professionals, not to develop knowledge, but to pass computerscoreable multiple-choice questionnaires. The Christian Classical humanist program aims directly at fostering the development, the increase of power of the student’s creative-mental faculty; this is a method, rooted in “Platonic ideas,” for fostering directly, by carefully aimed intent, the development of the student’s creative powers of reason. Modern positivist education aims at a conformist show of mere learning, as, in the extreme case, the late behaviorist pigeon-tortmenter, B.F. Skinner, might have defined “learning.” Classical humanist education fosters human knowledge.

In the contrast of such “knowledge” to such mere, empiricist “learning,” is key to the kind of banalized credulity toward which Dawkins’ form of populist sophistry is directed. The sixteenth century, Venetian founders of modern neo-Aristotelian gnosticism and its twin, Baconian empiricism, explicitly proposed exclusive emphasis upon the symbols (“marks”) of nature (perception), in explicit attack upon Nicolaus of Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia. In other words, the gnostic empiricism of the Baconian Rosicrucians is based upon a militant outlawing of “Platonic ideas.” Thus, to accept empiricism, or, the same thing, positivism, is already to have adopted, purely arbitrarily, without reason, the formal premises for denying the existence of God, e.g., for excluding arbitrarily the entirety of that body of conclusive evidence upon which a proof depends. In short, bury the relevant crucial evidence, human creative knowledge, out of sight; then, that done, deny that there is any relevant evidence in sight. (This practice reminds one of a typically crooked prosecutor, burying exculpatory evidence with the complicity of a corrupt judge.) Thus, did a hoaxster such as Professor Dawkins tread in the gnostic Venetian footsteps of Paolo Sarpi, Francis Bacon, Robert Fludd, Jeremy Bentham, Bertrand Russell, and Rudolph Carnap.

II.

The Kernel of the Proof

Since all progress in knowledge is correlated with the single dimension, of an increase of society’s potential population-density, it adumbrates, from that latter standpoint, a formal representation by a single series of the general form of our pedagogical sequence of theorem-lattices, A, B, C, D, E, . . . . The increase of potential population-density lies causally, not in any one or many of these denoted terms of that sequence, but in the changes marked by the discontinuities among the literal terms.

Thus, the “ substance” of knowledge is change. All such change has the “content” of a “Platonic idea,” or “thought-object.” In the pedagogical sequence referenced, two distinct orders of such change are denoted. There is the first case, the change (discontinuity) defining the change from one lattice to a successor; there is the second, higher order of change, the latter implied by the specification that the sequence as a whole correlates with a succession of increases of potential population-density. This second, higher order of change bounds the first; the first is determined by the second, not the contrary. That is to say, that the mere fact of a successful generation of B from A, does not generate per se a subsequent successful
generation of C from B. AB occurs as a subsumed action occurring on the level of the first order of approximation, subsumed (in the causal sense) by the higher principle of change, a higher persisting principle which generates the continued succession of each of the first-order changes of that series.

A still higher, third order of change (to similar effect), is implied by the notion of variability in change of the second order. Given $A_1, B_1, C_1, D_1, E_1, \ldots$, is there possibly a more powerful, alternate rate of change of the second order which generates a series, $A_2, B_2, C_2, D_2, E_2, \ldots$, of higher rates of growth than the first series? And, then, a third such; and, so on? The question is implicitly its own answer, at least partially so. (1) Let change of the first order be designated as hypothesis. (2) Let change of the second order be a principle of higher hypothesis. (3) Let change of the third order be a principle of hypothesizing the higher hypothesis.

This “hypothesizing the higher hypothesis” has a significance of Becoming in Plato and in Georg Cantor. This transfinite Becoming, in Plato and Cantor is bounded, “as from above,” by Plato’s (“infinite”) Good (God). The “hypothesizing the higher hypothesis,” the highest state of mind corresponding to comprehension of Plato’s and Cantor’s Becoming, is bounded by the unchanged cause of change (for increase of potential population-density), the Good. This relationship of the lesser (Becoming) to its master (Good) parallels somewhat the bounding of the inferior species, a polygonal process, by the higher species, circular action.

Focus upon the crucial detail of series A, B, C, D, E, ..., the relationship of the individual revolutionary discovery, say CD, to altering the determination of DE by a BC + CD. There are two qualities to be considered. First, CD must be the necessary predecessor of DE. Second, CD must increase the series’ rate of increase of potential population-density above that determination of future such rate already implied for CD by the series.

To accept empiricism is already to have adopted, without reason, the formal premises for denying the existence of God, that is, for excluding the entirety of that body of conclusive evidence upon which a proof depends. AB, BC. Nonetheless, (respecting this second quality), the principle of transfinite equivalence implicitly anticipates this increase of rate of value of the series as a whole by later changes in the same series.

To illustrate what we are saying of this extraordinary quality of each term of that unified, transfinite series of changes, compare this to the case of successive integration (in the calculus): each term of the series is not only an integral of the preceding term created now as a differential; the number of multiple integrations performed increases with each successive term. This is merely a simplified illustration of the kind of analysis situs which substitutes for ordinary notions of deterministic function in the highest transfinite domains.

Consider a real-life case from the history of music (Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s “1782-1786 Revolution in Music.”) Three revolutions, in succession, brought about the discovery which Mozart exhibited in, for example, his six “Haydn” string quartets. The first was Joseph Haydn’s 1781 presentation of his revolutionary Motivführung principle in his six “Russian” quartets of that year, Op. 33. The second is a Bach discovery of 1747, represented by a collection of related compositions entitled “A Musical Offering.” The third is Mozart’s 1782 discovery, combining the three in the isochronic time-series of necessary predecessor, 1781, 1747, 1782.

This example from the history of music is equivalent to the more general form of a (Christian) Classical humanist education, based upon the isochronic “necessary predecessor” principle of ordering of primary-source representation of crucial creative discoveries in the advancement of human knowledge.

What is occurring in all valid such series of this A, B, C, D, E, ..., form, is that the series is converging isochronically upon a generalized form of Plato’s and Cantor’s Becoming. Notably, the manner in which this process of “perfection” is proceeding (in valid cases), to its “equivalence,” shows that it never becomes coincident.
with the efficiently subsuming principle bounding it, the Good.

Now, reconsider the term, “leap of faith,” as employed to describe the mere outside appearance of an act of valid revolutionary discovery. To this purpose and effect, focus all that has been, or might have been said up to this point upon the Classical humanist educational process. The following observations bring the relevant images into the required focus.

1. The purpose and content of humanist education is not the accumulation of mere information and recipes, but rather a direct fostering of the individual spark of creative genius (imago viva Dei) in each student, by a total emphasis upon incorporating in the student’s mind crucial moments from the acts of crucial, valid discoveries by (implicitly) all of the greatest known creative geniuses in all of history. This experience of genius—this youthful living the experience of becoming a genius—is not limited to any so-called specialty; it covers all natural philosophy, plus great Classical forms of all fine arts, plus mastery of the universal principle of language from the standpoint of Classical Indo-European philology, plus the science of state-craft.

2. The discoverer does not make a “blind leap of faith,” although that appearance may be presented to an observer who lacks familiarity with the true, Classical humanist species-nature of creative genius. The discoverer reacts to the stimulating paradox in the natural way of genius, as previously acquired through reliving the acts of genius of the greatest discoverers from the past. Genius, so educated, is not an extraordinary event to such an educated person. For that reason, for such persons, creativity has become a continuing way of life. It is the natural way of reacting to experience for those who have made constant companions of exemplary creative moments from within the minds of numerous among the greatest original thinkers of history.

The spark of potential genius is given to all of us who might become capable of understanding, for example, this page; all are imago viva Dei. Some, too few, develop their talent; most, unfortunately, waste it in squirrel-like pursuits of wealth and sensuous pleasures, or simply bury it, unused. To those who do develop that talent, or who might do so, as a Christian form of Classical humanist education implies that accomplishment, the way of true genius becomes simply daily custom, in every aspect of experience, throughout the entirety of one’s life.

So, the educated Classical humanist—the modern “Renaissance man”—knows relevant parts of the creative mental processes of Plato, Archimedes, Cusa, da Vinci, Kepler, Gilbert, Desargues, Fermat, Pascal, Huygens, Leibniz, et al. Somewhat similarly, great moments of the greatest, and other Classical fine artists, and of the political history of our planet. For that humanist, the creative principle of change is the efficient principle, the characteristic behind all valid forms of human activity.

The apparent “leap of faith” is not a capricious act of arbitrary “blind faith.” Not only does creative revolutionary change—as best typified by valid, fundamental scientific discovery—set mankind’s individual person apart from, and above the beasts; such creative thinking, such apparent leaps, is the true nature of all behavior which is characteristically human. The Classical humanist education compresses millennia of such human progress into the student’s direct experience, by replication of numerous among the greatest moments of concentrated, valid discovery, by means of selection from among the works of the greatest original thinkers of all history. For the student fortunate enough to enjoy such a form of education, thousands of years of such progress in natural philosophy, fine arts, and political affairs are compressed into a few years of one’s youth, one’s development of the intellectual and moral foundations of adult life. In that case, one’s own, richly developed creative talent is elevated from the rank of “raw intuition,” to an intelligible form of creative thinking. That intelligibility is named by Plato “the method of hypothesis:” to see one’s own creative efforts in the setting of the higher hypothesis posed by one’s experience of creative moments of history to date, is to make one’s own conscious efforts, so situated, an object of conscious reflection; this is “hypothesizing the higher hypothesis.” Knowing the principle of hypothesizing the higher hypothesis, so, we know when, how, and where to leap.

Once that educable quality of self-consciousness, hypothesizing the higher hypothesis, is attained (through a lifetime’s continuing commitment to this Classical educational approach), the ontological proof is a readily intelligible proposition. Otherwise, as the case of Dawkins’ April 15 Edinburgh address illustrates the widespread illiteracy among putatively professional academicians, competence in this and related deeper matters of scientific method were not possible.

The crucial marks of Dawkins’ address are sufficient to prove his illiteracy, conclusively. His hand-waving reference to hackneyed phrases respecting “evolutionary theory,” is among the more glaring examples of this.
Here, thus far, we have examined, in summary, the kernel of the ontological proof; we turn next, to exploit the Dawkins case as a “whipping-boy,” to show some among the more important historical implications of the proof.

III.

Plato vs. Aristotle

The core of Dawkins’ argument is derived not from the progress of modern science, but from the influence of an anti-Renaissance, anti-Christian, gnostic movement which rose to great influence over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of modern European history, the Rosicrucian and related, gnostic cults which assumed the disguise of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment of Voltaire and his cronies.

This post-Renaissance, gnostic intrusion into Western Europe was partially an echo of medieval cults of “Buggery” and “Averroism.” It was introduced chiefly through Venetian usurers, such as the faction of the notorious Paolo Sarpi, and his forerunners of the early through middle sixteenth century. The proverbial “red dye,” by means of which this gnostic subversion may be traced from the East, is the promotion of the teachings and method of Aristotle.

That the real-life Aristotle, and also his writings are evil, is beyond reasonable doubt; his notorious Politics and (Nicomachean) Ethics are luridly so. In this present discussion, a different facet of his writings occupies our attention, the Aristotle of logic and natural philosophy.

The famous Philo (“Judaean”) of Alexandria was the first leading theologian to show explicitly that Aristotle’s method rejects absolutely the existence of a Mosaic, Christian God the Universal Creator. In modern times, whoever has adopted competently the method of Aristotle, such as René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, or the typical, consummately evil Bertrand Russell, will reject axiomatically, as did Dawkins, even the mere suggestion that an ontological proof exists.

Expressed in this writer’s “On the Subject of Metaphor,” the Aristotelian, or so-called “Big Bang” model of the universe, is implicitly consistent with a popularized delusion, that “human intelligence” is merely “information,” the which might be assessed statistically, and therefore could be accomplished by an adequately sophisticated form of digital computing system. This argument, typified by that of the late Professor Norbert Wiener, et al., is the same proposition underlying today’s Boltzmann-like statistical representation of an “evolutionary theory” based upon the “action” of “survival of the fittest/natural selection.”

Compare the primary features of two somewhat similar, but specifically distinct evolutionary series. The first, is the geological and related records of transformation of the species-composition of the biosphere. The second, is human history (and archaeological pre-history) from the standpoint of physical economy. Both series demonstrate the principle, that successful reproduction of the global biosphere, or successful cultural evolution of physical-economic modes of social existence are characteristically nongentropic processes.

The following considerations are adduced.

1. The first series (biological evolution) is characterized by some biological principle of action, the second by the sovereignly creative-mental processes of the individual mind. Yet, the general form of both is similar.

2. The successful case of evolutionary development is the diversification of the entire process by addition of a new type whose characteristic activity increases the relative nengtropy of either the biosphere, or the society taken as a whole process.

3. There are many instances of failures in the actual history of both series, yet the failures are the proverbial exceptions which prove the rule.

Consider some crucial features of cultural evolution, and thereafter resume the comparative examination of the two, specifically distinctive series. Focus upon the physical-economic characteristics, i.e., changes in potential population-density per capita and per square kilometer. Include the standard of durable survival, e.g., not the value of AB, but of the series A, B, C, D, E, ... , as a type, e.g., the higher hypothesis. Reflection upon variability of performance of higher hypothesis, then implies hypothesizing the higher hypothesis.

From this objective standpoint of physical performance, of the science of physical economy, the data collected by the anthropologists represent chiefly types of cultures which collapsed because they were, at best, no longer morally fit to survive, the least suitable, the “least fit” of cultural types. The usury-practicing cultures of Mesopotamia are a leading example of persistent decadence. All cultures under the influence of those forms of worship associated with the Shakti-Shiva, Cybele-Dionysus, Ishtar, Isis-Osiris, or Gaia-Python-Apollo form of Satan-worship, represent a fatal cultural virus,
a disease of culture analogous to bubonic plague in the biological domain. From no later than approximately 1000 B.C., the pre-Columbian cultures of the Americas were in a spiral of collapse, into such terminal forms of utmost moral degeneracy as the Aztec culture of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. There are virtually no instances of known aboriginal cultures; the philological and archaeological shards show that the so-called “primitive cultures” are usually the pitiful, degenerated remains of a former, collapsed culture.

Against this mass of evidence, there is no doubt of the great advancement of humanity’s potential population-density, especially since the European Golden Renaissance of the fifteenth century.

The negentropic character of successful cultures is best illustrated by attention to the largest component of the human activity of a successful culture, its physical economy. To the purpose of exposing the illiteracy of Dawkins’ use of so-called “evolutionary theory,” we take a necessary detour through the relevant rudiments of modern physical economy.

Physical Economy

The science of physical economy, or technology, first established by Gottfried Leibniz during the interval 1672-1716, was founded upon study of two leading features of the industrial revolution which such collaborators of Colbert as Leibniz and Huygens were designing at that time. In his 1672 “Society and Economy,” for example, Leibniz treated the principles of a real-wages policy. His more extensive work emphasized the principles of design of heat-powered machinery and the relationship between technology and productive powers of labor.

So, we have identified technology, heat-powered machinery, and real-wages policy. Examine each of these topics, summarily, in that order; we need consider only enough to situate our use of the term “negentropy” as applicable to a description of culture.

Technology is fairly described as follows:

1. Every scientific discovery is susceptible of being represented in its effects by a form of demonstration sometimes named “a crucial experiment.”

2. A refined version of such a crucial experiment is the model of reference for design of a corresponding principle of machine-tool design.

3. The appropriate application of such a machine-tool design increases the average value of the productive powers of labor of that society.

4. That form of increase of the productive powers of labor is the correlative of an increase of potential population-density.

5. The crux of these connections, which places science and materialist ideology into irreconcilable opposition, is the fact that the origin of this causal sequence is a spiritual, i.e., mental-creative act of discovery, and hypothesis. I.e., a material result, increase of potential population-density, is the result of a spiritual cause, a result which could be accomplished in no other way than reliance upon this spiritual causation. This is directly contrary to the arbitrary dogmas of materialists Descartes (deus ex machina) and Newton (hypotheses non fingo).

For example, the importance of private entrepreneurship is implicit in this aspect of technology. The higher the rate of capital-intensive (and energy-intensive) investment in application of high rates of scientific and technological progress, the higher the combined rates of real-wage growth, profits, and potential population-density. Thus, the necessary emphasis upon the sovereign individual, personal quality of creative-mental processes, in the form of private entrepreneurship by family farms and small- to medium-sized manufacturing and related organizations, especially in the machine-tool sector. The right to private entrepreneurship is properly contingent upon promotion of scientific and technological progress in energy-intensive, capital-intensive modes.

However, the possibility of success in the private sector depends upon certain forms of relatively massive investments by government. These are properly concentrated in two categories of basic economic infrastructure: “hard” (e.g., water, sanitation, energy, transportation, communications grids), and “soft” (e.g., educational systems, public health systems). We turn to “hard” infrastructure, under Leibniz’s rubric of heat-powered machinery.

Leibniz’s treatment of the principles of heat-powered (e.g., steam-powered) machinery shows us, that although the increase of per capita and per square meter power does tend to correlate with functions of increase of the productive powers of labor, this functional increase is delimited by progress in technology—using a geometric representation of technological progress (of hypothesis and of higher hypothesis). The reverse is also true, even “more true.” The ability to realize technological progress is delimited by several factors which are measured appropriately in common terms of “per capita” and “per square meter” (or a multiple or fraction of a square meter). We call these “basic economic infrastructure,” which we divide into the indicated “hard” and “soft” categories.
A level of technology requires a minimum to maximum range of allotment, per capita and per square kilometer, of such "hard" infrastructure as (fresh) water management, transportation grids (ton-kilometer-hours), power grids (megawatts per capita, per square kilometer), sanitation, and communications. It requires a certain level of compulsory education (by Classical standards), and health-service grids—otherwise intellectual development, longevity, and health will not be sufficient for economical realization of the indicated level of technology.

In addition to such infrastructural constraints, the feasible level of realized technology by a society (as a whole) is delimited by the capital-intensity of employment in infrastructure, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, combined. This capital-intensity is not measured, in any way, in dollars or kindred monetary units or indices; it is measured twice, in ratios of the total available, and employed (respectively) labor-force. This capital-intensity of the society/economy as a whole, is the ratio of labor employed directly in production of producers’ goods, to labor employed directly (physically) in fashioning households’ and related goods.

This ratio of capital-intensity for infrastructure, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, respectively, is combined to yield a capital intensity for that society/economy as a whole. Agriculture is combined with mining and manufacturing, to yield one crucial ratio; this ratio, in ratio to total (including infrastructure) yields the second significant ratio.

Demography

Given, these constraints, infrastructural and capital-intensity, for realization of a level of available technology, consider then the following, diagram-aided representation of the corresponding process of self-reproduction of an entire society.

The analysis of the process of self-reproduction of a society begins with the population as a whole.

In physical economy, two demographic features of the social-reproductive process are most crucial; life-expectancy and health provides us the general profile of the consuming population; the way in which the labor-force component of the population is defined, is the second of the two principal features.

In a modern, late twentieth-century industrial society, for example, the following rule of thumb applies (see Chart 1).

Chart 1 is a bar diagram placed in a representation of age (modal life-expectancy of the society) compared with a functional demographic composition of that population. This bar, roughly corresponding to trends in the post-World War I U.S. economy to date, shows the following composition.

The highest significant life-expectancy range is between eighty-five and ninety years of age. The highest generally-significant age of gainful employment is between sixty and seventy years. Except for those living in sub-standard social circumstances, the modal school-leaving age is between seventeen and twenty-five years,
concentrated in the seventeen to twenty-two year range. Elementary education occupies the age-interval from five or six through ten or twelve, secondary education up to seventeen or eighteen years. For obvious reasons, we distinguish infants under one year from the under six norm for pre-(elementary)-school-age.

Since World War II, an increasingly excessive ration of “housewives” has been employed in meeting the two-income requirement of the typical family; the resulting damage to children and youth is one of the principal evils of U.S. social life today. (The popular “baby-sitter” for children of all ages, has become Satan’s own one-eyed entertainer, the proverbial “boob-tube.”) Although some have seen only the “improvement” of women’s independent career opportunities, the fact of the matter is that the cause for the two-person-per-family income standard is a result of a trend of falling real wages per capita. This trend has been uneven, but consistently downward since approximately 1947-1949.

Since pre-civilized society, humanity has moved upward, especially since the accelerated impetus supplied by the early fifteenth century, Western European (Christian) Golden Renaissance (see Chart 2, “Population Growth Since Pagan Rome”). If a “primitive hunting-and-gathering society” ever existed, the life-expectancy was below twenty years of age, the infant mortality almost that of rabbits in the wild, and plus or minus the ten square kilometers of Cenozoic wilderness required to sustain an average individual life—such as that life might be.

The most crucial feature of modern civilized social life is, that individual political equality cannot be realized without a Classical humanist form of education through secondary-school age-levels. A civilized form of political society, a constitutional form of republican democracy, cannot be sustained unless the cultural standard of such an education is the generally accepted standard for policy deliberations. Call this standard set by the Brothers of the Common Life of the late fourteenth through the late sixteenth centuries, or of the Humboldt reforms of the nineteenth century. Every child and youth has a moral right, therefore, to completion of a Classical form of secondary compulsory education in natural philosophy, fine arts, language, and history of statecraft, through the age of seventeen or so. In addition, beyond a general Classical humanist education compulsory for all, modern society requires post-secondary specialist education of professionals, up to an age range between twenty-one and twenty-five years rather commonly, and through thirty (approximately) for the most intensive of scientific professional specialties.

Thus, a civilized level of society today requires postponing regular labor force duties of the young until the age of between sixteen or seventeen and twenty-five. This period of life, and cost of education, must be sustained by the production of the adult labor-force. This requires a long-lived labor force, kept in sound, work-a-day health, through ages sixty-five through seventy years. Such a labor-force has the present best life-expectancy profile for the age-ranges seventy to ninety. So in these and other ways, are development and demography interdependent.

Similarly, if the modal ratio of births per capita of adult population falls below more than one, a catastrophic demographic aging of the total population is the result. If the family (parental) household becomes an unstable institution, serious mental illness among the young is more frequent, and a broader range of incidence of less severe personality defects as well.

Such and related demographic considerations determine the ratio of a demographically healthy society’s labor-force to total population. This brings us to Chart 3, summarized in the illustrative bar-diagram provided.

Compare the corresponding labor force and employment censuses of leading industrialized nations today.
with the first eight U.S. censuses (1790, 1800, 1810, 1820, 1830, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870). We begin with the required rural component of total employment which is in excess of ninety percent; we proceed, through scientific and technological progress in the family-owned and operated farm and ranch, to a requirement on the order of two percent of the total labor-force. Look closely, briefly, at some crucial features of the development of agriculture.

Consider yields in agriculture in terms of per capita and per hectare. Consider also the roles of transportation-grids, energy grids, and industrial capital-intensity, and technology in bringing about reduction in agricultural labor-force required per one thousand of total national population. Consider also, improvements in diet resulting from technology of agricultural development, and from water-management, transportation, and post-1930 use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) for refrigeration in the food chain.

Consider the growth of infrastructure 1790-1970 (little improvement, significant collapse has occurred in the U.S.A., for example, since 1970). Consider the growth in employment and manufacturing and fluctuations in mining. Consider the growth of employment in physical science and related engineering in two respects: as a percentile of the labor force, and in ratio to the operatives employed in rural and agricultural occupations.

Consider the "post-industrial" pathologies in employment of the labor-force, which have become so prominent, and so distinctly costly, since about the time of Harold Wilson's becoming prime minister in Britain. These include the cancerous growth of employment in parasitical expansion of administration and non-scientific services, financial services most notably. This also includes the growth of unemployment, and underemployment, and marginal employment. It includes the doubly parasitical wastefulness of a "recreational drugs" market which loots the U.S. economy today of an amount far greater than U.S. military and related expenditures combined.

Thus, as this bar-diagram illustrates the point, these patterns of allotments of the total labor-force, to the various categories of respectively (physically) productive and non-productive employments, are an integral aspect of the characteristic of action of an economy/society during a chosen interval of time. This is a key facet of what may be termed fairly the "spectroscopy" of that economy during that interval, speaking in much the same sense we speak either of characteristic spectra in referring to the Periodic Table, or the spectra emitted, for example, to be detected by a moth, of a mechanically agitated molecule of pollen.

This same characteristic of action of any interval of a physical economy has additional integral facets. The absolute levels of household consumption, per capita and per square kilometer, and the levels of output, also per capita and per square kilometer, correlate with the foregoing spectra of allotment in crucial and otherwise interesting ways. Also, we have already noted power-correlatives; this includes kilowatts per capita and per square kilometer, for both residential and production uses of land, respectively; the distribution of this requirement varies by type of land use, and by level of technology and capital-intensity employed. At the point of application of power by technology, we have power-density and electromagnetic-radiation characteristics.

The result of correlating this and other significant, integral facets of the characteristic of action, is an estimate of the necessary, optimal allotment of the total labor-force, as contrasted with any actual or mooted "spectroscopy." This picture of a "global" economic function can be described in a series of constraints, written out for purposes of approximation as a list of inequalities. These include such constraints as the following leading items:

1. The longevity and coefficients of health of the population must be increased, while the duration of the period of education converges upon a Classical-humanist program of compulsory education for all, ex-
tended upward in specialist professional education toward an asymptotic level of perhaps twenty-five years modally.

2. The per-capita household consumption of a population of such demographic characteristics must be gradually increased in quality at an approximately steady rate.

3. The allotment of labor force directly to agricultural employment must be decreased as a percentile, toward some lower asymptotic limit of probably between one and two percent, while increasing the per capita supply and quality of agricultural products for the population as a whole.

4. The employed industrial operatives component (including infrastructural employment) of the labor force must grow to a level of perhaps seventy percent of the total labor force, and be diminished below that only by transfers into the professional ranks of science and engineering.

5. Within the individual operatives segment of employment, the ration employed in producers goods must increase relative to employment in production of household goods, but without reducing the per capita supply of household goods.

And so on.

However, to realize the program of development such constraints imply, imposes two additional constraints upon the economy. First, scientific and technological progress must proceed at an adequate rate. Second, increases in development of basic economic infrastructure must be supplied in quantity and quality.

This requires a minimization of wasteful and parasitical activities, especially the evil of financial and related usury. If the kinds of constraints indicated are not satisfied, the physical economy will slide into an entropic collapse. The general rule is fairly described as follows:

Think of both "raw materials" and man's improvements of the total physical environment as, at each moment, a productive resource which must be maintained, if the productive potential—potential population-density—is not to be lowered. It is sufficient, for our present purposes, to stress an aspect of this connection: as the best and cheapest raw materials are depleted by use, physical productivity must fall in the sector, (and, thus, in the economy as a whole), unless this marginal depletion's effects are offset by advances in technology. There is no possibility of a "zero technological-growth equilibrium" in a real society/economy without scientific and technological progress in a relatively capital-intensive, power-intensive mode; otherwise society decays.

With this in view, return to Chart 3. With the considerations—constraints—identified taken into account, let a moment of the economic process of a society be treated as "theorem-lattice A" of a series of the pedagogical form A, B, C, D, E, . . . . This "moment," A, is, of course, otherwise seen as an "interval." This is an "interval of action," action defined "spectroscopically" by the considerations outlined in our elaboration of some leading implications of Chart 3: a characteristic action of that interval A. This "local" characteristic of action is, of course, action for change, but changes which might appear to correspond consistently to the internal functioning of a system of linear inequalities. We are concerned to represent the point of breakdown of such a particular array of changes governed by linear inequalities.

This characteristic action of the economy/society as a negentropic process, has the following general features of interest to us respecting Dawkins' use of the catch-term "evolutionary theory."

We begin with a demographic determination of a total population's labor force; this, as we have indicated, already reflects, at each moment, a level of technological practice. We measure consumption, per capita and per square kilometer, in terms of the total physical output of an operative's portion of the total labor force. We then estimate the amount of combined technological progress and expansion required (after accounting for depletion of previously improved resources) to sustain at least the same per capita values; this rate of technological progress plus expansion defines—with apologies to Professor Hermann Minkowski—a "world-line," a pathway of growth which merely secures a "zero entropy" condition for that society.

The margin of total physical output of operatives which is consumed up to the level of securing a bare "zero entropy" of the economy/society, is treated as analogous to the thermodynamic "energy of the system." The "free" margin of total output remaining after this deduction for maintaining a "zero entropy" state, then attracts our attention. We focus more narrowly on that ration of this "free output" which is employed in fostering technologically progressive expansion of the economy's productive system; this latter, smaller portion of the "free" output is treated as analogous to "free energy." We have, then, a notion analogous to that of a variable ratio of "free energy" to an absolutely expanding "energy of the system."

This analogue of a "free energy" function correlates with a rising potential population-density.
Actual Physical Economy

The outline of economic growth just summarized does not correspond, in any consistent way, to the overall practice of modern European civilization. However, the exceptions prove the rule, conclusively.

Speaking statistically, European civilization—and its actual economy—is not the result of a single current of successive cultural impulses (“characteristic of action”); for more than 2,500 years to date, Europe and European civilization have been, at each moment, the net result of two conflicting, irreconcilable sets of impulses. There was the evil of Mesopotamia and Canaan, against the Ionian city-state republics. There was the conflict between the Athens of Solon’s constitutional reforms, and the oligarchical evil of slave-holding Sparta under Lycurgus’s code. There was Plato, versus the evil represented by Aristotle and Isocrates. There was the Christianity of Sts. Peter, John, and Paul, against the oligarchical, paganist gnosticism of the Delphic and Roman pantheons.

Of these, Professor Dawkins might say, “Two opposing viruses.” Indeed, from the standpoint of his April 15 address, were he consistent, the whole of history, including the history of teaching biology at Oxford University, must appear to him as not a product of human behavior, as much as a virus-like infection of the collective mind by some potency in the form of “covenants,” or “linear systems.” To understand Dawkins’ thus-perplexed miscomprehension of history and science, think back to a type of Hollywood, pseudo-science fiction rather modish during the 1950’s. Pods from outer space invade Earth surreptitiously (of course), and capture the minds of hapless persons, which latter become a special sort of “zombie-like” creatures, “pod people.” Unfortunately, there are real-life approximations of that script, less fantastic, but ultimately just as eerie in their own fashion, and as evil.

“Sorry, buddy. This is nothing personal; I’m just doing my job.” Assassin? Government bureaucrat? Corporate bureaucrat? U.S. Democratic Party hack? Concentration camp gas chamber attendant? Vietnam body counter for Robert S. McNamara? Whoever that might be, the principle of the case is essentially the same. Personal moral responsibility to be self-governed by truth-seeking reason is put aside, when a mere covenant might be obeyed blindly. Who or what covenant-wielding potency is directing this “zombie”? A “blob” from outer space, perhaps? No, not from “outer space,” but perhaps one of those “blob”-like pestilences spread from the Cult of Apollo by way of a Venice faction to which the notoriously evil Paolo Sarpi and also England’s Sir Henry Wootton adhered.

Fly for a moment, in the imagination, to a possibly fictional death chamber of a dying, fabulously wealthy and powerful man. His attorneys and a notary are occupied at the side of the tycoon’s bed. The dying man completes the legal rituals; his visitors depart, leaving the old Croesus to the ominous sound of his own breathing. Whatever his daydream, it brings a small, sadistic smile to his aged, Faustian features. He has purchased a certain, perverse kind of earthly immortality, by creating his own “blob” to live after him: a new charitable foundation.

Already, the foundation’s initial roster of administrators is in the process of being selected and installed. They will each die, as will the individual attorneys of the law firms, and the officials of the private banks; but the foundation will live on in its eerie, “blob”-like earthly quasi-immortality, like a pagan god of Olympus—to live in earthly immortality forever, at least until the inevitable “Twilight of the Gods.”

Who are the passing generations, of attorneys, bankers, and so forth, who administer to the “blob”-like
covenant throughout its long, but finitely eternal immortality? “Pod people”? More or less, exactly so; just “pod people” going about, “just doing my job.” The dying old man leers at the thought.

The “pod people” who minister to such “blobs,” are not limited to the administrators, attorneys, financial officers, and so forth, who serve as the lackeys of the “blob”’s personal household. Its power reaches out, through the tentacles of its usurious capital, to recruit its “pod people” among the corporation executives, real estate schemes, and reinsurance cartels. Through the tentacles of its charities, the “blob” controls its “pod people” in the university faculties, the science laboratories, the fine arts, medical officials, and the popular entertainments. By aid of these means, the “blob”’s roster of “pod people” includes judges, various officials of other branches of government, and political party organizations, as well as the leading news and entertainment media.

One “blob” by itself does not make such an Olympian power within, or over society. Over the centuries, the species of “blob,” called in Venice the fondi, has come to constitute a large number of such “blob” families. It is these types of “blob” families who constitute the collection of those non-human creatures, the real-life gods of Olympus. These “blobs,” whose existence is premised upon a mere parasitical, usurious covenant, constitute the oligarchy; those “pod people” who serve the oligarchy’s “blobs” are merely the mind-slave lackeys of the inhuman oligarchy proper.

Since King Philip’s ancient Macedon, Philip’s agent Aristotle is the gnostic archetype for the mind-slave lackey of those inhuman “blobs” which constitute the ruling oligarchies of this planet, the quasi-immortal, earth-bound gods of pagan Olympus. This quality of evil in Aristotle’s still continuing influence, is shown explicitly, pervasively in his Politics and Ethics. The immediately relevant point is the correlation between the method of Aristotle’s anti-scientific logic and natural philosophy, on the one side, and the method permeating Dawkins’ address reported in the April 16 London Independent. We are stressing here the congruence of that Aristotelian method with the state of mind which is typical of the mind of the priestly rank among mind-slave lackeys of the “blobs,” down through the ages, into the present.

The non-human existence of the “blob” as a species, is key to the curious dualism we see in 2,500 years of European civilization to date. The “blob” does not exist, of course; it “lives” only as a phantasm in the minds of deranged children, children who might just be occupied with playing the game of the Lord of the Flies. What if many deranged people play out acting lackeys of a “blob,” or of an assortment of “blobs,” as young people might be caught up playing “Dungeons and Dragons” in dead earnest? What if people make a secure income, and enjoy great covert power by pretending that the “blob” which nominally employs them is a real personality, a personality whose absolute self-interest is the preservation of itself as an increasingly wealthy “blob” in a nation which is ruled by like-minded “blobs”? What if overgrown children, as an assortment of trustees, attorneys, financial agents, corporate executives, heads of fraternal orders, university officers, and so on, each and all dedicate all of their resources, in dead earnest, to perpetuating eternally “the game of blobs”?

What, on the other side, if a newly elected government, for example, were to remove the legal protection of tax and other statutes indispensable for the continued fictive existence of a powerful nation’s local oligarchical collection of “blobs”? How would the assembled lackeys of the “blobs” respond?

Some common gossips insist, that every individual’s opinions are either a response of an experience-scarred “human nature” to sensory stimuli, or some silly babbling to the same net effect. What ignorant, unobservant, foolish gossips these are! How often do we not meet a person pompously “just doing my job” in the disgusting manner of a mind-slave lackey of either some “blob,” or another, but related type of non-human, fictive institution manned by mere apparently soulless lackeys? What of the curious propensity, observed in that way, in such a variety of frequently encountered incidents, of persons whose apparent chief concern in life is “what will the neighbors think?” What is the commonly pathological feature of mental life typical of those persons who behave in such unwholesomely aberrant ways? Why speak of “human nature”? Why not speak also of persons of “unhuman nature”? What is the method commonly characteristic of such bureaucratic, unhuman mental processes? This brings our attention back to the method of Aristotle, and of Dawkins’ address.

The submission of the human will to the service of a non-human, fictive potency, such as an oligarchy of “blobs,” submission to such an institution, the most vital, usurious interest of which is antithetical to natural law, such submission is in itself a form of evil. This evil is intrinsic to the most essential feature of oligarchical overlordship. This evil is that which underlies the method and doctrines of that person who is, historically, to date, one of the most famous, perhaps the most famous, gnostic lackeys of the oligarchy of “blobs,” Aristotle.
Construct a concept of the relevant conception in the following, illustrative way.

Focus upon the cited attribute of the “pod people,” the lackeys: “This is not personal; I’m just doing my job.” That statement reports implicitly that lackey’s conviction that he has, at least momentarily, suppressed that agency fairly identified as “one’s personal conscience.” In other words, the lackey signals us so, that he has suppressed his capabilities for truth-seeking, rejected, at least for the moment, that quality of rational thinking and action we associate with the tradition of scientific discovery.

There is nothing immoral, per se, in carrying out orders; it is the suspension of reason, the suspension, thus, of moral responsibility for the ultimate consequences of one’s actions, which is immoral. One might say, “I know the person guiding my actions in this matter is a reasonable, responsible person, who deserves to be respected morally as an ‘authority’ in such matters.” A respected physician might be such an authority, and the person speaking a patient of that physician, or a person assisting in the care of one of that physician’s patients. In such latter circumstance, to reject or ignore the physician’s authority out of hand, would be an irrational act, and therefore an immoral act. Or, persons who insist on “my right to act according to my gut-feeling,” that tribal witch doctors often know better than doctors, are behaving irrationally, certainly immorally, and perhaps also criminally. In the latter case, the evil lies in the mode of thinking per se of that culprit.

So, there is nothing intrinsically immoral in short-term faith in the competence of moral accountability of some putative authority provided that judgment is premised upon a reasonably grounded, intelligible basis for faith. Frequently, especially in those urgent cases where postponed action would be disastrous, it would be a lunatic degree of immorality to do other than act, at least for the near term, upon acceptance of such authority. The moral question is, whether one is acting on the basis of a reasonable attribution of reason and personal moral accountability to the person issuing the instruction, or, in the opposite case, acting as an “amoral” lackey in service of a form of “blob”-like power, such power as command over great wealth or physical forces. Without going much further than this in the matter of a fine, legalistic distinction, we may now concentrate on the types of instances in which the latter, immoral relationship to power is clearly the case, the point in Beethoven’s Fidelio (Act II, Scene 3) at which the bass, “Papa” Rocco, the warden of the prison, exclaims with evidently great relief and recognition: “O was ist das, gerechter Gott!”

For this purpose, we must exclude from the Christian (and, Plato’s) notion of an ontologically existent creator the Adam Smith doctrine of worship of God “by faith alone,” without “any consideration of their [personal impulsions’] tendency to those beneficent ends which the great director of nature intended to produce by them.” The god of Adam Smith and Lady Margaret Thatcher’s “free trade” dogmas, is clearly not the God the Creator of Moses and the Christians. This is to underscore the point, that the “beneficent ends” of policy guided by true reason are intrinsically intelligible to the degree that whoever disregards that practical connection, as Adam Smith proposes we do, is plainly a scoundrel. It is the intelligibility of the Creator’s work, as this is accessible to us within the inferior domain of Plato’s Becoming, and Cantor’s Transfinite, which is the intelligible basis for morality, and also the intelligible elementary basis for faith in the ontological existence of the Creator.

In belief, as in Adam Smith’s clearly paganist belief, there is another, pagan’s choice of monotheistic deity, such as Baal and the Zeus of Olympus. This deity is a “blob,” a pseudo-human (anthropomorphic), quasi-immortal, fictive object, to which is ascribed the authority and power of a Babylonian potentate, the authority and power of the ruling fondo of this usurer’s earthly paradise. In a word, Satan. For Adam Smith, this fondo-god was currently incarnate as that spawn of Paolo Sarpi, et al., the “Venetian Party’s” British (and, Dutch) East India Company, which Smith served as a lackey. For this Smith, the palpable devil incarnate was probably known to him as that lackey’s immediate employer, Barings Bank’s William Petty, also controller of William Pitt the Younger’s Parliament, and paymaster also for King George III, the second Earl of Shelburne. If not Shelburne himself, then certainly Shelburne’s chief thug, the murderous professsed usurer and pederast, Jeremy Bentham.

Such pagan deist’s anthropomorphic concoctions are a caricature of all the wicked rulers of ancient Canaan and Mesopotamia, concentrated into one foul essence. They are as arbitrary in their absurd claims to legitimate authority as in their whimsical decrees, their literal commands. These are fondo, whose literal commands must be obeyed by the lackeys (and helots) without rhyme or reason. Such a lunatic’s earthly paradise corresponds to its own implicitly underlying axioms respecting ordering and ontology. The most consistent known representation of such a satanic form of natural philosophy is the Organon of Aristotle.

Let us introduce the term institutional reflex, to iden-
tify that type of human behavior which is controlled characteristically by a wont for blind implicit obedience to literal commands; this is in contrast to individual behavior intelligibly directed by an agency of truth-seeking reason (as we have defined reason, both in the referenced “On the Subject of Metaphor,”66 and earlier in this present writing). Focus upon that type of institutional reflex we have described here to the lackey’s form of submission to the “blob.”

In the oligarchical utopia, the infantile, mythical realm of the Olympian pantheon, men and objects alike are ordered directly by the literal form of a command spoken by one among the pagan gods, or as conveyed by an Olympian emissary (lackey) to the same effect. The intent attributed to such literal babbling by Delphi’s Pythia, as such intent is interpreted by the local, hermeneutic “spin doctors,” the priests of Apollo at the bench before Python’s grave, is the presumed order of universal pagan law, civil, geological, biological, and astronomical.67 Herein lies, implicitly, the underlying axiomatic, ontological basis which, as an “hereditary,” oligarchical principle, underlies Aristotle’s so-called Organon as a whole.68 Mythically, Zeus spake, and by his literally spoken command, all the objects in Aristotle’s universe, and their attributes, were created in a single “Big Bang.” If this is examined rigorously, then, as Friedrich Nietzsche adduced from Aristotelian rantings, such a god—Aristotle’s pagan god, in point of fact—is long since as good as dead.69 The simple Aristotelian dialectic, turned upon Aristotle himself, is to the following effect.

Q: Is this God perfect?
A: Yes, that is his nature, by definition.
Q: Otherwise, he would not be God. Is that not true?
A: That is true.
Q: If he is perfect, then his commands must be perfect. Is this true?
A: Yes, that is true.
Q: Then, his creation is perfect. Is this not also true?
A: Yes, that follows, as you have said it.

Q: Then, the laws his creation builds into the universe are perfect?
A: Also.
Q: If they could be changed, they would not have been perfect laws in the first place?
A: Also true.
Q: Then God could not act to alter any of these laws without causing them to have been imperfect?
A: That is true.
Q: Then, once your God had created this universe, he must never act to change what he had done at the moment of creation?
A: (Silence)
Q: Did you hear me?
A: (Nods slowly)
Q: Do you see any flaw in my argument thus far?
A: (Shakes his head very slowly).
Q: Then, all is as pre-ordained at the instant of creation, and your God himself could not change any of it, without making the original creation imperfect, and therefore himself the author of an imperfect act, and not a true God. Is this not also true?
A: (Pulls out a dagger, and moves as if to kill).

So, like the pagan oligarchical priest’s mythical Python swallowing his own tail, Aristotle’s form of the dialectic consumes, and nullifies itself. His God never existed; neither did his fictive, linear, mechanistic universe, nor the neo-Aristotelian fictive universe of the materialists Francis Bacon, Descartes, Kant, Darwin, and Dawkins.

In Aristotle’s fictive universe, the name of an attribute, associated with the mere name of an object, drives the name of that object, linearly, to affect the name of another object in a named way. In Aristotle, there is no true causation; there is only the mechanism of the syllogism. His universe is a tangle of “blobular,” “physiocratic” covenants, in which each particle does his duty as prescribed by contract.

The Christian impulse in political-economy, in opposition to the oli-
garchical radical Aristotelian nominalism of modern monetarist dogma, drives the economy as we have indicated, but does so in defiance of the satanic power of the oligarchical enemy. Hence, the dual aspect of European civilization’s history. Hence, because of the political power currently enjoyed by the oligarchical patrons of empiricism, Dawkins acquired his esteem for the views he has championed in his April 15 published address.

Evolutionary Theory

Evolutions intrinsically are negentropic processes, as this writer, for example, has supplied a corrected definition of “negentropy” in other locations. We introduce four exemplary relevant paragraphs from “Mozart’s 1782-1786 Revolution in Music” for this purpose:

“There are two distinct species of thought-objects implied in the given, illustrative series of theorem-lattices. First, on the relatively lower level, there is a quality of the thought-object which is typified by the transformation of $A$ to generate $B$. Second, there is the higher quality, higher species of thought-object associated with a notion of a choice of determined ordering for the series presented, the ordering of the lower-order thought-objects corresponding to the discontinuities $AB, BC, CD, DE, \ldots$.

“For example, a successfully advancing science would be associated with a succession of such revolutions, each always leading the relevant society (implicitly) to higher levels of potential population-density. This would also signify, that that generation of successive revolutions $AB$ and $BC$ must result in a revolution $CD$, which latter increases the potential population-density more rapidly than the average of $AB$ and $BC$. These successive revolutions are effected under the guidance of a self-evolving method for effecting successive such revolutions, a self-evolving method of scientific discovery. Call this quality of revolutionary ordering a method of evolutionary negentropy in increase of potential population-density.

“Understand ‘evolutionary negentropy’ as a conception introduced by Niccolao of Cusa. The progressive evolution of the biosphere is dominated by emergence of relatively higher species—higher than any previously extant. This does not (generally) wipe out the surpassed inferior species. Rather, the proliferation of most among the accumulated, interacting species makes possible the emergent existence of the higher species. Similarly, in the case of the Mendeleeyev Periodic Table of Elements and their Isotopes, the emergence of helium and lithium, and so on, from nuclear fusion of hydrogen, and so on, does not eliminate the lower ranking elements and isotopes of that table; rather, that development is characteristic of an ever higher state of organization of the “table” as an interdependent wholeness.

“We combine this view of such revolutionary/evolutionary processes as these, with a notion of rising ‘free energy’ of the entire ‘system’ undergoing such ordered evolution. This combination of higher states of organization with relative increase of ‘free energy,’ is a definition we prescribe for our use of the term ‘negentropy.’”

And, an additional paragraph on the same subject:

“Thus, the provisional array of such thought-objects, $\mu_{AB}, \mu_{BC}, \mu_{CD}, \ldots$, is subsumed by a generative, self-evolving quality of yet higher-order thought-object. This higher species of such thought-object is called scientific method, a thought-object whose efficient dimensionalities are the notion of ‘evolutionary negentropy,’ which we referenced above.”

In contrast to such a definition of “evolutionary negentropy,” Dawkins’ address adopts the contemporary positivist representation of the Malthus-Darwin-Huxley dogma of the “survival of the fittest”/“natural selection.” This dogma Darwin adopted explicitly from Thomas Malthus; however, the dogma was not original with Malthus; it had been introduced to Britain earlier from the work of the Venetian Giammaria Ortes. It had been rightly seen as consistent with a Hobbesian-Lockean, bestial view of man’s nature.

If we adopt as the primary phenomenon of biophysics, the biosphere as a whole, rather than the individual species taken one, two, or three at a time, the truer picture, refuting Darwinism, quickly appears. Contrary to the faddish “ecological catastrophes,” the biosphere as a whole has a remarkable adaptability, a remarkable type of metastability. This quality is associated with the curious interdependency among the full range of participating species in the evolutionary development of the biosphere as a whole. The characteristic of the emergence of new, higher species, successively, within that biosphere, is a type of generative principle, a principle of negentropic transfinite ordering, analogous to the subsuming principle of thought-object depicted here as ordering the successful successor of an evolutionary negentropic series of the pedagogical form $A, B, C, D, E, \ldots$.

This “evolutionary negentropy” is, on the one side, a description of those processes of successive ordering which we associate with the term “creative,” as employed to signify the form of “creative reason.” Thus, successive evolution “in the wild” has an eerie resemblance to successful creative, problem-solving reason in man. The effect of successful evolution of species and varieties is to increase the negentropy of the characteristic action of the biosphere as a whole; conversely,
the level of the negentropy of the biosphere as a whole delimits the “spectra” of species which can be sustained. The existence of human culture is functionally a part of the biosphere as a whole; thus, as human development is negentropic for the human species, it is also a negentropic enhancement of the entire biosphere.

This line of argument is required, not to settle here issues of biology, but to expose the shamefully theological bias which Dawkins’ address superimposes arbitrarily upon the hapless name of “evolutionary theory.” It is not biological science which governs Dawkins’ theology; rather, Dawkins delimits “evolutionary theory” to what fits the Olympian blob’s theology of his circle of putatively atheistic co-thinkers. We continue this line of argument, now, briefly, with that warning to the reader set plainly in view.

What Dawkins’ choice of “evolutionary theorists” have done, may be described fairly in the following way.

Let the pedagogical series, A, B, C, D, E, . . . , represent a species-evolutionary development—“evolution.” Instead of viewing the succession of discontinuities as this writer has described (as in correspondence with a higher, transfinite principle of ordered, “axiomatic”—or, “genetic”—changes), the empiricist ideologue demands, perhaps even hysterically, that we attribute the change from A to B, B to C, and so forth, in each instance, to some mechanistic, e.g., statistical form of action. Such an ideologue next aggravates his initial mechanistic assumption by demanding that we all ignore the most crucial fact of this series, that the succession itself has a self-similarly negentropic form of ordering; this ordering is, in turn, the characteristic action of the transfinite equivalence of each valid stage in the succession.

All such ideological errors of the empiricists are premised upon that same, specifically gnostic (i.e., oligarchical) principle which is typified by such marks as Descartes’ *deus ex machina* and its Newtonian predicate *hypotheses non fingo*. Thus, in the case of the evolutionary biosphere, as in cultural progress, there is something which the gnostic refuses to face. In the case of the biosphere it is the evidence that evolution is not “randomly mechanistic,” but has an intrinsic ordering, as if *a priori*, an ordering consistent with a principle of nature subsuming the creative evolution of living from ostensibly non-living processes. In the case of cultural progress the empiricists deny the existence of a “divine spark” of the person’s sovereign, human-specific potential for creative reason. As this “divine spark” puts mankind’s existence into an efficient relationship to the creator of this universe, so that “divine spark” (Schiller’s and Beethoven’s *Götterfunken*) must be denied hysterically by all of pagan Olympus’ lackeys. Hence, the mark of the lackey intellectual in European civilization has become a preference for the method of Aristotle (or, worse, Ockham), and calumnious hatred toward the person and method of Plato.

This mark of the academic lackey is key to the perpetuation of the so-often discredited Malthus-Darwin-Huxley “evolutionary theory” hoax. When Professor Dawkins employs the name of such an “evolutionary theory” dogma to libel the Creator, it must be pointed out, that from the outset, the very existence of such an “evolutionary theory” was a gnostic’s “religious” refusal to allow crucial evidence to be considered. Thus, the use of “evolutionary theory” to libel God, is a plain tautological fallacy.

It may be the case, that some persons had started from their arbitrary, diabolical hatred of God as Creator, to arrive at an adoption of the formalist methods of either an Aristotle or an Ockham. We are not making such an assumption; we are focusing our argument here only on the general case, in which the origin of Aristotle’s (or, Ockham’s) method is axiomatically implicit in the oligarchical lackey’s servile attitude of dependency upon the species of Olympian “blobs.”

### IV.

**Social Relations As A Correlative Of Method**

We have reached a crucial subordinate feature of our proof.

We said, at the outset, that the issue posed for us, is not whether God the Creator exists, but whether it is possible for the mortal mind of an individual person to know that He exists. We have demonstrated several things. We used the case of Nicolaus of Cusa’s discovery of a principle of universal least action, to define a notable experience of an individual creative act. We show the equivalence of this creative act to Plato’s *Parmenides* method, and to his negative proof of an absolutely infinite *Good* (God) from manifest existence of a universal, transfinite *Becoming*.

That, with its essential, subsumed features, was the first part of our rebuttal of Dawkins’ address.

We then focused upon Dawkins’ specific assertion, that so-called “evolutionary theory” absolutely refuted the notion of the existence of God. We examined the
Ortes-Malthus-Darwin-Huxley dogma of mechanistic “evolution” against the backdrop of social (e.g., “cultural”) evolution. We emphasize the proof, that social evolution is ordered by the creative principle of reason, which defines the individual person as imago viva Dei. We define this evolution as necessarily subsumed by a principle of higher hypothesis, a principle expressed in the form of self-similarly neg-entropic change in sequences of the pedagogical form A, B, C, D, E, .... We indicated that the interdependence between an entire biosphere and its included, newest highest participating species, reflects an ordering-principle of this same form.

To make clear the case for cultural evolution, we described the relevant setting of Dawkins’ own existence and development: the two, irreconcilably (“axiomatically”) opposed social currents whose interaction is the past 2,500 years of European civilization. We defined, thus far, the crucial features of one of these two conflicting social currents, the “blob”-dominated oligarchical faction. We turn, now, to contrast that current with its Platonic and Christian adversary. We define thus, the most characteristic features of the conflicting interaction. We proceed thus, to show how the defect of Dawkins’ imperfect thinking, on the subject of God the Creator, can exist in a universe created by a perfect God, in “this best of all possible worlds.”

There is a manifest reciprocity between the two conceptions, between the individual person as imago viva Dei, and the “evolutionary negentropic” form of characteristic of action of a viable form of physical economy. In this connection, we have shown already, that the axiomatic basis for all valid thought respecting either conception, is Plato’s quality of change as we have enriched Plato’s notion of change by aid of references to our pedagogical negentropic series A, B, C, D, E, .... For the Platonist, for the Christian humanist, this non-linear quality of (negentropic) change takes the axiomatic place otherwise occupied by that linear principle of the

Aristotelian syllogism within the oligarchical thinking of the “pod people,” the mind-slaves of “the blobs.” This latter distinction is key to both the functional differences and the interaction between the two warring factions in 2,500-odd years of European civilization to date. This is the axiomatic root of the difference between Professor Dawkins’ April 15 address and the contrary way of thinking represented by Plato’s, Leibniz’s, and this present writer’s statement of the ontological proof.

This is key to understanding those moral disorders of the student’s or professional’s intellect which are induced by the continued influence of such sadistic scalawags as the neo-Aristotelian formalists Leopold Kronecker and Bertrand Russell. A similar impairment of otherwise gifted minds is met too frequently, caused by the victim’s guilt-ridden, propitiatory compulsion to conform to the crippling, anti-geometry sophistries of today’s “generally accepted classroom mathematics.” The Cusa solution for the paradox of Archimedes’ construction could never have been discovered, to this day, 550 years later, nor anything of non-algebraic functions, had the discoverers not detested the anti-geometric Aristotelian formalism of Ockham, Descartes, Newton, Kant, and the nineteenth-century positivists.

Contrast the two mutually-exclusive axiomatic systems: first, the modern Platonist mathematics, in which (in non-algebraic functions) multi-connected, circular least action is made self-evident through successive discoveries, especially the crucial such discoveries of the A.D. 1440-1697 interval; second, the opposing, Aristotelian system, in which static objects enjoy the attributed axiomatic quality of being perceived to exist self-evidently. For the second case, therefore, the “perfect point” and “perfect straight line” have also a self-evident, axiomatic existence, derived from the Aristotelian axiom of perception. For the first case, the modern Platonist thus echoes ancient Heraclitus “nothing exists but
change”; from this, we are led to the notion of action for change in physical space-time as the most elementary unit of cognition of the particular. In the second case, contrary to the first, the essential thing is that the mere sensory perception of the discrete object is the premise for the notion of existence.

Dawkins’ address rests implicitly, entirely upon the implications of the Aristotelian’s crude faith in the authority of perception per se. The deeper point to be made is that Dawkins’ opinion flows ultimately from his adopted social status, as, so to speak, a “pod person,” a lackey of the oligarchical hierarchies within the “Venetian Party’s” system.

The issue thus posed is implicitly twofold. First, how do social relations determine the axiomatic (methodological) beliefs of persons? Second, how is it possible, that an imperfect system, specifically the implicitly satanic system of Aristotelian oligarchism, may exist as ostensibly part of a perfect Creator’s universe? We will bring this rebuttal to its implicitly pre-designated close by applying the answer to the first query to resolve the paradox of the second.

We know the universe by changing it. By comparing changes in human productive (and, related) behavior with corresponding changes in potential population-density, we are enabled, uniquely so, to know two things we could not know in any other way. The experience so identified admits of representation in the form of our pedagogical series, A, B, C, D, E, . . . . Thus, as indicated earlier here, we have two immediate qualities of change represented. First, the relatively linear order of change: from A to B, B to C, and so on. Second, the analysis situs ordering principle which subsumes the series of changes AB, BC, CD, DE, . . . . In other words, hypothesis and higher hypothesis. As noted earlier, any value of self-similarly negentropic evolution attributed to a row-series AB, BC, CD, DE, . . . , implies a column series AB, AB, AB, . . . , of additional row-series, each with a higher value than row-series AB; hence, implying the envelope-like hypothesizing the higher hypothesis. The object of our quest for scientific knowledge, is to refine our hypothesizing the higher hypothesis toward desired lessening of disagreement between our wills and the manifest Will of God.

That is not perfect, not absolute knowledge, nor does it converge, as if asymptotically, upon absolute knowledge. It is merely the transfinite of Georg Cantor, or, the same thing, the Becoming of Plato, which differs in species from the Absolute, the Good in the sense the perimeter of Nicolaus of Cusa’s 2 regular polygonal perimeter differs from that higher species of bounding existence, the circle.

This (transfinite) hypothesizing the higher hypothesis is what we must signify by use of the term “human knowledge.” It is not only false, but a quasi-schizophrenic sickness of the mind, to imagine that God or nature poses “right answers” neatly parsed in textbook formalism. No defensible definition which is contrary to our own here exists. This knowledge is generated and recalled in the form of what we have identified variously as “Platonic ideas,” “monads,” “Geistesmassen,” or “thought-objects.” It belongs to a higher species of mental existence than communicable forms of conscious activity, and bounds all sane forms of such inferior species of activity. The substance of this knowledge is, generically, not objects, not perception, but change; this change occurs in four forms: hypothesis, higher hypothesis, hypothesizing the higher hypothesis, and that still higher species which may be known only negatively, the absolute Good.

This knowledge is individual knowledge, but it can be acquired and expressed only in a social way. It is individual because each and every generation of a true thought-object occurs uniquely within the sovereign creative-mental processes of the individual person, and never occurs in any different way. Nonetheless, in each valid discovery, the individual acts directly upon the
entire corpus of human knowledge to date, and upon the potential population-density of the present and future of the human species. The terms of reference in which all discoveries are made is the general, historical-social context to which the efficiency of all discoveries refers.

In such creative-mental activity, it is as Nicolaus of Cusa stressed: the individual, as microcosm, participates directly, efficiently in the macrocosm—the society and the universe are as a Becoming within a timeless wholeness. It is through this relationship to knowledge for society as a whole, that the individual mind acts upon the wholeness of the efficient relationship of the human species to the universe. It is as hypothesis, and changed practice whose change is informed by hypothesis, that the individual mind acts upon the universe directly. This nexus is the point to which all development or proof of human knowledge is referred.

In the case of the Christian Platonist (to be specific), all such knowledge has the substance of “change”: hypothesis, higher hypothesis, hypothesizing the higher hypothesis. Thus, knowledge as a process is not merely non-linear in the relatively limited sense of non-algebraic function in general; it reaches into the still higher domain of the “alephs” (“N’s”), as the discontinuities of the pedagogical series A, B, C, D, E, ..., are such. In the contrary case, the Aristotelian, the Ockhamite, the principle of the syllogism—the linear principle of Kronecker, et al.—takes the place of Platonic change.

The Platonic social relationship is essentially educational, as the Schiller or von Humboldt (Christian) humanist educational programs, or the related aesthetical principles of Schiller illustrate such a relationship. It is as we have summarized the matter above, the generation of thought-objects, as in the use of primary sources to replicate the creative-mental processes experienced by an original discoverer as part of the genius reproduced within the mind of many students. Thus, in the republican, anti-oligarchical humanist tradition of Solon, Plato, and the Christian Platonist, the quality of change, as we have defined its significance, is the essential, non-linear social relationship.

In the contrasted, oligarchic scheme, man’s individual and collective relationship to both man and nature is that arranged by the Sophist’s nominalist reading of the literal commands issued on behalf of the Olympian “blobs,” as Lycurgus’ Spartan communist oligarchy illustrates the point. Literal, deductive, linear consistency, as typified by Aristotle’s and Kant’s principle of the syllogism and categories, is the prescribed form of relationship among persons, and of mankind to nature.

On this account, if one does not see the unbridgeable gulf separating Socrates and Plato from the evil Aristotle, one understands nothing of the underlying issues of modern scientific work. On this account, among Plato’s attacks upon the Eleatic forerunners of Aristotle and the Sophists, his concentrated Parmenides dialogue takes us most directly to the core of Plato’s thought and method. If one does not grasp the significance of that dialogue, one understands nothing of Plato’s work and standpoint. A related point: the student who has not yet experienced the abyssal and tectonically violent issues separating Plato from Parmenides and Parmenides’ Sophist followers, one has not yet grasped anything of the principal issues of European thought during the past 2,500 years.

The Parmenides dialogue, with its central ontological paradox, is also the key, both to the Platonic ontological proof for the existence of God the Creator, and to recognizing the implications of the two indicated, mutually opposing, humanist versus oligarchical, social systems, as the root of those axiomatic differences in method which divide all of the recent 2,500 years of European civilization into two, thus far, perpetually warring cultural camps.

On this point of cultural differences, the oligarchical representative Sir Isaac Newton conceded—unlike British oligarchs Kelvin, Clausius, Grassmann, Helmholtz, Maxwell, and Rayleigh, later—that the false picture of the universe, the “entropic” one, which is characteristic of the method of his Principia, was the result of a vicious defect in his choice of mathematics. That defective mathematics was the same syllogism-based formal algebra which underlies axiomatically the flawed “generally accepted classroom mathematics” of today. Any attempt to portray a universe in terms consistent with such a philosophically oligarchical, gnostic, linear mathematics, consistent with the principle of the syllogism, must represent the universe falsely, and pervasively so: from frontiers of scale in astrophysics, to frontiers of scale, beyond 10^-18 centimeters, in microphysics. Linear mathematics must represent the phenomena falsely, superimposing upon the array of data a false image of an efficient statistical principle of universal entropy (“Time’s Arrow,” this folly is sometimes named).

Similarly, as in the included case of mathematics’ sly imposition of its vicious ideology upon the image of nature, does the axiomatic root of a method of thinking determine the policies of practice in all aspects of cultural determination of individual and social life. In this way, two mutually irreconcilable methods, the Platonic notion of universal change, versus the Aristotelian notion of a universal syllogistic principle, define implicitly, in their
interaction, the essential features of the ruling cultural warfare of the recent 2,500 years.

**Parmenides and the Aleph-Transfinite**

The oligarchical syllogistic method, as Bertrand Russell’s and Alfred North Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica* depicts a radical Ockhamite form of Aristotelian mathematics, is axiomatically simple, one might say “brutishly simple.” As the case of the great Professor David Hilbert’s pathological “Tenth Problem” ably illustrates this point, the comprehension of Platonic axiomatics notoriously less simple. To be certain our ontological proof is stated without omission of any crucial pedagogical point, we describe summarily the importance of this present writer’s relevant 1952 discovery.

In the culminating work of his *magnum opus* series on the transfinite, the 1897 *Beiträge*, Georg Cantor provides a systematic view of his last great discovery, the transfinite *alephs* (N’s). Certain among Cantor’s sophisticated admirers, then and later, praised this discovery, many with the curiously mistaken assertion, that Cantor had discovered a higher class of numbers which had no useful place in the real world. This latter mistaken opinion is analogous to the prevailing scholarly misinterpretation of Plato’s *Parmenides* dialogue. This writer’s 1952 solution, as represented in the design of the pedagogical series employed pervasively in this and earlier books and papers, permits a “stronger” treatment of both the *Parmenides* paradox and Cantorian *alephs*, than has been otherwise available.

The crucial added feature of the pedagogical series (A, B, C, D, E, . . .), relative to Plato’s *Parmenides* and Cantor’s treatment of his *alephs*, is this writer’s definition of that series as a sequence of successive increases in *potential population-density*. This addition leads to solution of hitherto perplexing problems in the physical economic functional definition of the Leibnizian term, *technology*. That, in turn, defines a quality of process in which Cantor’s *alephs* acquire a unique physical significance.

The apparent problem of these *alephs*, is, that, apparently, by construction, they do not permit the kind of notion of functional ordering which we associate with a mathematical physics. They differ thus from algebraic and also non-algebraic series. In the pedagogical series A, B, C, D, E, . . ., the commas correspond to formal discontinuities. These discontinuities are *alephs*, by construction; they also correspond to the indicated *action of change*, and thus to “thought-objects.” As thought-objects of such a series, they have a certain kind of *two-fold functional ordering*. They have the *analysis situs* order of “necessary predecessor”; they are a series subsumed *in effect* by rising negentropy (potential population-density).

Look at Plato’s *Parmenides* from this vantage-point. Substitute for the series of sections of that dialogue a series conforming to our pedagogical series here. This substitution does not alter any essential feature of the methodological and ontological issues posed by the original. Yet, this substitution, by introducing technological ordering, shows a case in which the doubly (or, even trebly) transfinite ordering of change is introduced to a dialogue which is perfectly characteristic of the form of Plato’s *Parmenides*. On later reflection, this substitution yields in fact the general form of Plato’s own dialectical argument.

That is to emphasize, once more, that if the change from A to B represents the actions of hypothesis, the series as a whole represents a higher hypothesis action. This, in turn, poses hypothesizing the higher hypothesis. Then, with the introduction of *self-similarly negentropic action* as the metric feature of the higher hypothesis (increase of potential population-density), the meaning of the *Parmenides* is illuminated most brightly. Hypothesizing the higher hypothesis is the “envelope” of all

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*We know the universe by changing it.*

The object of our quest for scientific knowledge, is to refine our hypothesizing the higher hypothesis toward desired lessening of disagreement between our wills and the manifest Will of God.
higher hypotheses, and corresponds to the Becoming; the Becoming defines negatively the Good which bounds and subsumes it.

Examine the quality of analysis situs this (negative) dialectic implies. Begin with the exemplary case of Cusa's "De Circuli Quadratura," and De Non Aliud (The Not-Other). The persistence of a discrete discrepancy, and also a typical non-congruence between a \(2^n\)-regular polygon and the circumscribing circle, shows that the linear (algebraic) species of construction (action) defines the existence of the higher species, circular action, only negatively. Consider the discrete margin of discrepancy between the perfectly defined area of the sphere, and the indeterminately approximate area of the corresponding pseudosphere. However, the higher species, multiply-connected least (circular-derived) action adequately defines subsumed algebraic forms. This set of relations, between lower and higher species of constructions, illustrates the relevant notions of analysis situs ("required predecessor," "required successor").

Given, such a sequence (e.g., of the \(A, B, C, D, E, \ldots\), form). The "required successor" is the higher hypothesis which orders the sequence of changes as a self-similarly negentropic series of a type.

This corresponds to the empirical actuality of cultural evolution.

That type is a one which subsumes perfectly a many. This example supplies a functional significance to the method of the Parmenides dialogue, a dialogue echoed by Cusa's De Non Aliud. So did the application of the relationship of Plato's the Becoming to the Good, applied to the method of the Parmenides dialogue, suffice to point to the crux of Cusa's De Non Aliud.

The Subjectivity of Science

It is fashionable to speak of "scientific objectivity." Yet, like most popular beliefs nowadays, this fashionable conceit is also false. Science is intrinsically subjective. Science is essentially the correlation of our hypothesizing of our formation of higher hypothesis with resulting increases of potential population-density. This hypothesizing, insofar as it governs our on-going process of changing our society's practice, is our relevant action upon the lawfulness of our universe. The gains in potential population-density "measure," in effect, the lessening of the discrepancy between our thinking about the universe and the way in which the universe "thinks" efficiently. It is as if our hypothesizing the higher hypothesis were an attempt to guess at the "hypothesizing of the higher hypothesis" by the universe. The "reward" for our thinking in the right direction, is increase of our society's potential population-density.

This subjectivity of scientific thinking is key to defining the interaction of the humanist and opposing, oligarchical cultural impulses: the respective consequences of a culture based upon either the oligarchical gnostic principle of the syllogism, or of the opposing principle of "Platonic ideas."

Sir Isaac Newton once held the key in his hand. The gnostic principle of the syllogism, expressed as mathematics, is a pagan religious ideology, which superimposes an entropic principle upon the array of data it adopts; true, such a mathematical ideology imposes entropy also upon the practice of a credulous society. As the Golden Renaissance of Cusa et al. demonstrates the reverse, the practice of "Platonic ideas" (change) imposes negentropy not only upon the data as a whole, but also social practice.

If Isaac Newton did, thus, recognize the falseness of that "clock-winder" ("entropic") portrait of nature, which his Principia presented, and, if he also recognized (as he did) that this false portrait was directly the result of a flaw in the mathematics he had adopted, why did he not choose a different mathematics? Why did he not choose a readily available, alternate mathematics which was free of that specific flaw, that mathematics of Johannes Kepler from which Newton and his Rosicrucian cronies of the London Royal Society had plagiarized such notable contents of the Principia as Kepler's discovery of the correct algebraic formulation for universal gravitation? The answer to these, and other such questions is veiled behind the lurid fact, that Newton and other Ashmolean scalawags among the followers of Francis Bacon and Robert Fludd were pagan mystics, a collection of gnostic, cabalistic practitioners of black magic in the image of Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus.

What lies behind that sordid veil of Ashmolean debauchery? What but that which the higher-ranking English people (and others) of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries knew as "the Venetian Party" of Paolo Sarpi's casa nuova, the "blobs" transplanted North by the usurers of Venice. Newton was a lackey of those "Venetian Party blobs." The history of this Venetian Party in England, notably from the 1520's onward, is a topic of most importance and detail in its own right; let us limit our treatment of it here to stipulating those few most urgently relevant highlights, as follows.

In the middle of the fourteenth century, England repudiated its usuriously pyramided debt to the House of Bardi. This event triggered an avalanche of similar debt-repudiations throughout Western Europe. During
the hundred-odd years preceding that event, and following the A.D. 1250 death of the Hohenstaufen Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II, these evil, usurious Venice-led fondi had nearly destroyed the economies, the Church, and the political institutions of Western Europe by “IMF conditionalities”—like measures, promoting economic collapse, wars, famine, and epidemic—wiping out half the population of Europe in the greatest genocide until the twentieth century’s looting of the so-called “developing sector.” Thus, the middle decades of the fourteenth century are known in the history texts as the “New Dark Age.” The wave of mid-fourteenth century bankruptcies of Lombard “blobsters” created the opening into which the Christian humanist forces advanced, leading to their glorious Golden Renaissance of the fifteenth century.

The central figure of the mid-fifteenth century Renaissance was the towering intellect of that priest, theologian, scientist, and statesman, Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa. Several times during the 1430’s and 1440’s, Cusa played a crucial role in reconstituting the shattered Christian Church, and also defined the indispensable foundations of modern scientific method in his *De Docta Ignorantia* and in his relevant later writings. Venice responded promptly with efforts to destroy the work of the A.D. 1439 Council of Florence, and the influence of the Platonic Christian humanists. On the practical side, Venice and its Ottoman partners conspired with the leading Aristotelian gnostic of Mount Athos, Scholarius (later Patriarch Gennadios) to bring Constantinople and the Greeks under the partitioning of Greece by Venice and the Ottomans, in A.D. 1453. At the same time, Venice worked virtually to drive the memory of Cusa from the Church, and to establish Aristotle as the official pagan philosopher of organized Catholic, Byzantine, and Protestant theology during the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

By the middle of the sixteenth century, Venice had nearly succeeded. Venice’s usurious “IMF conditionalities” had plunged Europe into what some have described as a hundred years of a “little dark age,” until the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. By 1648, the name of Cusa had been driven into obscurity by Venetian calumnies. This is the background for the launching of strange pseudo-scientific, gnostic cults by the oligarchical faction, from approximately the beginning of the seventeenth century. Typical are Francis Bacon’s rantings against England’s greatest scientist of that time, and Rosicrucian Robert Fludd’s attacks upon Johannes Kepler. The strange features of Descartes’ *deus ex machina* dogma, and of the Rosicrucian kookery by the Ashmolean London Royal Society’s Isaac Newton, et al., represent the pro-Aristotelian Venetian Party’s basing of both Cartesian formalism and English liberalism and empiricism upon the revived core of theological dogmas of French medieval “Buggery” (“Bogomil/Cathars”). This echo of “Buggery” persisted after the seventeenth century, as the axiomatic basis for the philosophical standpoint of such exemplary influentials as David Hume, Adam Smith, Voltaire, Rousseau, Bentham, and the “French (pro-Aristotelian) Enlightenment” generally, Immanuel Kant, Karl S. Savigny, and today’s positivists.

This tradition of “Buggery” in the misused name of science, is known to us most commonly as “materialism,” although it has other expressions, including wildly mystical speculations. The “Buggers,” otherwise known formerly as the “Bogomils” or “Cathars,” were, like their Manichean forerunners, a Byzantine-created cult, deployed by Constantinople as part of its arsenal of alternating military and cultural warfare against both the so-called barbarians and Western Christianity. The usury-practicing Bogomil cult, thus established in Byzantine Thrace (Bulgaria) about 1,000 years ago, spread across Bosnia into the commercial centers of northern Italy and southern France’s Rhône and Cologne-Tarne-Pyrenees regions. The cult’s notion of an “elect” was based upon a Dionysiac/yin-yang notion of hermetic separation of the spiritual from the material realm. That is a hermetic distinction perfectly consistent with Aristotle’s *Organon* and the Aristotelian “Big Bang” dogma of Creation attacked by Philo of Alexandria. Although this Bogomil cult was nearly destroyed several times, including the case of the “Albigensian Crusade,” its network of usury, extending across northern Italy, enabled it to persist into the sixteenth century, whence are derived the prominent reflections of its dogmas of “elect” and “spiritual/material” dichotomy in Descartes’ *deus ex machina* and other ways. The Rosicrucian cults of the London Royal Society, and Newton’s *hypotheses non fingo* are consistent reflections of the usury-network’s deeply embedded tradition of such Buggery.

The relevance of the Padua Aristotelians’ promotion of Bogomil dogmas in this way, ought to be clear at this point in our report.

In science, *spiritual* signifies *imago viva Dei*, those faculties of creative reason which cast man in the imperfect likeness of the Creator. Similarly, it signifies three conscious states of the maturely developed creative intellect: *hypothesis*, *higher hypothesis*, and *hypothesizing the higher hypothesis*. The essence of such scientific activity, is the role of the spiritual, as cause, in changing the ordering of the ostensibly *material*. 
From the standpoint of the oligarchical “blobs” pagan-priestly lackeys, the useful feature of the sexually aberrant Bogomil dogma was the passionate extremes to which these Buggers went in outlawing interaction between the creative powers of the spiritual realm and their usury-bound material domain. The motive of Venice’s sixteenth and seventeenth century’s Aristotelians for promoting the Bogomil dogma as Cartesian deus ex machina and English Rosicrucianism, was essentially the same as the impulse among today’s oligarchs for promoting “ecological” anti-science fanaticism under such rubrics as the satanic (gnostic) dogma of stewardship, or revived pagan worship of Satan’s putative Delphic mother, Gaia.

In summary of this point: the seventeenth-century oligarchs attempted to destroy, and replace then-existing institutions of Renaissance science, by aid of the following doctrinal argument. “The world of perceived things, the material world, is the realm of Satan, a realm which operates according to its own, nether-world logic, Aristotelian logic. You must deal with this nether-world of perceived things on its own terms, and never attempt to mix in anything pertaining to the higher, spiritual domain.” Hence, Descartes’ deus ex machina and the London Royal Society’s war-cry, “Hypotheses non fingo!”

The same echo of medieval Buggery dominates, permeates the work of Immanuel Kant, and also the nineteenth-century dogmatic, neo-Kantian Romanticism of Karl Savigny’s war-cry: “Absolute separation of Geisteswissenschaft (spiritual) and Naturwissenschaft (material)!” Thus, it was avowed by these modern Buggers, that there must be no attempt to find the connection between science and the fine arts, or to consider any principle of creative discovery in efforts to define the characteristics of valid work in the physical sciences. Such was the doctrine of Kant. Such is the basis, in the tradition of Buggery, for today’s “generally accepted classroom mathematics.”

To repeat the crucial point of rebuttal, we summarize the case as follows. We are able to demonstrate knowledge of nature, not from repetition of the same facts of perception, but only by showing a correlation between our states of mind and increase of man’s power over nature, as measurable in per-capita and per-square-kilometer terms. It is this kind of efficiency of material change, as a consequence of the spiritual change we experience as Platonic hypothesis, higher hypothesis, and hypothesizing the higher hypothesis, which is the sole basis for that which deserves the name of human knowledge.

We note, and emphasize, in this connection the aleph-like ephemerality of a creative action which shows itself to be the most powerful agency internal to the universe of the Becoming.

Thus, through showing the creative power of the spiritual, hypothesis, we expose the quality of imago viva Dei in its aspect as efficient agency. This shows man as participating in God! Through knowing this connection, we have access to certainty respecting the efficient existence of God as the higher species of universal personality which bounds and subsumes both our universe and ourselves individually.

We see thus directly the fallacy, the Buggered-up quality of Dawkins’ thinking. He proceeds, according to his own insistence on the point, from a materialist standpoint (in “evolutionary theory”), a standpoint which was established for the specific purpose of excluding fanatically all signs of the spiritual domain from contemplation of perceived things. This policy, this so-called materialist method, was introduced directly, contrary to a two-hundred-year record of the greatest material scientific successes in history by persons who rejected the materialist method.

Thus, we should not be astonished at the spectacle of those only philosophically illiterate, or, in some cases
lying professors today, who insist that science is essentially “objective”; there exist the strongest motives of factional self-interest, among the oligarchical party, to conceal the mystical depths of their own subjectivity, the subjectivity upon which the popularized delusion of “objective materialist science” is premised rhetorically.

“The Best of All Possible Worlds”

If we measure history by the standard of each person as imago viva Dei, we have a completely different notion of history in general than is taught in our foolish university textbooks and kindred places. We summarize this proof, beginning with the case of the individual person as such. Each of us, by the time we enter adolescence, knows that person never lived—“Even great physical works erode tectorially; there exist the strongest motives of textbooks and kindred places. We summarize this proof,

entropic degree of required offset to depletion of man-improved natural resources. Thus, although, as the two foregoing examples imply, the necessity for a life lived long ago may be expressed in terms of a concrete work, such examples do not address the essence of the matter in a general way. It is the participation of, one may wish, all of the population's individuals in the continuing process of generation, transmission, and efficient assimilation of the fruits of combined, fundamental scientific and Classical fine-arts progress, which is the essence of the human species' ability to continue to both merely exist as a species, and to progress. Thus, the development of the individual person's “divine spark” of potential for creative reason, imago viva Dei, is the essence of history, and thus the measure of the immortal necessity earned by an individual mortal life.

This reflection should guide the reader's thoughts toward a higher notion of relativistic space-time. To wit: we observed a kind of analysis situs which applies, demonstrably, to the domain of creative reason's “thought-objects.” We observe, that in that space-time, of that analysis situs ordering, the relations among efficient ideas (“thought-objects”) have a characteristic paralleling isochronicity in the domain of non-algebraic physical functions. On such grounds, we may not know the design of God's own clock, but we can see its reflection within a domain of our “thought-objects,” the domain Plato named “the Becoming,” Georg Cantor's higher transfinite. That reflection is, as we have just indicated, a far different sort of a clock than that to which we are accustomed in measuring ordinary, mere perceptions.

Think! When we reach back into history, to employ and modify a discovery a century or more ago, we are changing the past in the essential feature of all things past, their outcome for our future. Once we shift our notion of what is essential, from the relatively petty matters of perception, to that which is historically essential, the “world-line” of necessary predecessors and successors in the isochronic domain of “thought-objects,” we're in a higher, truer universe, qualitatively different than the inferior world of mere perception, a wonderful domain in which I may know Plato, or Nicolaus of Cusa, far better, more intimately than a sibling in my household.

It is from the vantage-point of such relations among efficient “thought-objects,” which he named “monads,” that Gottfried Leibniz spoke of that domain as “the best of all possible worlds,” the “best world” one might choose to inhabit.

What, then, of poor Richard Dawkins’ pathetically blasphemous public utterance of this recent April 15; did
that transpire in “the best of all possible worlds”? The largest genocide in history, executed upon Africa by such means as “IMF conditionalities,” is occurring; is that an event in the “best of all possible worlds”? We might continue so.

A friend has recently translated into English three extremely important essays, on the subject of tragedy, by history’s greatest tragedian, Friedrich Schiller. In these three are stressed, in an excellent way, a topic which fills Schiller’s treatments of the intertwined topics, tragedy and history, in many more instances than these three. The gist of the matter to be emphasized here, is that the emotions are an integral feature of our powers of reason, creative reasoning most emphatically so. I know that the sight of great suffering, real or Classical tragedy, musters within me a well-spring of motivating strength, to the purpose of goading me to solve the quality of problem which has afflicted my emotions in that painful way. In that way, in “this best of all possible worlds,” despite himself, Professor Dawkins’ shameful piece of public blasphemy may evoke from others, by negation, a good thing we might otherwise lack.

That now said, in conclusion of this, let us turn our imagination to the Prometheus of Aeschylus’ *Prometheus Bound.* Prometheus warns the immortal, Olympian “blobs” by the ears of Zeus’s message-bearing lackey, that there is a real god who will work justice upon both Olympian pretenders and on behalf of mankind. I am certain that Aeschylus’ Prometheus is a true prophet; we shall have an end of Olympus’ tyranny soon, and that by aid of God’s own agent, the *imago viva Dei* acting within men and women. Then, soon, I presume that Professor Dawkins will begin to recognize the ontological proof of the existence of God.

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**ADDENDUM**

**On the Subject of God:**

**Suffix**

A friend, after reading the draft of this work, suggested that I compare my argument with the content of Book II of St. Augustine’s *Free Choices of the Will.* From this, I have adduced two topics whose brief treatment may help to clarify further the arguments central to my principal text. The first, prompted by Chapter II, Section III of Augustine’s text, I caption now “The Correspondence Among ‘Free Will,’ ‘The Power of Reason,’ and ‘Self-Similar Negentropy.’” The second, prompted by Chapter VIII of Augustine’s text, I caption now “The Paradox of Indefinite Divisibility of Number.”

Chapter II, §III of Augustinus’ *Free Choices of the Will*

The Correspondence Among ‘Free Will,’ ‘The Power of Reason,’ And ‘Self-Similar Negentropy’

Populist hermeneutics misdefines “free will” as a matter of mechanical choices. The “freedom” of the voter to choose the received “lesser of two evils” in the 1992 general election, is an example of that pathetic opinion. In my book, on the contrary, “freedom” is equal to those exercises of truth-seeking creative reason in the sense I have employed that term in this and other relevant published locations.

To the point, a beast may choose, even if he is likened to Balaam’s Ass. So much for “unhuman behavior”; creative reason signifies more than choice; it signifies an included quality of negentropy, or, for emphasis, “evolutionary negentropy” as that is described in the article above.

To “do what is right,” is not to select one from among an array of two or more alternatives presented; to “do right” is to do only that which promotes the cause of the right in defiance of all wrongs, including all “lesser evils.” That “right” is not the mere avoidance of evil (wrongs), but has a required negentropic quality, even as 1 Corinthians 13 defines the requisite quality of *agapē*.

For example. In music, to repeat a thematic passage over and over, without developmental change, as Maurice Ravel’s experimental “Bolero,” for one case, is a degradation of music. In music, constant simple repetition, like monotony *per se,* is to be abhorred. Negentropic change, as the Haydn-Bach-Mozart form of the *Motivführung* principle of unifying equivalence in composition exemplifies this, is the essence of truth in artistic beauty in Classical composition. This principle, as typified by two outstanding Mozart songs, his *Abendempfindung* and *Ave Verum Corpus,* is also key to the perceived quality of *agapē* in great artistic compositions.
The complementarity/interdependence between the "evolutionary negentropic" quality of creative reason, and the quality of "sacred love," *agape*, is the reflection of the *Good*, of *rightness*, in the macrocosm.

It should not be inferred from this excerpt from Augustinus that good deeds are always followed by simple rewards to the doer. Only a fool would deny that Augustinus was already aware of martyrs at the time of writing this referenced passage. However, the society does not soon discover itself to have lost its moral fitness to survive. All individual *Good*, and its consequences, lie essentially in the macrocosm, in the larger process in which the mortal individual action participates.

Chapter VIII of Augustinus' *Free Choices of the Will*

The Paradox of Indefinite Divisibility of Number

Georg Cantor's referenced *Beiträge* obliges us to look in a new way at the nature of attempts at an indefinite divisibility of number. Nonetheless, although it might appear that Augustinus suffers from a deficient mathematical education, the point of his argument endures on the condition we shift the discussion of Augustinus' illustrative point from the standpoint of Cantor's *Beiträge*. For example, referenced, above, are a treatment of the polygonal series to the *n*, through *n* = 256.

Nature is not "indefinitely divisible" in a simple way. However, the proofs of that fact lead us to Cantor's discovery of the *aleph*, as presented in his *Beiträge*. Thus, as we have corrected, above, such relatively popularized misreadings of Cantor's work as that of David Hilbert, a rigorous form of failed attempt to solve problems of convergence "at infinity" is the basis for proving Augustinus' point respecting the faculty of reason.

NOTES

1. The quoted passage is from the April 16, 1992 wire-dispatch summary by EIR News Service. Dawkins' reference to "order" and "beauty," appears to be a direct slap against the 1961 "informal proof of God" by Princeton University's Professor Kurt Gödel; that appearance is buttressed, twofold, by the fact that Dawkins' radical-positivist argument is virtually plagiarized intact from "linguistics" co-founder Rudolf Carnap's 1941 arguments against Gödel.


5. Admittedly, "Platonic ideas" are not to be confused with the ordinary positivist definition of the term. Hence, for several years, this writer accepted the suggestion that Plato's *eidos* be translated as the English "species," or Cantor "type." For reasons grounded in the argument of his "On the Subject of Metaphor," *op. cit.*, it is better to adhere to the two-word translation, "Platonic ideas."


9. This is proven implicitly by Plato, as in his already referenced *Parmenides*. Modern proofs of this, such as Georg Cantor's, or the famous "Gödel's Proof" of Professor Kurt Gödel, are reflections of Plato's original model proof. Although a correspondent of Gödel's, Göttlingen's famous Professor David Hilbert never understood the most essential implications of Cantor's *Beiträge*; *cf.* Georg Cantors Briefe, ed. by Herbert Meschkowski and Winfried Nilson (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1991), *passim*. This is perhaps nowhere more plainly displayed than by Hilbert's axiomatic blunder proposing his famous, intrinsi-


11. Ibid., chap. III.

12. Ibid., passim; also, LaRouche, "Metaphor," op. cit., passim.


15. Ibid.


19. Contrary to later apologies for the London-allied Enlightenment circles, France's continued leading position in the world's science and technology, through 1815, was centered in the Platonic heritage of Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Académie des Sciences, and its successor, the Leibnizian Gaspard Monge's École Polytechnique of 1794-1814. The factional opposition represented the contrary, Aristotelian, "Enlightenment" method. With the victory of Castlereagh's faction at the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna, the Holy Alliance forces inside the Restora­tion Bourbon monarchy expelled Monge and his program from the École Polytechnique, putting French science under the vastly less competent leadership of the Marquis de Laplace and Laplace's protege, Augustin Cauchy.

20. This is a point from the (Leibnizian) science of physical economy. The continued existence of any society, even one of fixed population, must deplete natural conditions upon which the existing standard of per-capita and per-square-kilometer productivity depends. This depletion must be offset by an at least equal margin of growth of per-capita productivity. Hence, a minimal rate of advancement of employed technology is required.

21. The Brothers of the Common Life was a religious community founded in 1376 by the Dutchman Gerhard Groote. Based on a rule of personal piety known as the devoteo moderna, the movement followed the precepts expressed by Thomas à Kempis in his The Imitation of Christ and The Christian's Exercise: or, Rules to Live Above the World While We Are in It. A Kempis also wrote "The Life of the Reverend Master Gerard the Great, Commonly Called Groote." Nicolaus of Cusa received his early education from the Brothers of the Common Life community at Davenport. See Albert Hyma, The Brethren of the Common Life (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1950).

Either way, the moral assessment of Aristotle's thinking remains essentially the same.


63. The well-known "free market" economist Adam Smith was a paid retainer of the British East India Company throughout most of his career. According to the family biography of William Petty, Earl of Shelburne (1737-1805), during a rather famous carriage ride to London in 1763, Lord Shelburne, a member of the East India Company's ruling "secret committee," commissioned Smith to prepare the research outline for an ambitious study of the rise and fall of the Roman Empire. The outcome of that Shelburne-Smith discussion was Edward Gibbon's *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*.

64. Jeremy Bentham served as resident philosopher and counterinsurgency specialist for the British East India Company from 1776 through his death in 1830. He was one of the principal propagandists of the Enlightenment concept of the "pleasure-pain calculus," which posited the idea that human beings are merely animals driven by the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain. An avowed enemy of the American Revolution, Bentham, operating out of the Earl of Shelburne's estate, ran a "radical writers workshop" which produced many of the speeches and pamphlets for the Jacobins in France. He later entered into a close collaboration with the American traitor Aaron Burr, and was part of the Burr plot to establish a new British colony in what was later the Louisiana Territory. When Burr fled North America, he took up residence at Bentham's estate in England. Among Bentham's most noteworthy economic writings is his essay, "In Defence of Usury."

74. We are using the term “empiricist” here in its “generic,” rather
69. See footnote 35.
68. On “hereditary principle,” see LaRouche, “Metaphor,” op. cit.,
32. pp. 32-36.
69. See footnote 35.  
70. LaRouche, “Mozart’s Revolution,” op. cit.  
71. Ibid., p. 12.  
72. Ibid., p. 17.  
73. Giammaria Ortes (1713-1790), influential Venetian economist,
whose works were plagiarized by various of the British school
of political economy (Adam Smith et al., emphatically including
Karl Marx), following the consolidation of Venetian control
over England. His “Calculation of the Pleasures and Pains of Life”
(1757) formed the basis for the Benthamite hedonistic calculus
(see footnote 64); the economic models he based upon this
philosophy of “man as beast” are developed in the works of
“Free Traders” from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman, including
today’s illiterate Jeffrey Sachs. His Reflessioni sulla popolazione
delle nazioni per rapporto all’economia nazionale (Reflections
on the Population of Nations in respect to National Economy)
(Venice: 1790) was plagiarized and popularized by Parson
Thomas Malthus in his “On Population.” Ortes was the only
Italian economist cited by Karl Marx in his Capital (Vol. I). See
Scrittori classici italiani di economia politica; ed. by P. Custodi
(Milan: 1802-16).
74. We are using the term “empiricist” here in its “generic,” rather
than more narrowly proprietary definition. Specifically, we
are including British liberal philosophy and Franco-Viennese positi-
ivism under the same rubric.
75. Freude, schöne Götterfunken, Tochter aus Elysium: Götterfunken
equals “God’s sparks.” The reference is to Beethoven’s famous
Ninth Symphony setting of Friedrich Schiller’s “Ode to Joy”
(“An Die Freude”).
76. William of Occam (Occam) (d.1349). A radical Averroist gnos-
tic, forerunner of empiricists such as John Locke and David Hume,
and, later, Ernst Mach and Sigmund Freud, the lowest
intellectual form of neo-Aristotelianism.
77. Roughly speaking, Georg Cantor’s work equates his notion of
transfinite to Plato’s Becoming, and places the idea of an absolute
infinite beyond both transfinite and becoming, in the domain of
Plato’s the Good.
78. This is the formulation from Gottfried Leibniz which drove
the author of Candide, the gnostic Voltaire, into his frenzy of
hatred on the subject.
79. Leopold Kronecker (1823-1891), professor of mathematics at
the University of Berlin, student of the great Lejeune Dirichlet;
but a fanatical, cabbalistically inclined formalist, famous for the
savagery of his vendettas against mathematicians Carl Weiers-
strass and Georg Cantor. See Uwe Parpart, “The Concept of the
54-56.
80. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), grandson of British-empiricist
Prime Minister, and anti-American foe of President Abraham
Lincoln, Lord John Russell. Bertrand is regarded by some well-
informed circles as not only a savage racialist mass-murderer
against people of darker complexions, but one of the most evil
political figures of the twentieth century. In mathematics, a
radical empiricist, early author of a bungling but hateful text
(Lectures on Geometry) attacking Karl Gauss, Wilhelm Weber,
and Bernhard Riemann. His influential misrepresentation of
Cantor’s work is a travesty.
81. The commonplace worst case of this classroom problem is the
radical-postivist “New Math,” popularized since the close of
the 1950’s.
82. Satan equals Lucifer, Apollo, Python, Dionysus, Osiris, Baal,
The best-organized Satanist forces currently operating in the
United States include the Lucis Trust. This putatively respect-
able, United Nations-accredited Satan cult—it worships Luci-
fer—operates in New York City out of the United Nations, and
also the Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine. The Lucis
Trust runs the “Temple of Understanding” at United Nations
headquarters, the only religious chapel so located. It was origin-
ally founded in London in 1922, as the Lucifer Trust. The
Lucis Trust associated with the U.N. is the New York affiliate
of the British organization; the name was changed from Lucifer
Trust to Lucis, to make the nature of the organization less
conspicuous. For a review of the spread of satanism today, see
Carol White, Satanism: Crime Wave of the ’90’s, EIR Special
Report (Washington, D.C.: Exe cutive Intelligence Review,
1990).
84. A humorless obsession with nominalist literal, “dictionary”
meanings, is associated with schizophrenic tendencies in lan-
guage behavior. In professional and related work, this is a
destructive phenomenon, and plainly, functionally a pathologi-
cal disorder of the mind.
85. Cf. LaRouche, “The Science of Christian Economy,” chap. IV,
op. cit., pp. 229-240.
87. Georg Cantor, Beiträge, op. cit., passim.
88. See Friedrich Schiller, “On the Aesthetical Education of Man,”
in Friedrich Schiller, Poet of Freedom, Vol. I, ed. by William F.
Wertz, Jr. (New York: New Benjamin Franklin House, 1985);
also “What Is, and to What End Do We Study, Universal History?”
in Friedrich Schiller, Vol. II, op. cit. For Wilhelm von Humboldt’s educational policy, see footnote 21; see also Joachim
H. Knoll and Horst Siebert, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Politiker
und Pedagoge (1767-1867) (Bad Godesberg: Inter Nationes,
1967).
89. Unfortunately, the term “neo-Platonist” has been pre-empted
by a collection of quasi-Aristotelian, anti-Plato, gnostic cults of
Byzantine origin. Such cults have nothing to do with Plato or
Christian Platonism.
90. Friedrich Schiller, “The Legislation of Lycurgus and Solon,”
op. cit.
91. The so-called “Second Law of Thermodynamics,” or “Law of
Entropy,” concocted by Kelvin and Clausius during the 1850’s, is
essentially a rewarmed Newton “clock-winder” fallacy. Entropy
occurs, of course; it is the gnostic dogma, a so-called “law of
universal entropy,” which is the kookery in question.
92. See footnote 48.
93. See Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia
Mathematica, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press,
94. Georg Cantor, Beiträge, op. cit.
95. The LaRouche texts referenced include the cited Christian Econo-
my, “Metaphor,” and “Mozart’s Revolution.”
96. Nicolaus of Cusa, “De Circuli Quadratura,” op. cit.
97. Nicolaus of Cusa, “De Non Aliud” (“The Not-Other”), in To-
wards a New Council of Florence: “On the Peace of Faith” and
Other Works of Nicolaus of Cusa, ed. and trans. by William F.
98. The pseudosphere is the rotation, as around the abscissa of a
three-coordinate system, of the tractrix. Therefore, the area of
the surface of the pseudosphere differs from the area of the
surface of the corresponding sphere by an infinitesimally discrete, but not eliminable discrepancy. See diagrams below.

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100. "Humanist" is employed here in its original, Renaissance meaning, as "Classical humanist" or "Christian Classical humanist," not the modern atheistic, "secular humanist.
103. See H. Graham Lowry, How the Nation Was Won, op. cit.
104. See footnote 32.
105. See Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century (New York: Knopf, 1978); see also Carol White, New Dark Ages, op. cit., passim.
108. De Docta Ignorantia was completed on Feb. 12, 1440. A major attack on the work, written by the Aristotelian John Wenck and entitled On Unknown Learning (De Ignota Litteratura) was written between March 26, 1442 and mid-summer of 1443. Cusa's response, entitled A Defense of Learned Ignorance, was completed on Oct. 9, 1449.


112. The Phrygian Satan-figure's Indo-European name signifies "day-night," indicating the yin-yang and other affiliations.
114. Once a Cathar effected the rite of passage to the ranks of the elect, he could not place his semen in the vagina of a woman; he was permitted almost any substitute form of recreation. Hence the name Bugger.
115. The substitution of "stewardship" for "dominion" in Genesis 1:28, is the hallmark of the anti-Christian, gnostic "Bible." The Delphi of the Cult of Apollo was originally the site of the Gaia-Phoenix cult. In the case of Python, like that of Shiva, Osiris, er al., the customary "Satan" of the interchangeable serpent/penis imagery: Gaia was ambiguously his consort or mother.
The accepted view today among many, both inside and outside the Catholic Church, is that St. Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1225-74) was an Aristotelian and as such an opponent of Plato (427-347 B.C.). The truth, however, is that Thomas Aquinas actually devoted much of his adult life to defending the Christian faith from being subverted by the philosophy of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), which was rapidly establishing its hegemony over the intellectual thought of his day, and that through the influence of St. Augustine (A.D. 354-430), he adopted the method and most crucial conceptions of Plato's philosophy.

The reason it is important to establish that Aquinas is not an Aristotelian, is that Aristotle's philosophy is contrary not only to the Christian faith, but also to true science.

During Aquinas’ time, a number of Popes, recognizing that the works of Aristotle, which had newly become available in Europe by way of the Arabs, were contrary to the Christian faith, had on several occasions forbidden their being read in the schools. But a simple ban on the reading of Aristotle’s works was obviously insufficient, and may very well have even fueled the crisis. Therefore, in order to effectively combat the influence of Aristotle, especially as his ideas were put into circulation through the writings of Averroës (A.D. 1126-98), Pope Urban IV entrusted the defense of the Christian faith against the influence of the philosophy of Aristotle, to Thomas Aquinas.

This article is based upon a speech prepared for and read to a convention sponsored by the Ibero-American Solidarity Movement (MSIA) in Tlaxcala, Mexico on May 28, 1992.
However, rather than explicitly attacking Aristotle's philosophy as anti-Christian, Aquinas took the approach, which the Catholic Church has traditionally taken in respect to pre-Christian religions and philosophies; that is, not to reject anything that may happen to be true in them, while at the same time correcting that which is false from the standpoint of Christianity.

In his *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas makes it clear not only that this is the approach that he is taking to Aristotle, but also that in so doing he is following in the footsteps of St. Augustine. Citing St. Augustine's work entitled *On Christian Doctrine*, Aquinas writes as follows:

As Augustine says, “If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of heathens.” Consequently, whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended.

Anyone who maintains that Thomas Aquinas was an Aristotelian opponent of Plato, based upon his criticism of Plato on some points and his apparent adoption of Aristotle’s terminology on others, has therefore misunderstood Aquinas’ method.

If one were to classify Aquinas as being in any current of thought, one would have to consider him an Augustinian. Aquinas makes no criticism of Plato’s philosophy which was not already made explicitly or implicitly by Augustine. Therefore, it is accurate to say that Aquinas employed the Platonic method as corrected by Augustine to amend those doctrines of Aristotle which were contrary to the Christian faith.

Both for Aquinas and Augustine, this is expressed in the concept that the Word is the Form of all forms and all things are created through it.

In respect to the first conception—Plato’s eternal ideas—Aquinas repeatedly cites Augustine’s discussion in a work entitled “Eighty-three Different Questions,” in which Augustine writes: “Ideas are the primary forms or the permanent and immutable reasons of real things and they are not themselves formed; so they are, as a consequence, eternal and ever the same in themselves, and they are contained in the divine intelligence.” Aquinas clearly adopts this Platonic viewpoint in the *Summa Theologica*, where he writes: “Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine.”

In respect to the second conception—Plato’s notion of participation in the eternal ideas—Aquinas writes in the *Summa Theologica* that “this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the failure to refer to this has been to some an occasion of error.”

In his *Metaphysics*, in the section entitled “Critique of Doctrine of Ideas,” Aristotle explicitly rejects both the existence of eternal ideas and the notion of participation in them: “In addition, other things do not come from the ideas in any of the usual senses of ‘from.’ But to participate in them is to use empty words and poetic metaphors.” Later in the same book Aristotle writes: “‘participation,’ as we have said before, is nothing.”

### Aquinas' Method as Dialogue

Related to Aquinas’ adoption of these two Platonic conceptions is his employment of Plato’s method of dialogue, as opposed to Aristotle’s logic. In the *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas’ method is to present a negative thesis followed by every conceivable argument that could be mustered in its defense. Next he asserts the contrary based either upon divine revelation or the right use of natural reason, followed by his own reasoned answer. Finally, he responds to each of the objections, which had been advanced in support of the thesis under consideration.

Obviously, this is not the method of syllogism. With respect to each topic under discussion, Aquinas enters into a dialogue with all those who have put forward an argument contrary to the truth. Like Plato in his dialogues, Aquinas then derives the truth from the process of negating these false assertions. This negative approach is the hallmark of the Platonic method and is reflected both in the works of Augustine and in the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, another Christian theologian whose Platonic writings influenced Aquinas.

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### Plato’s Ideas and The Notion of Participation

*AQUINAS, LIKE St. Augustine before him, adopted two of Plato’s most important conceptions, both of which were rejected by Aristotle: first, that God created the universe based upon eternal ideas; and second, that all creatures participate in these ideas, which are located in the Divine Mind.*
Thus, both in respect to his method and in his conception of God and His relationship to His creation, Aquinas effectively aligned himself with the Platonic tradition of St. Augustine, who wrote in the City of God: “It is evident that none come nearer to us than the Platonists.”

Aquinas was also aware of the fact that in On Christian Doctrine, St. Augustine explained why he believed the philosophy of Plato was so much in harmony with Christian theology:

Did not the famous bishop [Ambrose], when he had considered the history of the pagans and found that Plato had traveled in Egypt during the time of Jeremiah, show that Plato had probably been introduced to our literature by Jeremiah so that he was able to teach or to write doctrines that are justly commended?

Although Augustine later concluded in the City of God, that Plato could not have seen Jeremiah (who had died earlier), and could not have read the scriptures (which had not yet been translated into Greek), he nonetheless insisted that Plato probably learned the contents of the scriptures through an interpreter:

That which most of all inclines me almost to assent to the opinion that Plato was not ignorant of those writings, is the answer which was given to the question elicited from the holy Moses when the words of God were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what was the name of that God who was commanding him to go and deliver the Hebrew people out of Egypt, this answer was given: “I am who am; and you shall say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me unto you”; as though compared with Him that truly is, because He is unchangeable, those things which have been created mutable are not—a truth which Plato vehemently held, and most diligently commended.

Thus, it is no accident that, although Aquinas did not have access to Plato’s actual works, which with the sole exception of the Timaeus only became available in Europe in the fifteenth century, he was nevertheless heavily influenced by Plato’s philosophy, through his predecessor St. Augustine, who considered the Platonic distinction between “Being” and “becoming” to have been derived from divinely revealed truth.

Moreover, it was due to this influence of Plato on his work that Aquinas was so highly esteemed by such later Christian Platonists as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), who wrote the following in defense of Aquinas in his Discourse on Metaphysics (1686):

The many investigations which I carried on compelled me to recognize that our moderns do not do sufficient justice to Saint Thomas and to the other great men of that period, and that there is in the theories of the scholastic philosophers and theologians far more solidity than is imagined, provided that these theories are employed a propos and in their place. I am persuaded that if some careful and meditative mind were to take the trouble to clarify and direct their thoughts in the manner of analytic geometers, he would find a great treasure of very important truth, wholly demonstrable.

In his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz goes so far as to derive his entire refutation of Descartes’ concept of extension from Aquinas’ notion of substantial form.

The Transfinite

Perhaps the clearest way to distinguish between Aquinas and Aristotle is through an examination of their respective views of the infinite, as they are reflected in the scientific debate at the end of the nineteenth century over the concept of the “transfinite,” which was set forth by the German mathematician, Georg Cantor (1845-1918).

In August 1879, Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical entitled Aeterni Patris (On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy). In this encyclical, Pope Leo called for a revival of the study of St. Thomas Aquinas both as a means of defending the faith against the atheistic and materialistic philosophies then on the ascendency—which claimed that the Church was opposed to the advance and development of natural science—and to give proper direction based on the Christian faith to the exercise of reason in the natural sciences. As the Pope stressed in the letter, “there is no conflict worthy of the name between certain and accepted conclusions of modern physics and the philosophic principles of the schools.”

In response to this encyclical, there ensued a renaissance of studies of the works of Aquinas in Catholic academies throughout the world, for the purpose of countering the rationalist enlightenment claim that modern physics had exposed the Christian faith as contrary to reason. One of the most productive results of this renaissance was the collaboration which developed be-
tween Georg Cantor and a group of Thomist theologians, who, working in the spirit of Pope Leo's Aeterni Patris, accepted Cantor's revolutionary concept of the mathematical transfinite, as coherent with the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.

The importance of this issue in establishing that Aquinas was not an Aristotelian, but rather an Augustinian in the tradition of Plato, is that the predominant current in modern science during the nineteenth century was Aristotelian, and as such denied the existence of the transfinite. This Aristotelian current argued that there is an unbridgeable gap between God, the absolute infinite, and the created universe, including man, which it claimed to be entirely finite. Therefore, according to this view, the transfinite or an actual infinite is impossible. The practical result of this outlook was to reduce science to materialism and to render God impotent in the world.

The primary source of opposition to Cantor's theory that an actual infinite exists is Aristotle, who, in his *Metaphysics*, argued that "the actual infinite does not exist."

It was assumed falsely by some students of Thomas Aquinas, that Aquinas followed in the footsteps of Aristotle in denying the existence of the actual infinite. To this day, the source usually cited for this assumption is Aquinas' argument in the *Summa Theologica* in the article "On the Infinity of God." However, a close reading of this article shows conclusively that Aquinas did not follow Aristotle, but in reality actually refuted Aristotle.

Aquinas' Notion of the Relative Infinite

Aquinas argues that "God Himself is infinite and perfect," whereas matter without form is imperfectly infinite and is made finite by form: "The infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter, and such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God." Also: "[T]he fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him."

Since "everything outside of God is from God as from its first principle, ... besides God nothing can be infinite." However, Aquinas goes on to explain that "things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite." Furthermore, "[I]t is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite."

Finally, Aquinas argues:

The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things is because the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of an organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.

In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Aquinas explicitly states that Aristotle did not prove that there can be no actual infinite: "In the *Physics* and *On the Heavens* he proves there is no actual infinity in natural bodies, but he does not proved that there is no actual infinity in immaterial substances."

Therefore, according to Aquinas, although only God is absolutely infinite, an actual infinity does exist in immaterial substances. However, because such substances are created, they are relatively infinite.

It is interesting to note that in his *Discourse on Metaphysics* Leibniz specifically points to "what St. Thomas says ... regarding angels and intelligences" as being "true of all substances."

In his "Treatise on the Angels" referred to by Leibniz, Aquinas reiterates his contention that a creature can be relatively infinite: "Every creature is finite absolutely, since its being is not absolutely subsisting but is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite."

Cantor and Cardinal Franzelin

Although Cantor held discussions concerning the transfinite with many leading Thomist theologians, by far his most important discussion partner was Cardinal Johannes Franzelin. In his *Communications on the Theory of
the Transfinite (1887-88), Cantor reproduced copies of an exchange of letters between Cardinal Franzelin and himself.

In response to the questions raised in Cardinal Franzelin’s first letter about how Cantor distinguished between the Absolute Infinite and the actual infinite, Cantor wrote that he employed the expressions “natura naturans” and “natura naturata” in the same manner as the Thomists:

So that in the first expression, God is that which is outside the world, not of created substance, both the permanent Creator and Preserver, but the latter expression describes the created world. Correspondingly, I differentiate between “an eternal, uncreated or absolute infinite,” in reference to God and his attributes, and “a created infinite or transfinite.”

As should be clear from the above referenced quotes from the Summa Theologica, this is precisely the distinction made by Aquinas between God, who is the Absolute Infinite, and His creation, which cannot be absolutely infinite, because it is made, but which can be relatively infinite.

Once Cantor clarified this fundamental distinction, Cardinal Franzelin wrote back as follows:

Thus the two concepts of the Absolute-Infinite and the Actual-Infinite in the created world or in the Transfinite are essentially different, so that in comparing the two one must only describe the former as properly infinite, the latter as improperly and equivocally infinite. When conceived in this way, so far as I can see at present, there is no danger to religious truths in your concept of the Transfinite.

Univocal, Equivocal, and Analogical Predication

Besides the cited distinction between the Absolute Infinite and the relative infinite or transfinite, Franzelin makes a further, related distinction, derived from Aquinas’ philosophy, that is, the distinction between a univocal and equivocal concept of the infinite.

This latter distinction is made by Aquinas in the Summa Theologica in the article “On whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them.” Aquinas concludes that although God created man in His own image, because God, who is absolutely infinite, is the cause of creatures including man, no name belongs to God in the same meaning (univocally) that it belongs to creatures. Thus, although man is created in the likeness of God, he is not the same as God. Therefore, whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

As Aquinas writes: “Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effort which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause receives the likeness of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short.” To counter those who argue that therefore nothing can be known or demonstrated about God from creatures, an error which Aquinas refers to as the fallacy of equivocation, he further stipulates that for this reason he prefers the concept of analogy to that of equivocation. Therefore, predication between God and creatures is “according to analogy, that is, according to proportion. . . Thus whatever is said of God and creature is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently.” In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas states that “because every other being besides God is a being by participation, its being is predicated analogically.”

With the application of this additional distinction, we now see that Cantor’s concept of the actual infinite is completely coherent with the theology of Aquinas. Man and the created universe are relatively infinite in a manner analogous to, rather than univocal with, God, who is the Absolute Infinite.

In contrast to Aristotle, who argues that the human mind is finite, Aquinas correctly argues that the power of the human intellect “extends itself in a way to infinite things.” This is precisely the point made by Cantor in his Foundations:

[T]he human understanding must also be granted the predicate ‘infinite’ in certain respects, which, in my considered opinion, is the only correct thing to do. . . . As limited as human nature may in fact be, much of the infinite nonetheless adheres to it, and I even think that if it were not in many respects infinite itself, the strong confidence and certainty regarding the existence of the Absolute, about which we are all in agreement, could not be explained.

If one reflects upon it, the opposite, Aristotelian conception, that the human understanding is finite, is actually blasphemous from a Christian standpoint. If God created man in His likeness and the human mind were finite, then God Himself were finite or His work defective. In 1888, Cantor quoted St. Thomas Aquinas in making this precise point in a letter to the Thomist priest Ignatius Jeiler:
Were I correct in asserting its truth in terms of the possibility of the Transfinite, then there would be (without doubt) a certain danger of religious error for those of the opposite opinion since: "error concerning creatures redounds in false knowledge concerning God" (Summa Contra Gent. II, 3).

Cantor and Christianity

That Cantor's work was not only coherent with the Christian faith, but actually inspired by it, is clear from Cantor's correspondence and published work. He himself was baptized a Lutheran, but his mother was a Roman Catholic and he explained his interest in Catholic theology by reference to his mother's Catholicism.

In Nov. 1895 in a letter to the French mathematician Charles Hermite, he echoed the Platonic conception of Aquinas and Augustine, in arguing that the natural numbers "exist at the highest level of reality as eternal ideas in the Divine Intellect." In Section 5 of his Communicatioes on the Theory of the Transfinite, he reproduced Chapter 18 of Book XII of St. Augustine's City of God ("Against those who assert that things that are infinite cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God"), in a lengthy footnote to support his notion of the actual infinite. In his 1883 Foundations, he stated that his concept of the transfinite was related to Plato's conception of the infinite, which he says "is an entirely different one than that of Aristotle." In the same location, he further states, "I find points of contact for my conceptions in the philosophy of Nicolaus Cusanus." Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa was a direct successor of Aquinas and himself developed the conception that man is a "finite infinite" or a "contracted infinite," a concept directly related to Aquinas' notion of man as a "relative infinite."

Thus, the source of Cantor's monumental contribution to the physical sciences was clearly his religious faith, and he acknowledged as much. In 1888, he wrote to Jeiler: "I entertain no doubts as to the truth of the transfinities, which I have recognized with God's help...." In a letter to Hermite during January 1894, Cantor—who was not a practicing Catholic—wrote: "Now I only thank God, the all-wise and all-good, that He always denied me the fulfillment of this wish (for a specific university position teaching mathematics), for He thereby constrained me, through a deeper penetration into theology, to serve Him and His Holy Roman Catholic Church better than I would have been able to with my probably weak mathematical powers through an exclusive occupation with mathematics." As he told Esser in February 1896: "From me, Christian philosophy will be offered for the first time the true theory of the infinite."

The Concept of God

Having thus introduced our refutation of the portrayal of Aquinas as an Aristotelian by a discussion of his notion of the infinite as that bears on modern science, we shall now proceed to discuss a number of other key concepts which Aquinas held in direct opposition to Aristotle, beginning with the concept of God.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle rejects Plato's notion that God is self-moving, saying, "It is scarcely consistent for Plato to say, as he sometimes does, that what moves itself is the source of all movement."

In his "Treatise on God" in the Summa Theologica, Aquinas rejects Aristotle's criticism of Plato and endorses the idea that God is self-moving, rather than being an unmoved mover, as Aristotle suggests:

In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself, not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.

Moreover,

since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.

In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas notes that Plato understood the name motion in a wider sense than did Aristotle. For Aristotle understood motion strictly, according as it is the act of what exists in potency inasmuch as it is such. So understood, motion belongs only to divisible bodies.... According to Plato, however, that which moves itself is not a body.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle also argues that the unmoved mover is subordinate to the necessity of his own nature: "If, therefore, there are any things eternal and immovable, nothing can be... against their nature." Aquinas, on the other hand, argues that such a conception would deny God freedom in respect to His creatures. Directly contrary to Aristotle, he writes: "We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things and that He..."
acts by the will and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature."

Directly related to Aristotle's false conception of God as not self-moving and subordinate to necessity, is Aristotle's contention that matter is uncreated. Although his unmoved mover "induces" the movement of the world as a whole, Aristotle's God does not create the world out of nothing. In the *Physics*, Aristotle writes that matter "is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. For if it came to be, something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and which should persist in it; but this is its own special nature, so that it will be before coming to be." Aquinas, on the other hand, insists that the world did not always exist, but was created out of nothing by God.

**The Trinity**

That Aquinas is not an Aristotelian, but rather an Augustinian, is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in his "Treatise on the Trinity" in the *Summa Theologica*. This work, which is based almost entirely upon St. Augustine's book *On the Trinity*, also looks forward to the work of Nicolaus of Cusa on the same subject. In fact, it is interesting to note that Cusa's treatment of the Trinity as unity, equality, and the concord of equality and unity, is immediately derived from Aquinas, who in turn derives it from Augustine, who wrote in *On Christian Doctrine* as follows: "Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit is the concord of equality and unity."

In his "Treatise on the Trinity," Aquinas explicitly makes the point that the Trinity cannot be known by the natural reason as employed by Aristotle. Aquinas takes note of the fact that in *On the Heavens*, Aristotle recognizes the importance of the number three. Aristotle writes as follows:

> For as the Pythagoreans say, the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning, and middle, and end give the number of an "all," and the number they give is the triad. And so, having taken these three from nature as (so to speak) laws of it, we make further use of the number three in the worship of gods.

However, as Aquinas points out, Aristotle clearly had no conception of the Trinity of the Divine Persons in the One God:

> So when Aristotle said "by this number," etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three.

In answer to the question whether the Son is in the Father and conversely, Aquinas makes it clear why Aristotle is incapable of understanding the Trinity. He first points out that the Son and the Father are in each other according to none of the eight modes of one thing existing in another that Aristotle gives in the *Physics*. However, this does not mean that the Son and the Father are not in each other. Rather, according to Aquinas, "What is in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated by the Philosopher are the Son and the Father in each other."

Aristotle's lack of knowledge of the Trinity leads necessarily to crucial differences between Aristotle's concept of man and nature, and that of Aquinas. First, because man is created in the image of God, according to Aquinas, as with Augustine before him, "[w]e must therefore say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons." Thus, according to Aquinas, the human mind in the likeness of God, is triune, consisting of memory, understanding, and will. As Aquinas writes: "So Augustine says that the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive the trinity, not, indeed God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God."

At the same time, since all creatures were created by
the triune God, even though we find a likeness of image only in man as a rational creature, in all other creatures “we find a likeness by way of a trace . . . . In other creatures . . . we do not find the principle of the word, and the word, and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause, that produced them.” Aquinas derives this conception from Augustine, who says in On the Trinity, that “the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures.”

From this Christian notion of the creation of the human mind as the image of God, and of the physical universe as a trace of the same God, follows inescapably the conclusion that the laws which govern the physical universe are coherent with the laws of human mentation. This is the basis for the conclusion arrived at by Georg Cantor in his 1883 Foundations, to the effect that a concept which exists intrasubjectively or immanently in the mind will always exist transsubjectively or transiently in the physical universe as well.

The Filioque

In his “Treatise on the Trinity,” Aquinas asks whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. This issue of whether the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son (Filioque in Latin) is the primary theological issue which has traditionally divided the Roman and Eastern Orthodox Churches since the schism of A.D. 1054.

Aquinas’ defense of the Filioque is a further demonstration of his anti-Aristotelianism, insofar as denial of the Filioque is a reflection of the Aristotelian conception of God and man. One of the arguments Aquinas cites as an objection to the Filioque is based explicitly on Aristotle’s Physics: “the actual and possible do not differ in things perpetual.” According to this argument, it is possible for the Holy Spirit to be distinguished from the Son, even if He does not proceed from Him, since each has his being from the Father in a different way, one by birth and the other by procession. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is actually distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.

Aquinas replies to this Aristotelian argument as follows:

The Holy Spirit is distinguished personally from the Son, since the origin of the one is distinguished from the origin of the other; but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, while the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other. . . .

According to Aquinas, there are two processions from God the Father, that of the Word or intellect and that of the will or love: “Although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still since love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the conception of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.” As Aquinas emphasizes, “nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect.” In other words, “love must proceed from a word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception.”

Another misconception of the Trinity adopted by the Orthodox Church on the authority of Aristotle, was the idea that the Son and the Holy Spirit are inferior to the Father rather than equal. There are two arguments derived from Aristotle to this effect which Aquinas attacks. First, according to Aquinas, Aristotle says that “principle and cause are the same.” Aquinas points out that, following Aristotle, “The Greeks [Orthodox Church] use the words cause and principle indifferently when speaking of God, but the Latin Doctors [Roman Church] do not use the word cause, but only principle.” The Latin Doctors do not use the word cause, because between the cause and the effect there is always a distance of perfection and power, which would imply the inferiority of the Son and the Holy Spirit in respect to the Father, which is not the case.

The second argument derived from Aristotle to deny the equality of the Divine Persons is that equality is in relation to things which are “one in quantity.” From this standpoint, since there is no numerical quantity in the Divine Persons, there can be no equality. Aquinas counters this Aristotelian argument by stressing that the equality of the Divine Persons is in respect to the unity of their essence. To this effect he cites Augustine: “no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness or surpasses in power.”

The Christian Concept of Man

Aquinas’ support of the Filioque, in opposition to the Aristotelian arguments of the Orthodox (Greek) theologians, reflects his own commitment to the idea that man has the capacity to participate in divinity through the imitation of Christ. This is the critical conception, which distinguishes the concept of man in the Christian West.

In his “Treatise on God” in the article “On whether any creature can be like God,” Aquinas argues that we do participate in God, since we are created in His image and likeness. Insofar as man is created and God uncre-
ated, man does not participate in God directly according to the same specific and generic aspect, but rather according to some sort of analogy. Aquinas quotes Dionysius:

When the Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For the same things can be like and unlike to God: like according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause.

In other words, according to Aquinas: “a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God, but not that God is like a creature.”

Aquinas further argues, that although a created intellect cannot see the Divine Essence by its natural powers, it can do so, if God unites Himself to the created intellect by His grace. In other words, if the created intellect is illuminated by divine grace, it can then see the essence of God, because it itself has been made as Aquinas says, “deform,” that is, like to God. Moreover,

the intellect, which participates more of the light of glory, will see God the more perfectly. And he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity, because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire, and desire in a certain way makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the thing desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity will see God the more perfectly and will be the more happy.

In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas writes that “charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Spirit Himself dwelling in the mind.” Thus, “the charity by which formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity.”

What is more, there is no limit to the increase in charity. Aquinas writes: “For charity itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Spirit.” Since, as Aquinas wrote earlier, “we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by mental conception,” the infinite capacity of man to increase his charity entails necessarily the infinite capacity for concept formation. Aquinas states as much elsewhere: “The intellectual soul, because it can comprehend universals, has a power extending to the infinite.”

In taking this view, Aquinas once again does combat with Aristotle, who insisted that the capacity of man as a rational creature is finite. Aquinas first cites the following Aristotelian objection to man’s having an endless capacity to increase his charity: “every movement is towards some end and term,” and therefore charity does not increase without limit. Aquinas then counters: “The increase of charity is directed to an end which is not in this, but in a future life.”

Aristotle’s Ethics

ALTHOUGH IT MIGHT appear from a superficial reading of the Summa Theologica that Aquinas was not critical of Aristotle’s Ethics, the opposite is the case. Aristotle’s Ethics begins by rejecting Plato’s idea of the Good and Plato’s view that all goods derive from participation in the Good itself, which Plato identifies with God. Aristotle first claims that this idea was introduced by “friends of ours,” and then sanctimoniously insists that it is “our duty, for the sake of maintaining the truth, even to destroy what touches us closely . . . for piety requires us to honor truth above our friends.”

In total opposition to Aristotle, Aquinas writes:

Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness as from the first exemplary, effecting and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the likeness of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, by which it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodesses.

As a consequence of Aquinas’ adoption of Plato’s idea of the Good, which Aristotle rejected, Aquinas necessarily rejects every significant conclusion in Aristotle’s Ethics.

First, having denied the existence of the Good, Aristotle argues that the end desired by man is happiness, which he locates ultimately in contemplative reason, which aims at no end beyond itself. Thus he writes:

[T]he activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, un weariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with this activity. . . .
In his “Treatise on the Last End,” Aquinas argues, to the contrary, that since the human soul is not the universal good, but only a participated good, “that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.” Because every creature has goodness by participation, the universal good, which constitutes man’s happiness, is not to be found in any creature, nor in the good of the universe as a whole, but rather in God alone.

Aquinas continues, that happiness consists in the contemplation or the vision of God, but his notion of contemplation has nothing in common with that of Aristotle, because Aristotle’s notion of speculative intellect does not extend beyond knowledge of sensibles. Aquinas writes:

Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics, and at the end of the Posterior Analytics. Therefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend further than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man’s final happiness, which is his final perfection, cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles.

Therefore, in contrast to Aristotle’s view in the Ethics, that contemplation has no end beyond itself and is self-sufficient, Aquinas argues that man cannot attain happiness by his natural powers, but only by the grace of God: “Happiness is a good surpassing created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature, but man is made happy by God alone, if we speak of perfect Happiness.”

Second, in his Ethics, Aristotle names ten moral virtues, each of which is a mean between some excess or deficiency. On the surface it would appear that Aquinas accepts these moral virtues and Aristotle’s notion of the mean. However, the reality is quite the opposite.

The first thing Aquinas does in his “Treatise on Habits” is to add to Aristotle’s list of ten moral virtues a not-insignificant eleventh virtue omitted by Aristotle, namely, justice, so that Aristotle’s moral virtues include the four cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice, the exemplars of which, according to Aquinas, pre-exist in God.

Aquinas next introduces the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation in the Godhead, and which alone lead to true happiness. These virtues, according to Aquinas, do not observe the Aristotelian mean between excess and deficiency, because “there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue.” In other words, there can be no excess of faith, hope and charity.

What is more, Aquinas totally devastates Aristotle’s notion of the self-sufficiency of virtuous actions by arguing that the moral virtues cannot exist without the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. Aquinas first cites St. John: “He that loves not, abides in death.” He then refers to St. Paul: “All that is not of faith is sin.” Thus, without the theological virtues, Aristotle’s moral virtues lead only to sin and death.

Third, in his Ethics, Aristotle puts forth friendship, based upon one’s love for oneself, as an ethical ideal. He further argues that a man needs virtuous friends in order to achieve happiness.

Although the Christian concept of charity includes love of oneself, love of oneself is not the basis of charity towards others. Rather, as Aquinas writes, “inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin,” and the “love of neighbor results from perfect love of God.” In the “Treatise on Faith, Hope, and Charity,” Aquinas argues that “charity is friendship”; however, it is first and foremost “the friendship of man for God.” Thus, while agreeing with Aristotle that friendship is a form of love, Aquinas bases his notion of friendship on man’s participation in Divine Charity, not on self-love, as Aristotle does. Aquinas writes: “God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God’s sake.”

Citing Ambrose, Augustine’s teacher, Aquinas argues that “charity is the form of the virtues.” “It is charity, which directs the acts of all the other virtues to the last end.” Aquinas describes the last end as “the goodness of God and the fellowship of everlasting life.”

Based on this concept of charity as the form of virtue, Aquinas argues, as does Nicolaus of Cusa in On the Peace of Faith, that “charity is the form of faith.” Faith without works of charity is dead, as St. James said. However, faith which is perfected and “formed” by charity is living and leads to eternal life.

On the other hand, even as love of God requires love of neighbor—and not just the virtuous friend, as Aristotle argues, but also the sinner and even the enemy—Aquinas rejects Aristotle’s contention that the happy man “needs” friends. Aquinas writes: “But if we speak of perfect happiness, which will be our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness, since man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God.”

Aristotle’s Politics

Although Aquinas does not refer at length to Aristotle’s Politics in the Summa Theologica, the fundamental prem-
Laws.

Aristotle, on the other hand, writes:

And thus it is, as Pope Leo XIII reaffirmed in his encyclical, "Aeterni Patris," that Christ, who is "the power and wisdom of God," (I Cor 1:24) and "in whom are hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge," (Col 2:3) is "the restorer of human science."

is of Aristotle's notion of the state, as should be clear from our treatment of his Ethics, are necessarily at variance with Aquinas' concept of man.

While posing as a defender of the family and private property, Aristotle himself subordinates the individual and the family to the state by arguing that "the state is by nature prior to the family and the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part."

Next, Aristotle argues that slavery is natural: "he who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave. . . . For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth some are marked out for subjection, others for rule."

For Aristotle, "a distinction between the ruling and the subject element" is a principle of the universe: "Such a duality exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in the constitution of the universe . . . ." "It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter, slavery is both expedient and right." "And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments . . . ."

In addition, Aristotle makes it clear that his notion of virtuous activity precludes the productive labor necessary to the economic sustenance of society. He therefore writes that in the best form of government, "the citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble, and inimical to virtue. Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties."

Directly related to Aristotle's view, that it would be immoral for citizens to engage in labor, is his advocacy of population control. In the Politics, he explicitly attacks Plato's refusal to limit population in his Laws. In the Laws, Plato argues that

if mated love should cause an excessive glut of population, and we find ourselves at a loss, we have ready to our hand the old contrivance we have more than once spoken of—we can send out colonies of such persons as we deem convenient with love and friendship on both parts.

Aristotle, on the other hand, writes:

One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of sterility in married persons. The neglect of this subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime.

And how does Aristotle propose to limit population?

We read further in the Politics the following:

As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but that on the ground of an excess in the number of children, if the established customs of the state forbid this (for in our state population has a limit), no child is to be exposed, but when couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation.

Conclusion

As should be clear from the above discussion, Aristotle's conception of society in the Politics, including his advocacy of slavery and abortion, flows directly from his rejection in the Ethics of Plato's view that man derives all good from participation in the Goodness of God. This rejection of Plato's conception of participation in the eternal ideas, to which Aristotle devotes the bulk of his Metaphysics, results in his denial to created nature of the capacity to participate in God's infinity.

It is for this reason that Aristotle's arguments have invariably been employed throughout history by those who for political reasons have opposed the Judeo-Christian conception of man as created in the image of God and the Christian concept of the Filioque, which implies that man can become increasingly "deform" through imitation of Christ.

Thus, although some have falsely claimed St. Thomas Aquinas to be an Aristotelian, as we have seen, nothing is further from the truth. Aquinas is not only the direct successor to St. Augustine and Dionysius the Areopagite, but also the immediate predecessor of Nicolaus of Cusa, all of whom saw themselves in the Platonic tradition of philosophy.

If properly understood, Aquinas' notion of "relative infinity" is the immediate precursor of Cusa's concept of the "finite infinite" or "contraction infinite," from which Georg Cantor later developed his notion of the "trans-finite."

And thus it is, as Pope Leo XIII reaffirmed in his encyclical, "Aeterni Patris," that Christ, who is "the power and wisdom of God," (I Cor 1:24) and "in whom are hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge," (Col 2:3) is "the restorer of human science."
On the Employment of The Chorus in Tragedy
(1803)
Friedrich Schiller

This work was written as the prologue to Schiller's play, The Bride of Messina, or, The Hostile Brothers, which was completed on February 1, and first performed in the Weimar theater on March 19, 1803. In writing this play, Schiller was influenced by his study of the Classical Greek tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, to re-introduce the ancient device of the chorus.

The significance of this prologue, however, is not its discussion of the chorus per se, but rather its discussion of the chorus from the standpoint of Schiller's concept of tragedy. As in his other writings on this subject, Schiller stresses that the purpose of tragedy is to ennoble the audience by providing it with the highest enjoyment—freedom of the mind. True art does not aim to transpose a person into a merely momentary dream of freedom, but rather to make him truly free. To achieve such freedom, the artist must not merely imitate nature, but rather achieve mastery over it.

Schiller's discussion of the chorus in this piece should therefore be seen in the context of Lyndon LaRouche's "On the Subject of Metaphor" published in Fidelio, Vol. I, No. 3 (Fall 1992). Schiller explicitly polemicizes against French symbolism, while at the same time describing his re-introduction of the chorus as a declaration of war on naturalism in art.

A poetical work must justify itself, and where the deed does not speak, words will not be to much avail. One might well, therefore, leave it to the chorus to be its own spokesman, were it for once given the appropriate form of representation. But the tragic work of art first becomes a whole in theatrical performance: the poet only provides the words; music and dance must be added to bring life to them. Thus, as long as the chorus lacks this sensuously powerful accompaniment, it will appear to be a thing extraneous to the economy of tragedy, a foreign body, and a way-station which only interrupts the progress of the action, disturbs the illusion, and makes the observer cold. To do justice to the chorus, therefore, one must transpose oneself from the actual state to a possible one, but one must do that everywhere where one intends to achieve something higher. That which art still lacks, that it is to obtain; the fortuitous lack of resources must not be permitted to constrain the creative power of imagination of the poet. He sets himself the most worthy as his goal, he strives toward an ideal; the practicing artist may accommodate himself to the circumstances.

It is not true, as one usually hears the claim made, that the audience degrades art; the artist degrades the audience, and at all times when art degenerated, it fell because of the artists. The audience needs nothing more than receptivity, and this it possesses. It steps before the curtain with an indeterminate yearning, with a manifold capacity. Among the highest of these, it brings an ability, it takes pleasure in what is intelligent and right, and if it once begins to be satisfied with what is bad, it will assuredly cease to demand what is excellent, even when it is provided.

The poet, one hears the objection, does well to work according to an ideal; the art critic does well to judge according to ideas; contingent, limited, practicing art rests upon needs. The entrepreneur wants to continue to exist; the actor wants to show himself; the audience wants to be entertained and moved. The audience seeks enjoyment, and is dissatisfied if one demands
an effort from it, where it expected a play and recreation.

But by treating theater more seriously, one does not want to do away with the enjoyment of the audience, but to ennoble it. It should remain a play, but a poetical one. All art is dedicated to joy, and there is no higher and no more serious task than to make people happy. True art is only that art which provides the highest enjoyment. Supreme enjoyment is the freedom of the mind in the living play of all of its powers.

Every person, indeed, expects from the arts of imagination a certain liberation from the bounds of the real world; he wants to take pleasure in what is possible and give room to his own fantasy. He who sets his expectations the lowest, still wants to forget his business, his common life, his particular individuality, he wants to feel himself in extraordinary situations, he wants to delight in the strange combinations of chance; if he is of a more serious nature, he wants to find the moral world-government, which he misses in real life, upon the stage. But he himself knows quite well, that he is engaging in but an empty play, that in fact he takes delight only in dreams, and when he returns from the theater back to the real world, it will surround him once more with its full, oppressive constriction; he is its prey as he was before, and it has not been changed in the slightest. Thus, nothing but a pleasant delusion of the moment has been won, which disappears when one awakens.

And just for that reason, because the intent here is but a temporary illusion, all that is necessary is thus but an appearance of truth, or popular probability, which one so gladly sets in the place of truth.

True art, however, does not aim merely at a temporary play; it seriously intends not to transpose a person into a merely momentary dream of freedom, but to make him really and in fact free, and to accomplish this by awakening in him a force, exercising it and developing it, to thrust the sensuous world, which otherwise only presses upon us as crude material, bearing down upon us as a blind power, into an objective distance, to transpose it into a free work of our mind, and to achieve mastery over the material with ideas.

And just for that reason, because true art wants something real and objective, it cannot be satisfied merely with the appearance of truth; upon the truth itself, upon the firm and deep foundation of nature, art erects its ideal edifice.

But now, how art can be at once entirely ideal and yet in the most profound sense real—how it can take leave utterly from what is real and yet be in most precise accord with nature, that is what few comprehend, which makes the view of poetic and plastic works so skewed, because these two requirements seem to cancel each other out in the common way of judging.

Furthermore, it usually happens that one seeks to achieve the first by sacrificing the other, and fails to meet either requirement for that very reason. He who is endowed by nature with a true sense and an intimacy of emotion, but who is deprived of creative imagination, will be a faithful painter of reality; he will be able to grasp chance phenomena, but never the spirit of nature. He will restore the material of nature to us, but it does not become our work on that account, not the free product of our forming mind, and can thus also not have the beneficial effect of art, which consists in freedom. Such an artist and poet will leave us in a serious mood, but distasteful, and we shall see ourselves painfully thrown back into the mean narrowness of reality by the very art which should have liberated us.

On the other hand, he who partakes indeed of a vivid imagination, but without mind and character, will not trouble himself over any truth; he will, instead, but play with the material of the world, will only seek to surprise us with fantastical and bizarre constructions, and since everything he does is only foam and fancy, he will, to be sure, entertain us for the moment, but he will neither build nor found anything in the mind. His play, like
of all poetry. The introduction of the chorus would be the last, the crowning step; and if it only served to openly and honestly declare war upon naturalism in art, to us it should be a living wall which tragedy draws around itself in order to close itself off completely from the real world, and to maintain for itself its ideal ground, its poetic freedom.

The tragedy of the Greeks, as we know, emerged from the chorus. And although it cut itself loose from the chorus historically and in the course of time, one can also say that it emerged from the chorus poetically and in spirit, and that without this persevering witness and bearer of the action, it would have become an entirely different poetry. The dissolution of the chorus, and drawing this sensuously powerful organ together into the characterless, boring, ever returning figure of a miserable confidant, was thus no such great improvement of tragedy, as the French and those who parrot them have imagined.

Ancient tragedy, which initially dealt only with gods, heroes, and kings, required the chorus as a necessary accompaniment; it found it in nature, and employed it because it found it. The actions and fates of the heroes and kings are public in and of themselves, and were even more so in simple, primal time. The chorus, thus, was more than a natural organ in ancient tragedy; it followed out of the poetical form of real life. In modern tragedy, it becomes an artificial organ; it helps to bring forth poetry. The modern poet no longer finds the chorus in nature; he must create it poetically and introduce it, i.e., he must make such a change in the story he treats, whereby it is transposed into that childlike time and that simple form of life.

For the modern poet, therefore, the chorus performs a far more essential service than it did for the ancient poet, and just for the very reason that it transforms the common modern world into the ancient poetical one, because it makes everything useless which contends against poetry, and drives him aloft to the most simple, the most original, and most naive motifs. The palace of the kings is now closed; the courts have withdrawn from the gates of the city into the inner courts of the buildings; writing has displaced the living word; the people itself, the sensuous, living mass, where it does not make itself felt as raw power, has become the state, and thus become a derivative conception; the gods have returned within the breasts of people. The poet must open the palaces once again; he must conduct the courts out under the open heavens; he must resurrect the gods; he must reestablish everything immediate, which has been annulled by the artificial edifice of real life; and he must cast off

the seriousness of the other, is not poetical. To arrange fantastic portraits in an arbitrary sequence does not mean entering into the ideal, and to present reality imitatively does not signify a representation of nature. These two requirements are so little in contradiction with each other that they are, instead, one and the same: art is only true, in that it completely takes leave of reality and becomes purely ideal. Nature herself is only an idea of the mind, which never impinges upon the senses. She lies beneath the blanket of appearances, but never appears herself. It is granted alone to the art of the ideal, or actually it is her mission, to grasp this mind of the universe, and bind it to a corporeal form. Even this art cannot present the universe to the senses, but yet, by means of her creating force, she can present it to the power of imagination, and on that account be more true than all reality, and more real than all experience. It follows, self-evidently, that the artist can use no single element of reality as he finds it, that his work must be ideal in all of its parts, if it is to have reality as a whole and be in agreement with nature.

What is true of poetry and art as a whole, also holds for all of the species of the same, and what has just been said, may be applied to tragedy with no difficulty. Here, too, one has struggled for a long time, and is still struggling, with the common notion of the natural, which as much as annuls and destroys all poetry and art. The plastic arts are grudgingly conceded a certain ideality, more out of convention and for internal reasons, but from poetry and the dramatic arts, in particular, one demands illusion, which, were it actually achievable, would only be the miserable fraud of a pick-pocket. Everything external in a dramatic performance is contrary to this notion — everything is but a symbol of reality. The very day in the theater is only artificial, the architecture is only symbolic, the metrical language itself is ideal, but the action is supposed to be real, and the part destroys the whole. The French, who were first to misunderstand the spirit of the ancients, thus introduced a unity of place and time in the crudest empirical sense upon the stage, as if this were a place different from merely ideal space, and a time different from the mere continuous succession of the action.

One has come a large step closer to poetical tragedy by introducing metrical speech. Some lyrical experiments on the stage have been successful, and, in individual cases, poetry has carried a number of victories over dominant prejudice by virtue of its own vital force. But little is won in these individual cases, if the error is not felled in the whole, and it is not sufficient that only that is tolerated as poetic freedom, which is in fact the essence
all artificial concoctions of the person and around him, everything which hinders the appearance of his inner nature and his original character, as a sculptor casts off modern robes, and he must take nothing of the external environment except that which makes the highest of forms, the human form, visible.

But just as the plastic artist spreads the pleated fullness of robes about his figures in order to fill the space of his portrait richly and gracefully, combining the disparate parts in a continuity of calm masses, giving the color, which entices and pleases the eye, room to play, ingeniously veiling the human form and making it visible at the same time, in the same way the tragic poet carries through and surrounds his rigorously proportioned action and the firm contours of his acting figures with a lyrical, splendid fabric, in which the acting persons, as if in a broadly folded robe of purple, move freely and nobly with dignity and high composition.

In a higher organization, the material or the elementary need no longer be visible, the chemical color disappears in the fine carnation of a living being. But the material, too, has its splendor, and can, as such, be taken up in a work of art. But then it must earn its place with life and fullness, and with harmony, and it must vindicate the forms which it surrounds, rather than subjugate them with its gravity.

This is easy for everyone to understand in works of the plastic arts, but the same happens in poetry, and in the tragic, which is the subject of our attention here. Everything which the understanding expresses, in general, is like that which merely excites the senses, only material and raw element in a poetic work, and where it predominates, it will inevitably destroy the poetical, because it lies at the point of indifference of the ideal and the sensuous. Now, the human being is so constituted, that he always wants to proceed from the particular to the universal, and therefore reflection must also have its place in tragedy. But if it is to earn this place, it must obtain that through the presentation which it lacks in sensuous life, since if the two elements of poetry, the ideal and the sensuous, are to work together in intimate connection, then they must work beside one another, or the poetry is annulled. If the scale does not stand perfectly still, the balance can only be established by an oscillation of the two pans of the scale.

And this is the function of the chorus in tragedy. The chorus itself is not an individual, rather a general, conception; but this conception represents itself in a sensuous, powerful mass, which impresses the senses with its opulent presence. The chorus leaves the narrow arena of the action, in order to make statements about the past and future, about distant times and peoples, about what is human in general, to draw the grand results of life and to express the teachings of wisdom. But it does this with the full power of fantasy, with a bold lyrical freedom, which coincides, at the highest summit of things human, as though with the stride of the gods—and it does this accompanied by the full sensuous power of rhythm and music, in sound and movement.

The chorus thus purifies the tragic poem by segregating reflection from the action, and equips itself with poetic power by means of this segregation, just as the plastic artist transforms the common requirement of clothing into charm and beauty with rich draperies.

But just as the painter sees himself compelled to intensify the color-tone of the living being to maintain the balance of powerful materials, the lyrical speech of the chorus compels the poet proportionally to raise the entire speech of the poem, and thus to intensify the sensuous power of the expression in general. Only the chorus justifies the tragic poet in this exaltation of tone which fills the ear, enraptures the spirit, expands the entire mind. This, a gigantic form in his portrait, compels him to place all of his characters upon the cothurnus, thereby giving his portrait tragic magnitude. If the chorus is removed, the language of tragedy must be lowered on the whole, or that which is grand and powerful will seem forced and exaggerated. To introduce the ancient chorus into French tragedy would reveal it in its full paltriness and destroy it; without any doubt, introducing it into Shakespeare's tragedy would reveal its true significance for the first time.

While the chorus brings life to the speech, it brings calm to the action—but the beautiful and high calm which must be the character of a noble work of art. The mind of the audience must maintain its freedom even amidst the fiercest passion; it should not fall prey to impressions, rather take its leave of the emotions which it suffers, always clear and bright. What the usual judgment tends to fault about the chorus, that it dissolves the illusion, that it breaks the force of the affects, is actually its highest recommendation, for it is this very blind force of affects which the true artist avoids, it is this illusion which he disdains to excite. If the blows with which tragedy strikes our heart were to follow one another without interruption, suffering would vanish activity. We would be immersed in the material, and no longer hover over it. By holding the parts apart, and stepping between the passions with its calming reflection, it re-

1. A cothurnus is a buskin, or high boot, worn by the actors in Greek Classical tragedies. It became emblematic of an elevated, tragic style.
stores our freedom to us, which would be lost in the storm of affects. The tragic characters also require this place of repose, this calm, in order to collect themselves, for they are no real beings, which obey merely the force of the moment, rather ideal persons and representatives of their species, which express the depth of humanity. The presence of the chorus, which listens to them as a judging witness, and harnesses the first outbreak of their passion with its intervention, motivates the presence of mind with which they act, and the dignity with which they speak. They stand, to a degree, upon a natural theater, because they speak and act in front of observers, and they will therefore speak all the more fittingly from the artificial theater to its audience.

So much on the subject of my right to re-introduce the ancient chorus upon the tragic stage. Choruses are, indeed, already known in modern tragedy, but the chorus of Greek tragedy, the way I have employed it here, the chorus as a single ideal person, which carries the entire action and accompanies it, this is fundamentally different from those opera-like choruses, and if on the occasion of Greek tragedy I hear talk about choruses instead of a chorus, I become suspicious that someone does not know what he is talking about. The chorus of ancient tragedy, to my knowledge, has not appeared on the stage since the demise of the same.

I have indeed separated the chorus into two parts, and represented it in conflict with itself; but this is only the case where it joins in the action as a real person and as a blind mass. As chorus and as ideal person, it is always identical with itself. I have changed the place and allowed the chorus to exit a number of times; but Aeschylus, too, the creator of tragedy, and Sophocles, the great master in this art, also employed this liberty.

Another liberty I have permitted myself, may be more difficult to justify. I have employed the Christian religion and the Greek gods together, and even recalled the faith of the Moors. But the location of the play is Messina, where these three religions still express themselves, partly in living form, partly in monuments, and they speak to the senses. And I hold it to be a right of poetry to treat the different religions as a collective whole for the power of imagination, in which everything which has its own character, expresses its own sensibility, has its place. Beneath the shroud of all religions there lies religion itself, the idea of one divinity, and it must be permitted to the poet to express this in whichever form he finds most comfortable and most fitting.

—translated by George Gregory

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An Early Setting of Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’

Many Americans may know Germany’s national poet of freedom, Friedrich Schiller, only through the musical setting of a part of his most famous poem, the “Ode to Joy,” as the choral finale of Ludwig van Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. Beethoven’s setting is so sublime—and Beethoven himself acknowledged that he consider setting the poetry of Schiller an almost impossible task—that any other music for this great hymn to universal human brotherhood under a benevolent Creator seems out of place today.

Yet, from the very year in which it was first printed, 1786, the “Ode to Joy” (“An die Freude”) began to be sung to various musical accompaniments, in the environment of the “house music” that flourished around Schiller, his fellow poet Goethe, and their companions at the height of the German Classic period in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.

German lieder are today so much a part of the recital repertoire and the recording industry, that we forget that these songs were not mainly intended by the Classical composers for professional singers, but rather for the many ordinary citizens who shared a knowledge of beautiful singing and a basic technical command that are lost even to many professionals today.

Schiller’s poem was set out with alternating verses and choral refrains, a format adhered to by most of the early composers, until Beethoven dared to reshape it. Written in 1785, the poem was published in Schiller’s review Thalia in 1786; that same year, a composer named J. Chr. Müller set it to music. By 1800 there were at least twenty different composers whose versions of “An die Freude” survive today, and of these, some did several different variants.

In 1797 an otherwise unknown, Haydn-esque composer with the name (or pseudonym) of Tepper von Ferguson published, in a limited subscription edition in Berlin, a grandiose choral version of “An die Freude” with four soloists, chorus, and with each verse and its refrain set as a separate movement, complete with changes in key and tempo, and beginning with a bass solo—in these respects a curious and perhaps unique foretaste of Beethoven’s much later choral symphony. (The printed version has a keyboard accompaniment which might be a reduction of a lost orchestral score.)

Beethoven was already contemplating the task of setting the poem, as we know from a letter written in 1793 when he was only twenty-three. In November 1799, for Schiller’s fortieth birthday, the Berlin composer and music publisher J.C.F. Rellstab put out a collection of six settings of “An die Freude,” reprinted as the Intelligenzblatt of the Leipzig General Music Review. Besides a version of his own, Rellstab included one by J. Fr. Reichardt, a composer at the

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**An die Freude**

Freude, schöner Götterfunken,
Tochter aus Elysium,
Wir betreten feuertrunken
Himmelsche, dein Heiligtum.

Deine Zauber binden wieder,
Was der Mode Schwert geteilt;
Bettler werden Fürstenbrüder,*
Wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.

---

**To Joy**

Joy, thou beauteous godly lightning,
Daughter of Elysium,
Fire drunken we are ent’ring
Heavenly, thy holy home!

Thy enchantments bind together,
What did custom’s sword divide,*
Beggars are a prince’s brother,*
Where thy gentle wings abide.

---

* Reworked by Schiller in the 1803 edition of his works to the more familiar: "Was die Mode streng geteilt;" *Alle Menschen werden Brüder;"

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* Reworked by Schiller in the 1803 edition of his works to the more familiar: "What did custom stern divide;" "Every man becomes a brother;"
Berlin court who often antagonized Goethe and Schiller, but whose many songs setting Schiller's poems greatly helped to popularize Schiller in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The collection also included an anonymous tune which, before Beethoven, was destined to become the most famous setting, and continued to be sung throughout the last century.

Indeed, in 1805, when Beethoven first produced his opera Fidelio, he used the theme of the last line of that popular version of "An die Freude" as the basis for the choral finale, when the chorus of prisoners and townspeople unite to sing "Wer ein holdes Weib errungen, stimm in unserm Jubel ein" ("Who e'er a lovely wife has won, chime in with our jubilation!"") Any German listener of that era would have recognized the nearly identical words of the second stanza of Schiller's ode, "Wer ein holdes Weib errungen, mische seinen Jubel ein!" This chorus in Fidelio can therefore be considered the first major attempt by Beethoven to set "An die Freude," which is highly appropriate, since the whole opera is a tribute to Schiller's ideals.

The anonymous tune was so popular that it was published again in Berlin in 1800 in English (!) as one of "Twelve Favorite Songs." Unfortunately, we were unable to inspect this edition and cannot comment on the quality of the translation.

Thirty years after Beethoven first mentioned his desire to compose the "Ode to Joy," and nearly twenty years after he began working on his opera Fidelio in 1803, there appears in his sketches for the Ninth Symphony, a line of music in the bass clef with the words, "this it is, Ha now it is found," followed by "Freude, schöner," under the opening notes of the choral theme. Beethoven had finally found exactly the right line of music to express the developmental possibilities of Schiller's concept of joy. Like the folk-tune which he had earlier adapted for the great choral finale of Fidelio, the melody is one of the utmost "popular" simplicity. By using such simple material and weaving it into higher and higher orders of complexity spanning the entire universe of human thought and feeling, Beethoven unfolded the message of human redemption which is implicit throughout Schiller's "Ode to Joy," and carries us, together with the cherub at the climax of the finale, until we "stand before God."

—Nora Hamerman
An die Freude

Friedrich Schiller

Freude schöner Götterfunken, Tochter aus Elysium, Deine
Wir betreten feuertrunken, Himmlische dein Heiligum.

Zauber binden wieder was die Mode streng geteilt, Better werden Fürstenbrüder, wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt. Seid umschlungen, Millionen, seid umschlungen, Millionen! diesen Kuß der ganzen Welt! Brüder überrn Sternennetz muß ein lieber Vater wohnen, muß ein lieber Vater wohnen.

“Wer ein holdes Weib errungen”

Opening phrase of the chorus from Ludwig van Beethoven’s “Fidelio”

Soprano Allegro ma non troppo

Wer ein holdes Weib errungen, stimm in unsern Jubel ein, stimm in unsern Jubel ein,

Alto Wer ein holdes Weib errungen, stimm in unsern Jubel ein, stimm in unsern Jubel ein,

Tenor Wer ein holdes Weib errungen, stimm in unsern Jubel ein, stimm in unsern Jubel ein,

Bass Wer ein holdes Weib errungen, stimm in unsern Jubel ein, stimm in unsern Jubel ein,
LaRouche Appeal Filed

On Nov. 17, 1992 Ramsey Clark and other attorneys for political prisoner Lyndon LaRouche filed an appeal of Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr.'s denial, earlier in the year, of LaRouche's habeas corpus motion for freedom. That motion argued that the sentence against LaRouche and two of his co-defendants, William Wertz and Edward Spannaus, should be vacated, and LaRouche should be freed, on the grounds of new evidence which showed that "the prosecution conducted and participated in a conspiracy and concerted action with others to illegally and wrongfully convict him and his associates by engaging in outrageous misconduct, including financial warfare."

The appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals charges that Bryan was "intractably biased" and should have recused himself from hearing LaRouche's new-evidence motion. Bryan's "bias was manifested in his actions at trial and attendant proceedings, and rearticulated with shocking blindness and passion in his response to the recusal motion," the appeal argues [emphasis added]. The new fifty-page legal document, backed by an appendix of six volumes of new evidence, demands LaRouche's immediate freedom, that he and his co-defendants "are entitled to have their wrongful convictions set aside, be released from custody, and the charges dismissed."

Owing to Judge Bryan's prejudice, both in the original 1988 trial and in the appeal, LaRouche has now spent four years in federal prison for crimes which he did not commit.

Bryan's Bias

The papers filed for LaRouche on Nov. 17 exhibit Judge Bryan's own statements as evidence of his bias. For example, according to the brief, "defending the Government from charges of politically motivated misconduct, Judge Bryan proclaimed 'this idea' that the prosecution was politically motivated as 'errant nonsense.' Further, he declared, '[t]he idea that this organization is a sufficient threat to anything, that would warrant the Government bringing a prosecution to silence them, just defies human experience.' This shocking statement flew in the face of massive evidence to the contrary which was known to the Court."

After reviewing other outrageous statements from Judge Bryan, the appeal concludes: "Judge Bryan's fixed opinion was not about some collateral or irrelevant matter; it constituted a preconceived idea bearing on the heart of the case."

New Evidence Keeps Coming

Since LaRouche's sentencing in 1989, there has been a steady stream of new evidence. Therefore, in the January 1992 motion, LaRouche argued for discovery and hearings to get all of the facts. All of this was ignored by the biased Bryan.

LaRouche's new evidence motion was filed on Jan. 22, 1992, and presented a detailed picture of prosecutorial misconduct and concealment, including the knowing use of perjured testimony at trial; the exploitation of this perjury in making closing arguments to the jury; the bad-faith filing of bankruptcy proceedings against defendants' companies which had taken all the loans listed in the indictment, as a means of destroying the ability to repay loans; the recruitment of prosecution witnesses through immunity agreements, rewards, threats of prosecution, and other inducements not disclosed to the defense; and the withholding of exculpatory and impeach­ment evidence specifically requested by the defense prior to trial.

The new appeal argues that the new evidence stream is overflowing with fresh new evidence each month: "In August 1992, a former Stasi (East German spy service) official confessed that the Stasi mounted a massive disinformation campaign designed to blame the assassination of Olof Palme on persons associated with LaRouche. This demonstrates... that
the LaRouche movement was significant enough to prompt this bizarre and elaborate contrivance, which was coordinated with Soviet attacks on LaRouche and their demand that action be taken against him in the U.S. This vicious falsehood was broadcast by NBC and became a critical aspect of attempts to destroy movement finances at the very time the loans in question were coming due. In September 1992, Don Moore, an integral part of the prosecution team, was arrested and charged with conspiracy to kidnap and deprogram LaRouche associates. The facts surrounding this criminal plot call into further question the misconduct of the prosecution team. In October 1992, an FOIA release was received which indicates that Elizabeth Sexton, a critical Government witness, was acting as an agent of the Government during times relevant to this case, a fact she denied and the Government covered up at trial.”

Ten Major Errors

The new appeal exhaustively documents ten major errors which Bryan made in his denial of the new-evidence motion, each of which is grounds to free the former presidential candidate. The errors range from Bryan’s failure to recuse himself, to his failure to either overturn LaRouche’s conviction or, in the alternative, to grant him discovery and hearings, on nine substantive issues backed by new evidence.

The topics these nine issues cover range from the bad-faith bankruptcy action which shut down the companies which owed the loans; to the illegal government-private “concert of action” of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith (ADL), American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), John Train, journalists, et al., which plotted the prosecution; to the Ollie North-linked government “secret team” member who was foreman of LaRouche’s jury; to covert operations against LaRouche during the Reagan-Bush administration under Executive Order 12333 and other “national security” pretexts.

A decision on the appeal is expected early in 1993.

Civil Rights Alliance Forged

At a conference held in Kiedrich, Germany, Nov. 21-22, 1992, the American Civil Rights movement and the movement associated with Lyndon LaRouche, took the historic step of joining their forces in a new international Civil Rights movement. The name of the new alliance in Germany is Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität (Civil Rights Movement Solidarity).

The American leaders present at the founding conference of the new movement included leading personalities who fought with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the 1960’s, among them:

• Rev. James Bevel, founder of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Direct Action Coordinator for the Southern Christian leadership Conference (SCLC) and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.;
• Rev. Wade Watts, former State President of the Oklahoma NAACP (1968-84);
• Joe Dickson, editor and publisher of the Birmingham World, the oldest and largest circulation African-American newspaper in Alabama;
• Rev. Richard Boone, Project Director for SCLC in Selma, Alabama and other locations under the personal leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.;
• Hadaasha Maryum, of Universal Human Rights for African People, Des Moines, Iowa.

Representatives of the LaRouche movement included Helga Zepp-Lauf, founder of the Schiller Institute, as well as the national board and membership of the Patriots for Germany, which lent its institutional weight to the effort.

The decision to join forces, literally merging the two movements, was dictated by the urgency of the world strategic crisis, characterized by global
The Cowardly Murders of Foreigners Must Be Stopped!

On November 24, 1992, Helga Zepp-LaRouche, founder of the Schiller Institute and chairman of the Civil Rights Movement Solidarity, issued the following declaration on the attacks on foreigners in Germany:

The cowardly and criminal arson attack in Mölln, in which two Turkish women and one young ten-year-old Turkish girl growing up in Germany were killed and nine other people were badly injured, must finally rouse citizens to action against these racist-chauvinist gangs. In the face of the more than three thousand attacks by autonomist and right-radical perpetrators of violence during this year, which have already claimed sixteen fatalities, the whole failure of the government led by Chancellor Kohl is apparent. These are the results of the debate on asylum which has been conducted by all the parties in a reprehensible way.

Over last weekend citizens joined together in a “Civil Rights Movement Solidarity,” in order to oppose this ominous development in Germany. There we linked up closely with the Civil Rights movement of Martin Luther King, Jr. which fought for decades against racism between whites and blacks, and against the influence of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States.

For the restoration of internal peace in Germany the following measures must be taken:

• The safety of those foreigners living in Germany must be protected under all circumstances. For that purpose the local police forces need the broad support of the population. The fact that the greatest number of attacks occurs in states led by the SPD, shows the bankruptcy of the “soft line,” which has stood in the way of the police requirements during the past years. These requirements include a functioning registration service, which includes the still unknown perpetrating circles and persons; these include protective custody and severe punishment of deeds which involved bodily injury and murder.

• Federal legal measures and competent state legal measures must rigorously uncover, stop, and punish the men behind the right-radical terrorism, including the involvement of foreign intelligence services in their organization and propaganda work. The examples of connections of neo-Nazi groups to KKK leaders and skinheads increase, without the circles of persons who have been known for years being prosecuted.

This is even more important, because the huge campaign of filth, which was fomented by British and American press outlets after reunification, against a supposed “re-strengthening Fourth Reich,” receives its propagandistic effectiveness for the first time through the bloody provocations from the neo-Nazi and autonomist scene.

• In the longer view however, the production of internal peace in Germany depends on a decisive change in course away from the failed economic and foreign policy of the federal government since reunification: in the face of the world economic crisis, the murderous policy of free trade at any price and of wholesale privatization under IMF conditions must finally be abolished. The seven million unemployed or underemployed people in eastern and western Germany must find work in large-scale Eurasian construction projects. Not shrinkage, but construction in the East and in the South of the world, must determine the course of the next years. If I were in the government, I would immediately tomorrow submit an appropriate construction and investment plan, and call upon the ministers to make the cooperation of Germany in the international governing bodies of the European Community, GATT, or the Group of Seven dependent upon whether the fundamental direction of world economic policy is changed in the direction of a policy of construction.

This change in course must also find expression in bringing about an end to the war in former Yugoslavia, which has robbed many people of the last hope for humanity from the German people. The new “Civil Rights Movement Solidarity” wants to contribute with all its strength to restoring in Germany constitutional rights, the fundamental human rights, and here first and foremost the inviolability of life.
D.C. Resolution to Remove Pike Statue Introduced

District of Columbia Council member William P. Lightfoot introduced the "Albert Pike, Ku Klux Klan Memorial Statue, Removal Resolution of 1992" on October 22, 1992 [see article, page 6]. After pressure was brought to bear by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the resolution was allowed to die in committee. Efforts will be made to reintroduce it in early 1993. Resolutions modeled on this one have already passed the city councils of Birmingham, Tuskegee, New Orleans, Newark, Buffalo, and Austin. The text follows:

A proposed resolution in the Council of the District of Columbia. ... To request that the President of the United States remove a memorial statue maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor which honors Albert Pike, Confederate General and Scottish Rite Southern Jurisdiction Sovereign Commander and chief founder of the post-Civil War Ku Klux Klan.

Resolved, by the Council of the District of Columbia, that this resolution may be cited as the "Albert Pike, Ku Klux Klan Memorial Statue, Removal Resolution of 1992."

Sec. 2. The Council of the District of Columbia finds that:

(a) A memorial statue of Albert Pike stands at Judiciary Square in the District of Columbia, having been dedicated in 1901;

(b) The statue stands on public land of the United States, and is maintained at the public expense of United States taxpayers;

(c) Albert Pike was a chief founder and strategist of the Ku Klux Klan in the years following the Civil War, the "Chief Judiciary Officer" of the Ku Klux Klan and the "Grand Dragon" of the Ku Klux Klan in Arkansas;

(d) The United States Congress on April 4 and 5, 1898, authorized a private organization to place the statue of Albert Pike on the public land of the United States, being falsely informed only that Albert Pike was a leader of white freemasons in the southern states, and "a distinguished citizen of the United States, an able lawyer and statesman, an accomplished poet, and a brave soldier."

(e) The Massachusetts born Albert Pike was a Brigadier General of the Confederate Army, when troops under his command committed atrocities and war crimes against United States soldiers, causing a protest from the United States against the Confederate Army, whereupon Pike was relieved of his command and placed under arrest by the Confederate Army;

(f) Albert Pike was indicted for treason against the United States and fled prosecution by escaping to the territory of Great Britain;

(g) The News Quarterly, a publication of the Prince Hall Freemasons, in its Spring 1992 edition reprinted the most famous poem of the Ku Klux Klan, attributed to Albert Pike, called "Death's Brigade", which is a terrorist threat against African-Americans and all loyal citizens, and the said Prince Hall publication denounced the said statue of Ku Klux Klan leader Albert Pike as "an affront" to the predominantly African-American population of the District of Columbia;

(h) The Ku Klux Klan was an instrument of mass murder, terrorism, judicial barbarism, false imprisonment, kidnapping, and torture, designed to re-enslave newly freed African-Americans, and to prevent the establishment of modern industrial, labor, and living conditions in the southern states; and

(i) A statue representing "Confederate-style justice" should not symbolically stand guard over Judiciary Square, at a time when the rights and living conditions of ordinary American citizens are under severe attack, and it is an outrage, affront, and insult to the people of Washington, and to all humanity who may look to the capital of the United States as the seat of justice and freedom.

Resolved, by the Council of the District of Columbia,

That the Council of the District of Columbia requests that the President of the United States honor its request to remove the statue located at Indiana Avenue and 3rd Streets, in Judiciary Square, which is maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor, this statue of Albert Pike, Chief Judiciary Officer and Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan.

Sec. 3. The Secretary of the Council of the District of Columbia shall transmit a copy of this resolution, upon its adoption, to the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Department of Interior, the Office of the Mayor, United States House of Representatives, Committee on the District of Columbia and to the Delegate of the District of Columbia...
Found Brazil Center for Ibero-American Solidarity

On Nov. 14, 1992 the Center for Ibero-American Studies and Solidarity was founded in the city of Anapolis, in the heart of Brazil. The founding ceremony took place following a week-long seminar held in Anapolis Nov. 9-13, on the Quincentenary of the Evangelization of the Americas. Both the founding ceremony and the seminar were attended by Anapolis Bishop Manoel Pestana and the city’s Mayor-elect. A special invited guest was Helga Zepp-LaRouche, founder of the Schiller Institute and wife of American political prisoner Lyndon LaRouche.

The inauguration of the Center in Brazil parallels the creation of the Movement for National Identity and Ibero-American Integration in October 1992 in Argentina, as well as the founding in May 1992, in Tlaxcala, Mexico, of the Movement for Ibero-American Solidarity (MSIA). All three institutions promote the idea of building Ibero-American integration to counter the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and each was founded in defense of man’s inalienable right to economic and social justice and on the principle of *imago viva Dei*—man created in the living image of God. This same concept, of a just new world economic order based on the idea of *imago viva Dei*, is the guiding light behind Zepp-LaRouche’s campaign for a World Coalition of Peace Through Development.

In addition to her attendance at the Anapolis events, Zepp-LaRouche gave several press and television interviews, met with Bishop Pestana and others, and visited an Anapolis school whose curriculum had been designed around Lyndon LaRouche’s principles of Classical education. She also visited Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro, where she held meetings with business, religious, and academic leaders, as well as with congressmen and other political figures.

**Exposing the Black Legend**

The Anapolis seminar on the Evangelization, which was attended daily by 120 or more—including university students, community leaders, businessmen, religious representatives, and leaders from other Ibero-American countries—focused on exposing the lies of the so-called Black Legend, which paints the Spanish and Portuguese colonization and evangelization effort as a purely genocidal encroachment of European civilization upon the “noble savages” of the continent’s pre-Columbian Indian populations.

Numerous of the presentations concentrated on formulating a program that could transform Ibero-America into an economic and moral superpower for a world in crisis. As Bishop Pestana declared in his opening statement to the seminar, “It is now our turn to return to Europe the optimism that the evangelizers brought us.”

The week-long seminar was addressed by such eminent scholars as Dr. Ricardo Henry Dip, a Brazilian expert on questions of natural law, Dr. Mario Caponnetto of Argentina, speaking on Hispanic culture, and Msgr. Emilio Silva, one of the Roman Catholic Church’s foremost scholars on the Black Legend. Extensive television, press, and radio coverage was given to the seminar, whose closing address by Zepp-LaRouche was on “The Science of Christian Economy,” the text authored by her imprisoned husband.

Zepp-LaRouche warned that a Thirty Years War scenario is already engulfing parts of the world, and that only by undertaking a “Peace through Development” perspective, as first outlined by Pope Paul VI and translated into concrete programmatic proposals by her husband, could the world find the moral strength to fight its way back from the brink of catastrophe.
Schiller Institute Stages First Moscow Conference

The Schiller Institute held its first-ever conference in Moscow on Oct. 30-31, 1992. Co-sponsored by the Russian State Humanitarian University and the Ukrainian University in Moscow, the conference focused on the programs for comprehensive Eurasian-wide development which have been prepared by American statesman and political prisoner Lyndon LaRouche.

The fact that IMF (International Monetary Fund) shock therapy is ripping the Russian economy and social fabric apart, has created considerable interest in LaRouche's economic alternative in the Russian capital. This fact was reflected in the composition of the audience of more than fifty, which included a parliamentary delegation from Armenia, political party leaders from Russia and Ukraine, and two representatives of Russian government ministries.

In greetings read to the conference, Schiller Institute founder Helga Zepp-LaRouche emphasized that a solution to the Russian crisis must be part of a global alternative to the IMF system, and that the failure to get rid of that system will mean escalating war both within the former Soviet Union, and throughout the world.

Breakdown Crisis
Michael Liebig, European Director of EIR (Executive Intelligence Review, the international news service founded by Lyndon LaRouche), opened the conference with a presentation on the reality of the Great Depression now dominating the world. The collapse of the Bretton Woods financial system has encroached upon the industrial countries now, but the Anglo-American financiers refuse to abandon the system. Liebig shocked the audience by providing graphic detail on the state of decay in the U.S. and British economies.

EIR’s Director for Russia and Eastern Europe, Konstantin George, reviewed case studies from the Third World and Eastern Europe, as to how the IMF had devastated all of the economies it is supposed to have aided. Under IMF surveillance, the Third World has already paid, in the last ten years, twice the amount it owed back in 1982, George showed. And yet the books show that the same countries still have the same debt burden they had back in 1982.

In addition to the financial transactions, of course, many Third World nations literally starved their people to death, in order to pay this debt. This is the process which the IMF has now determined is necessary for all the Eastern European countries, including Russia. Dumping the IMF program is not just a sound idea, but a moral prerequisite for saving the lives of millions of Russians, George argued.

The LaRouche Program
The second day of the conference opened with a presentation by Dr. Jonathan Tennenbaum, president of the German Fusion Energy Forum, and co-author with LaRouche of An Economic Miracle for Eastern Europe, the Productive Triangle: Paris-Berlin-Vienna, a book-length development program for Eurasia.

Tennenbaum presented the policies of Hamiltonian national banking, in answer to what is perhaps the most often-asked question in the nations of the East: If no aid comes from the West, how can the necessary, huge infrastructure projects and industrial-agricultural modernization described in the LaRouche-Tennenbaum book be funded? As Dr. Tennenbaum detailed, the state can act in a sovereign manner and establish a national bank, as Alexander Hamilton did in the young United States, to issue credits to the state, banks, and enterprises. If this is done to finance infrastructure construction projects and other investments which will get modern industry and agriculture going, it will promote the growth and technological advancement of the real economy.

In Russia, the necessary projects center heavily on building a modern, high-speed railway network which would connect the country with the powerhouse industrial region of Western Europe. This is precisely the opposite of the IMF’s demand for dismantling heavy industry, and turning
sections of the economy over to financial mafias and speculators.

Hamilton’s ideas were understood in the nineteenth century by the American System political current out of which came Abraham Lincoln in the U.S., Friedrich List in Germany, and Finance Minister Count Sergei Wittte in Russia. In the modern period, the regime of General Charles de Gaulle and the methods which created the German postwar “economic miracle,” were closest to the Hamiltonian idea.

Today, economists the world over can’t get past the erroneous idea that such state-funded directed credit for infrastructure is inflationary. But it is not inflationary, as long as it creates real wealth through promoting industrial and technological development. After a period of time, the program so increases employment and productivity, that tax revenues increase sufficiently to liquidate the original cost.

**Russian Involvement**

Two professors from Moscow also addressed the conference—the first, Prof. Dr. Taras Muranivsky, doctor of Philosophic Sciences and rector of the Ukrainian University in Moscow, and the second, Prof. Dr. Arkady Romannenko of the Russian State Humanitarian University. Both made introductory remarks to the assembly.

Also speaking was a Moscow scientific researcher, Dr. Victor Petrenko, a member of the Schiller Institute in Moscow, who introduced the forthcoming first Russian-language edition of the physical-economy textbook authored by Lyndon LaRouche, *So, You Wish to Learn All About Economics?* After Dr. Petrenko’s presentation, the conference participants received copies of the proofs of the Russian-language book.

The Schiller Institute has been organizing aggressively around LaRouche’s Productive Triangle program in Eastern Europe since late 1989. Seminars have been held, with high-level government participation, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Croatia.

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**EXHIBITS**

*‘Greek Miracle’ Brings Classical Art*  

A spectacular art exhibit featuring original Greek sculptures of the fifth century B.C. opened on Nov. 22 at Washington’s National Gallery of Art. *The Greek Miracle: Classical Sculpture from the Dawn of Democracy* will run through next Feb. 7, 1993; it then will be on view from March 11 until May 23 at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City.

The exhibit is the first-ever organized in the United States of this period of Greek art, which set the Classical standard for the visual arts of western civilization. In every succeeding era, artists have chosen either to emulate the Classical model or to rebel against it. It includes thirty-four bronzes and marbles, twenty-two of them from Greek museums, including many which have never before left Greece.

The show marks the 2,500th anniversary of the beginnings of Greek democracy, launched with the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C. In the introductory essay for the catalogue, writer Nicholas Gage described the unique nature of Classical Greek art.
Art to U.S.

contribution of Greek culture, by stating that “The ancient Greeks believe there is a divine spark to be found within every mortal. . . . This is an essential difference between the Greeks and all previous societies. . . . It was no coincidence that the Greek discovery of individual worth and freedom produced the most profound advances in art and sculpture. If the spark of divinity is to be found in man, then the form and appearance of man would inevitably be the proper subject matter of the artist.”

The very helpful Time Line which takes up the first wall of the show in Washington goes from the age of Solon to the era of Alexander the Great, highlighting such figures as Pericles, Socrates, Thucydides, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Plato, and omitting Aristotle, who however is presented in the exhibition catalogue as the man who defined the “democracy” practiced in Athens. As with today’s United States, it was a democracy which did not exclude imperialism, especially under Pericles (495-429 B.C.) who became the leader of the democratic party in 461 B.C. Pericles created the most democratic constitution that had ever existed. Yet, after Athens was defeated by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War, this democracy became the mob rule that murdered Socrates.

More inspiring is Solon, elected chief magistrate of Athens in 594 B.C., whose reforms included cancelling debts, abolishing personal security for loans, and freeing those who had been sold into slavery.

The Kouros Tradition

The first piece displayed is a pre-Classical statue, a kouros of c.530 B.C. from Boetia. The kouroi are votive figures of youths, thought to portray Apollo, found in cemeteries or temples. Through them, art historians trace the evolution of the depiction of the nude human body. Although still reminiscent of Egyptian standing figures cut from a solid block, this statue shows the sculptor’s efforts at lifelikeness, for the arms are cut free of the body, the left leg strides energetically forward, and the lips are drawn up in the by-then traditional “Archaic smile.”

At either side of the statue, openings allow the visitor to look into the next gallery, where several Classical sculptures are displayed, making it possible to compare the Boetian kouros with a kouros of c.480 B.C. excavated on the Acropolis, known as the Kritios Boy. The description by H.W. Janson in his well-known textbook, The History of Art, can hardly be bettered:

“This remarkable work . . . is the first statue we know that stands in the full unfolding of the sculptor’s art during the fifth century is shown by these two female figures. Left: In the “Running Girl” (who actually appears to be dancing) of c.490-480 B.C., the draperies have begun to lose their previous columnar quality and partially reveal the body, while expressing motion. By turning the head backward, the sculptor sets up contrary motion, as in music. Below: The "Sandalbinding Nike" heightens all these elements. The "wet drapery" style of the late fifth century fully reveals the structure and movement of the body. This Nike pauses to unite her sandal while approaching the holy ground of a temple; the precariousness of her balance is an even more subtle form of "contrary motion."

National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C.
sense of the word…. [W]hen we compare the left and right half of his body … we discover that the strict symmetry of the Archaic kouros has now given way to a calculated nonsymmetry: the knee of the forward leg is lower than the other, the right hip is thrust down and inward, the left hip up and outward; and if we trace the axis of the body, we realize that it is not a straight vertical line but a faint, S-like curve…. The Krítios Boy, then, not only stands; he stands at ease. And the artist has masterfully observed the balanced non-symmetry of this relaxed, natural stance. … Only by learning how to represent the body at rest could the Greek sculptor gain the freedom to show it in motion. … Life now suffuses the entire figure, hence the Archaic smile, the ‘sign of life,’ is no longer needed. It has given way to a serious, pensive expression…. ” [emphasis added]

Divine Law vs. Hubris

This artistic breakthrough came just after the Greeks, unified under Athenian leadership, defeated the much more powerful Persian empire. The decline of the Classical ideal in the period of the Peloponnesian Wars is also recorded in the exhibit.

In Aeschylus’ drama The Persians, performed at just about the same time as the first full-blown Classical art was created (472 B.C.), the destruction of the Persian army was seen as a divinely sanctioned punishment for their arrogant pride and aggressiveness, the sin of hubris. The Greek cities were thought to have prevailed because they curbed local self-interest for the greater common good, and adhered to sophrosyne (moderation) and eusebia (respect for divine power). Later, the historian Thucydides would strongly imply that Athens was defeated by Sparta because its policies had become like those of the Persians, driven by arrogance based on raw power.

Man the Measure

The show is introduced by a multi-image audiovisual program of fifteen minutes, which uses slides from multiple projectors. The effect is like a film but better, because the still images are wonderfully crisp. The program is entitled “Man the Measure,” in honor of the famous lines from Protagoras (485-410 B.C.): “Man is the measure of all things: of those that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not.”

For the Greeks of the fifth century, the answer to the question, “why is man the measure of all things?” is that man’s mind enables him to measure everything else, and not merely that man should be used as a sort of universal metric of comparison. Man measures all things, because measuring is the form of human knowledge. Other species do not measure; they do not know, in the sense man knows. Thus, man’s science distinguishes him from the rest of Creation.

In both the physical sciences and philosophy, there is an implicit assumption of the coherence between what is to be measured, and those who measure it. Measurement is geometry, of course; and as Plato demonstrates, the dialectical method of Socrates is geometry in action.

This idea is restated by Lyndon LaRouche in his notion of man’s uniqueness in transforming, through scientific and technological progress, the physical-economic basis upon which he reproduces himself.

And it is this idea, more than any other, which the fifteenth-century Renaissance learned from Classical Greece. In one of his last writings, De Beryllium of 1458, the seminal Renaissance scientific thinker, Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa, cited Protagoras: “Man is the measure of things. For with the senses man measures the sensible, with the intellect the intelligible, and that which is beyond the intelligible he attains in the excess. … For this reason, man finds in himself everything created, as if in the measuring rational ground.”

Strangely, this idea is particularly revolutionary nowadays—given the paradigm shift away from the idea that man is the crown of Creation, toward the idea of universal leveling back into Mother Earth (which radical environmentalist lunacy has increasingly gripped the world’s political elites).

Hence, we welcome The Greek Miracle show to the United States, and we cannot share the attitude of some oligarchist critics, who sniffed that it was not worth the risk of transporting irreplaceable treasures like the Sandalphasing Nike and Contemplative Athena from the Athens Acropolis, and the Heracles metope from the Temple of Zeus at Olympia, when one could always travel to Europe.
to see them! We certainly hope that millions of youth, especially, who don’t have the means to go to Greece, will be touched by seeing this great humanistic art.

Not Without Flaws
Having said this, however, there is much to fault in the show. Oddly for the National Gallery and Metropolitan Museum, the exhibition catalogue, rather than being a work of scholarship, is little more than a picture-book, with perfunctory or downright silly essays (like that of Robertson Davies, which asserts that the Renaissance rediscovery of Greek antiquity liberated men from repressive Christianity by reintroducing the erotic gods of Olympus!) and minimal entries on the objects. The entry on the Kritios Boy, for example, never mentions the important fact that in 1987, at the behest of an American archaeologist, the statue’s head was reset to a less frontal position (since marble statues are always excavated in fragments, their restoration is subject to change as scientific knowledge about them grows).

The anniversary of Cleisthenes’ reforms in 508 B.C. does seem like a minor pretext for such a monumental effort; this may have affected the organizers’ attitude toward the catalogue. And, given all the possibilities for a “politically correct” interpretation which would have been hostile to the Classical spirit, we should perhaps be glad that the intellectual trappings around the show are so meagre.

Since the show is small—a handful of stunningly beautiful works complemented by small bronzes which reflect now-lost monumental pieces—visitors in both New York and Washington can do their own reflecting on the Greek miracle. The Metropolitan’s grand Egyptian, Persian, and Greek collections will invite a comparison with all that went before and came after the fifth century; while in Washington, one naturally goes from the Kritios Boy and Athena, to view their later siblings in the art of Raphael and Leonardo.

—Nora Hammerman

A Turning Point for Science
Reviewing this book-length report by Lyndon LaRouche is a particular pleasure to me, since I was personally involved in its genesis. Since Mr. LaRouche was the only major political figure in the world who was supporting cold fusion, I hastened to brief him on the exciting Second Annual Conference on Cold Fusion, which was held in Como, Italy, in July 1991. This memorandum emerged out of that briefing.

At the time, we discussed LaRouche’s proposal for a mini-crash program to develop cold fusion—which he then featured in his campaign first for the Democratic nomination for President, and then as an independent Presidential candidate. The short memorandum on science policy which he planned to write substantiating the proposal, took on a life of its own, and thus the present work was born.

It is a policy proposal, but of a unique sort, because the proposal as such involves recasting the whole of modern science, as it is understood by professional practitioners and academics. It is a passionate call for a scientific renaissance which would revive the Platonic tradition of science.

He makes the compelling case that only from the Platonic, and then Christian-Platonic tradition as represented by Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci, Johannes Kepler, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Bernhard Riemann, and Eugenio Beltrami (as leading figures) can this occur. In contrast to this, LaRouche points to the barrenness of the Aristotelian tradition in science as exemplified by Isaac Newton and James Clerk Maxwell—two of the heroes of modern scientific opinion.

What will startle some readers is the unification between science, art, and morality which is central to the Platonic—and LaRouche’s—approach. Thus, LaRouche develops the case that there is a connection between mathematical physics and the principles of classical musical composition; this emerges from the source of creativity within the individual, whether he or she be a scientist or an artist.

Key to the problem faced by most scientists today, is that in the domain of their experimental practice they feel obliged to separate the material side of things, that which pertains to sense perception and knowledge based upon sense perception—as it is revealed by experiment—from the spiritual world. LaRouche rejects this as Aristotelian nonsense, and adopts instead the rigorous point of view of Nicolaus of Cusa—that what we know best about the Universe, is that reflection of the Creator in ourselves.

Thus, say LaRouche and Cusa, man may transcend the limitations of sense perception, to penetrate into the very mind of the Creator; thus, he apprehends—even if as through a glass darkly—the generative principle of the Universe; thus, he gathers scientific understanding, and can himself participate in the Creation, by making discoveries which have the potential to
transform the Universe through technology, medicine, and the like.

It is this Creative Principle, embedded within the apparently more objective principles, which guided, on the one hand, composers such as Johann Sebastian Bach, and on the other hand, most emphatically the physical scientist Johannes Kepler.

For example: All classical music depends upon recognition of the well determined demarcations of voice registration for all singers. This allows a well-composed song to reflect a musical dialogue, by using contrasting registers to indicate a dialogue between differing “voices.” These registers occur according to physical geometries which also determine the orbital values of the planets of our Solar System.

Throughout the memorandum, LaRouche emphasizes how algebraic thinking was deliberately imposed upon science and art by Aristotle and his followers, to obscure the beautiful coherence of the Universe.

The Case of Cold Fusion

Just recently, the Third International Cold Fusion Conference was held in Nagoya, Japan (Oct. 21-25, 1992). The chairman of the Conference, Hideo Ikegami, posed to the three hundred assembled guests that this conference marked a turning point for science. In this he was seconded by many of the conference speakers.

Cold fusion represents a crucial experiment for modern physics, because by any known, presently accepted theory, it simply should not occur. The probability that two heavy-hydrogen (deuterium) atoms might be made to fuse (or at least interact on a nuclear level), merely by packing them into a small piece of palladium, is just vanishingly small.

Here is not a case of scientists mimicking the workings of a hydrogen bomb, as occurs in the case of high-energy fusion, where the deuterons are accelerated to temperatures in the hundred-million degree range. Cold fusion occurs at room temperature.

Nor does one need huge machines to accomplish the reaction. Instead it may be done on a laboratory tabletop, by using a battery and applying electrolysis—with a palladium negative electrode, a platinum positive electrode, and a bath of heavy water.

Thus, not only is cold fusion a most promising window on new energy resources, but this simple apparatus threatens the hegemony of the whole of the Aristotelian establishment who now run the science show. It is therefore not that surprising that Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons, and the scientists who supported them in their claims for their experiment, have been exposed to a kind of political persecution—not excluding threats of prison for scientific fraud—reminiscent of the persecution of which LaRouche has been a victim.

LaRouche’s *Science Policy* memorandum is not easy reading. It is a book that requires reading and re-reading, over time; but it is more than worth the effort. Paul Gallagher, the editor of this volume, is to be commended for the extraordinary richness of the footnotes which he assembled with the collaboration of Mr. LaRouche and a group of his associates.

---Carol White

A Timely Lesson in American History

The reprinting of Allen Salisbury’s *The Civil War and the American System*, first published in 1978 and now being released by Executive Intelligence Review, is a crucial intervention into today’s incompetent policy debates on free trade and economic growth. For Salisbury’s book is one of the few places today where the citizen can find the direct documentation that free trade was, and is, a ruse by oligarchical financial interests to destroy and enslave aspiring industrial nations.

The bulk of the book is a compilation of essays and speeches by Abraham Lincoln and his leading collaborators in the business of the nation’s economic policy. Major American intellectual figures of the nineteenth century, like Mathew and Henry C. Carey, are excerpted at length, along with economic policy makers and politicians William D. Kelley, William Elder, and Stephen Colwell. These are thinkers who have been virtually written out of American history books—along with their arguments against British free trade policies.

Yet the Careys, father and son, form a personal line of continuity from the revolutionary economic and political thinking of American founding father Benjamin Franklin, who brought Mathew Carey from Ireland into the American independence struggle, to Abraham Lincoln, the last great President representing the American System of political economy. Mathew Carey brought the economic nationalist ideas of Alexander Hamilton into the remains of Jefferson’s Democratic Republicans, thus creating the basis for the Whig tradition. His son Henry continued this work, in close collaboration with those Whigs who formed the Republican Party, and worked out the anti-slavery and industrial policies of Abraham Lincoln and his political heirs.
You cannot know American history without knowing the fight that the Careys and their collaborators carried out. This, Salisbury passionately believed; and he wrote this book to overcome the ignorance that hampers the fight for a sane economic policy today.

**Economics**

Allen Salisbury, a long-time collaborator of political prisoner Lyndon LaRouche, who passed away in 1992, began the work for his book in the aftermath of the 1977 publication of *The Political Economy of the American Revolution*, a compilation of the work of British, American, and French thinkers who formed the American economic outlook. The central argument of what became known as the P.E.A.R. book, was that the United States and its original economic system was based upon the republican commitment to scientific and technological progress for all people.

The P.E.A.R. thesis ran directly counter to the popular historical revisionism of the time, which claimed that the American founding fathers were simply greedy planters and businessmen, who wanted to cut Britain out of the profits, and line their own pockets. Among the Black population, these revisionists peddled a Black nationalism which called for a return to African culture and rejection of the role of Black Americans in building the American republic, as reflected in Alex Haley's bestseller, *Roots*.

Salisbury was angry at the stupidity of his fellow Black Americans who fell for the *Roots* line. He plunged himself with gusto into reviving the real story of the fight against slavery, which meant digging out the history of Carey's fight against British free trade.

The protagonists of the American System of political economy had always been against slavery. Franklin had formed a society for the manumission of slaves, and Alexander Hamilton, so often slandered as an oligarchical economist, had formed an anti-slavery society in New York in the mid-1780's. It was their understanding that the creation of a prosperous economy depended upon providing the conditions for development of the individual creative mind, and that the toleration of any slave society would undermine that development.

The fact was, as the founding fathers and their American System heirs realized clearly, that the British System of economics, expressed through the free trade system of buying cheap and selling dear, both created and maintained slave labor conditions. This was literally true in the colonial South, where British cotton merchants profited off the slave plantation system, and more generally true in all Britain's Third World colonies, such as India. The British system depended upon driving down the price of labor and raw materials, to provide the greatest possible profit.

It was because of Britain's insistence on maintaining the free trade system in the United States, that the Civil War became inevitable. To be truthful, the Civil War should be called, as Salisbury says, the Second War between Britain and the United States.

**Relevance Today**

Today it is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), supported by a host of other international financial institutions, which has taken over the role of the British Empire of the eighteenth century. Behind the IMF is a host of international bankers and cartels, who profit from the imposition of free trade.

Therefore, today, just as Carey said in the nineteenth century, the free traders literally reduce nations to starvation, in order to get all the advantages of the "free market." The American System measures of tariffs, internal improvements, and national banking, are virtually outlawed.

But to wage an effective fight against the IMF, it is necessary to understand the successful war waged by Abraham Lincoln in the 1860's, and also the means by which his faction was later defeated. This, author Salisbury presents in his Introduction to the compilation of excerpts. Given the devastation wreaked throughout today's world by the oligarchy's free trade dogma, the truth of Salisbury's introductory conclusion may now be as clear to others as it was to him when he first penned it in 1978:

"If the American System is not now restored, adherence to British economic policy threatens to plunge the nation and the world into thermo-nuclear disaster."

—Nancy B. Spannaus

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Some Early Ideas of A Christian Republic

I first came across mention of John of Salisbury, the twelfth-century secretary to Thomas à Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury during a research project into Louis XI of France, the fifteenth-century founder of the modern republican nation-state. Neither man is very familiar, unfortunately, although both are important to the ideas that evolved around the construction of what can best be described as a "Christian republic."

John of Salisbury lived in a time of political turmoil and great intellectual ferment. Born in the early twelfth century without knowing the fight that the Careys and their collaborators carried out. This, Salisbury passionately believed; and he wrote this book to overcome the ignorance that hampers the fight for a sane economic policy today.

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**Policraticus**

by John of Salisbury
edited and translated by Cary J. Nederman
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990
240 pages, hardbound, $49.95; paperbound, $15.95
tury, he studied at Paris under Peter Abelard, Thierry of Chartres, William of Conches, and others. Returning to England, he joined the court of Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury in 1147, where he came into contact with another member of the staff, Thomas à Becket. This book was written to Becket in 1156-57, at a time when Salisbury had been banished from the archiepiscopal court on orders of King Henry II (Plantagenet), and Becket had become the King's chancellor.

In the fifteenth century, at the beginning of the Renaissance—which revived debate over the roles of Church and State—Salisbury's writings were closely studied. Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II), the ally of Nicolaus of Cusa, featured Salisbury in his De liberorum educatione; Thomas More is widely believed to have drawn inspiration for his Utopia from the works of the twelfth-century thinker.

Politicatus is one of the earliest, if not the first, explicit treatises on the constitution of a republic in Christian times, which addresses how the different responsibilities of each of the republic's elements—the king, the clergy, the military, the ministers, and the working class—must function to the mutual benefit of all.

Salisbury posits a "divine right" of kings—although he does not use that term as such—which is very different from the oligarchical absolute right, derived from the Roman emperors, which we associate with the term today. Instead, Salisbury develops the idea that the king is the image of the divine Lord, Whose works are good and to Whom one owes obedience.

Since the king is not himself divine, Salisbury argues, he must strive to do that good which will most advance the body politic. Nonetheless, as is the case with obedience to God, obedience to the king is not conditioned upon the king's actions; although obedience must be an act of free will. Salisbury makes much use of the metaphor of the organic body, both to draw out the analogy of functions, and to inject some quite humorous elements, with respect to some of the more bureaucratic functionaries within the political "body."

**Against Tyranny**

Salisbury draws a great deal on Roman sources—Ovid, Cicero, Plutarch, Vegetius—but does not neglect the Church Fathers nor references to Plato and Homer (the latter two were extremely rare and, at best, in translation). Nearly a third of his book, the section on the military defense of the republic, heavily cites a work by Plutarch—the Instruction of Trajan—which editor/translator Cary Nerman believes to be apocryphal, as there are no references to this work preceding Salisbury's, and all subsequent references base themselves on the discussion in Politicus.

Book VIII, which begins and ends with an attack on the Epicureans, includes Salisbury's application of the doctrine of just war to the appropriate treatment of a tyrant, an issue whose conflicting concerns Fidelia readers who are familiar with Schiller's play Wilhelm Tell will find particularly interesting.

Salisbury begins his polemic by distinguishing the tyrant from the prince and, in the same chapter, addresses the clergy—which are also capable of a kind of tyranny—by making the distinction "in what way a shepherd, a thief, and an employee differ from one another." Focusing on the difference between the prince and the tyrant, he writes: "[T]he law is a gift of God, the likeness of equity, and norm of justice, and image of the divine will. . . . The prince fights for the laws and liberty of the people; and the tyrant supposes that nothing is done unless the laws are canceled and the people brought into servitude. The prince is a sort of image of divinity, and the tyrant is an image of the strength of the Adversary and the depravity of Lucifer."

Citing Scripture, Salisbury warns that, while tyrants may justly be killed, they may also have been imposed on peoples as punishment for sin: "[A]s the history of Judges narrates, the children of Israel were repeatedly enslaved under tyrants. They were afflicted at many and various times according to divine dispensation, and they were often freed by crying out loud to the Lord." However, of those who slew a tyrant, he says: "Not a single one of those, by whose virtues a penitent and humble people was liberaed, is to be censured, but the memory of posterity is to recall them favorably as ministers of God." Salisbury cites as an example, Judith's killing of Holofernes: "[She] destroyed his cruelty with the weapons of charity for the liberation of her people."

Although recognizing Judith's bravery, Salisbury nonetheless argues that "tyrants are to be removed from the community, but . . . they are to be removed without loss to religion and honor." He recommends the example of King David: "Although he enjoyed frequent opportunities to destroy the tyrant [King Saul], David still preferred to spare him, trusting in the compassion of God who could free him without sin. He therefore decided to wait patiently to the end, that the tyrant might be visited by God with a return to chastity or might fall in battle."

**Pursuit of Truth**

In his last chapter, Salisbury returns to his polemic against the Epicureans, by showing how the pursuit of that which is truly most pleasing, and which therefore confers the greatest happiness, must be the pursuit of that which is most good. This pursuit prevents one from being tyrannized by one's appetites, and hence becoming incapable of resisting external tyrannies.

Salisbury adresses Becket directly: "[T]o those who grieve, Truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived, promises true happiness in return. And one is not to be afraid to extend a hand towards the tree of knowledge of good and evil on account of the example of the first prohibition. . . . [F]or in the tree of knowledge is found a certain branch of virtue, through which the whole life of man as he progresses is consecrated. No one, except for him who extends the branch of virtue cut from the tree of knowledge, may return by other means to the Creator of life, namely God."

—Katherine R. Notley
The Conquest of Barbarism

The current round of Columbus-bashing, keyed to the 1992 quincentenary of his first landing in the New World, has been so extreme as to become almost a parody of itself.

Thus, we have Jacques Cousteau, the underwater naturalist, demanding a "Nuremberg Trial" for Columbus, on the grounds that the explorer committed intentional genocide against the Indians; while at the same time, he blithely calls for reduction of the world's population by 350,000 people per day [!!], on the grounds that nothing less will avert an ecological catastrophe.

In this book, Caponnetto shows compellingly that the new surge of liberals which portray the Spanish role in the Americas as unrelieved rape and murder against idyllic Indian communities—what best-selling author Kirkpatrick Sale puffed in his 1990 Conquest of Paradise—is indeed merely the latest in a sequence of Black Legends, deeply colored by anti-Catholic propaganda from the British and Dutch East India Companies, the "noble savage" indigenism of the French Enlightenment, and the Marxist-allied "cultural relativism" of the last hundred years of anthropology.

The enormous range of subject matter and subsumed polemic—the writer is a conservative Argentinian Catholic doing battle alike with Marxists, Liberation Theologians, Protestantism, liberal Catholics, Anglo-American financial imperialism—makes the book read more like a syllabus than a primer.

This can be frustrating for the reader who does not have the time to read beyond this one book. Caponnetto's passionate and incisive ironies lead the reader to a thirst for the real story of the evangelizers who successfully brought to the New World a much higher standard of civilization than anything that came before, or, for that matter, than anything the modern Columbus-bashers preach. And unfortunately, often just at such moments, the book drops the matter with a tantalizing, "further explanation is very lengthy; see the specialized bibliography."

Nonetheless, the book is a rich roadmap for the person who can delve further, and the condensed ironies are as powerful as anything that can be found anywhere on these subjects. On the double standard of the "indigenist" propagandists, for instance: "If the Spanish kill in just war, it is genocide. If the horrible Aztec wars to get prisoners for sacrifice to their gods and some of the routine native abuses against weaker tribes are discovered, one must extend a cloak of cultural understanding. If thousands of enslaved Indians died working on the construction of Pharaoh-like monuments for a despotic state, one speaks of the architectural wonders of the natives."

It would be easy to find a limitation in the book in its fervent vision of an "Hispanidad" which borders on a "blood and soil" form of mysticism. Thus, Castile is the "absolute land under the absolute sky"; it is "the synthesis of the space and time of Hispanidad, the passion for the imperishable and an imperial destiny. It is not a region, enterprise, or accidental problem. Castile is something perennial, like the Hispanidad that it represents."

The reason such criticism should be judicious is that Caponnetto almost always couples these extravagant passages with a crucial and legitimate point: that the critics of "Hispanidad" are almost never criticizing anything having to do with Spain itself, but rather Spain's "incarnation of 'go forth and preach'"; that is, they deny an inherent legitimacy to the historical process of evangelization which spread Christianity to the New World. In this sense, the critics are ultimately defending barbarism.

Medieval vs. Renaissance

There is, however, a much more serious flaw to Caponnetto's work. He counterposes "the medieval" to "the Renaissance," and insists that "the Spain of the Discovery . . . is of strongly medieval character." "It is erroneous to say that Spain the Discoverer was a modern nation of the Renaissance. . . . [T]he verbs to discover, to civilize, and to evangelize are conjugated in the medieval idiom."

This is a crucial error. The project "to discover, to civilize, and to evangelize" was in fact a European-wide Renaissance project, which found its most concentrated expression in the deliberations of the Council of Florence of 1437-1441, and the activities of its principal figures, most notably Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa, in the quarter-century extending from roughly 1440 to 1465.

The Portuguese and later Spanish circles which accepted the challenge of "showing devotion to God by making the seas navigable," in the language of Renaissance Pope Nicolaus V's Papal Bull of 1455, and the challenge of a universal evangelization, sponsored one of the greatest scientific "breakouts" in history—the nested achievements in shipbuilding (the car-
appreciate the Christian humanism of poses, deprives him of the most powerful humanism which he correctly opposed, deprives him of the most powerful humanism which he correctly opposed.

Columbus arrived in the New World on the decks of the Florentine Renaissance. Caponnetto’s failure to appreciate the Christian humanism of the Renaissance, as opposed to the secular humanism which he correctly opposes, deprives him of the most powerful epistemological weapon which Western Christianity has to confront the very Black Legends which he so trenchantly dissects.

Despite this weakness, Caponnetto himself points in the right direction—one based on the Council of Florence program—in a passage which can only be seconded: “There was an encounter between two worlds, an encounter which—besides all the traumatic aspects which are usually emphasized—one of the worlds, the Old, gloriously embodied in ‘Hispanidad,’ had the enormous merit of bringing to the other ideas which were unknown to it concerning the dignity of the creature made in the image and likeness of the Creator. These ideas—patrimony of Christianity and spread by eminent scholars— ... were the true program of life, the genuine anti-genocidal plan for which Spain fought during three centuries of civilization, evangelization, and fervent commitment.”

—Timothy Rush

The Imperial Origins of Central Asia’s Thirty Years War

On November 15 and 16, 1992, the Washington Post featured a two-part series titled “The Afghan Archive” by correspondent Michael Dobbs. Dobbs’ articles, based on newly declassified Politburo documents, indicate that in 1979 there was significant opposition within the Politburo to what was to become Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan.

According to Politburo documents, the split was between Soviet political leaders—in particular, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin—on the one hand, and the KGB faction headed by the “forward-looking” (i.e., expansionist or empire-building) Yuri Andropov, on the other. Andropov even went so far as to argue that a prolonged war was to be expected and not feared.

Andropov’s “forward-looking” philosophy regarding Central Asia (the area which includes Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and the former Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirgizstan, as well as the Transcaucasus) was the mirror-image of the outlook of a faction of British political and military officers stationed in India in the nineteenth century, who believed that it was their duty to bring Central Asia into the British sphere of influence, before Imperial Russia brought it under theirs. A parallel faction existed as well in nineteenth-century Imperial Russia. There was constant friction between Tsar Alexander II’s Russian Foreign Ministry headed by Prince Alexander Gorchakov, who opposed such military expansionism, and the intrigues of the Venetian-inspired Prince Nikolai Ignatiev, who was attempting to advance Russian military interests in Central Asia.

The name given to the application of this “geopolitical,” imperial outlook to Central Asia, was “the great game,” a phrase first coined by Lt. Arthur Conolly of the 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry, and later immortalized by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim.

Peter Hopkirk’s The Great Game tells the story of that century, with a decidedly British bias. Britain’s goal during this period was to maintain its commercial interest in Asia, which at the time was primarily opium (not mentioned by Hopkirk!), and to monopolize the trade from and to Asia. Britain’s political and military agents viewed Central Asia as its buffer against Imperial Russia—which they believed would invade India if it could find an overland route suitable to that purpose. Its agents were constantly attempting, either through diplomatic or military means, to negotiate friendship treaties with the major khansates in the region. Through such treaties, Britain hoped to shut the door on any Russian operations in the region.

Hopkirk informs the reader in his Prologue that The Great Game is intended to be the story of “individuals,” and that “this book does not pretend to be a history of Anglo-Russian relations” in the nineteenth century. The author’s chosen perspective has the effect of further muddling the reader’s historical perspective, since the individuals involved, far from being simply British officers on hunting holiday or merchants looking for new markets as he portrays them, were in fact high-level intelligence personnel connected either to London or Calcutta, whose object was reconnaissance into the areas just beyond India’s northernmost and northwestern borders. By focusing on individuals in this manner, Hopkirk avoids the essential analysis of how larger historical forces and the
global strategic situation made themselves felt within the sphere of the “great game.”

Eurasian Development

In the penultimate chapter, we are treated to a very telling diatribe against Russia’s Count Sergei Witte. Hopkirk accuses Witte, who wished to use the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway as a civilizing force into the resource-rich, underdeveloped areas just north of Central Asia, of feeding “his sovereign’s [Nicholas II] dreams with visions of a golden future for Russia.” In just two pages, Hopkirk pours out his venomous hatred for Witte’s grand design which, by economically linking the Asian continent to Europe, particularly Germany, would have successfully stymied the British geopolitical strategy of imperial control over the Asian rim, through the economic development of the interior: “Russia would be a great economic power, as well as a great military one.”

Eighty years later, in 1979, both Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, strongly objected to the same sort of geopolitical thinking amongst their Soviet colleagues, in their opposition to Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan. “We have examined this question from all sides... and I will tell you frankly: We must not do this. It would only play into the hands of enemies—yours and ours,” said Brezhnev; and Prime Minister Kosygin added, “If our troops went in, the situation in [Afghanistan] would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse. Our troops would have to struggle not only with an external aggressor, but with a significant part of the Afghani people. And the people would never forgive such a thing.” It is unfortunate that the lesson of the “great game” had not been learned.

And today, with Witte’s grand design almost forgotten, it is the continued refusal of oligarchical Britain to surrender its vision of an imperial, one-world empire based on the immiseration of others, which gives rise to the opposition to peaceful economic development of Central Asia. Hopkirk makes one realize that the flames of a Thirty Years War have been fanned in the region by a several-century process of exploitation by the “forward-looking” factions of both Britain and Imperial Russia. One can only admire the humanitarian intent behind Count Sergei Witte’s grand design, and reject the imperialism which has been played out so tragically in the “great game” in Central Asia.

—Denise Henderson

President Clinton: Free Lyndon LaRouche!

Dear President Clinton:

In the course of your election campaign, and following your election as President of the United States, you pledged to bring about a change in American policy. We welcome this intent, and wish you courage and steadfastness for this difficult task.

We call upon you to take a first step in this direction: To end a crying injustice—see to it that Lyndon LaRouche is immediately set free and exonerated.

Lyndon LaRouche, who is innocent, has been incarcerated as a political prisoner in the federal prison in Rochester, Minnesota since January 1989. He committed no crime; his sentencing and imprisonment were the result of years-long slanders and persecutions by forces of the Reagan-Bush administration, in combination with the media and private organizations, as well as forces of the secret services of formerly communist states.

Over 1,000 prominent jurists from all over the world have protested publicly against this abuse of justice, in the course of which LaRouche and a number of his associates were supposed to be eliminated as an undesired opposition. Hundreds of parliamentarians and other prominent personalities from all over the world have joined this protest.

The LaRouche case was presented to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations several times; UN Special Rapporteur Angelo Vidal D’Almedia Ribeiro included the case in his report last year to the UN Commission on Human Rights.

Since then, explosive new material has come to light documenting the political motivation behind this persecution. One U.S. court has, in fact, ruled that the trial had come into being as a result of ‘constructive fraud’ on the part of the government.

We are outraged at the arrogance of the Bush government, which ignored all protests and appeals. Yet it was George Bush himself who in 1988, i.e., before LaRouche had been indicted in Alexandria, Va., declared in public that LaRouche belonged behind bars, thus, as Vice President, anticipating any legal procedure.

We, the undersigned, see ourselves as members of an international coalition to free Lyndon LaRouche. We appeal to you, President Clinton: Give a signal that you seriously mean to bring about change: Act! Take the necessary steps immediately to set LaRouche and his associates free.

I join the international coalition to free Lyndon LaRouche and endorse the above appeal. I agree to have my name published with this appeal in American or European newspapers.

Name __________________________________________ Address __________________________________________

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The painting of “Aristotle Contemplating the Bust of Homer” was completed by Rembrandt in 1653 for the Sicilian nobleman Don Antonio Ruffo. Like Raphael’s painting of the “School of Athens,” which ironically counterposed the scientific method of the divine Plato as reflected in the Timaeus to the defective logical method of the immoral Aristotle as expressed in his Ethics, this painting also attacks Aristotle and the Aristotelian method as incapable of comprehending truth—insofar as such comprehension requires the poetic principle of metaphor, as that was employed by the great poet Homer. The irony in both paintings is so clear, that only an Aristotelian would claim that either painting favors Aristotle.

In the painting, Rembrandt employs the metaphor of light to convey that the blind poet Homer is more capable of “seeing” the truth than Aristotle who, despite his having physical vision, is actually “blind.” The only light possessed by Aristotle is the external light he receives from Homer; he is otherwise engulfed in darkness. Aristotle is like a night owl vainly attempting to see the sun.

The painted features of Aristotle are certainly not in the image of antiquity; his world is other than Homer’s. If anything, Aristotle is portrayed as a parasitical fop, with extremely fanciful dress, including a pinky ring. The placement of his hand on top of Homer’s bust, is an extremely ironical portrayal of Aristotle’s contention that all knowledge is derived from the perception of sensuous objects; it is as if he hoped to grasp Homer’s mind by examining the bumps on his head. Aristotle’s tendency to reduce people and their creative accomplishments to mere object possessions, is similarly reflected in the medal bearing the image of Alexander the Great which hangs from the huge, glittering gold chain draped over his shoulder.

The slight tilt of Aristotle’s head suggests his incomprehension of Homer, whose bust stands erect. For Homer, the truth must necessarily be incorporeal and invisible. How else could the blind poet express it? Homer’s very capacity to compose is the unique refutation of Aristotle’s entire method, which reduces truth to an array of finite objects in the visible universe.

The painting correctly portrays the Aristotelian outlook as devoid of action, for there is no change in Aristotle’s world: everything is fixed. The nearly square format of the painting contributes to this impression. The mind of Homer emerges as the sole source of change in the painting. It is only insofar as the viewer identifies with the mind of Rembrandt the artist—which, like that of Homer, transcends the mentality of Aristotle—that change and progress become possible.

—William F. Wertz, Jr.

The Greek Miracle

A spectacular art exhibit featuring original Greek sculptures of the fifth century B.C. is now touring Washington, D.C. and New York City. The Greek Miracle: Classical Sculpture from the Dawn of Democracy is the first-ever exhibit in the U.S. of this period of Greek art, which set the Classical standard for the visual arts of Western civilization. As the exhibit catalogue explains: “It was no coincidence that the Greek discovery of individual worth and freedom produced the most profound advances in art and sculpture. If the spark of divinity is to be found in man, then the form and appearance of man would inevitably be the proper subject matter of the artist.”

Right: “The Contemplative Athena,” marble relief, c.470-460 B.C.
In This Issue

On the Subject of God

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. rebuts the assertion—not only blasphemous, but unscientific—that belief in God is analogous to a computer “virus,” and that “evolutionary theory has removed any scientific basis for arguing the existence of God.” LaRouche restates the Classical proofs of Plato and Leibniz for the existence of God, from the more advanced standpoint of Georg Cantor’s concept of the transfinite, as illustrated by the fundamental principles of physical economy.

Why Albert Pike’s Statue Must Fall!

On Judiciary Square in Washington, D.C. there stands a statue honoring Confederate General Albert Pike, once national chief judiciary officer of the Ku Klux Klan, as well as Sovereign Grand Commander of the Scottish Rite of Freemasonry Southern Jurisdiction. Historian Anton Chaitkin reveals who is behind this statue and why, like the Berlin Wall, it must fall.

Call to Form Student Non-violent Constitutional Committee

Civil Rights veteran Rev. James L. Bevel, a co-founder of the 1960’s Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC), has joined forces with the political movement of Lyndon LaRouche to call for the creation of a new Student Non-violent Constitutional Committee, to continue the fight—based on the principles embedded in Christ’s Sermon on the Mount—for the inalienable rights of all people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.